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A US Marine walks during an early morning guard shift in southern Afghanistan. (AP Photo / Brennan Linsley)

We walked in a single file. Not because it was tactically sound. It wasntat least according to standard infantry doctrine. Patrolling southern Afghanistan in column formation limited maneuverability, made it difficult to mass fire, and exposed us to enfilading machine-gun bursts. Still, in 2011, in the Pashmul District of Kandahar Province, single file was our best bet.

The reason was simple enough: improvised bombs not just along roads but seemingly everywhere. Hundreds of them, maybe thousands. Who knew?

Thats right, the local Talibana term so nebulous its basically lost all meaninghad managed to drastically alter US Army tactics with crude, homemade explosives stored in plastic jugs. And believe me, this was a huge problem. Cheap, ubiquitous, and easy to bury, those anti-personnel Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs, soon littered the roads, footpaths, and farmland surrounding our isolated outpost. To a greater extent than a number of commanders willingly admitted, the enemy had managed to nullify our many technological advantages for a few pennies on the dollar (or maybe, since were talking about the Pentagon, it was pennies on the millions of dollars).

Truth be told, it was never really about our high-tech gear. Instead, American units came to rely on superior training and discipline, as well as initiative and maneuverability, to best their opponents. And yet those deadly IEDs often seemed to even the score, being both difficult to detect and brutally effective. So there we were, after too many bloody lessons, meandering along in carnival-like, Pied Piper-style columns. Bomb-sniffing dogs often led the way, followed by a couple of soldiers carrying mine detectors, followed by a few explosives experts. Only then came the first foot soldiers, rifles at the ready. Anything else was, if not suicide, then at least grotesquely ill-advised.

And mind you, our improvised approach didnt always work either. To those of us out there, each patrol felt like another round of Russian roulette. In that way, those IEDs completely changed how we operated, slowing movement, discouraging extra patrols, and distancing us from what was then considered the ultimate prize: the local villagers, or what was left of them anyway. In a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, which is what the US military was running in Afghanistan in those years, that was the definition of defeat.

My own unit faced a dilemma common to dozensmaybe hundredsof other American units in Afghanistan. Every patrol was slow, cumbersome, and risky. The natural inclination, if you cared about your boys, was to do less. But effective COIN operations require securing territory and gaining the trust of the civilians living there. You simply cant do that from inside a well-protected American base. One obvious option was to live in the villageswhich we eventually didbut that required dividing up the company into smaller groups and securing a second, third, maybe fourth location, which quickly became problematic, at least for my 82-man cavalry troop (when at full strength). And, of course, there were no less than five villages in my area of responsibility.

I realize, writing this now, that theres no way I can make the situation sound quite as dicey as it actually was. How, for instance, were we to secure and empower a village population that was, by then, all but nonexistent? Years, even decades, of hard fighting, air strikes, and damaged crops had left many of those villages in that part of Kandahar Province little more than ghost towns, while cities elsewhere in the country teemed with uprooted and dissatisfied peasant refugees from the countryside.

Sometimes, it felt as if we were fighting over nothing more than a few dozen deserted mud huts. And like it or not, such absurdity exemplified Americas war in Afghanistan. It still does. That was the view from the bottom. Matters werentand arentmeasurably better at the top. As easily as one reconnaissance troop could be derailed, so the entire enterprise, which rested on similarly shaky foundations, could be unsettled.

At a moment when the generals to whom President Trump recently delegated decision-making powers on US troop strength in that country consider a new Afghan surge, it might be worth looking backward and zooming out just a bit. Remember, the very idea of winning the Afghan War, which left my unit in that collection of mud huts, rested (and still rests) on a few rather grandiose assumptions.

The first of these surely is that the Afghans actually want (or ever wanted) us there; the second, that the country was and still is vital to our national security; and the third, that 10,000, 50,000, or even 100,000 foreign troops ever were or now could be capable of pacifying an insurgency, or rather a growing set of insurgencies, or securing 33 million souls, or facilitating a stable, representative government in a heterogeneous, mountainous, landlocked country with little history of democracy.

