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Major Wayne Owers was honoured three times by the Queen during his 27-year career

AN ARMY bomb disposal expert who saved countless lives in war-torn Afghanistan says he has been betrayed by the military after he was discharged while suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.

Major Wayne Owers was honoured three times by the Queen during his 27-year career and defused nearly 100 bombs in Afghanistan.

SWNS:South West News Service

PA:Press Association

PA:Press Association

But when the 46-year-old, originally from Whitnash, near Leamington in Warwickshire, asked for help tackling his nightmares and extreme anxiety from Army doctors, he was given a medical discharge.

He underwent two years of treatment and was showing signs of improvement but he was given amedical discharge and just 6,000 compensation rather than anon-operational posting.

He told the Mirror: The Army was my life but in my darkest hour when I most needed help I was told, You are no longer fit to serve.

I was mortified. It was a devastating blow. I could have continued serving.

In 2013 the Sun reported how Owers crawled forward in the middle of the battle to defuse a bomb in a school in Afghanistan.

When asked if they may be booby trapped and go off in his face when he touched them, the brave soldier grinned as he said: Probably not.

Simon Jones

Simon Jones

Major Owers received the Queens Commendation for Valuable Service after serving in the Iraq War and the Queens Gallantry Medal and the MBE for two tours in Afghanistan.

The dad-of-one described the pressure his unit faced and the horrific injuries some endured.

I have since been contacted by five other bomb disposal officers who have been suffering in the same way, he said.

He says the Ministry of Defences claim that it is serious about tackling PTSD is nonsense and says he knows soldiers who have lied about their recovery because they dont want to lose their jobs.

An Army spokesman said: We are absolutely committed to the mental health and wellbeing of soldiers and work hard to reduce the stigma associated with mental illness, encouraging those who need help to come forward.

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Brave Army officer who defused nearly 100 bombs in Afghanistan says he was dumped by MoD after suffering from ... - The Sun

Afghanistan has severely challenged every U.S. administration since the fall of 2001. The Trump administration is debating intensely what strategy, if any, might lead to more success than its predecessors achieved and turn around the stalemate on the ground in Afghanistan.

The media focus is largely on the troop numbers, tactics and costs being proposed to put the Taliban and its extremist bedfellows on the defensive and the positions of various U.S. policy makers including the president. A strategy for success, however, is much more complicated than just the issues surrounding security, vital as they are. There are at least seven pillars needed for a comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan: 1) military and security tactics and capacity-building; 2) Afghanistans domestic politics; 3) governance and economic performance; 4) Pakistans role; 5) options for a non-military solution; 6) international support; and 7) an effective U.S. policy and budgetary process. To only focus on the military pillar is a formula for misunderstanding. Neglecting any of the pillars can lead the enterprise to fail.

Supporters of a continued U.S. role in Afghanistan argue that it is in the national interest to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a base for terrorists. They argue that success is possible with a sustained, vigorous, multi-year effort without deadlines to bolster Afghan government capacity and to generate sufficient pressures on the Taliban and others to open paths to a non-military solution. This approach, they argue, will prevent terrorists from being able to operate internationally from Afghanistan.

As the U.S. policy debate unfolds, it is important to understand that a pathway to success demands a multifaceted and integrated strategy which addresses security issues well, while deploying effective diplomacy and non-military assistance.

Providing Military Support and Building Afghan Capacity

The Taliban gained ground militarily over the last two years. The fighting revealed serious shortcomings in the Afghan military, security and intelligence forces. Nevertheless, many Afghan troops and commanders fought with success and suffered very heavy casualties resisting the Taliban. The Afghan military clearly needed more support from U.S. airpower, intelligence, and Special Forces to counter the Taliban attacks and with that, they have held territory recently. They will need that support and advice for some time to come. In the interim, there is a clear need to clean out poorly performing and corrupt senior officers (in the army, the Interior Ministry and the intelligence service), to add an effective U.S. advisory presence closer to the front lines, and to undertake a serious revamp of training and capacity building programs, including addressing the airpower needs of the Afghan forces. The cleaning out of the Afghan military leadership has already begun with the support of Afghan president Ghani, but it will take time and persistence, as will a revitalized capacity building effort once properly resourced. This cluster of issues was at the core of the U.S. militarys request for more troops earlier this year, and is central to the debate in the Trump administration, which reportedly has included consideration of using private military contractors.

