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When Mike Beck developed a rare form of Parkinsons US intelligence concluded he was the victim of a hi-tech weapon Havanna Syndrome illustrating the use of suspected micro/radio waves Composite: Guardian Design/Getty When the first reports surfaced of a mysterious disorder that was afflicting dozens of US diplomats in Cuba, Mike Becks reaction was one of recognition and relief. Beck, a retired National Security Agency counterintelligence officer, was at his home in Maryland, scrolling through the days news on his computer when he spotted the story, and remembers shouting out to his wife. I got excited because I thought: well, its coming out now that its not a mirage, Beck said. I felt bad for the victims but thought: Now Im no longer one of one. Im one of many. Beck had been forced into retirement in late 2016 by a rare early-onset, non-tremor form of Parkinsons disease, and he had evidence, supplied by the NSA and the CIA, that he could have been the victim of a deliberate attack from a microwave weapon. After years of lonely struggle, he now feels vindicated. Last December the National Academy of Sciences published a report finding that the scores of CIA and state department officials affected by Havana syndrome in Cuba, China and elsewhere, were most likely suffering the effects of directed, pulsed radio frequency energy. After years of playing down the reports and failing to provide proper medical care for the victims, Washington is now clearly alarmed at the implications of the attacks. The Democratic and Republican leadership on the Senate intelligence committee put out a bipartisan statement on Friday, saying: This pattern of attacking our fellow citizens serving our government appears to be increasing. The statement came the day after the White House said it was looking into unexplained health incidents after reports that two of its own officials had been targeted in the Washington area. The CIA and state department have launched taskforces to investigate and it was reported last week that the Pentagon had launched its own inquiry into suspected microwave attacks on US troops in the Middle East. Earlier this month, the senior director for the western hemisphere in the national security council, Juan Gonzalez, voiced concern over the lingering risk to US diplomats from microwave weapons in Cuba, in an interview with the CNN Spanish language service. The reality is that this has been an intelligence community issue for decades Mark Zaid But what is so striking about Becks case is that its origins were two decades earlier and that it produced official confirmation more than eight years ago that such weapons had been developed by Americas adversaries. That raises more questions about why the CIA and state department were so reluctant to believe their own officers could have been targeted by such weapons when cases appeared in Cuba and then China in 2018 and elsewhere around the world. The reality is that this has been an intelligence community issue for decades, said Mark Zaid, a lawyer representing both Beck and Havana Syndrome victims. An NSA statement declassified in 2014 for Becks work injury compensation case stated: The National Security Agency confirms that there is intelligence information from 2012 associating the hostile country to which Mr Beck traveled in the late 1990s, with a high powered microwave system weapon that may have the ability to weaken, intimidate or kill an enemy, over time, and without leaving evidence. The 2012 intelligence information indicated that this weapon is designed to bathe a targets living quarters in microwaves, causing numerous physical effects, including a damaged nervous system. Beck is still not allowed to name the hostile country he visited in 1996, but said he and a colleague, Charles Chuck Gubete, had gone to make sure a US diplomatic building under construction was not bugged. It was a sensitive assignment, Beck told the Guardian. So we knew what we were getting into from the standpoint of the hostile country being a critical threat environment. On arrival, he and Gubete were detained at the airport and then put up in adjoining rooms in a budget hotel after their release. On their second day on the project, they expanded their sweep to a neighbouring building and came across what he calls a technical threat to the equity we were there to protect. A worker looks at a huge concrete Cuban flag being built in front of the US embassy in Havana last month. Photograph: Yamil Lage/AFP/Getty Images They reported the device to their superiors and left it in place. The next day, they were passed a message from a local translator working with the Americans that the host country authorities, in Becks words, had seen what we did and that was not a good thing. The next day, Beck said: I woke up and I was really, really groggy. I was not able to wake up routinely. It was not a normal event. I had several cups of coffee and that didnt do a thing to get me going. The symptoms passed by the time Beck and Gubete returned to the US. But 10 years later, when Beck was in the UK, on secondment to General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Britains NSA counterpart, he came down suddenly with crippling symptoms. The right side of my body started freezing up. I was limping and I couldnt move my arm, he said. He was referred to a