The first of these points is at least debatable. As you might imagine, any kind of accurate polling is quite difficult, if not impossible, outside the few major population centers in that isolated country. Though many Afghans, particularly urban ones, may favor a continued US military presence, others clearly wonder what good a new influx of foreigners will do in their endlessly war-torn nation. As one high-ranking Afghan official recently lamented, thinking undoubtedly of the first use in his land of the largest non-nuclear bomb on the planet, Is the plan just to use our country as a testing ground for bombs? And keep in mind that the striking rise in territory the Taliban now controls, the most since they were driven from power in 2001, suggests that the US presence is hardly welcomed everywhere.

As for the third point, its simply preposterous. One look at US military attempts at nation-building or post-conflict stabilization and pacification in Iraq, Libya, ordare I saySyria should settle the issue. Its often said that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. Yet here we are, 14 years after the folly of invading Iraq and many of the same voicesinside and outside the administrationare clamoring for one more surge in Afghanistan (and, of course, will be clamoring for the predictable surges to follow across the Greater Middle East).

The very idea that the US military had the ability to usher in a secure Afghanistan is grounded in a number of preconditions that proved to be little more than fantasies. First, there would have to be a capable, reasonably corruption-free local governing partner and military. Thats a nonstarter. Afghanistans corrupt, unpopular national unity government is little better than the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam in the 1960s and that American war didnt turn out so well, did it? Then theres the question of longevity. When it comes to the US military presence there, soon to head into its 16th year, how long is long enough? Several mainstream voices, including former Afghan commander General David Petraeus, are now talking about at least a generation more to successfully pacify Afghanistan. Is that really feasible given Americas growing resource constraints and the ever expanding set of dangerous ungoverned spaces worldwide?

And what could a new surge actually do? The US presence in Afghanistan is essentially a fragmented series of self-contained bases, each of which needs to be supplied and secured. In a country of its size, with a limited transportation infrastructure, even the 4,0005,000 extra troops the Pentagon is reportedly considering sending right now wont go very far.

Now, zoom out again. Apply the same calculus to the US position across the Greater Middle East and you face what we might start calling the Afghan paradox, or my own quandary safeguarding five villages with only 82 men writ large. Do the math. The US military is already struggling to keep up with its commitments. At what point is Washington simply spinning its proverbial wheels? Ill tell you whenyesterday.

Now, think about those three questionable Afghan assumptions and one uncomfortable actuality leaps forth. The only guiding force left in the American strategic arsenal is inertia.

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Remember something: This wont be Americas first Afghan surge. Or its second, or even its third. No, this will be the US militarys fourth crack at it. Who feels lucky? First came President George W. Bushs quiet surge back in 2008. Next, just one month into his first term, newly minted President Barack Obama sent 17,000 more troops to fight his so-called good war (unlike the bad one in Iraq) in southern Afghanistan. After a testy strategic review, he then committed 30,000 additional soldiers to the real surge a year later. Thats what brought me (and the rest of B Troop, 4-4 Cavalry) to Pashmul district in 2011. We leftmost of usmore than five years ago, but of course about 8,800 American military personnel remain today and they are the basis for the surge to come.

To be fair, Surge 4.0 might initially deliver certain modest gains (just as each of the other three did in their day). Realistically, more trainers, air support, and logistics personnel could indeed stabilize some Afghan military units for some limited amount of time. Sixteen years into the conflict, with 10% as many American troops on the ground as at the wars peak, and after a decade-plus of training, Afghan security forces are still being battered by the insurgents. In the last years, theyve been experiencing record casualties, along with the usual massive stream of desertions and the legions of ghost soldiers who can neither die nor desert because they dont exist, although their salaries do (in the pockets of their commanders or other lucky Afghans). And thats earned them a stalemate, which has left the Taliban and other insurgent groups in control of a significant part of the country. And if all goes well (which isnt exactly a surefire thing), thats likely to be the best that Surge 4.0 can produce: a long, painful tie.

Peel back the onions layers just a bit more and the ostensible reasons for Americas Afghan War vanish along with all the explanatory smoke and mirrors. After all, there are two things the upcoming mini-surge will emphatically not do:

*It wont change a failing strategic formula.

