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A federal judge in the criminal trial of Hillary Clinton campaign attorney Michael Sussmann denied a prosecution request Thursday to remove a juror whose daughter plays on the same high school sports team as the defendants daughter.

A woman, identified as Juror #5, came forward Thursday morning to tell the court that she only recently discovered that her daughter and Mr. Sussmanns daughter play on the same high school crew team.

The juror told U.S. District Judge Christopher Cooper that she was unaware of the connection when she filled out a jury questionnaire last week. The juror stressed that the daughters are not friends and there is at least a three-year age gap between the two.

She also said it was a large crew team with over 40 students, adding that she has never met Mr. Sussmann or his wife. She emphasized that she could still be fair and impartial and has no other ties to the defendant.

Prosecutors immediately moved to strike the juror, saying they would have asked her to be removed from the jury pool had they known of the connection.

Our position is that she should not stay on the jury, Brittain Shaw, a federal prosecutor in the case, said.

SEE ALSO: FBI official 100% confident Clinton lawyer denied repping client to peddle Trump-Russia dirt

Sean Berkowitz, defense attorney, said the woman should stay, noting that she never met Mr. Sussmann and did not know him.

There is no reason she cant sit as a fair and impartial juror, Mr. Berkowitz said.

Judge Cooper agreed that the juror should remain, saying notifying the court of the connection shows that she can be impartial.

The connection is not so close that it affects her impartiality, he said. She did not know the connection, unfortunately, when she filled out the questionnaire.

Judge Cooper said bringing the connection to the courts attention shows she is conscientious and takes her obligations as a juror seriously.

As a senior, her daughter is probably out of there anyway, he said.

SEE ALSO: Evidence in Sussmann trial points to Clinton campaigns link to a Trump-Russia collusion theory

Judge Cooper was criticized last week for allowing three Hillary Clinton campaign donors, including one who also donated to Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Democrat, to remain in the jury pool.

Others in the jury pool who were allowed to remain included people who worked the phone banks for the Clinton campaign or said they had strong views about the outcome of the 2016 election.

One potential juror told the court that she thought law enforcement was racist because the FBI dismantled the Black Panther movement.

None of the individuals who donated to the Clinton campaign nor the woman who objected to the FBI made the jury.

Original post:
Judge in Sussmann trial denies prosecution request to remove juror over daughter's ties to defendant - Washington Times

Former Trump administration Attorney General Bill Barr is in talks to cooperate with the House select committee investigating the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, according to an individual close to Barr.

Committee chair Rep. Bennie Thompson told "Face the Nation" in January that the select committee "had conversations with the former attorney general already," and an individual close to the Barr confirmed the panel contacted him for what was described as an informal conversation to see whether he had information related to the Capitol attack or the actions of former Justice Department official Jeffrey Clark.

When asked about a draft executive orderobtained by Politicothat was given to former President Donald Trump directing the Defense Department to seize voting machines after he lost the 2020 election, Thompson, a Democrat from Mississippi, said, "we've had conversations with the former attorney general already. We have talked to Department of Defense individuals."

At that time, Barr said he did not have any visibility into the events of January or Clarke's work and did not feel he had much information that could be useful to the select committee. Barr resigned from his post as attorney general in December 2020 and ended his tenure at the department on December 23.

Clark, a key figure in raising doubts about the integrity of the election with Trump, attempted to use Justice Department resources to delay certification of the 2020 election results, according to a report from the Senate Judiciary Committee. Clark was in contact with Mr. Trump in the days leading up to January 6, according to the Senate Judiciary committee's report.

The select committee issued a subpoena for his testimony in October. The committee had moved to hold Clark in contempt late last year when he failed to appear but granted him a reprieve after he indicated he would appear for a deposition and invoke the Fifth Amendment.

While Barr was considered a defender of Trump while he led the Justice Department, their relationship soured in the wake of the 2020 presidential election after Barr told the Associated Press that federal investigators had not found evidence of widespread voter fraud, as Trump claimed.