neurologist who diagnosed Parkinsons. At the time, Beck was 45. I thought this is not coincidental that were both presenting the same variant of Parkinsons at the same time Mike Beck Shortly afterwards, he was visiting NSA headquarters and happened to bump into Gubete. Beck was shocked by what he saw. He was walking like an old man, he recalled. He was slumped over and walking really awkwardly. I went up to him and said: Whats going on? Within a few days, Gubete, 55 at the time, was diagnosed with the same form of Parkinsons disease as Beck. Ive worked in counter-intelligence for the predominance of my career, Beck said. I thought this is not coincidental that were both presenting the same variant of Parkinsons at the same time. This is not happenstance. The cause of their shared plight was a total mystery to Beck until 2012 when he saw US intelligence communications about a microwave weapon with potentially debilitating neurological effects developed by the country he and Gubete visitedtogether. He was able to get part of that intelligence declassified for his labor department claim in 2014 but by then it was too late for Gubete. He had died at home, of a suspected heart attack the previous year. Mike Beck. Photograph: Handout Even with the declassified intelligence, the NSA leadership continued to oppose Becks claim, so he arranged a briefing by CIA experts who came to NSA headquarters in the spring of 2016. Their opinion was based upon information that they had and that NSA didnt have access to and they supported my affirmation that I had been attacked in the hostile country with a microwave weapon, Beck recalled. They said it was a no-brainer that this medical condition was due to an attack. On 24 August 2016, according to Beck and his lawyer, Zaid, the head of NSA security and counter-intelligence, Kemp Ensor, sent an email to the NSA chief of staff, Liz Brooks, supporting Becks account. The NSA did not respond to a request for comment. There are still many unanswered questions about the Beck case. Gubete had a family history of Parkinsons and any causal effect between microwave radiation and the disease is unknown, and differs from the more recent cases. But it is clear from the Beck case that when the wave of Havana syndrome injuries began in 2016, US intelligence agencies knew much more that they admitted to. My head was spinning, incredible nausea, I felt like I had to go to the bathroom and throw up. It was just a terrifying moment Marc Polymeropoulos It took a three-year campaign by CIA and state department employees targeted by the attacks to have their illnesses taken seriously, to receive proper treatment and for the mysterious attacks to be properly investigated. That its taken me three years to get treatment is disgraceful, ethically and morally, said Marc Polymeropoulos, a former senior officer in the CIAs clandestine service,. You make a pact when you join the Central Intelligence Agency particularly in the operations side, the silent service. They asked me to do some really unusual and risky things over the years, in some pretty bad places but you always had a pact with your leadership that if you got jammed up, they would have your back, he said. Polymeropoulos was visiting Moscow in 2017, as deputy chief of operations of the CIAs Europe and Eurasia Mission Centre, when he experienced crippling symptoms of an attack. I was woken up in the middle of the night with an incredible case of vertigo, he said. My head was spinning, incredible nausea, I felt like I had to go to the bathroom and throw up. It was just a terrifying moment for me. I had tinnitus which was ringing in my ears, and the vertigo was really what was incredibly debilitating and I really wasnt sure what was happening. I couldnt stand up. I was falling over. Since that incident, I have had a headache 24/7 for three years and theres a mental health challenge in this too, Polymeropoulos said. I was able to work for two hours every morning but then Id be spent. Even having a conversation like this, I would be exhausted after that. The US embassy in Moscow in 2012. Photograph: Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images He is convinced that Russia is behind the attacks, and also says he is certain that Russia is the unnamed country in the Beck case. In 1996, the US was in the process of tearing down the top two storeys of its Moscow embassy because the building was so full of bugging devices. Four new floors were constructed with the aim of creating a secure environment. The new CIA director, William Burns, assured Congress earlier this month that he was taking the problem seriously and that he had appointed a senior officer to run a taskforce ensuring people get the care they deserve and need, and also making sure we get to the bottom of this. Polymeropoulos, who is now being treated at Walter Reed military hospital and is pushing for other CIA victims to get similar treatment, said he was cautiously optimistic. Under Bill Burns, there seems to be a sea change. We have to see actions now, not just words. But I have hope, he said. Meanwhile, a quarter-century after his ill-fated trip to a hostile nation, Michael Beck is still fighting for workers compensation. The Department of Labor has turned down his claim but the one-year window for appeal is still open. Im not suing anyone, he said. Im just looking for whats right out of this.