Assuring Afghan Domestic Political Support

Continued here:
7 Pillars for Success in Afghanistan - The National Interest Online

Updated 2 hours ago

As President Trump wrestles with America's role in Afghanistan, he should first decide what our objectives are today compared to what we wanted immediately after Sept. 11, 2001.

Initially, the United States overthrew the Taliban regime but failed to destroy it completely. Regime supporters, allied tribal forces and opportunistic warlords escaped (or returned) to Pakistan's frontier regions to establish sanctuaries.

Similarly, while the Taliban's ouster also forced al-Qaida into exile in Pakistan and elsewhere, al-Qaida nonetheless continued and expanded its terrorist activities. In Iraq and Syria, al-Qaida morphed into the even more virulent ISIS, which is now gaining strength in Afghanistan.

In short, America's Afghan victories were significant but incomplete. Subsequently, we failed to revise and update our Afghan strategic objectives, leading many to argue the war had gone on too long and we should withdraw. This criticism is superficially appealing, recalling anti-Vietnam War activist Allard Lowenstein's cutting remarks about Richard Nixon's policies. While Lowenstein acknowledged that he understood those, like Sen. George Aiken, who said we should win and get out, he said he couldn't understand Nixon's strategy of lose and stay in.

Today in Afghanistan, the pertinent question is what we seek to prevent, not what we seek to achieve. Making Afghanistan serene and peaceful does not constitute a legitimate American geopolitical interest. Instead, we face two principal threats.

Taliban's return to power

First, the Taliban's return to power throughout Afghanistan would re-create the prospect of the country being used as a base of operations for international terrorism. It is simply unacceptable to allow the pre-2001 status quo to re-emerge.

Second, a post-9/11 goal (at least one better understood today) is the imperative of preventing a Taliban victory in Afghanistan that would enable Pakistani Taliban or other terrorist groups to seize control in Islamabad. Not only would such a takeover make all Pakistan yet another terrorist sanctuary, but if its large nuclear arsenal fell to terrorists, we would immediately face the equivalent of Iran and North Korea on nuclear steroids. Worryingly, Pakistan's military, especially its intelligence arm, is already thought to be controlled by radical Islamists.

Given terrorism's global spread since 9/11 and the risk of a perfect storm the confluence of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the continuing threats we face in the Afghan arena are even graver than those posed pre-9/11. Accordingly, abandoning the field in Afghanistan is simply not a tenable strategy.

However, accomplishing America's goals does not require remaking Afghanistan's government, economy or military in our image. Believing that only nation building in Afghanistan could ultimately guard against the terrorist threat was mistaken. For too long, it distracted Washington and materially contributed to the decline in American public support for a continuing military presence there, despite the manifest need for it.

There is no chance that the Trump administration will pursue nation building in Afghanistan, as the president has repeatedly made clear. Speaking as a Reagan administration alumnus of USAID, I concur. We should certainly continue bilateral economic assistance to Afghanistan, which, strategically applied, has served America well in countless circumstances during the Cold War and thereafter. But we should not conflate it with the diaphanous prospect of nation building.

Nor should we assume that the military component in Afghanistan must be a repetition or expansion of the boots-on-the-ground approach we have followed since the initial assault on the Taliban. Other alternatives appear available and should be seriously considered, including possibly larger U.S. military commitments of the right sort.

Even more important, there must be far greater focus on Pakistan.

