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Binance froze cryptocurrency accounts associated with Hamas amid … – Tekedia

In a major blow to the Palestinian militant group Hamas, Israeli police announced on Monday that they had frozen several cryptocurrency accounts linked to the organization. The accounts, which were used to fund Hamass activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, were traced and blocked with the assistance of Binance, one of the worlds largest cryptocurrency exchanges.

According to a statement by the Israeli police, the operation was carried out by the cyber unit of the Lahav 433 anti-fraud division, in cooperation with the national security agency Shin Bet and the Israel Tax Authority. The police said they had identified and seized more than 150 cryptocurrency accounts, wallets and addresses that received donations from Hamas supporters around the world.

The police also said they had uncovered a complex network of websites and social media platforms that Hamas used to solicit donations in various cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum and Dogecoin. The donations were then transferred to the accounts that were controlled by Hamas operatives in Turkey and Gaza.

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The police estimated that Hamas had raised tens of millions of dollars through this scheme, which was launched in early 2019 after the group faced a severe financial crisis due to the blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt on Gaza. The police said that the cryptocurrency donations enabled Hamas to bypass the banking system and the international sanctions imposed on it as a designated terrorist organization.

Binance, which is based in the Cayman Islands and has offices in several countries, confirmed that it had cooperated with the Israeli authorities in their investigation. A spokesperson for Binance said that the exchange had a zero-tolerance policy for illicit activity on its platform and that it was committed to working with regulators and law enforcement agencies to safeguard the interests of our users and the broader industry.

The spokesperson also said that Binance had implemented robust compliance and security measures to detect and prevent suspicious transactions, such as advanced identity verification, blockchain analysis and cyber threat intelligence.

The freezing of Hamass cryptocurrency accounts is not the first time that Israel has targeted the groups online fundraising efforts. In August 2019, the Israeli military said it had hacked into a website run by Hamass military wing, the Qassam Brigades, and exposed its Bitcoin donation campaign. The military said it had also sent warning messages to potential donors, alerting them that they were exposing themselves to legal action and cyber attacks by supporting Hamas.

Hamas has not yet commented on the latest Israeli operation, but it is likely that the group will try to find new ways to raise funds through cryptocurrency or other means. Hamas has been engaged in a long-running conflict with Israel, which has intensified in recent months following a series of violent clashes and rocket attacks.

Binance, the worlds leading cryptocurrency exchange, has announced that it is reducing the minimum order sizes for some of its spot and margin trading pairs to 1USDT. This means that traders can now execute orders with smaller amounts of capital, allowing them to diversify their portfolios and access more opportunities in the crypto market.

The new minimum order sizes apply to the following trading pairs:

BTC/USDT

ETH/USDT

BNB/USDT

ADA/USDT

DOGE/USDT

XRP/USDT

DOT/USDT

SOL/USDT

LUNA/USDT

AVAX/USDT

The change will take effect on October 15, 2023, at 00:00 AM (UTC). Traders who have open orders below the new minimum order sizes will not be affected by this update. However, they will not be able to modify or cancel their orders until they meet the new requirements.

Binance said that the decision to lower the minimum order sizes was based on user feedback and market demand. The exchange aims to provide more flexibility and convenience for its users, especially those who are new to crypto trading or have limited funds. By lowering the barriers to entry, Binance hopes to attract more users and increase the liquidity and depth of its markets.

Binance also reminded its users to trade responsibly and be aware of the risks involved in crypto trading. The exchange advised its users to do their own research, use proper risk management tools, and follow the platforms rules and regulations.

Binance is constantly improving its products and services to offer the best trading experience for its users. The exchange has recently launched several new features and initiatives, such as:

Binance NFT Marketplace, a platform for buying and selling digital collectibles and artworks. Binance Pay, a peer-to-peer payment service that supports multiple cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies.

Binance Earn, a suite of products that allows users to earn passive income from their crypto assets. Binance Smart Chain, a blockchain network that supports smart contracts and decentralized applications. Binance Charity, a non-profit organization that uses blockchain technology to empower social good.

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Binance froze cryptocurrency accounts associated with Hamas amid ... - Tekedia

TangibleDAO Plans Recovery After USDR Stablecoin Crashes – BeInCrypto

In the last 24 hours, mass redemptions of the Polygon-based stablecoin USDR used up the liquid DAI collateral in the treasury of its issuer TangibleDAO (Tangible). Panic selling ensued, causing the asset to fall from its $1 peg.

