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Can Russia's control of the national media be successful? Interview with political scientist Professor Nils Weidmann

"Russia's information war has been neglected for too long": Political scientist Professor Nils Weidmann from the University of Konstanz studies how autocracies control their country's media, and what role the internet plays for protest movements.

In the interview, he describes why internet technology can play into the hands of autocracies, and why courageous actions like the disruption of Russian news by a peace activist will rarely be seen.

Note to editors:Professor Nils B. Weidmann is happy to talk to the press. Please email kum@uni-konstanz.de if you are interested.

About Nils Weidmann:Professor Nils B. Weidmann is professor of political science at the University of Konstanz and co-speaker of the Cluster of Excellence "The Politics of Inequality". He leads the research group "Communication, Networks and Contention" and focuses on protest movements and civil wars as well as digital communication and political mobilization.

Recommended reading:Nils B. Weidmann, Espen Geelmuyden Rd (2019): The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies. Oxford University Press.

You can download a photo of Nils Weidmann at:https://cms.uni-konstanz.de/fileadmin/exzellenz/inequality/Personen/Weidmann_Nils.jpgCaption: Professor Nils B. Weidmann, University of KonstanzPhoto: Ines Janas

Contact:University of KonstanzCommunications and MarketingPhone: + 49 7531 88-3603Email: kum@uni-konstanz.de

- uni.kn/en

Disclaimer: AAAS and EurekAlert! are not responsible for the accuracy of news releases posted to EurekAlert! by contributing institutions or for the use of any information through the EurekAlert system.

Link:
The "Information War in Russia - EurekAlert

The FIA announced in the days after the controversial title-decider between Max Verstappen and Lewis Hamilton that it would be launching a full investigation, which has taken place over the last three months.

On the eve of the 2022 season, the FIA released an executive summary of the report, detailing what happened in Abu Dhabi and offering recommendations.

FIA Executive Summary Report

Executive summary of the analysis and clarification exercise conducted by the FIA following

the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix.

Introduction

This report has been drawn up to present to the WMSC members the conclusions arising from the analysis of the events that took place during the last five laps of the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix counting towards the 2021 FIA Formula One World Championship. The sole purpose of this report is to draw any lessons from this situation and clarity to be provided to the participants, media, and fans about the current regulations to preserve the competitive nature of our sport while ensuring the safety of the drivers and officials.

A) Ontrack events

1. On 12 December 2021, on Lap 53/58 of the race of the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix held at the Yas Marina circuit in the United Arab Emirates (the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix), the last Competition counting towards the 2021 FIA Formula One World Championship, Nicholas Latifi (Williams Racing) crashed into the barrier at the exit of Turn 14 at 18:21:37 local time. Marshals were required to remove the car and debris from the track. At this point, the racing order was as follows: #1. Lewis Hamilton (HAM), MercedesAMG Petronas F1 Team (Mercedes); #2. Max Verstappen (VER), Red Bull Racing Honda (Red Bull) and #3. Sergio Perez, Red Bull. Marshals immediately displayed doublewaved yellow flags in that sector.

2. At the time of the crash, both HAM and VER were driving on hard compound tyres, each having undertaken one previous tyre change. At 18:21:54 local time, the Safety Car was deployed by Race Control. VER pitted for new soft compound tyres. HAM remained out on track on hard compound tyres, behind the safety car Once the field was under control behind the Safety Car, the recovery of N. Latifis car began. The speed of the recovery was, however, slower than anticipated, due in part to the cars brakes having caught fire. On Lap 55/58, the recovery and cleanup of the incident continued.

3. At 18:27:55 local time, with the race on Lap 56/58 and the safety car still on the track as there was still significant debris being cleared by marshals on the track, the standard message LAPPED CARS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO OVERTAKE was published which led to confusion amongst the teams as they were preparing for the unlapping procedure. At this point, the racing order was as follows: #1. HAM; #2. VER and #3. Carlos Sainz, Scuderia Ferrari Mission Winnow (S. Perez having retired). Several radio exchanges took place between Red Bull and Race Control (see details on Page 4).

4. At 18:31:01 local time, with the race on Lap 57/58 and the safety car still on the track, the track was clear and the message LAPPED CARS 4 (NOR) 14 (ALO) 31 (OCO) 16 (LEC) 5 (VET) TO OVERTAKE SAFETY CAR (i.e., only the five lapped cars between HAM and VER) was published on Timing Page 3 and official message system. Three further lapped cars remained behind VER (Car 3 (Riccardo), Car 18 (Stroll) and Car 47 (Schumacher)). Those three lapped cars were not directed to, and did not, overtake VER or others. Mercedes made a remark to Race Control by radio (see details on Page 4).