A source familiar with the situation confirmed to CBS News in October that former acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen sat for an interview with the committee. It lasted around 8 hours.

The committee is winding down its investigations ahead of planned public hearings, set to start on June 9. Thompson said earlier this week that he didn't expect the committee would call Trump as a witness.

Thompson said earlier this week the first hearing will "more or less" show what the committee has learned over the past year.

The House select committee was created last year by Speaker Nancy Pelosi to investigate the January 6 attack, when thousands of Trump supporters descended on the Capitol as Congress counted the electoral votes, a largely ceremonial final step affirming Mr. Biden's victory. Lawmakers were sent fleeing amid the riot, which led to the deaths of five people and the arrests of hundreds more. Trump, who encouraged his supporters to "walk down" to the Capitol during the rally at the Ellipse before the electoral vote count, was impeached by the House one week later for inciting the riot but was later acquitted by the Senate.

The committee has issued dozens of subpoenas, including ones to Trump's allies, former White House officials, campaign aides and individuals involved in the planning of the rally outside the White House before the Capitol building came under siege. Two top Trump allies, Steve Bannon and former White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, have been held in contempt of Congress for refusing to comply with subpoenas, and the Justice Department has charged Bannon. Both said they are following instructions from Trump, who has claimed executive privilege.

Rebecca Kaplan, Zak Hudak and Ellis Kim contributed to this report.

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Trump Attorney General Bill Barr in talks to cooperate with January 6 committee, source says - CBS News

As long as the muscle-flexing current Supreme Court majority purports to be bound by the constitutional language adopted in the first years of our Republic, honesty and consistency should compel them actually to look to that text.

Here is the Ninth Amendment (1791) in full: The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

The justices may not like the Ninth Amendment, but it directly demonstrates how deeply rooted and explicit was the Framers intention to include rights not specifically mentioned.

Roe v. Wade identified such a right, but that decision hardly stood alone. Justice Samuel Alitos leaked draft is disingenuous at best in its search for a particular word in the Constitution.

In Marbury v. Madison (1803), for instance, Chief Justice John Marshall and a unanimous Court established the Courts power to declare government actions unconstitutional. This judicial review power cannot be found anywhere within the constitutional text. Indeed, the Marbury court also proclaimed again without any textual anchor that William Marbury had a vested individual right to his judicial commission.

Similarly, no constitutional text applies equal protection to the federal government. When the court unanimously held in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) that state public schools segregated by race were unconstitutional, the justices applied that holding to a companion federal case, Bolling v. Sharpe (1954). It was unthinkable, Chief Justice Earl Warrens opinion held that this constitutional right might not apply to the District of Columbia schools. Perhaps Justice Alito would have to concede that the unanimous Bolling decision was not grounded in specific language in the Constitution.

Nor has creative judicial interpolation only been the bailiwick of liberal Justices. For example, the Eleventh Amendments text protected states from lawsuits brought against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. The Court simply ignored this textual limitation when it shielded railroads and the towns that sold bonds to attract them from suits brought by citizens of their home states. Indeed, state governments and state officials continue to enjoy a kind of defensive superpower shield; it is entirely judicial innovation that enables local police officers to defeat federal civil rights claims through the judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity.

In addition, there is growing judicial receptivity to claims by local property owners that state regulations take their property without compensation. Beginning in the 1890s, the court established a purported Fourteenth Amendment basis for such claims by invoking natural equity. This overcame a major textual problem: the early court had held that the Fifth Amendments textual protection applied only to federal takings, and not to those done by states. Nonetheless, after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment omitted the Fifth Amendment takings language entirely as it otherwise directly quoted the rest of the Fifth Amendments due process language. The Court itself later plugged this textual hole through the vagaries of what it termed due protection, and this takings doctrine addition continues to expand.