Imagine that formula this way: American trainers + Afghan soldiers + loads of cash + (unspecified) time = a stable Afghan government and lessening Taliban influence.

It hasnt worked yet, of course, butso the surge-believers assure usthats because we need more: more troops, more money, more time. Like so many loyal Reaganites, their answers are always supply-side ones and none of them ever seems to wonder whether, almost 16 years later, the formula itself might not be fatally flawed.

According to news reports, no solution being considered by the current administration will even deal with the following interlocking set of problems: Afghanistan is a large, mountainous, landlocked, ethno-religiously heterogeneous, poor country led by a deeply corrupt government with a deeply corrupt military. In a place long known as a graveyard of empires, the United States military and the Afghan Security Forces continue to wage what one eminent historian has termed fortified compound warfare. Essentially, Washington and its local allies continue to grapple with relatively conventional threats from exceedingly mobile Taliban fighters across a porous border with Pakistan, a country that has offered not-so-furtive support and a safe haven for those adversaries. And the Washington response to this has largely been to lock its soldiers inside those fortified compounds (and focus on protecting them against insider attacks by those Afghans it works with and trains). It hasnt worked. It cant. It wont.

Consider an analogous example. In Vietnam, the United States never solved the double conundrum of enemy safe havens and a futile search for legitimacy. The Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army used nearby Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam to rest, refit, and replenish. US troops meanwhile lacked legitimacy because their corrupt South Vietnamese partners lacked it.

Sound familiar? We face the same two problems in Afghanistan: a Pakistani safe haven and a corrupt, unpopular central government in Kabul. Nothing, and I mean nothing, in any future troop surge will effectively change that.

*It wont pass the logical fallacy test.

The minute you really think about it, the whole argument for a surge or mini-surge instantly slides down a philosophical slippery slope.

If the war is really about denying terrorists safe havens in ungoverned or poorly governed territory, then why not surge more troops into Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, Pakistan (where Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiriand Osama bin Ladens son Hamza bin Laden are believed to be safely ensconced), Iraq, Syria, Chechnya, Dagestan (where one of the Boston Marathon bombers was radicalized), or for that matter Paris or London. Every one of those places has harbored and/or is harboring terrorists. Maybe instead of surging yet again in Afghanistan or elsewhere, the real answer is to begin to realize that all the US military in its present mode of operation can do to change that reality is make it worse. After all, the last 15 years offer a vision of how it continually surges and in the process only creates yet more ungovernable lands and territories.

So much of the effort, now as in previous years, rests on an evident desire among military and political types in Washington to wage the war they know, the one their army is built for: battles for terrain, fights that can be tracked and measured on maps, the sort of stuff that staff officers (like me) can display on ever more-complicated PowerPoint slides. Military men and traditional policymakers are far less comfortable with ideological warfare, the sort of contest where their instinctual proclivity to do something is often counterproductive.

As US Army Field Manual 3-24Gen. David Petraeuss highly touted counterinsurgency biblewisely opined: Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. Its high time to follow such advice (even if its not the advice that Petraeus himself is offering anymore).

As for me, call me a deep-dyed skeptic when it comes to what 4,000 or 5,000 more US troops can do to secure or stabilize a country where most of the village elders I met couldnt tell you how old they were. A little foreign policy humility goes a long way toward not heading down that slippery slope. Why, then, do Americans continue to deceive themselves? Why do they continue to believe that even 100,000 boys from Indiana and Alabama could alter Afghan society in a way Washington would like? Or any other foreign land for that matter?

I suppose some generals and policymakers are just plain gamblers. But before putting your money on the next Afghan surge, it might be worth flashing back to the limitations, struggles, and sacrifices of just one small unit in one tiny, contested district of southern Afghanistan in 2011

So, on we walkedsingle file, step by treacherous stepfor nearly a year. Most days things worked out. Until they didnt. Unfortunately, some soldiers found bombs the hard way: three dead, dozens wounded, one triple amputee. So it went and so we kept on going. Always onward. Ever forward. For America? Afghanistan? Each other? No matter. And so it seems other Americans will keep on going in 2017, 2018, 2019

Lift foot. Hold breath. Step. Exhale.

