Mediaboss Marketing

Hes best known for his portrait of a young girl in Afghanistan named Afghan Girl from 1984. With her piercing green eyes, dark hair and red shawl draped over her head and shoulders, it made the front page of National Geographic, and went on to feature in many more magazines, becoming one of the most well known and famous front covers and a portrait that many will recognise. Its his single most striking portrait and is a timeless piece of work. As is much of Steve McCurrys work from his time travelling around Afghanistan.

On his first assignment to the country in 1979, the photographer ventured behind the lines, taking great risks, including dressing in Afghan robes in order to be smuggled across the border from Pakistan.

He journeys into treacherous and unpredictable landscapes much of which has been controlled by the Mujahideen, the Taliban and Russia. He thrives on getting out of his comfort zone to tell a story though his camera, as in many places he goes, there are no people left to tell the story.

He uses the battle-torn backdrops of the land to take centre stage for his work, in which hedelves into cultural traditions,framingeveryday people and activities, the effects of war, tribal rivalries and colonial wars, and which in turn gives a greatinsight into life in the country of his subject. But his work still retains its human interest elements, from young men selling oranges on the bonnet of a broken-down carto a portrait photographer and his Victorian-style camera on the streets of Kabul.

And despite the atrocities that have swept across the land, McCurry is able to find beauty in it too, both in the land and in the people that inhabit it. The Afhgans have always called their mountains the land of rebellion.

As his signature style, McCurry gives his work very short titles and almost no caption information, bar the location and date. The rest is left solely to the picture.

The American photographers latest book is a retrospective look back on his accomplished work across Afghanistan over the past 40 years, featuring more than 230 images that are almost all in colour, expect for a handful of black and white images from the70s and 80s.

After photographing India, the middle east and Afghanistan over the past four decades, McCurry founded ImagineAsia in 2004, which helps provide educational resources and opportunities to children and young people in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Steve McCurry is available to buy from Taschen.com

Kunar River, 1980 (Steve McCurry)

Bamiyan, 2006(Steve McCurry)

Bamiyan, 2003 (Steve McCurry)

Logar Province, 1984 (Steve McCurry)

Kabul, 2003 (Steve McCurry)

Read more here:
Afghanistan: Steve McCurry's retrospective look at a war-torn country - The Independent

According to Afghan officials 11 civilians, including women and children, were killed in Haska Mina district of Nangarhar province by a US air strike.

Photo by: AFP

Afghan women with their children walk as they flee the area where US air forces allegedly targeted a civilian vehicle in Haska Mina district Nangarhar province on August 12, 2017.

The United States on Saturday vehemently denied claims by Afghan officials that it had killed several civilians in an air strike in volatile easternAfghanistan.

Afghan officials had said 11 civilians, including women and children, were killed when a private vehicle was struck in Haska Mina district of Nangarhar province, a hotbed of Daeshactivity, on Thursday.

But United States Forces-Afghanistansaid in a statement the air strike "killed a number of militants".

"The militants were observed loading weapons in to a vehicle and were under surveillance until the vehicle was destroyed by an airstrike," said Bob Purtiman, a spokesman for American operations inAfghanistan.

"The strike was conducted in the middle of open terrain. There was zero chance of civilian casualties.

"This was the second false claim of civilian casualties in the same district in the last three weeks," Purtiman added.

Of the roughly 13,000 foreign forces inAfghanistanonly the US carries out airstrikes.

They have been regularly targeting Daeshpositions inseveral districts in restive Nangarhar.

Civilian casualties caused by NATO forces have been one of the most contentious issues in the close to 16-year campaign against insurgents, prompting strong public and government criticism.

Last month a US air strike killed 16 policemen in Helmand province. It came after a US air strike in Sangin killed at least 18 civilians, mostly women and children, in February.

Civilian deaths are at an all-time high inAfghanistan. In the first half of the year, 1,662 civilians were killed and more than 3,500 injured, according to the United Nations.

Attack on army vehicle kills 15 in southwestern Pakistan

Key Mongolian freshwater source faces fuel contamination

Outrage as 64 children die at India hospital

Russia's Lavrov warns of conflict over North Korea

Tibetan exiles hold rally backing India

If N Korea provokes US retaliation, will China remain neutral?