5. Race Control subsequently notified the teams (on Lap 57/58) as follows: SAFETY CAR IN THIS LAP.

6. At 18:32 local time, with the race entering Lap 58 (the final lap), the messages TRACK CLEAR and CLEAR IN TRACK SECTOR 18were published. This allowed for green flag racing conditions on the final lap.

7. On Lap 58/58, VER overtook HAM at Turn 5 and took the lead in the race. At Turn 9, HAM almost touched VER while trying to overtake him, but VER stayed ahead and crossed the finish Line first. HAM crossed the finish Line second.

8. At 18:33 local time, the message CHEQUERED FLAG was published.

B) Protests, hearings and Stewards decisions

9. At 19:01 local time, Mercedes filed two notices of protest pursuant to Article 17 of the 2021 Formula One Sporting Regulations (F1 Sporting Regulations) and Articles 13.1 to 13.5 of the 2021 International Sporting Code (Code). The first protest alleged a breach of Article 48.8 of the F1 Sporting Regulations on the basis that VER overtook HAM during the safety car period. The second protest alleged that there had been a breach of Article 48.12 of the F1 Sporting Regulations during the Race, and sought an amendment to the Race Classification as a result (the Protest).

10. At 19:45 local time, the Team representatives of Mercedes and Red Bull were summoned by the Stewards for the following reason: Protest by MercedesAMG PETRONAS Formula One Team against Car 33, alleged breach of Article 48.8 of the 2021 FIA Formula One Sporting Regulations (i.e. Car 33 (VER) would have overtaken Car 44 (HAM) during the Safety Car period at 18:32).

11. At 20:45 local time, the Team representatives of Mercedes and Red Bull were summoned by the Stewards for the following reason: Protest by MercedesAMG Petronas F1 Team against the classification established at the end of the Competition, alleged breach of Article 48.12 of the 2021 FIA Formula One Sporting Regulations.

12. At 22:14 local time, after having heard the representatives of both F1 Teams concerned, the Stewards issued Document 57 whereby they determined that although Car 33 did at one stage, for a very short period of time, move slightly in front of Car 44, at a time when both cars where accelerating and braking, it moved back behind Car 44 and it was not in front when the Safety Car period ended (i.e. at the line). Accordingly, the Protest is dismissed.

13. At 23:03 local time, after having heard the representatives of Mercedes and those of Red Bull (as an interested party) and the Race Director, the Stewards issued Document 58 (the Decision) whereby they determined that Article 15.3 allows the Race Director to control the use of the safety car, which in our determination includes its deployment and withdrawal. That although Article 48.12 may not have been applied fully, in relation to the safety car returning to the pits at the end of the following lap, Article 48.13 overrides that and once the message Safety Car in this lap has been displayed, it is mandatory to withdraw the safety car at the end of that lap. That notwithstanding Mercedes request that the Stewards remediate the matter by amending the classification to reflect the positions at the end of the penultimate lap, this is a step that the Stewards believe is effectively shortening the race retrospectively, and hence not appropriate. Accordingly, the Protest is dismissed.

14. At 23:22 local time, within one hour of the publication of the Decision (see Article 15 of the International Sporting Code and Article 10.1.1 of the FIA Judicial and Disciplinary Rules), Mercedes notified the Stewards in writing of its intention to appeal in respect of the Stewards decision regarding the Article 48.12 Protest. The deadline for lodging this appeal before the FIA International Court of Appeal (ICA) was 16 December 2021, 8.22 p.m. CET.

15. Mercedes did not submit a notification of appeal by the deadline (or at any time thereafter), but rather confirmed publicly on 16 December 2021 that it was withdrawing its appeal.

II. KEY ISSUES AND FINDINGS

As confirmed by the WMSC in its statement of 15 December 2021, the purpose of the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was to identify any lessons that could be learned from the events that took place at the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP and consider how best to provide clarity to F1 participants, fans, and media regarding the Formula 1 rules and regulations going forward.

16. The role of the Race Director is by nature demanding and highpressured. However, a recurrent theme in the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was a concern that the number of roles and responsibilities of the Race Director that have accumulated over the years might be adding additional pressure to the role.