One user, fearing that Tangible would be unable to liquidate the real estate backing its coin, swapped $130,000 for $0.0001 USDC on Binance Smart Chain. A maximum extractable value (MEV) bot raked in $107,000 profit from the transaction.

Tangible said it would liquidate its insurance fund and mark its TNGBL token to zero to improve liquidity. TNGBL is a token anyone can lock up to receive a multiplier based on the period they lock up their tokens and receive a 3,3+ non-fungible token (NFT) representing their position.

In addition, the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) will contribute $2.4 million of its own DAI, USDC, and USDT holdings.

On a slightly longer time frame, Tangible will mint its real-world tokenized assets into a yield-generating Basket token. Users will then have the option of earning yields from Basket tokens or selling them into Pearl, a decentralized exchange on Polygon, or farming them on the platform.

Tangible confirmed it is prepared to liquidate real-world property if there is no demand for Basket tokens.

Read more: Top 5 Yield Farms on Polygon

Stablecoins backed by real-world assets (RWA) are a fairly novel concept. It harks back to the eighteenth century when the US government backed dollars with physical gold bars, a strategy that President Nixon ended in 1971.

Stablecoins, when they were introduced, were the first attempt to tokenize or represent the fiat-backed currencies on the blockchain. Issuers generally keep liquid assets they can convert to cash when holders want to bring funds from the blockchain back into the traditional financial system.

The notion of backing stablecoins with blockchain versions of real-world assets is fairly novel. Companies are still investigating ways these tokenized assets can be quickly exchanged for cash when users need it.

Read more: What is Tokenization on Blockchain?

Several hurdles exist, such as how to quickly and legally complete a real-world transfer of ownership effected on the blockchain. There is also the issue of how to transfer the ownership of an asset on one blockchain to the buyer whose address is on another blockchain.

Lawmakers also must establish rules on how digital asset custodians protect tokenized RWAs from theft and loss.

Do you have something to say about the Tangible plan to make users whole after the USDR depegor anything else? Please write to us or join the discussion on ourTelegram channel.You can also catch us onTikTok,Facebook, orX (Twitter).

In adherence to the Trust Project guidelines, BeInCrypto is committed to unbiased, transparent reporting. This news article aims to provide accurate, timely information. However, readers are advised to verify facts independently and consult with a professional before making any decisions based on this content.

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TangibleDAO Plans Recovery After USDR Stablecoin Crashes - BeInCrypto

The Environmental Impact of Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A … – Tribune Online

Introduction

In the fast-paced world of cryptocurrencies, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains have emerged as a promising alternative to the energy-intensive Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems. As the demand for sustainable and eco-friendly blockchain technologies grows, researchers and developers are increasingly turning to PoS as a potential solution. In this comparative study, we delve into the environmental impact of PoS blockchains, exploring their advantages over PoW systems. Delving into the intricacies of blockchain technology? Consider exploring the Immediate Enigma official site, a premier online trading platform that offers detailed insights.

Understanding Proof-of-Stake and Proof-of-Work

To comprehend the environmental implications of PoS blockchains, it is crucial to differentiate them from PoW systems. In PoW blockchains, miners must solve complex mathematical puzzles, consuming vast amounts of electricity and leading to carbon emissions. On the other hand, PoS blockchains rely on validators who are chosen based on the number of coins they stake or commit as collateral. PoS is inherently more energy-efficient, as it eliminates the need for resource-intensive mining hardware.

The Energy Efficiency Advantage of PoS

One of the primary benefits of PoS blockchains is their significantly lower energy consumption compared to PoW systems. PoS requires minimal computational power, making it more sustainable and environmentally friendly. As a result, PoS networks like Ethereum 2.0 have shown a considerable reduction in their carbon footprint, offering a promising pathway towards greener blockchain technology.

The Environmental Impact of PoS vs. PoW

A comprehensive comparative study reveals that PoS blockchains have a substantially lower environmental impact when compared to their PoW counterparts. PoS blockchains like Tezos, Cardano, and Solana boost significantly reduced energy consumption and associated carbon emissions. As the industry moves towards more sustainable solutions, PoS stands out as an attractive option for eco-conscious investors and developers.