Keep walking to defeat but together.

Link:
A US Military Officer Explains Why Another Surge in Afghanistan Is Not a Good Idea - The Nation.

June 29, 2017 Kabul, AfghanistanOn a warm Thursday morning last August, a very odd group of people gathered outside the Abu Fazal mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan. The mosque was the site of a horrific attack in December 2011 that left more than 80 dead. The unlikely group in August included Afghan children younger than 14, two older Afghan men, and a slightly older US man with long curly hair, a golf cap, and a guitar. Much to the surprise of the onlookers outside the mosque, the group broke into a song.

A little loud and a little out of sync with each other, the young members of the Miraculous Love Kids and their American teacher, Lanny Cordola, were performing the song Dont Panic by the British rock band Coldplay. Not that anyone present in their audience of older Afghan gentlemen and a few women knew what it was until a few children sang part of the lyrics in Dari, one of Afghanistans national languages. As the youths sang We live in a beautiful world in the local language, the initially suspicious crowd warmed toward them. Within no time, a small congregation had formed around them, smiling and cheering for the children.

Mr. Cordola, a rock musician, moved to Kabul in early 2016. Before that he had toured with well-known names in music such as Gilby Clarke from Guns N Roses, and he had appeared in a couple of episodes of the ABC comedy Full House as a musician. But everything changed when he learned about two attacks in Afghanistan.

I saw this photo on the news of a young girl in green crying, surrounded by dead bodies. It really moved me, Mr. Cordola says. But when I read about these two sisters ... who were killed in another attack while working on the streets selling scarves, I knew I had to do something.

Cordola hoped that his music could bring healing to child survivors of the frequent attacks and at the outset, he specifically wanted to help the family that lost the two daughters. On one of my visits to their house, I brought my guitar along, and one of the [other] daughters Mursal asked to play it, he narrates. I taught her a few moves, and seemed to make her very happy.

His mission became clear: Thats when I thought, Why not do this teach music? he shares. His venture has been largely self-funded.

In particular, he wanted to work with street children. So Cordola and his Afghan associate, Jamshid Bik, drove around parts of Kabul to talk to such youngsters. They were a bit distrusting at first, so we told them to bring their fathers, uncles, and brothers along anyone who made them feel safer, he recalls. After they started coming regularly, the word got out, and next thing we know we had a large classroom.

Today more than 60 children participate, the classes taking place in a large apartment rented by Cordola in central Kabul. Parents rarely accompany the children now, although he adds with a chuckle, Some of the mothers and fathers have also picked up the guitar and sat for a lesson or two.

A key factor in families acceptance of the music lessons is the fact that they provide stability and a routine. And in addition to music, Cordola and his team of volunteers teach the children English and other subjects. Jamshid also teaches them the Quran, which also encourages parents to send their kids to us, Cordola notes.

Working with Mr. Lanny has been a very fulfilling experience, says Mr. Bik, Cordolas interpreter and colleague. I am going to be here for as long as God wills me to be here.

Of course, the undertaking hasnt been without risks. As an American in a postconflict and conservative country, Cordola has to be mindful of the security situation and local values. Ive heard some stories that people werent happy with what we were doing, although I havent faced any direct threats, he says.

Playing U2

Most of the songs that Cordola picks for the children are in English, and he has some verses translated into Dari. He chooses songs that he feels the youths can relate to.

Take the U2 song Pride (In the Name of Love), which is about Martin Luther King Jr. I used that song to explain to them about civil rights, he says, noting pragmatically, I dont assume they retain a lot of what I tell them, but it is a lot of seeds being planted.

We pick songs that speak to the universal human condition, which they have experienced at a harsh level, Cordola elaborates. But the youths, he admits, usually prefer the noisier songs.

Indeed, a recent class has a lot of high-pitched singing. The children, mostly girls, are thrilled to have guests and demonstrate some of their best moves on the guitar. Thirteen-year-old Mursal, the girl who lost two sisters in an attack, takes control of the crowd, shouting over the din, Give me a D minor! Soon, all the youngsters organize themselves and are following Mursals lead. (Many Afghans go only by a first name.)