With luck, Justice Alito may turn out to be writing a concurrence. As a matter of constitutional text and history, his draft surely is unworthy of a majority vote. Recent New York Times columns by Linda Greenhouse and Emily Bazelon underscore how completely Alitos draft ignores the actual impact his decision would have on womens lives. Yet it also bizarrely assumes that, because of progress since 1973, a womans right to choose an abortion somehow is no longer salient.

Unfortunately, Alitos extremely selective brand of textualism makes it now seem realistic to fear that Loving v. Virginia (1967) which struck down state laws against interracial marriage could be on the chopping block; certainly it makes same-sex marriage seem shaky at best. In fact, one vainly searches the Constitution for words such as marriage, and privacy. Missing also are references to contraception or parental authority. Nor is there any mention of campaign funding, for that matter.

The current courts blatant manipulation of its shadow docket indicates no principled limits regarding which precedents will fall away. But the Constitutions structure and the longstanding recognition of implicit constitutional rights should matter much more than any narrow word search seeking a desired result. There is great wisdom in the idea that the past has a vote, but it does not have a veto.

Aviam Soiferserved 17 years as dean of the William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii, after five years as dean of the Boston College Law School.He has been teaching and writing about constitutional law and legal history for over 40 years, often focusing on the post-Civil War period.

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The Supreme Courts text mess - The Hill

Criminal; Miranda waiver:Where the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about a gun involved in a felon-in-possession charge, but he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering a detectives questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights, his motion was denied. United States v. Medley, No. 18-4789 (filed May 11, 2022).

Immigration; class-wide injunctive relief: Where the district court issued a class-wide injunction that modified procedures used by the government to detain aliens pending their removal hearings, but the relevant statute expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws on a class-wide basis, that aspect of the district courts order was vacated. Miranda v. Garland, No. 20-1828 (filed May 12, 2022).

Labor; what constitutes an employee: Where the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the relationship between a vocational services program and disabled janitors was akin to a typically industrial relationship, thus making the janitors employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and substantial evidence supported that finding, its decision was affirmed. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 21-1642, 21-1683 (filed May 10, 2022).

Consumer Protection; calculation of damages: The court clarified the damages a borrower shall collect for knowing violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions of Maryland Commercial Law. Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 13, 2022).

BOTTOM LINE: Where the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about a gun involved in a felon-in-possession charge, but he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering a detectives questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights, his motion was denied.

CASE: United States v. Medley, No. 18-4789 (filed May 11, 2022) (Judges Gregory, Before King, QUATTLEBAUM).

FACTS: Jovon Medley appeals his felon in possession of a firearm conviction and sentence. Regarding his conviction, Medley challenges the district courts denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about the gun involved in the felon-in-possession charge. Regarding his sentence, he argues that the district courts application of a sentencing guidelines enhancement, based on its finding that Medley used the firearm to commit a carjacking, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct.

LAW: Medley concedes that he was not federally charged at the time of his interview. However, he argues that the right to counsel nevertheless attached to his federal felon-in-possession charge because it is the same offense as the D.C. felon-in-possession charge.

Even assuming, without deciding, that Medleys Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to his federal felon-in-possession charge on the day that he was questioned by Detective Dalton, Medley waived the right because he never made a clear, unambiguous assertion of the right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warnings.

Medley never made a clear, unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warnings. He did not request his attorney, ask for the interview to stop or say anything that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand . . . to be a request for an attorney. Instead, Medley knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering Daltons questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights.

A defendant who waives his Sixth Amendment right to counsel may still challenge his waiver by establishing it was based on misrepresentation or deception by the state. Medley argues Detective Dalton misled him by stating that he was not interested in Medleys D.C. case. He claims that, because of Daltons statement, Medley did not understand that by answering Daltons questions, he was waiving his right to counsel regarding his D.C. felon-in-possession charge. As a result, Medley claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the D.C. case.

However, this is an appeal from Medleys federal case and only concerns whether he waived his right to counsel regarding his federal charges. The use of Medleys statements in his D.C. case is not at issue here. What is at issue is whether Daltons representations prevented Medley from making a knowing or voluntary waiver of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights regarding his subsequent federal charges. Medley does not even make this claim and, even if he had, the court sees no support for it in this record.