A volatile & lethal mix

Politically unstable since British India's 1947 partition, increasingly under Chinese influence because of the hostility with India, and a nuclear-weapons state, Pakistan is a volatile and lethal mix ultimately more important than Afghanistan itself. Until and unless Pakistan becomes convinced that interfering in Afghanistan is too dangerous and too costly, no realistic U.S. military scenario in Afghanistan can succeed.

The stakes are high on the subcontinent, not just because of the Af-Pak problems but because Pakistan, India and China are all nuclear powers. The Trump administration should not be mesmerized only by U.S. troop levels. It must concentrate urgently on the bigger strategic picture. The size and nature of America's military commitment in Afghanistan will more likely emerge from that analysis rather than the other way around. And time is growing short.

John Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations and, previously, the undersecretary of State for arms control and international security.

Read more:
What's next in Afghanistan? - Tribune-Review

Nicholson speaks out as Trump considers new military policy inAfghanistan; says war has to be won.

NATO has to win the war against the insurgents in Afghanistan, the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan (RS) said on Saturday at a gathering in Kabul held to mark the sacrifices of by Afghan and foreign soldiers.

The commander of the U.S and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, said failure in Afghanistan will embolden extremist groups in the West.

Nicholson said they should and will defeat the insurgents to safeguard their own homeland.

If we fail in Afghanistan, we will invite terror attacks on our homelands. Failure with unleash millions of migrants out of this region and the rest of the world. Failure will embolden terrorists and jihadists globally to include those already inside our own countries. That is why we are here and that is why we must win, said Nicholson.

The sacrifices of the Afghan and foreign soldiers who have injured in the war against insurgents were appreciated by NATO chief in Kabul.

The country has a right to rely on us and you, if we sacrifice our lives for the country, that is still not enough, Nasir Ahmad, a former Afghan National Army officer said.

Meanwhile, President Ashraf Ghani also admired the bravery of Afghan forces in defending their homeland.

I thank our new generation, for their bravery and sacrifices they make in the Afghanistans defense and security forces, said Ghani.

Nicholson remarks over defeating insurgents in Afghanistan were expressed as the United States president Donald Trump recently said he had inherited a mess in Afghanistan and that announcing his strategy on Afghanistans war is a big decision for him.

The new US strategy is expected to be announced soon.

See more here:
Failure In Afghanistan Means Strengthening Terrorists In West - TOLOnews

Blackwater founder Erik Prince's controversial proposal to privatize a large portion of the U.S. war in Afghanistan is being met with growing opposition in Kabul and Washington.

President Donald Trump is reportedly considering the proposal as part of his monthslong review of the war in Afghanistan, where the U.S. is locked in a stalemate with the Taliban after 16 years of fighting.

Prince touts the plan as a cost-effective way to turn the war around. Under the proposal, about 5,000 contractors would replace U.S. troops currently advising Afghan forces. They'd be backed by a 90-plane private air force. The contractors would operate under Afghan control, Prince said.

"This is very much under the authority of the central government and the control of the chief of staff of the Afghan armed forces. This is not a local militia that's going to be raised," Prince said in an interview with VOA's Afghan service.

Unaccountable

But a growing number of prominent Afghans fear that Prince's for-profit, private military would be unaccountable and say the move risks a repeat of the atrocities carried out by Blackwater guards in Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s.

Afghanistan's government has not yet officially responded to the proposal. But a senior Afghan defense official told VOA, "The plan has legal problems and raises questions about our mutual security agreements with the U.S."

The Afghan official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to publicly discuss the proposal, specifically cited the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, which went into effect in 2012, and the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which the U.S. and Afghanistan signed in 2014 during the first few months of President Ashraf Ghani's tenure as leader of Afghanistan.

His predecessor, President Hamid Karzai, had refused to sign the agreement, even after a traditional Loya Jirga (grand council) approved it.