I love coming here. Mr. Lanny is my qahramaan, she says at the end of the class, using the Dari word for hero.

For Mursal and her friend Breshna, these classes are more than just an extracurricular activity; they are a way to leave behind the evils and misery of their daily lives. My father is a drug addict, and a few months ago, he abandoned us, Mursal confides. We dont know where he is, but my mother is a strong woman; she is a policewoman. She provides for my four siblings and myself, she adds with pride.

Both girls plan to finish school and go to the United States for further studies. Mursal wants to be a music teacher like Cordola. And Breshna says, I no longer sell scarves on the streets. I play guitar, study English here on the weekends, and I go to a school on weekdays.

The girl in green

Still, a few children have dropped out of Cordolas classes because of family pressure. Its a constant struggle, he says with a small sigh. But he is sure he can turn things around and recalls an incident with one of his first students, Tarana the girl in green in the photo, a picture taken right after the attack at the Abu Fazal mosque.

Although Tarana started attending Cordolas classes, her father didnt approve and wanted to put a stop to it. Cordola invited him over for a chat. Her father came to one of our classes, sat through the session, and even picked [up] the guitar and inspected it, Cordola recalls. Convinced that this could be a positive change for his daughter, who spent a few hours every day selling trinkets on the streets, he agreed to let her attend. Today Tarana, age 14, leads some of the classes for the younger children.

Cordola often collaborates with local artists to give the children exposure to a variety of local art and music. Weve conducted classes with Ramika Khabiri, one of Afghanistans first female rap artists, he notes. Theyve also teamed up with ArtLords, a peace organization working on cultural development in Afghanistan.

I first met Lanny and his kids during one of their practices, and I could see the impact the music had on those children, says Omaid Sharifi, cofounder of ArtLords. The organization collaborated with Cordola to paint a mural of Mursal holding a guitar at the very location where she lost her sisters.

What Lanny is doing giving these children a safe place to grow and heal through music is innovative and effective, Mr. Sharifi says.

The deteriorating security situation does not deter Cordola. In fact, it pushes him to work harder. There are terrible things happening, but we elect how we respond. I choose to respond with hope, he says. Unlike most foreigners working in Kabul, Cordola has no exit plans, even after the bombing May 31 that killed at least 150.

I will only leave if I feel that my presence could adversely affect the kids, he says. Till then, I will live my life like a great song.

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From 'Full House' to Afghanistan: an American teaches street ... - Christian Science Monitor

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis declined to discuss timeframes for the mission in Afghanistan after meeting with defense ministers in Brussels on Thursday over the future of America's longest war.

"I don't put timelines on wars, it's that simple," Mattis told reporters. "War is a fundamentally unpredictabe phenomenon, and every effort to create a pat answer to something like that is probably going to fail."

Mattis is using his time in Brussels to discuss NATO commitments for the fight in Afghanistan as he prepares a plan for the next phase of the war. He'll also use information gathered from Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joe Dunford, who visited Afghanistan this week.

On Thursday, Mattis was asked to respond to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats' testimony before lawmakers last month, in which he said the situation in Afghanistan "will almost certainly deteriorate" through 2018.

Coats told members of the Senate Intelligence Committee that the deterioration will continue "even with a modest increase in military assistance by the United States and its partners."

Mattis said of the comments "They're entitled to their assessment," adding that it's more important to ask what would happen if the U.S. pulled its troops from the country.

"You can't say, 'well I got tired of it so I'm going to come home' and wonder why you get hit again. We've all seen the results of leaving ungoverned areas. What is the price of not fighting this war, and in this case we're not willing to pay that price."

Read this article:
Jim Mattis on Afghanistan: 'I don't put timelines on wars' - Washington Examiner

CFB TRENTON, Ont. The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwallwill start the second day of their royal tour atCFB Trenton in eastern Ontario, where the couplewill meet members of the military and honour soldiers who lost their livesin Afghanistan.

Prince Charlesis also expected towatch asearch and rescuedemonstrationand visit military families while the Duchess of Cornwall will meet with aregiment the Queen's Own Rifles.

The couple will also attend a commemoration service and participate in a wreath laying at the Afghanistan Repatriation Memorial near the base.