17. From 1997 to 2019, the role of Race Director was held by Charlie Whiting. In addition to the position of Race Director, Mr Whiting simultaneously held the positions of FIA Safety Delegate, Permanent Starter, and Single Seater Sporting Director. Following Mr Whitings death in March 2019, Michael Masi was appointed as the new Race Director. Mr Masi had previously held the role of Deputy Race Director for F1, F2 and F3 from 2018. Mr Masi also took over Mr Whitings roles of Safety Delegate and (from 2021) Single Seater Sporting Director.

18. Suggestions made by the F1 Commission, and those interviewed included that some of the Race Directors responsibilities should be divided and assigned to other persons to reduce the workload of the Race Director and allow them to focus on their key functions, including managing and controlling the race.

2. Radio communications between F1 teams and the Race Director

19. Radio communications between F1 teams and the Race Director were identified as another key issue during the analysis.

20. Direct radio communications between the F1 Teams and Race Control were made public from early on the 2021 Season as part of a broader media strategy. It should be noted that only part of the exchanges was made public.

21. Following the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP, there was a significant amount of media attention and public debate directed towards the communications between the Race Director and the Red Bull Racing Team Principal on the one hand, and the Race Director and the Mercedes Team Principal on the other hand, especially the conversations which took place during the final laps of the race

22. On Lap 56/58, after the message LAPPED CARS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO OVERTAKE was published, the conversation1 between Red Bulls Team Principal (Christian Horner) / Team Manager (Jonathan Wheatley) and Race Control (Michael Masi) was as follows:

23. On Lap 57/58, after the message LAPPED CARS 4 (NOR) 14 (ALO) 31 (OCO) 16 (LEC) 5 (VET) TO OVERTAKE SAFETY CAR was published, Mercedes Team Principal (Toto Wolff) radioed Race Control:

24. Thus, much of the debate centred around the purpose and appropriateness of those communications and whether inrace communications between the F1 teams and the Race Director should be broadcasted or even permitted at all.

25. The consensus of those involved in the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was that the respective communications to the Race Director by the Red Bull Racing and Mercedes Team Principals during the final laps of the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP had a negative impact on the smooth running of the final laps because they were distracting when the Race Director needed to focus on making difficult and timepressured decisions.

26. Indeed, when the Safety Car is deployed, the Race Director must in particular monitor the cars on track, the order in which they are placed, the deployment of the appropriate flags, the progress of the marshals intervention and then, if the Clerk of the Course considers that conditions so permit, order the Safety Car to leave the track.

27. The Race Director must therefore manage both the cars on the track, the intervention of the Safety Car and what happens at the scene of the incident, i.e. a considerable number of tasks to be accomplished in a minimum of time to allow the race to resume safely and as soon as possible, while at the same time responding to the demands of the Team Principals. This requires immense concentration.

28. Hence, it was found that these communications were neither necessary nor helpful to the smooth running of the race. Rather, the consensus was that they add pressure to the Race Director at a critical time (i.e. at a time when the Race Director must simultaneously monitor the cars on the track, the deployment of the appropriate flags, and the progress of the marshals in clearing the track, and also liaise with the Clerk of the Course in relation to the end of the safety car period) and might seek to influence (whether directly or indirectly, or intentionally or unintentionally) the decisions made by the Race Director.

29. With the foregoing in mind, the consensus of those involved in the detailed analysis and clarification exercise was that communications between (on one hand) F1 teams and (on the other hand) the Race Director during a race ought to be restricted so that the Race Director would be free to perform his/her crucial role without unnecessary disruption and distractions.

3. Safety car unlapping procedure

30. The safety car unlapping procedure was a central topic of discussion during the detailed analysis and clarification exercise, stemming from the misunderstanding regarding the application of this procedure at the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP, pursuant to Articles 48.12 and 48.13 of the F1 Sporting Regulations.

31. It was apparent from the analysis that there could be different interpretations of Article 48.12 and/or Article 48.13, and that this likely contributed to some of the confusion surrounding the safety car unlapping procedure. It was therefore considered that these provisions of the F1 Sporting Regulations would benefit from clarification.2

32. It was also considered that the decisions regarding the safety car at the end of the 2021 Abu Dhabi GP likely took into account previous discussions (including at meetings of the F1 SAC, the F1 Commission, and F1 Team Managers) that made clear the F1 teams preference to end races under green flag racing conditions, rather than behind a safety car, when safe to do so. The F1 drivers consultation confirmed that finishing a race under green flag racing conditions remains desirable, but that safety should always come first. If for safety reasons it is not possible to withdraw the safety car, the F1 teams confirmed that they would accept finishing the race under safety car conditions.