Championing Sustainable Practices

Some online trading platforms have been at the forefront of promoting sustainable practices in the cryptocurrency space. By providing access to a diverse range of PoS-based cryptocurrencies, the platform enables users to participate in eco-friendly investments. This alignment with sustainable technologies signifies the platforms commitment to reducing the overall environmental impact of the crypto industry.

Enhancing Scalability and Reducing Energy Consumption

PoS blockchains, such as Binance Smart Chain (BSC), have demonstrated enhanced scalability and reduced energy consumption. This efficiency has allowed BSC to become a viable alternative for developers seeking a more sustainable option for decentralized applications (dApps) and smart contracts. As developers transition from PoW to PoS-based ecosystems, the overall ecological footprint of the blockchain industry is expected to shrink significantly.

Challenges and Limitations

While PoS blockchains offer a more environmentally friendly approach, they are not entirely without challenges. Some critics argue that PoS systems might centralize power, as validators with more significant stakes may have more influence over network decisions. However, ongoing research and innovation seek to address these concerns and maintain the decentralized nature of PoS blockchains.

The Road Ahead: PoS Adoption and Sustainability

As the cryptocurrency industry evolves, the adoption of PoS blockchains is poised to play a crucial role in driving sustainability. Investors, developers, and platforms can collectively contribute to reducing the industrys carbon footprint. By fostering responsible investment practices and supporting eco-friendly blockchain technologies, the crypto space can build a more sustainable future for generations to come.

Overcoming the Environmental Concerns: Innovations and Collaborations

In the pursuit of further reducing the environmental impact of PoS blockchains, the crypto community is actively engaged in innovative solutions and collaborations. Eminent blockchain projects and academic institutions are conducting research to optimize PoS algorithms, enhance energy efficiency, and ensure decentralization. Additionally, partnerships between prominent players in the industry and renewable energy providers are being explored to power PoS networks using clean and sustainable energy sources.

Moreover, regulatory authorities are also recognizing the significance of sustainable blockchain technologies. Governments worldwide are incentivizing the adoption of PoSblockchains through grants and policies that promote eco-friendly practices, setting the stage for a more sustainable future for the entire cryptocurrency landscape.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the environmental impact of PoS blockchains is significantly lower than that of traditional PoW systems. Their energy efficiency, scalability, and reduced carbon footprint make them an attractive alternative for those seeking a greener cryptocurrency ecosystem. Some platforms are championing sustainable practices by offering access to PoS-based cryptocurrencies and encouraging responsible investments. As the world embraces sustainable technologies, PoS blockchains are set to shape the future of cryptocurrencies in an environmentally conscious manner.

CAVEAT: This article, (https://tribuneonlineng.com/the-environmental-impact-of-proof-of-stake-blockchains-a-comparative-study/), is strictly advertorial. Nigerian Tribune is not liable for anytransaction between any reader andtheadvertiser.

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Senators Katie Britt and John Kennedy Call for Investigation into … – Calhoun County Journal

Washington, D.C. U.S. Senator Katie Britt (R-Ala.), a member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, has joined forces with Senator John Kennedy (R-La.) to request that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct an investigation into the potential risks, constitutional issues, and privacy concerns raised by the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT).

The CAT, a system designed to track trades across American markets, has been in operation for over a decade, offering regulators access to valuable investor information and trade activity data. However, among the vast amounts of data collected by CAT, there lies a critical concern the personally identifiable information (PII) of every investor trading on U.S. stock exchanges. The collection of such sensitive information raises substantial consumer privacy concerns, as it can be employed to construct a comprehensive profile of an individuals trading activity and may be vulnerable to potential data breaches.

In their letter addressed to Gene Dodaro, the Comptroller General, Senators Britt and Kennedy have called for a comprehensive GAO investigation to report on various key aspects of the CAT, including the constitutionality and legality of the collection of personal and financial information, the cyber vulnerabilities associated with the CAT database, and an estimation of the number of individuals who will have regular access to the information stored in the database.

The Senators have expressed their concerns over the CATs collection of PII, as it poses potential threats to Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizures. The mandated production of certain information, as per the Fourth Amendment, has previously been a matter of legal contention. The Senators contend that there are legitimate reasons for individuals not to want their financial transactions regularly submitted to a government registry, and they believe the SEC has not adequately addressed these concerns.