Any amendment to the BSA in the face of the proposed plan to privatize the war could potentially call for another Loya Jirga, and that could further complicate an already complex situation in the country.

Stalemate

There are about 9,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Most are in noncombat roles, aimed at training and advising Afghan forces, since U.S.-led NATO troops ended their combat mission in 2014.

But since taking over security control of the country, the Afghan military has been losing ground to the Taliban. The Kabul government now controls just over half of the country. Top Pentagon officials, including Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, now concede the U.S. is not winning the war.

The war is also expensive. The U.S. is expected to spend about $45 billion on Afghanistan this year alone.

"The United States, right now, is spending more than the entire U.K. defense budget, just in Afghanistan. And the U.S. can't continue that forever," said Prince, who claims to be able to do the job for less than $10 billion a year.

Prince's plan

Under Prince's proposal, the U.S. war would be coordinated by a "viceroy," who would consolidate what Prince calls Washington's "very chaotic and disorganized" approach to the country.

The 5,000 contractors would attach to Afghan military units and would "live with, train with and fight alongside them, when necessary," Prince said. They would report to Afghanistan's government, he added.

"These would be contracted professionals attached to the Afghan army. So even by United Nations definitions, those are not mercenaries. They would be attached to and serving with the Afghan forces," he said.

Prince also proposes a "big increase" in air support. The 90 planes in his private air force "would be badged as Afghan aircraft, with Afghan call signs, with an Afghan on board, and Afghans making the weapons release decisions," he said.

Prince, a former Navy SEAL, said he also wants to keep about 2,000 U.S. special forces in the country to "maintain a unilateral ability to go after terrorist targets."

Pushback

But Prince's plan faces an uphill battle.

Trump has said he is open to new ideas in Afghanistan. But if he decides to embrace Prince's plan, he may have to override top U.S. military leaders, who are said to dislike the proposal.

A wide range of Afghans are also skeptical. Former Afghan President Karzai said via Twitter he "vehemently" opposed the plan, calling it a "blatant violation" of Afghanistan's national sovereignty.

Rahmatullah Nabil, Afghanistan's former spy chief, said the plan would result in more civilian anger that would only help Taliban recruitment.

Hameem Talwar, a 28-year-old from the northeast province of Kunar, told VOA he feared the move would result in more civilian casualties.

"People will rise up against them, and the war will become longer and will provide an excuse for the Americans to stay even longer," Talwar said.

Thomas Johnson, who specializes in Afghanistan and national security issues at the Naval Postgraduate School, said, "This has to be one of the most insane, dangerous proposals I have ever heard.

"This would basically be a foreign mercenary force that couldn't speak the languages, would wear ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] uniforms, and would basically employ deadly military force outside the standard Law of Armed Conflict controls," Johnson said.

"It would represent one of our greatest abominations of military and international responsibilities in our history," he added.

Legal risks

Handing so many war responsibilities to private contractors could also make the U.S. more vulnerable to lawsuits, said Laura Dickinson, a law professor at George Washington University who studies the privatization of foreign affairs.

"If things go wrong, the United States could be on the hook legally for their actions," Dickinson said. "And we know from past experiences that without adequate planning, when you have a massive influx of contractors, things do go wrong."

Dickinson pointed to a 2007 incident in which four Blackwater guards were accused of killing 14 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad. A similar incident in 2010 in Kabul resulted in the deaths of two Afghan civilians.

Though Prince sold Blackwater in 2010 and now owns a Hong Kong-based company that would carry out the Afghanistan proposal, incidents like that could complicate his proposal.

Decision soon

Trump has indicated he is nearing a decision on Afghanistan. In addition to Prince's proposals, his options include boosting the U.S. troop presence there, or removing them entirely.

"We're getting very close," Trump said Thursday. "It's a very big decision for me. I took over a mess, and we're going to make it a lot less messy."

Excerpt from:
Plan to Privatize US War in Afghanistan Gets Icy Reception - Voice of America