Between 2001 and 2014, 158 members of the Canadian Armed Forces lost their lives in Afghanistan.

Gov. Gen. David Johnston alsoannounced this morning that the Prince of Wales has been appointed to the extraordinary companion category of the Order of Canada for supporting Canadian charitable activitiesas well as themen and women in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Later in the day, Charlesand Camilla will visitWellington Farmer's Market in Prince Edward County, where they will meet vendors and artisansand stop in at a local winery.

The Canadian Press

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Prince of Wales, wife Camilla to honour soldiers who died in Afghanistan - rdnewsnow.com

Last week, Islamic State fighters overran all of Darzab, according to the acting district governor, Baz Mohammad Dawar. Government officials were able to regain control of the districts center, but not most of the rest of the territory; 10 police officers or soldiers were killed in the fight, he said.

With the districts clinic under Islamic State control, 15 patients were evacuated to the capital of Jowzjan Province, Sheberghan, but they died en route, Afghan officials said.

Mohammad Reza Ghafori, the spokesman for the provincial governor, said that Islamic State fighters had destroyed the 50-bed clinic, forcing the patients to flee.

Mr. Dawar said he thought the patients had died of their injuries on the rugged journey because of a lack of medical staff members in the area. Other officials said it seemed likely that the fighters, who controlled the area the patients had to travel through, had killed them.

In the village of Betaw in Darzab, Islamic State militants killed seven local police officers and 15 civilians, according to a local elder, and threatened to kill anyone who held funeral ceremonies for them. Some held them anyway.

We live in a state of fear, the elder said by telephone. All of us who participated in the funeral are now scared that ISIS will attack and kill us. The elder spoke on the condition of anonymity because he feared retaliation by militants. It was not clear if the seven police officers were counted among the 10 cited by the governor, or if they were additional casualties.

ISIS is more powerful than the Taliban were in Darzab because their fighters are brave, said Hajji Obaidullah, the former police chief of the district. He and other local officials said that two former Taliban commanders, Qari Hikmat and Mufti Nemat, had combined forces and switched their allegiance to the Islamic State in recent months. He said the government had rushed in hundreds of reinforcements, in the form of police officers and soldiers from other areas, to keep the district center from falling to insurgents.

There is no Taliban in Darzab now, but only ISIS, said Halima Sadaf, a member of the Jowzjan Provincial Council, who is from Darzab.

They took over the district before Eid al-Fitr, she said, referring to the holiday signifying the end of Ramadan that began on Sunday.

But Afghan national security forces pushed them out of the capital of the district; the rest of the district is all with them, she added. They are strong and regrouping to launch another offensive.

One of the Islamic State commanders, Mufti Nemat, was persuaded last year to quit the Taliban and join the government side after a heavily publicized intervention by General Dostum, the first vice president. Mufti Nemat was previously a religious teacher in General Dostums home village. He later accused the government and General Dostum of reneging on promises made to him, announcing that he was joining forces with Qari Hikmat and would support the Islamic State.

Spokesmen for General Dostum and for the Taliban both confirmed that Mr. Nemat had left the Taliban, joined General Dostums side, but then gone over to the ISIS camp. Nemat is a threat for the government. He knows the Darzab District and the area very well; he is a very dangerous guy, said Enayatullah Babur Farahmand, General Dostums chief of staff. He blamed government inaction for alienating Mr. Nemat.

Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman who was reached via WhatsApp, said both local leaders who had joined ISIS had been rejected by the Taliban. Qari Hikmat, Mr. Mujahid said, had been sentenced to prison by the Taliban on corruption charges but he escaped and joined ISIS.

The Islamic State in Khorasan, as the group is known in Afghanistan, has generally been active only in the eastern province of Nangarhar, where fighters are locked in a struggle with the government as well as with local Taliban forces. Taking a district elsewhere in the country would be a significant advance for the group.

Jawad Sukhanyar reported from Kabul and Rod Nordland from London. Fahim Abed contributed reporting from Kabul.

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ISIS, Aided by Ex-Taliban Groups, Makes Inroads in Northern ... - New York Times