The GAOs forthcoming report, as requested by Senators Britt and Kennedy, will delve into several critical dimensions:

An analysis of the constitutionality and legality of collecting American investors personal and financial information by a regulator in a centralized database without evidence of wrongdoing. An examination of the cyber vulnerabilities associated with the CAT database. An estimation of the total number of individuals with regular access to data collected under CAT, their professional affiliations, and the screening or background check processes implemented by the SEC and FINRA to vet those with access to the CAT database. A comprehensive list of publicly reported cyberattacks on federal government agencies over the last three years and an analysis of compromised or potentially compromised American investors PII, including the cost associated with repairing the identities of affected individuals. An analysis of the legal entities that retail investors may hold liable for a cyberattack on the CAT, should such an incident result in the theft of American investors account numbers, identities, and/or securities holdings, along with an assessment of the potential costs based on previous identity theft data.

The Senators have requested a response from the GAO no later than November 15, 2023, emphasizing the importance of this matter. This collaborative effort by Senators Britt and Kennedy underscores the significance of safeguarding the privacy and constitutional rights of American investors in the digital age.

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Senators Katie Britt and John Kennedy Call for Investigation into ... - Calhoun County Journal

Trump and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment: An Exploration … – JURIST

Academicians, lawyers, elections officials, pundits and politicians are presently ensconced in the problem of Donald Trumps continuing constitutional qualification for presidential office. Although he plainly meets Article II of the United States Constitutions three qualifications at least 35 years old, natural born citizen, sufficient residence in the United States Trump arguably runs afoul of a more recent disqualification added in 1868 by way of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

That provision was added following the Civil War to keep former state and federal officeholders who had joined the Confederacy from once again rising to state and federal office. Its terms are broad and all-encompassing, with no apparent temporal limit, such that even today [n]o person shall hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as an officer of the United States to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Its being cast in general terms arguably makes it applicable to the events of January 6, 2021, as at least one court has already concluded. If the assault on the Capitol was an insurrection or rebellion against the Constitution, then any of its participants who had previously taken an oath to uphold the Constitution could be thereafter disqualified from holding state or federal office.

There is little precedent on how Section 3s disqualifying provision works and to whom it applies. Confederates were plainly subject to its terms, though Congress for the most part granted them amnesty in the years following the Civil War. Whether Section 3 was applied by elections officials to disqualify non-Confederate candidates in later elections is not clear. I have yet to find any examples that pre-date the events of January 6, 2021. But then again there has been nothing like the events of January 6, 2021 since the end of the Civil War.

As one might suspect, legal questions have emerged over the precise meaning of Section 3s terms. Even assuming that then-President Trump was culpably involved in the January 6 assault on the Capitol, for example, would his actions fall within the reach of Section 3s terms? More precisely, does Section 3s disqualification from holding any office cover the Presidency? Does its inclusion of officer[s] of the United States on the list of those who are disqualified because of having previously sworn to uphold the Constitution include those who took Article IIs presidential oath as opposed to that required of everyone else in Article VI? And what exactly is an insurrection. Meaty questions like these have no definitive answers (yet).

Seizing on definitional questions like these, some, like Professor Lawrence Lessig, have argued that section 3 should not be applicable to President Trumps involvement in the events that transpired on January 6. Worrying about the proverbial slippery-slope, Professor Lessig asks, What is the line that would divide insurrectionists from protesters?

Professor Steven Calebrisi now insists (after a change of heart) that Section 3 simply does not apply to the office of the President. Professors Josh Blackman and Seth Barrett Tillman add that not only does Section 3 not apply to the Presidency, it is not enforceable at all without congressional action.

Rejecting all of Lessigs, Calebrisis and Blackman/Barretts positions, Professors William Baude and Michael Stokes Paulsen argue in their upcoming Pennsylvania Law Review article that Section Three covers a broad range of conduct against the authority of the constitutional order, including many instances of indirect participation or support as aid or comfort. And in particular, it disqualifies former President Donald Trump because of his] participation in the attempted overthrow of the 2020 presidential election. President Trump is covered because he swore, as President, to uphold the Constitution. Section 3 applies to the Presidency as an office of the United States. Further, Section 3 is fully enforceable with or without congressional action.