Medley next claims that the sentencing enhancement violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. However, consistent with a growing number of critics of this practice, he explains his objections to it. Whether or not the court agrees or disagrees with the precedent, it is bound to follow it.

Medley also argues that the district courts application of the guidelines enhancement constituted clear error because there was insufficient evidence to find that he committed the Maryland carjacking. Under the clear error standard, however, the court cannot say that the district court erred by enhancing Medleys sentence when it found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that he used the Rock Island firearm in connection with the carjacking of Elton Wright.

Affirmed.

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court issued a class-wide injunction that modified procedures used by the government to detain aliens pending their removal hearings, but the relevant statute expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws on a class-wide basis, that aspect of the district courts order was vacated.

CASE: Miranda v. Garland, No. 20-1828 (filed May 12, 2022) (Judge QUATTLEBAUM) (Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented in part) (Judge Urbanski concurred in part and dissented in part).

FACTS: 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. And the Attorney General has adopted procedures for making that discretionary decision.

A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering, on a class-wide basis, that to continue detaining an alien under 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges, again on a class-wide basis, to consider an aliens ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.

LAW: The government argues that because the individual plaintiffs failed to appeal their bond decisions to the Board, the district court lacked the authority to review the immigration judges detention decision. The government has not pointed this court to any other provision of the immigration laws where Congress clearly required exhaustion, and neither has the court found one. Therefore, no statute applicable to Miranda, Espinoza and Adegokes claims provides that administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional. Because the government did not adequately address the district courts determination that administrative exhaustion was not required, the government waived this argument on appeal.

Next, the government argues that 1226(e) strips the courts of jurisdiction to review discretionary detention decisions like those at issue here. This is a close question of statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court decisions do not provide a clear answer. After reviewing the statute, the court rejects the governments argument that it lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims.

Third, the government argues that 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief. The court finds that 1252(f)(1) is a jurisdictional limit on the courts. Section 1252(f)(1) expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws, including 1226(a), on a class-wide basis. Despite this provision, the district court imposed class-wide limitations on the discretionary detention decisions permitted under 1226(a). Accordingly, that aspect of the district courts order is vacated.

The district courts order also granted Espinoza individual relief. The district court erred, however, because Espinoza did not show a likelihood of success on his claim that requiring an alien in a 1226(a) bond hearing to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk violates an aliens rights under the Due Process Clause.

Espinoza also failed to show a likelihood of success on his claim that due process requires immigration judges in 1226(a) bond hearings to consider an aliens ability to pay and alternative conditions on release. Without his alleged constitutional injury, Espinoza has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable harm. And the balance of the equities and public interest do not weigh in favor of the sea change in bond hearings that Espinoza desires.

Vacated and remanded.

CONCUR AND DISSENT: Because 1226(e) bars judicial review of any discretionary judgmentincluding those that apply to all detention decisions under 1226(a) and those alleged to violate the ConstitutionI disagree with my colleagues and would dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction on that basis. That disagreement does not preclude me from joining in striking down the class-wide injunction under 1252(f)(1).

CONCUR AND DISSENT: While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, the majority opinion concludes that 1252(f)(1) precludes class-wide injunctive relief. But plaintiffs also sought class-wide declaratory relief, which was not addressed below, perhaps because the government failed to raise 1252(f)(1) at the district court. As such, I would remand the case to the district court to allow it to address plaintiffs request for class-wide declaratory relief, which is not barred by 1252(f)(1). Further, in my view, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to bear the burden of proof in an immigration detention proceeding.

BOTTOM LINE: Where the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the relationship between a vocational services program and disabled janitors was akin to a typically industrial relationship, thus making the janitors employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and substantial evidence supported that finding, its decision was affirmed.

CASE: Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 21-1642, 21-1683 (filed May 10, 2022) (Judges KING, Motz) (Judge Niemeyer, concurring).