Here is the original post:
US denies air strike killed civilians in Afghanistan - TRT World

Mohammada Khan, 42, a truck driver, said in a telephone interview that he had lost six members of his family including two children and two women in the airstrike, which hit a minibus in which they were fleeing. We got to the area of the bombing and put their body parts in a truck and brought them to Jalalabad city, where we buried them this morning, he said. There were no ISIS members in the area. It was not a valley or a mountainous area. It was a clear area, and they should understand that people in the vehicle are civilians, as the car was a civilian car.

Mr. Khan added, But it was Gods will, so we cannot say anything.

On July 24, Afghan officials said, nine civilians were killed in an American airstrike on a prayer ceremony held in Haska Meena, near the border with Pakistan, by relatives of ISIS members who had been killed.

The American military asserted that that strike, too, targeted fighters. This is the second false claim of civilian casualties in the same district within the last three weeks, the military said in a news release.

As American airstrikes continue at a rapid pace, there have been a number of such episodes in recent months.

Claims of civilian deaths from airstrikes have occurred this year in Kunduz in the north and in Helmand Province in the south, often as a result of fighting in areas where it can be difficult to distinguish insurgents from civilians.

Haska Meena District, also known as Dih Bala District, is in a rugged area neighboring Achin District. Achin was long a stronghold of the Islamic State and was where the United States dropped the so-called mother of all bombs in April, the largest conventional bomb ever deployed, on a tunnel and bunker complex where insurgents had taken refuge.

That led Islamic State fighters to seek new refuge, including in the Tora Bora cave and tunnel complex in Nangarhar, which Osama bin Laden once used as a hide-out. The Islamic State fighters are believed to be relatively few, and in the Nangarhar area they fight against both the Afghan government and the more numerous Taliban insurgents.

The United States military has deployed Special Forces and airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Afghanistan and says it has killed dozens of the groups leaders and hundreds of fighters this year.

Casualties among Afghan civilians, especially women and children, have risen to a record this year, according to a recent report from the United Nations. Most of those deaths have been attributed to insurgents, particularly through suicide bombings, rather than to airstrikes and other pro-government actions, the report said.

Rod Nordland contributed reporting from London.

A version of this article appears in print on August 12, 2017, on Page A6 of the New York edition with the headline: Afghans Say U.S. Strike Hit Civilians.

See the rest here:
US Airstrikes in Afghanistan Are Said to Kill 16 Civilians - New York Times

Augusta mother of three and Maine Army National Guard wife Michelle Ouellette couldnt be prouder of the man she married even if his multiple oversea deployments have brought different challenges for her family.

Ouellette was surrounded by her children while her husband, Col. Bryan Ouellette, commander of the 120th Regional Support Group said goodbye to visiting family, friends, local and state dignitaries and other service members at the units send-off Friday at Hampden Academy.

Every time hes gone something different breaks at home, she said with a knowing smile on her face. Is is easier? Yes and no. Its a familiar routine when he leaves, but its different every time.

Thirty-five members of the 120th are heading to Afghanistan, after a period of training at Fort Hood, Texas. Two-thirds of the 35 soldiers have deployed before.

The soldiers will manage facilities, provide administrative and logistical support for troop services and provide security during their year-long deployment.

Master Sgt. Harold Whitten of Enfield, the units readiness noncommissioned officer, played with his 10-month-old grandson, Landon Nickerson, during the entire ceremony. He said he was getting in all the one-on-one time with the child that he could before he had to leave.

Whitten is also on his third deployment. He said he joined the military because everyone else in the family did. My father was in, my grandfather was in, uncles were in.

He went to Bosnia in 1997 and Iraq in 2003. His brother, Maj. Jeffrey Whitten, who works at the Armys Regional Training Institute in Bangor, sat behind him in support.

Maj. Megan Colleen Swanger, an engineer plans officer, is leaving on her second deployment. She went to Iraq as an active duty member of the 10th Mountain Division in 2009. Her parents, her best friend and boyfriend and both sets of their parents were at the ceremony in support.

Everybody took time off, Swanger said. Were enjoying all things Maine. We ate a lot of lobster to prepare of the departure.

Col. Ouellette said that some of the soldiers, including Swanger, were tapped from different Maine Guard units to fulfill the jobs required for the deployment.