Because I am not an expert on Section 3s application to insurrections and rebellions (is anyone?) and I profess no special knowledge about whether the office of the President qualifies as an office of the United States under Section 3 (though I think it does), I address my focus here on something that is within my wheelhouse: the enforceability of constitutional norms, particularly those found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, I explore whether congressional legislation was considered necessary in 1868 (when Section 3 was ratified) to enforce the Fourteenth Amendments restrictions. If true of Section 1, then a much stronger argument can be made that the disqualification provision in Section 3 was also meant to require enabling legislation. If not, then the argument that Section 3 was not considered directly enforceable (as Justice Salmon Chase argued in In re Griffin) loses some weight.

In sum, I am confident that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was understood by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legal community to be fully enforceable without congressional enabling legislation. As I explain below, direct, positive enforcement of constitutional provisions was the norm.

Toward this end, I would first like to add a word about legalese. Unlike discussions about state constitutional laws, which frequently include digressions into whether provisions are self-executing, federal constitutional discussions rarely (if ever) use that term. Instead, federal constitutional analyses inquire whether powers have been exercised, whether limitations apply, and generally whether the Constitution is enforceable. Addressing the Fourteenth Amendment as self-executing is therefore a non-starter, whether in todays terms or across history. It may be unenforceable without a statutory vehicle, or it could present a non-justiciable political question, but neither of these equates with its being non-self-executing. The question is whether it is enforceable without congressional support. And to that problem I now turn.

In support of their claim that Section 3 requires congressional support, Professors Josh Blackman and Seth Barrett Tillman argue for a distinction between defensive and offensive enforcement. Although a defensive use of the constitutional constraints found in the Fourteenth Amendment is always permissible, they claim, the offensive use of the Fourteenth Amendments limitation (including those in Section 3) is not. As a general matter, to sue the federal government or its officers, a private individual litigant must invoke a federal statutory cause of action. It is not enough to merely allege some unconstitutional state action in the abstract. The same is true for suits against states and their officers, they claim. Section 1983, including its statutory antecedents, i.e., Second Enforcement Act a/k/a Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, is the primary modern statute that private individuals use to vindicate constitutional rights when suing state government officers. Tying this into a historical thread, they then assert that [c]onstitutional provisions [including Section 3] are not automatically self-executing when used offensively by an applicant seeking affirmative relief, with the implication being that it has always been that way. It is in this latter regard that they are mistaken.

Section 1983 was passed in 1871 to correct state and local abuses of freed slaves throughout the Reconstructed South. It awarded, and still awards, the victims of unconstitutional conduct a private action against the offending government official. It has in modern times (defined as since 1961) become the premier mechanism for vindicating federal wrongs perpetrated by state and local officials.

But before modern developments beginning in 1961, constitutional provisions (including those in the Fourteenth Amendment) were always understood to be enforceable without federal enforcement statutes like section 1983. As explained by Professor Anne Woolhandler, positive, direct, offensive constitutional litigation in state and federal courts long preceded the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, section 1983 in 1871, and general federal question jurisdiction in 1875. Throughout the nineteenth century, both before and after Reconstruction, she explains, the Court saw diversity jurisdiction as an appropriate vehicle to raise federal questions, sometimes providing an expansive scope to diversity explicitly to accommodate this use of it. Consequently, much of the Supreme Courts development of individual rights and remedies took place without reliance on either federal question jurisdiction or statutes such as 1983, but rather under the rubric of diversity jurisdiction. Congressional enforcement mechanisms and federal question jurisdiction did not exist, were not used and were unnecessary. Constitutional provisions were fully enforceable without congressional assistance.

This remained true in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The Supreme Court in 1978 explained in Monell v. New York Department of Social Services that at the time the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983 were put in place it had already granted unquestionably positive relief in Contract Clause cases, the question being simply whether there had been a violation of the Constitution. It added that federal courts found no obstacle to awards of damages against municipalities for common-law takings at this time, either, citing an 1873 case as an example.

So-called confiscatory challenges under the Fourteenth Amendments due process clause were heard in federal court in the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth century, too, with one of the better-known examples being the 1908 case of Ex parte Young, which remains a cornerstone of modern constitutional litigation. There the Supreme Court concluded that the presence of constitutional claims under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, when coupled with federal question jurisdiction, was enough all by itself to support a federal courts entertaining a positive constitutional challenge to Minnesotas confiscatory rates. No statutory vehicle, like section 1983, was discussed. None was needed.

In 1946 the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood, without mention of any statutory enforcement mechanism, observed that it is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the state to do. In support of this established practice the Bell Court cited to late nineteenth century and early twentieth century precedents under constitutional provisions including the Fourteenth Amendment.