FACTS: Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc.s vocational services program, or VSP, seeks judicial review of a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board finding that VSP engaged in unfair labor practices by refusing to bargain with the union. Specifically, VSP contests the Boards underlying determination that certain disabled janitorial workers engaged by VSP are employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of the bargaining order.

LAW: VSP argues that its relationship with the disabled janitors working at the Baltimore County Social Security Administration facility is primarily rehabilitative in nature, and that the Boards decision incorrectly classified the disabled janitors as statutory employees. VSP argues that the Board therefore lacked jurisdiction to certify the union as the janitors collective bargaining representative and that the bargaining order was in error by association.

Under Board precedent, the statutory employee status of disabled individuals working in rehabilitative vocational settings turns on whether the relationship between worker and putative employer is best characterized as typically industrial or instead primarily rehabilitative. The typically industrial versus primarily rehabilitative determination calls for a case-by-case factual assessment, and the party seeking . . . to exclude otherwise eligible employees from the coverage of the Act bears the burden of proving a primarily rehabilitative employment relationship to the Board.

In concluding that VSP had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a primarily rehabilitative employment relationship, the Board resolved that the disabled janitors affiliation with VSP is more akin to that found in traditional private sector employment settings, such that the Acts leading purpose of restoring balance to bargaining power disparities is served by classifying the janitors as statutory employees.

To be sure, the Board acknowledged that certain testimony received during its representation hearings pointed toward a primarily rehabilitative relationship. But it ultimately ruled that [those] facts are insufficient to overcome the other facts supporting a traditionally industrial relationship and that each factor weighed against finding a principally rehabilitative connection between VSP and its disabled janitors. This courts review of the record fully supports the Boards determination.

Petition for review denied. Cross-application for enforcement granted.

CONCUR: I would approach this case with a strong presumption that disabled employees hired under a Javits-Wagner-ODay Act program, such as the one conducted by VSP, are not, as a class, employees within the ambit of the National Labor Relations Act and therefore are not entitled to the collective bargaining rights afforded by the Act.

Had VSP argued for such a categorical presumption before us, I would have welcomed the discussion and engaged both parties on that point. Instead, however, VSP focused its briefing on whether substantial evidence supported specific factual findings made by the Board. Because the record includes substantial evidence to support those findings, albeit narrow in scope, I concur in the opinion of Judge King, which ably demonstrates this.

BOTTOM LINE: The court clarified the damages a borrower shall collect for knowing violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions of Maryland Commercial Law.

CASE: Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 13, 2022) (Judges GETTY, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Wilner).

FACTS: Jabari Morese Lyles initiated a class action against Santander Consumer USA Inc. for alleged violations of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article, or CL, of the Maryland Codethe Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions, or CLEC, CL 12-1001 et seq. Before this court is a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland regarding the calculation of damages under CL 12-1018(b).

LAW: CL 12-1018(a) provides, in part [e]xcept for a bona fide error of computation, if a credit grantor violates any provision of this subtitle the credit grantor may collect only the principal amount of the loan and may not collect any interest, costs, fees, or other charges with respect to the loan. CL 12-1018(b) provides [i]n addition, a credit grantor who knowingly violates any provision of this subtitle shall forfeit to the borrower 3 times the amount of interest, fees, and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle.

CL 12-1018(b) provides the penalty provision for knowing violations of CLEC. The provision begins with the words [i]n addition, which signals that this is an additional penalty to the penalty set forth in subsection (a)(2). A credit grantor that violates CLEC is limited by CL 12-1018(a)(2) to collect only the principal loan amount from the borrower, and a credit grantor that knowingly violates the subtitle is subject to further liability under CL 12-1018(b).

The provision continues, stating that the amounts to be trebled are the interest, fees, and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle. The phrase in excess of that authorized by this subtitle is central to this courts analysis. This language identifies that the amount to be trebled is that which the credit grantor is not permitted to charge to the borrower under CLEC. Put differently, the amounts that a credit grantor charged in violation of CLEC are the amounts to be trebled for a knowing violation of the subtitle.