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GOP Rep. Claims Trump Wing Is Pushing to Oust Cheney Because She Won't 'Lie' The Madison Leader Gazette - The Madison Leader Gazette

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, Afghanistan A gray American transport plane taxied down the runway, carrying munitions, a giant flat screen television from a C.I.A. base, pallets of equipment and departing troops. It was one of several aircraft that night removing what remained of the American war from this sprawling military base in the countrys south.

President Biden has said that the United States will withdraw from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, ending the countrys longest war on foreign soil but the pullout has already begun.

The United States and its NATO allies spent decades building Kandahar Airfield into a wartime city, filled with tents, operations centers, barracks, basketball courts, ammunition storage sites, aircraft hangars and at least one post office.

Once the base is stripped of everything deemed sensitive by its American and NATO landlords, its skeleton will be handed over to the Afghan security forces.

And the message will be clear: They are on their own in the fight against the Taliban.

The scenes over the weekend were almost as if a multitrillion-dollar war machine had morphed into a garage sale. At the airfields peak in 2010 and 2011, its famous and much derided boardwalk housed snack shops, chain restaurants, a hockey rink and trinket stores. Tens of thousands of U.S. and NATO troops were based here, and many more passed through as it became the main installation for the U.S.-led war in Afghanistans south. It stood beside rural villages from which the Taliban emerged; throughout it all, the province has remained an insurgent stronghold.

Now, half-demolished outdoor gyms and empty hangars were filled with nearly 20 years worth of matriel. The passenger terminal, where service members once transited between different parts of the war, was pitch black and filled with empty, dust-covered chairs. A fire alarm detector its batteries weak chirped incessantly. The mess halls were shuttered.

The boardwalk was nothing more than a few remaining boards.

On the other side of the base that morning, an Afghan transport aircraft arrived from Kabul. It was loaded with mortar shells, small-arms cartridges and 250-pound bombs to supply Afghan troops under frequent attack by the Taliban in the countryside.

The American withdrawal, almost quiet, and with a veneer of orderliness, belies the desperate circumstances just beyond the bases wall. On one end of Kandahar Airfield that day, Maj. Mohammed Bashir Zahid, an officer in charge of a small Afghan air command center, sat in his office, a phone to each ear and a third in his hands as he typed messages on WhatsApp, trying to get air support for Afghan security forces on the ground and in nearby outposts threatened by Taliban fighters.

Yesterday, you wouldnt have been able to sit down because things were so chaotic, he said. I fell asleep with my boots on and my gun in my holster.

Sitting in his U.S.-built air-conditioned office, Major Zahid said he expected that one day soon his requests for help from the Americans would be met with silence. On Saturday, he didnt even ask. He concentrated instead on what Afghan helicopters and bombers he could reach.

His anger at the U.S. departure was not about the lack of air support but rather, pointing to pictures on his phone, about the sport utility vehicles that he said the Americans had destroyed at the airfield because they couldnt leave with them.

Now, this is what really upsets me, Major Zahid said, looking exhausted and encapsulating the sense of desperation of most Afghan soldiers. The Americans most likely destroyed the vehicles to prevent them from being sold off, given the rampant corruption in much of the ranks.

Major Zahid thought that the Americans were destroying more of those vehicles when an explosion echoed across the runway at around 2 p.m.

The blast was a rocket, fired from somewhere outside the base and landing somewhere inside, killing no one. The announcement from the base loudspeaker was distant and practically indecipherable in the can-shaped building that housed Major Zahids operations center. Nobody moved, phones rang, work continued.

Even though the rockets landed on the Afghan side, the Americans viewed it as a Taliban attack on them. The Trump administration had agreed to fully withdraw all forces from Afghanistan by May 1 in a deal with the Taliban signed in February 2020. In recent weeks, the Taliban said that any American presence in the country on or beyond that date would be considered a breach of the deal.

The U.S. military had been expecting some kind of assault as it left despite the diplomatic overtures from American negotiators in Doha, Qatar, who had tried to convey to the Taliban that the military was in fact leaving, and that attacking American troops was a fools errand.