None of this was changed by the additions of section 1983 in 1871 and the advent of federal question jurisdiction in 1875.Although having maintained a constant presence in the United States Code, albeit in various different subsections (such as 8 U.S.C. 43 when Bell v. Hood and Brown v. Board of Education (1954) were decided), section 1983 remained little-used until the 1960s. Justice Scalia observed in his dissent in Crawford-El v. Britton that section 1983 produced only 21 cases in the first 50 years of its existence. In the collection of the cases that make up Brown v. Board of Education, for example, most of the plaintiffs did not mention section 1983s ancestor, 8 U.S.C. 43, at all in their pleadings, and not one mentioned it before the Supreme Court as a basis for the suit. Judge Marsha Berzon was thus certainly correct to state in her 2008 Madison Lecture at NYU Law School that in Brown the plaintiffs grounded their claim for relief directly in the Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional scholars, I think, tend to agree.

Professors Blackman and Tillman are thus wrong to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment somehow distinguished or was meant to distinguish between positive (using the Amendment as a sword) and negative (using it as a shield) uses. Calling this an American constitutional tradition and claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to be wielded as a shield without legislation but not self-executing in court [for] affirmative relief unless Congress provides for its enforcement is far-fetched to say the least. It is not a tradition and has no basis in the many cases that were directly raised under the Fourteenth Amendment throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Fourteenth Amendment was directly used as a sword and a shield for more than eighty years without need of a congressional enforcement mechanism. The generation that framed the Fourteenth Amendment must have known all this. It would not have expected the Fourteenth Amendments terms to lie moribund until Congress took action.

So what happened to change all this? Why are Professors Blackman and Tillman correct about the lay of the constitutional land today? Why are statutory remedial vehicles like section 1983 now needed? The question is a difficult one with no ready answer. The short (and admittedly incomplete) answer is that in 1961 the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape breathed new life into section 1983 by allowing it to be used against unauthorized governmental actions. Before that happened section 1983s under color of law requirement had been interpreted to required authorized governmental wrongs. When attorneys fees were added to section 1983 in 1976 that pretty much sealed the switch from direct constitutional litigation to section 1983, with the latter now being both available and preferred by the plaintiffs bar.

Not that this killed off all direct constitutional litigation. Far from it. The Supreme Court in 1971 in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Bureau of Narcotic recognized a direct constitutional cause of action for damages under the Fourth Amendment against federal agents, and extended this rationale in 1979 and 1980 to cover violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. While it seems plain that no more direct constitutional actions will be recognized today, and in 2010 the Supreme Court put the final kibosh on attempts to circumvent section 1983 with direct constitutional logic, this most recent history demonstrates how powerful and lasting was the traditional use of direct constitutional causes of action.

In the end, how direct, positive, offensive constitutional actions came to be replaced by actions based on congressional legislation should prove unimportant to the debate over Section 3s enforceability. The point is that Section 3 could not have been considered offensively unenforceable as part of some traditional view. No such tradition had ever existed. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, like just about every other constitutional provision (such as the Contracts Clause in Article I, 10) was expected to be enforced directly in state and federal court. Further, to the extent congressional support for Section 3 is needed it is today readily found in section 1983, which has been extended to cover just about every constitutional provision worth litigating. Whether the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, or the Fourteenth Amendments limits in Section1, section 1983 has been recognized as an available vehicle. There is no apparent reason that it could not be used with Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment if that became necessary (though I think it should not).

None of this is meant to suggest that anybody and everybody is free to sue in state or federal court to force Trumps name from ballots. In federal court Article III standing presents a huge obstacle, as does the political question doctrine (though I think the latter is overstated). State courts have their own restrictions on who may sue for what violation. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not override any of this. Suffice it to say that enough water has flowed under a sufficient number of bridges to prove that state elections officials and state courts generally have the authority to entertain challenges to and remove potential federal candidates from ballots for a number of reasons, such as not having paid the required fees, not properly collecting signatures and not being qualified under Article I of the federal Constitution. States, moreover, have disagreed to the point that some presidential candidates, like Ralph Nader, have been disqualified in some states but not others. I dont see that Section 3s disqualification provision being applied to Trump should be any different.

Mark Brownis alawprofessor and the Newton D. Baker/Baker & Hostetler Chair atCapitalUniversityLawSchool.

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Trump and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment: An Exploration ... - JURIST