33. The process of identifying the lapped cars used to be a manual process. For 2022 season a software has been developed that will automate the communication of the list of cars that must unlap themselves.

34. In a recent EVote, the WMSC has confirmed a rule change that clarifies that in case of unlapping all cars rather than any cars have to unlap. Further investigation into the F1 timing system shall clarify whether a virtual unlapping procedure could bring advantages and simplification.

35. The results of the 2021 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix and the FIA Formula One World Championship are valid, final and cannot now be changed. In accordance with the rules, Mercedes made a protest to the stewards after the race, seeking to change the race classification. The stewards dismissed the protest and Mercedes then had an opportunity to appeal that decision to the FIA International Court of Appeal, but did not do so. There are no other available mechanisms in the rules for amending the race classification.

4. FIA race management team structure

36. The support available to the race management team was identified as a key issue by participants in the analysis, in the context of ensuring that the Race Director is able to perform his/her role to the best of his/her ability.

37. Responsibility for supporting the race management team lies primarily with the FIA Single Seater department. When consulted in relation to the support that they provide, department staff reported that the team was positive and worked well together. They noted the demanding nature of the Race Director role, particularly in light of the Race Directors multiple roles and responsibilities. They also identified the need for additional support and resource in order to improve the functioning of the department and thereby provide better support to the race management team.

38. Additionally, the staff identified the need to improve communications between the FIA office in Geneva and track staff, and between the F1 Sport and F1 Technical departments. They also noted the complexity of the F1 Regulations (in particular the F1 Technical Regulations, the Technical Directives that supplement them, and the F1 Financial Regulations) and the reduction of the duration of consultancy agreements from 3 years to 1 year, often resulting in higher staff turnover and so reduced familiarity with the rules.

IV. THE RECOMMENDATIONS

39. Recommendations are set out below to address the findings and conclusions in this report. These recommendations have been presented by the FIA President to both the F1 Commission and the WMSC, and were publicly announced in a statement of the FIA President released on 17 February 2022.

Recommendation 1: to assist the Race Director in the decisionmaking process, a Virtual Race Control Room should be created. Like the Video Assistance Referee (VAR) in football, it will be positioned in one of the FIA Offices as a backup outside the circuit. In realtime connection with the FIA F1 race director, it will help to apply the Sporting Regulations using the most modern technological tools.

Recommendation 2: direct radio communications during the race, currently broadcast live by all TVs, should be removed in order to protect the Race Director from any pressure and allow him to take decisions peacefully. It will still be possible to ask questions to the Race Director, according to a well defined and nonintrusive process.

Recommendation 3: unlapping procedures behind safety car should be reassessed by the F1 Sporting Advisory Committee and presented to the next F1 Commission prior to the start of the season.

Recommendation 4: a new race management team has been put in place starting in Barcelona for the test session. Niels Wittich (former DTM Race Director) and Eduardo Freitas (former WEC Race Director) will act alternatively as Race Director, assisted by Herbie Blash (former righthand man of Charlie Whiting) as permanent senior advisor.

40. Many improvements, such as recruitments and the division of the Race Directors many roles and tasks, have already been made. Furthermore, the role of Executive Director of the FIA Single Seater department was created within the FIA in December 2021, which Peter Bayer holds in addition to his role as Secretary General for Sport.

41. However, in order to finalise the new structure:

- A new F1 Sporting Director will be recruited (process finalized),

- An additional senior regulatory legal counsel will be recruited to strengthen the legal support (i) during the F1 competitions (regardless of the time difference) and especially during the weekend and (ii) on F1 sporting matters.

42. It is suggested that all the recommendations that have not already been implemented are actioned as a matter of priority so that the benefit of the lessons learned from the detailed analysis and clarification exercise can be maximised for the for the 2022 season. The WMSC members will be kept regularly informed of the progress made.

Read more from the original source:
In full: The FIA report on the 2021 F1 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix - Motorsport.com

The Bunkers has found itself at the centre of controversy after the Warriors were awarded a contentious try against the Titans.

On the stroke of halftime, Phillip Sami failed to ground the ball in his in-goal allowing Warriors star Adam Pompey the chance to score.

Replays, however, showed the put down was dubious at best, triggering debate amongst the Fox League panel.

