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Criminal; Miranda waiver:Where the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about a gun involved in a felon-in-possession charge, but he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering a detectives questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights, his motion was denied. United States v. Medley, No. 18-4789 (filed May 11, 2022).

Immigration; class-wide injunctive relief: Where the district court issued a class-wide injunction that modified procedures used by the government to detain aliens pending their removal hearings, but the relevant statute expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws on a class-wide basis, that aspect of the district courts order was vacated. Miranda v. Garland, No. 20-1828 (filed May 12, 2022).

Labor; what constitutes an employee: Where the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the relationship between a vocational services program and disabled janitors was akin to a typically industrial relationship, thus making the janitors employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and substantial evidence supported that finding, its decision was affirmed. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 21-1642, 21-1683 (filed May 10, 2022).

Consumer Protection; calculation of damages: The court clarified the damages a borrower shall collect for knowing violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions of Maryland Commercial Law. Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 13, 2022).

BOTTOM LINE: Where the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about a gun involved in a felon-in-possession charge, but he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering a detectives questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights, his motion was denied.

CASE: United States v. Medley, No. 18-4789 (filed May 11, 2022) (Judges Gregory, Before King, QUATTLEBAUM).

FACTS: Jovon Medley appeals his felon in possession of a firearm conviction and sentence. Regarding his conviction, Medley challenges the district courts denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about the gun involved in the felon-in-possession charge. Regarding his sentence, he argues that the district courts application of a sentencing guidelines enhancement, based on its finding that Medley used the firearm to commit a carjacking, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct.

LAW: Medley concedes that he was not federally charged at the time of his interview. However, he argues that the right to counsel nevertheless attached to his federal felon-in-possession charge because it is the same offense as the D.C. felon-in-possession charge.

Even assuming, without deciding, that Medleys Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to his federal felon-in-possession charge on the day that he was questioned by Detective Dalton, Medley waived the right because he never made a clear, unambiguous assertion of the right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warnings.

Medley never made a clear, unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warnings. He did not request his attorney, ask for the interview to stop or say anything that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand . . . to be a request for an attorney. Instead, Medley knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering Daltons questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights.

A defendant who waives his Sixth Amendment right to counsel may still challenge his waiver by establishing it was based on misrepresentation or deception by the state. Medley argues Detective Dalton misled him by stating that he was not interested in Medleys D.C. case. He claims that, because of Daltons statement, Medley did not understand that by answering Daltons questions, he was waiving his right to counsel regarding his D.C. felon-in-possession charge. As a result, Medley claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the D.C. case.

However, this is an appeal from Medleys federal case and only concerns whether he waived his right to counsel regarding his federal charges. The use of Medleys statements in his D.C. case is not at issue here. What is at issue is whether Daltons representations prevented Medley from making a knowing or voluntary waiver of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights regarding his subsequent federal charges. Medley does not even make this claim and, even if he had, the court sees no support for it in this record.

Medley next claims that the sentencing enhancement violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. However, consistent with a growing number of critics of this practice, he explains his objections to it. Whether or not the court agrees or disagrees with the precedent, it is bound to follow it.

Medley also argues that the district courts application of the guidelines enhancement constituted clear error because there was insufficient evidence to find that he committed the Maryland carjacking. Under the clear error standard, however, the court cannot say that the district court erred by enhancing Medleys sentence when it found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that he used the Rock Island firearm in connection with the carjacking of Elton Wright.

Affirmed.

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court issued a class-wide injunction that modified procedures used by the government to detain aliens pending their removal hearings, but the relevant statute expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws on a class-wide basis, that aspect of the district courts order was vacated.

CASE: Miranda v. Garland, No. 20-1828 (filed May 12, 2022) (Judge QUATTLEBAUM) (Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented in part) (Judge Urbanski concurred in part and dissented in part).

FACTS: 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. And the Attorney General has adopted procedures for making that discretionary decision.