Ouellette also deployed with the unit, formerly known as the 240th Engineer Group, when it last mobilized in 2006 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom to Afghanistan.

At that time, instant messaging was something new, his wife said.

It was such a treat if he was on at the same time, she said. This time, We made sure his Facetime was set up already so the family can communicate via video face-to-face.

In July, it was announced that six members of Bangor-based Detachment 3, 2nd Battalion, 641st Aviation Regiment would also be heading to Asia this fall. There are 28 members of the Maine Air National Guard currently overseas, Brig. Gen. Douglas Farnham, adjutant general for the Maine National Guard and commissioner of the Maine Department of Defense, Veterans and Emergency Management, said.

More:
Bangor Army Guard unit heading to Afghanistan - Bangor Daily News

By Ronald E. Neumann By Ronald E. Neumann August 9

Ronald E. Neumann was ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007.

In theory, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has been to train an Afghan army that can fight al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and now the Islamic State and then largely to withdraw. After 16 years, its not surprising that many people think that strategy has failed. In fact, it hasnt really been tried.

The Bush administration didnt think such a force was needed. The Obama administration not only didnt execute its own strategy, it also only grudgingly provided the resources necessary to avoid outright failure. The Trump administration has not increased those inadequate resources. In short, the strategy of trying to build an Afghan security structure that could successfully combat the Taliban only began six years ago and then was undercut after four years scarcely enough time to build a whole new army.

When I left Afghanistan in 2007, our target of a 216,000-strong Afghan army and police force was unmet. This security force included no serious air force, artillery, logistics or medical services, since it was designed on the assumption that the war was largely over. Our advisory presence was small in the army and almost nonexistent in the police. Iraq was soaking up all available resources, and my warnings that the fighting was about to get worse were ignored. Only in fall 2009 did the Obama administration decide to build to the current goal of 352,000 security personnel, including essential supporting forces. That effort did not begin to receive funding and equipment until a year later.

These expanded goals were only really pursued for four years and were heavily undercut by policy shifts. Virtually every aspect of the training was rushed and under-resourced. The development of essential support functions, from logistics to artillery to air, was delayed for a year so that all available training facilities could be devoted to getting infantry into the battle. U.S. and NATO training teams never reached much over 50 percent of required personnel, and even that low level took several years to achieve. Advisory teams were delegated to the National Guard and Reserves rather than the regular U.S. Army, a clear indication that this was a lower priority effort. Proper advanced training for these teams took several years to set up.

Then, the decision to end U.S. involvement in active combat by 2014 converted a conditions-based strategy to one driven by Washington timelines. Withdrawal of advisers consistently outpaced the readiness of the Afghans to take over. By 2014, many of our forces were devoted to getting packed up and out of the country rather than to the fighting. But worse was yet to come.

Critically, Afghan security forces trained with U.S. and NATO forces, and thus learned to fight as we do with air support. But from January 2014 to November 2016, that air support was withdrawn. The Obama administration declared that we are no longer at war with the Taliban. This nonsensical phrase, which I heard from senior officials at the National Security Council, left the Taliban free, except in the most extreme circumstances, to reinforce, maneuver and mass for attacks.

Only at the end of 2016 was the administration sufficiently shocked by the failure of its strategy to lift the prohibition on air support and end further withdrawals. But this left in place a greatly reduced U.S. and NATO force sufficient only to prevent immediate defeat. Since the Trump administration has largely maintained this inadequate force, it is puzzling that the White House wonders why it has not achieved a different result.

Our commanders may perhaps be faulted for not arguing harder against the political mistakes of Washington. I believe that they tried but found that the Obama White House resented every effort to speak truth to power. The Afghans can be seriously criticized for allowing politics to intrude much too far into senior military appointments (something that is being reversed by President Ashraf Ghanis appointment of battle-tested commanders). Nonetheless, our advisory presence still does not cover every Afghan army corps, nor their subordinate brigades. Much of the rush to failure has been Washington-driven.

Even a great effort to correct the mistakes of the past would not produce results on the battlefield for a year or more. Whether this can or should be done deserves serious debate. But that discussion should be based on a clear understanding of what has and what has not already been tried in Afghanistan.

Follow this link:
America keeps on failing in Afghanistan - Washington Post