If the General Assembly intended for this penalty provision to require a credit grantor to pay treble the amount collected in excess of the principal loan amount, it would have written the provision to read as such. However, the plain language of CL 12-1018(b) makes no reference to amounts collected in excess of the principal amount financed. The General Assembly only expressly authorized forfeiture of the amount of interest, fees, and charges that are collected in excess of that authorized by the subtitle.

As such, the amount to be trebled under CL 12-1018(b) are those amounts collected that are not authorized under CLEC.

Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for CL 12-1018(b) to be interpreted inconsistently with its plain meaning. Accordingly, assuming Santander knowingly collected the convenience fees alleged by Mr. Lyles in violation of CLEC, the appropriate calculation of damages under CL 12-1018(b) is treble the amount of convenience fees collected. For the foregoing reasons, CL 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor that is found to have knowingly violated CLEC to forfeit three times the amount of interest, fees and charges collected in violation of the subtitle.

Certified question of law answered as set forth above.

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Law Digest US 4th Circuit, Md. Court of Appeals May 19, 2022 - Maryland Daily Record

Now that rent control has made it onto the ballot, I have a couple questions? Why arent gas stations being forced to lower prices? Gas is crazy high. Why arent grocery stores having to keep costs in check? Those prices are skyrocketing. I could go on, but you get the point.

Placing the burden of lowering rents on the shoulders of mom and pop landlords who are having just as difficult a time with inflation as anyone is a veiled taking of private property rights and a violation of the fifth amendment of the US Constitution. Oh, wait, violatingrights seems to be okay these days.

Ive lived in Pasadena for more than 50 years. During that time, I was both a renter and a landlord. Toward the end of my dads life, I was able to move him into a duplex I owned so I could better care for him. If this ordinance had been in place, that might not have been possible. Sorry mom and dad, youre on your own.

I understand renters are angry and hurting. But, blaming and burdening our struggling mom and pop landlords is not the solution.

Pasadena is not doing enough to create much needed affordable housing, but that is no reason to take rights away from individuals who have worked hard to achieve what the City cannot. There are approximately 3,000 mom and pop landlords in the City of Pasadena that are struggling with a worsening economy just like everyone else these individuals did not sign up to do the job that our elected officials willingly agreed to do, yet sadly, are not.

When money is taken from mom and pop landlords, they have less money to make needed repairs and the quality of rental properties goes down.

Thats a fact. But wait, according to the proposed rental ordinance, mom and pop landlords also get penalized for not making the repairs they can no longer afford to make. Hows that going to work out?

Pasadena currently has the high number of rental properties it does because it abides by reasonable State rental laws. Make the rules unreasonable, and people will stop building rental units in Pasadena. How are fewer rental units in Pasadena going to make prices go down?

It isnt.

Simple economics says the answer is to build more affordable units. To disincentivize future rental units will stop new construction. Thats what rent control does. What may help in the present will definitely hurt down the road. It will take a bad situation and make it worse.

Just like we cannot force gas stations to subsidize high gas prices, nor ask grocery stores to artificially keep prices low, we should not force mom and pop landlords to provide subsidized housing. Its not fair, and it is not the answer. We live in a country that does nottake from private individuals without just cause theres that 5th Amendment again. But this ordinance does just that.

If we want a more affordable city, the City needs to require more affordable units in all new construction it also needs to fast-track the building of affordable units on church property, explore creative reuse of existing buildings, make it easier to build affordable units in the City, and any number of things its not doing enough of right now.

Kicking the can down the road by kicking mom and pop landlords and their families is a lose-lose solution. In the long run, it will degrade our precious existing housing stock and hinder the building of new units.

Todd HayesPasadena resident and Realtor

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Guest Opinion | Todd Hayes: Landlords Have Rights Too. Where Does the Taking of Rights Stop? Pasadena Now - Pasadena Now