A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering, on a class-wide basis, that to continue detaining an alien under 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges, again on a class-wide basis, to consider an aliens ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.

LAW: The government argues that because the individual plaintiffs failed to appeal their bond decisions to the Board, the district court lacked the authority to review the immigration judges detention decision. The government has not pointed this court to any other provision of the immigration laws where Congress clearly required exhaustion, and neither has the court found one. Therefore, no statute applicable to Miranda, Espinoza and Adegokes claims provides that administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional. Because the government did not adequately address the district courts determination that administrative exhaustion was not required, the government waived this argument on appeal.

Next, the government argues that 1226(e) strips the courts of jurisdiction to review discretionary detention decisions like those at issue here. This is a close question of statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court decisions do not provide a clear answer. After reviewing the statute, the court rejects the governments argument that it lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims.

Third, the government argues that 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief. The court finds that 1252(f)(1) is a jurisdictional limit on the courts. Section 1252(f)(1) expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws, including 1226(a), on a class-wide basis. Despite this provision, the district court imposed class-wide limitations on the discretionary detention decisions permitted under 1226(a). Accordingly, that aspect of the district courts order is vacated.

The district courts order also granted Espinoza individual relief. The district court erred, however, because Espinoza did not show a likelihood of success on his claim that requiring an alien in a 1226(a) bond hearing to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk violates an aliens rights under the Due Process Clause.

Espinoza also failed to show a likelihood of success on his claim that due process requires immigration judges in 1226(a) bond hearings to consider an aliens ability to pay and alternative conditions on release. Without his alleged constitutional injury, Espinoza has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable harm. And the balance of the equities and public interest do not weigh in favor of the sea change in bond hearings that Espinoza desires.

Vacated and remanded.

CONCUR AND DISSENT: Because 1226(e) bars judicial review of any discretionary judgmentincluding those that apply to all detention decisions under 1226(a) and those alleged to violate the ConstitutionI disagree with my colleagues and would dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction on that basis. That disagreement does not preclude me from joining in striking down the class-wide injunction under 1252(f)(1).

CONCUR AND DISSENT: While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, the majority opinion concludes that 1252(f)(1) precludes class-wide injunctive relief. But plaintiffs also sought class-wide declaratory relief, which was not addressed below, perhaps because the government failed to raise 1252(f)(1) at the district court. As such, I would remand the case to the district court to allow it to address plaintiffs request for class-wide declaratory relief, which is not barred by 1252(f)(1). Further, in my view, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to bear the burden of proof in an immigration detention proceeding.

BOTTOM LINE: Where the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the relationship between a vocational services program and disabled janitors was akin to a typically industrial relationship, thus making the janitors employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and substantial evidence supported that finding, its decision was affirmed.

CASE: Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 21-1642, 21-1683 (filed May 10, 2022) (Judges KING, Motz) (Judge Niemeyer, concurring).

FACTS: Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc.s vocational services program, or VSP, seeks judicial review of a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board finding that VSP engaged in unfair labor practices by refusing to bargain with the union. Specifically, VSP contests the Boards underlying determination that certain disabled janitorial workers engaged by VSP are employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of the bargaining order.

LAW: VSP argues that its relationship with the disabled janitors working at the Baltimore County Social Security Administration facility is primarily rehabilitative in nature, and that the Boards decision incorrectly classified the disabled janitors as statutory employees. VSP argues that the Board therefore lacked jurisdiction to certify the union as the janitors collective bargaining representative and that the bargaining order was in error by association.

Under Board precedent, the statutory employee status of disabled individuals working in rehabilitative vocational settings turns on whether the relationship between worker and putative employer is best characterized as typically industrial or instead primarily rehabilitative. The typically industrial versus primarily rehabilitative determination calls for a case-by-case factual assessment, and the party seeking . . . to exclude otherwise eligible employees from the coverage of the Act bears the burden of proving a primarily rehabilitative employment relationship to the Board.