This is a big crucial try right on halftime but did he get it down? Cooper Cronk asked.

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I dont think that was a try, Michael Ennis said.

Lets have a look at it, Braith Anasta said.

It is a big call and I think the focus of the bunker was so much on the grounding from Sami, but not so much Pompey.

Mark Geyer took aim at the bunker in a cheeky tweet on social media.

Ennis and Cronk initially believed that Pompey didnt have control of the ball and promoted it forward into Samis leg.

He pushes it into the leg of Sami and he doesnt get control of it, Ennis said.

It is not a try.

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Me neither and that right hand slides off it, Cronk said.

It doesnt actually compress the ball down onto the grass.

Im with Mick it hits the leg, but I dont know if it gets that compression on the grass.

However, Anasta believed that the call was close enough to give the attacking team the benefit of the doubt and Ennis conceded on the final replay that Pompey may have done just enough.

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I think it is really close, Anasta said.

We can maybe give them the benefit of the doubt even though the three of us are leaning towards no try.

Sami unfortunately thought he grounded that with his torso. They got that right, he certainly hadnt.

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But just whether Pompey grounded the ball is the contentious one.

Maybe he does when you slow it down from that back angle, Ennis said.

The side angle it doesnt look like it. It looks like it slides off.

But the rear angle it looks like it just gets pushed into the turf fractionally. Is it control? It was enough.

Read the original:
Are we watching the same game?: Legends stunned as bizarre bunker call burns Titans - Fox Sports

Social marketing intelligence is the method of extrapolating valuable information from social network interactions and data flows that can enable companies to launch new products and services into the market at greater speed and lower cost. This is an area of research however, companies using social marketing intelligence have achieved significant improvement in marketing campaigns.[citation needed]

Through social marketing intelligence, companies can identify people that are the most influential within their communities. These are the most connected people within any given social network. These people, sometimes called the alpha users or hubs as in small-world network theory, have considerable influence over the spread of information within their social network.[1]

Alpha users are key elements of any social networks, who manage the connectivity of the core members of the community. Similar to how viruses spread in nature, there is an initial starting point to communications in social networks, and the originators of such communications are alpha users. They tend to be highly connected users with exceptional influence to the other thought-leaders of any social network.

Before digital communications, it was only possible to isolate the most influential members of any community by interviewing every member and tracing their full communication patterns within the social network. Traditional fixed landline telephone and internet use did not give enough accuracy to be able to pinpoint alpha users to a meaningful degree. With the advent of mobile phones, a personal digital communication channel was available to study. Early research by mathematicians at Xtract[1] in Finland produced models that suggested mobile networks could indeed track the full communication and isolate the alpha users. Since then, several companies including Xtract have launched commercial tools to detect alpha users, usually using mobile operator billing and telecoms traffic data.

Engagement marketing campaigns attempt to use alpha users as spokespersons in marketing and advertising. The idea is that consumers will trust more the opinion of their friend or known contact from a social network, than the random marketing and advertising messages of companies and brands. The desire is to achieve viral marketing effects by which the alpha users would spread the messages further.

Alpha users were first briefly discussed in public in the book 3G Marketing in 2004.[2] The first industry article about alpha users was by Ahonen and Ahvenainen in Total Telecom in February 2005. The first telecoms conference where alpha user was explained was the 3G Mobile World Congress in Tokyo in January 2005. The topic was part of the strategy keynote address at the 3GSM World Congress in Cannes in February 2005. The first book to discuss alpha users at length was Communities Dominate Brands in 2005.[3]

View original post here:
Social marketing intelligence - Wikipedia

For nearly a month, Vladimir Putin has delivered a daily masterclass in incompetence and brutality. The ex-KGB spymaster and world-class kleptocrat was the guy Donald Trump wanted to be. Just weeks ago, the former president lavished praise on his idol and derided Nato as not so smart.

Hows that working out, Donald?

The world cheers for Volodymyr Zelenskiy and Ukraine, his besieged country. Russias economy is on its knees, its stock market shuttered, its shelves bare. The rouble is worth less than a penny. The west is not as decadent or as flaccid as the tyrant-in-the-Kremlin and President Bone-Spurs bet.

With impeccable timing, Marie Yovanovitch delivers Lessons from the Edge, her memoir. The author is the former US ambassador to Ukraine who Trump fired during his attempt to withhold aid to Kyiv in return for political dirt, an effort that got him impeached. For the first time.