In concluding that VSP had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a primarily rehabilitative employment relationship, the Board resolved that the disabled janitors affiliation with VSP is more akin to that found in traditional private sector employment settings, such that the Acts leading purpose of restoring balance to bargaining power disparities is served by classifying the janitors as statutory employees.

To be sure, the Board acknowledged that certain testimony received during its representation hearings pointed toward a primarily rehabilitative relationship. But it ultimately ruled that [those] facts are insufficient to overcome the other facts supporting a traditionally industrial relationship and that each factor weighed against finding a principally rehabilitative connection between VSP and its disabled janitors. This courts review of the record fully supports the Boards determination.

Petition for review denied. Cross-application for enforcement granted.

CONCUR: I would approach this case with a strong presumption that disabled employees hired under a Javits-Wagner-ODay Act program, such as the one conducted by VSP, are not, as a class, employees within the ambit of the National Labor Relations Act and therefore are not entitled to the collective bargaining rights afforded by the Act.

Had VSP argued for such a categorical presumption before us, I would have welcomed the discussion and engaged both parties on that point. Instead, however, VSP focused its briefing on whether substantial evidence supported specific factual findings made by the Board. Because the record includes substantial evidence to support those findings, albeit narrow in scope, I concur in the opinion of Judge King, which ably demonstrates this.

BOTTOM LINE: The court clarified the damages a borrower shall collect for knowing violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions of Maryland Commercial Law.

CASE: Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 13, 2022) (Judges GETTY, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Wilner).

FACTS: Jabari Morese Lyles initiated a class action against Santander Consumer USA Inc. for alleged violations of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article, or CL, of the Maryland Codethe Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions, or CLEC, CL 12-1001 et seq. Before this court is a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland regarding the calculation of damages under CL 12-1018(b).

LAW: CL 12-1018(a) provides, in part [e]xcept for a bona fide error of computation, if a credit grantor violates any provision of this subtitle the credit grantor may collect only the principal amount of the loan and may not collect any interest, costs, fees, or other charges with respect to the loan. CL 12-1018(b) provides [i]n addition, a credit grantor who knowingly violates any provision of this subtitle shall forfeit to the borrower 3 times the amount of interest, fees, and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle.

CL 12-1018(b) provides the penalty provision for knowing violations of CLEC. The provision begins with the words [i]n addition, which signals that this is an additional penalty to the penalty set forth in subsection (a)(2). A credit grantor that violates CLEC is limited by CL 12-1018(a)(2) to collect only the principal loan amount from the borrower, and a credit grantor that knowingly violates the subtitle is subject to further liability under CL 12-1018(b).

The provision continues, stating that the amounts to be trebled are the interest, fees, and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle. The phrase in excess of that authorized by this subtitle is central to this courts analysis. This language identifies that the amount to be trebled is that which the credit grantor is not permitted to charge to the borrower under CLEC. Put differently, the amounts that a credit grantor charged in violation of CLEC are the amounts to be trebled for a knowing violation of the subtitle.

If the General Assembly intended for this penalty provision to require a credit grantor to pay treble the amount collected in excess of the principal loan amount, it would have written the provision to read as such. However, the plain language of CL 12-1018(b) makes no reference to amounts collected in excess of the principal amount financed. The General Assembly only expressly authorized forfeiture of the amount of interest, fees, and charges that are collected in excess of that authorized by the subtitle.

As such, the amount to be trebled under CL 12-1018(b) are those amounts collected that are not authorized under CLEC.

Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for CL 12-1018(b) to be interpreted inconsistently with its plain meaning. Accordingly, assuming Santander knowingly collected the convenience fees alleged by Mr. Lyles in violation of CLEC, the appropriate calculation of damages under CL 12-1018(b) is treble the amount of convenience fees collected. For the foregoing reasons, CL 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor that is found to have knowingly violated CLEC to forfeit three times the amount of interest, fees and charges collected in violation of the subtitle.

Certified question of law answered as set forth above.

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Law Digest US 4th Circuit, Md. Court of Appeals May 19, 2022 - Maryland Daily Record