Yovanovitch tells a story of an immigrants success. But, of course, her short but momentous stint in the last administration receives particular attention.

On the page, Yovanovitch berates Trump for his obsequiousness to Putin, which she says was a frequent and continuing cause for concern among the diplomatic corps. Trump, she writes, saw Ukraine as a loser country, smaller and weaker than Russia. If only thousands of dead Russian troops could talk.

Trump was commander-in-chief but according to Yovanovitch, he didnt exactly have the best handle on where his soldiers were deployed.

At an Oval Office meeting in 2017 with Petro Poroshenko, then president of Ukraine, Trump asked HR McMaster, his national security adviser, if US troops were deployed in Donbas in eastern Ukraine, territory now invoked by Putin as grounds for his invasion.

An affirmative answer to that question would have meant that the United States was in a shooting war with Russia, Yovanovitch writes.

In the moment, she says, she also pondered if it was better to interpret Trumps question as suggesting that the commander-in-chief thought it possible that US troops were fighting Russia-led forces, or instead as an indicator that the president wasnt clear which country was on the other side of the war against Ukraine.

Let that sink in. And remember this. According to Mary Trump, the former presidents niece, Trump mocked his father as he succumbed to Alzheimers.

Yovanovitchs parents fled the Nazis, then the Soviets. She was born in Canada and her family moved to the US when she was three. Later she received an offer from Smith, an all-womens school in Massachusetts, but opted for Princeton. It had gone co-ed less than a decade earlier but Yovanovitch counted on it being more fun.

In her memoir, she devotes particular attention to snubs and put-downs endured on account of gender. One of her professors, a European history specialist, announced that he opposed women being admitted. After that, Yovanovitch stayed silent during discussion. It was only after she received an A, she writes, that the professor noticed her and made sure to include her. She really had something to say.

Lessons from the Edge also recalls a sex discrimination lawsuit brought in 1976 by Alison Palmer, a retired foreign service officer, against the US Department of State. The case was settled, but only in 1989 and with an acknowledgment of past wrongs by the department.

State had disproportionately given men the good assignments, Palmer said. Yovanovitch writes: I felt and still feel tremendous gratitude to [her] for fighting for me and so many other women.

Yovanovitch would serve in Moscow and as US ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Ukraine. She worked with political appointees and careerists. She offers particular praise for Republicans of an earlier, saner era.

She lauds George Shultz, Ronald Reagans secretary of state, for professionalism and commitment to country. Shultz reminded new ambassadors that my country meant the US, not their place of posting. He also viewed diplomacy as a constant effort, as opposed to a spasmodic intervention.

Yovanovitch also singles out James Baker, secretary of state to George HW Bush, for helping the president forge a coalition to win the Gulf war.

Department folks found him cold and aloof, Yovanovitch recalls. But it was clear immediately that he was a master of diplomacy.

Baker showed flashes of idealism. The US stood for something. As younger men, both Shultz and Baker were marines.

In marked contrast, Yovanovitch gives the Trump administration a thumping. She brands Rex Tillersons 14-month tenure as secretary of state as near-disastrous. As for Tillersons successor, Mike Pompeo, Yovanovitch lambasts his faux swagger and his refusal to defend her when she came under attack from Trump and his minions.

Amid Trumps first impeachment, over Ukraine, Yovanovitch testified: The policy process is visibly unravelling the state department is being hollowed out.

Loyalty to subordinates was not Pompeos thing or Trumps. Lick whats above you, kick whats below you that was more their mantra. True to form, in 2020 Pompeo screamed at a reporter: Do you think Americans give a fuck about Ukraine?

Two years later, they do. At the same time, Pompeo nurses presidential ambitions. Good luck with that.

Yovanovitch rightly places part of the blame for Putins invasion on Trump.

He saw Ukraine as a pawn that could be bullied into doing his bidding, she said in a recent interview. I think that made a huge impact on Zelenskiy and I think that Putin and other bad actors around the world saw that our president was acting in his own personal interests.

What comes next for the US, Ukraine and Russia? Pressure mounts on the Biden administration to do more for Ukraine at the risk of nuclear conflict. Congressional Republicans vote against aid to Zelenskiy but demand a more robust US response.

Recently, Trump admitted that he was surprised by Putins special military operation. He thought he was negotiating, he said. A very stable genius, indeed.

Read more:
Lessons from the Edge review: Marie Yovanovitch roasts Trump on Putin and Ukraine - The Guardian