The American response was not subtle.

A flight of F/A-18 fighter jets, stationed aboard the U.S.S. Eisenhower, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, were in the air, making their way toward Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea a roughly two-hour flight up what is called the boulevard, a corridor of airspace in western Pakistan that serves as an air transit route.

Having received approval to strike, the jets swooped in, dropping a GPS-guided munition a bomb that costs well over $10,000 on the additional rockets that were somewhere in Kandahar, mounted on rudimentary rails and aimed at the airfield.

Inside the American headquarters building at the airfield, two Green Berets part of the shrinking contingent who work there now pulled up the video of the afternoon airstrike on one of their phones.

Make sure that goes in the nightly brief, one of them said. The Special Forces soldiers, bearded and clad in T-shirts, ball caps and tattoos, looked out of place among what was left of the cubicles and office furniture around them, much of which was being torn apart.

Televisions had been removed from walls, office printers sat on the curb, the insignia once plastered on the stone wall that heralded who was in charge of the headquarters, long gone. Even though there would soon be fewer and fewer service members around each day, one soldier noted that the flow of care packages from random Americans had not slowed down. He now possessed what seemed like an infinite supply of Pop-Tarts.

A group of American soldiers, tasked with loading an incoming cargo flight didnt know when they were going home. Tomorrow? Sept. 11? Their job was to close Kandahar before moving on to the next U.S. base, but there were only so many installations left to dismantle. A trio of them played Nintendo while they waited. One talked about the dirt bike he was going to buy when he got home. Another traded cryptocurrency on his iPhone.

When asked about Maiwand, a district only about 50 miles away where Afghan forces were trying to fend off a Taliban offensive and Major Zahid was desperately trying to send air support, a U.S. soldier responded, Whos Maiwand?

In the evening, the base loudspeaker chimed as one of the transport planes departed. Attention, someone out of view said. There will be outgoing for the next 15 minutes. The dull thud of mortar fire began. At what was unclear.

The end of the war looked nothing like the beginning of it. What started as an operation to topple the Taliban and kill the terrorists responsible for the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, had swelled over 20 years into a multitrillion-dollar military-industrial undertaking, infused with so much money that for years it seemed impossible to ever conclude or dismantle.

Until now.

The Talibans often-repeated adage loomed over the day: You have the watches, we have the time.

In one of the many trash bags littering the base, there was a discarded wall clock, its second hand still ticking.

Najim Rahim and Jim Huylebroek contributed reporting.

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Day 1 of the End of the U.S. War in Afghanistan - The New York Times

Americas withdrawal from Afghanistan should be cause for rejoicing. But conditions in the country today, and the historical record of past U.S. withdrawals from similar conflicts, suggest that it will only create more problems. By leaving, Washington is vindicating an aphorism attributed to a captured Taliban fighter over a decade ago: You have the watches. We have the time.

Proving the Taliban wrong is not a politically unaffordable extravagance. It merely requires retaining a couple of thousand elite special operations, intelligence, and support personnel in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the risk is that this will be the fourth time in as many decades that a U.S. military withdrawal encourages terrorists by showing the weakness of U.S. resolve. When America left Beirut in 1983, Mogadishu a decade later, and Iraq in 2011, the result was more terrorism, not less.

Indeed, no one understood the significance of Americas past retreats better than Osama bin Laden. In a 1997 interview, he recalled how the deaths of 241 U.S. marines in the Beirut barracks bombing had compelled President Ronald Reagan to order a withdrawal from Lebanon within five months. This led to the collapse of the multinational force in Lebanon of which the Marines were the lynchpin and plunged Lebanon into further chaos. The main beneficiary was Hizballah, the shadowy terrorist group responsible for the attack. In the decades since, Hizballahs success influenced other terrorist leaders and groups, including bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

By 1993, the U.S. military was deeply involved in a United Nations mission to restore stability in Somalia and feed starving citizens enmeshed in civil war. But that October, a plan to arrest a local warlords paymaster and chief lieutenant went disastrously awry. Fifteen U.S. Army Rangers and three Delta Force commandos were killed in an uncontrolled spiral of urban combat depicted in the book and film Black Hawk Down. In some of the most gripping footage ever broadcast live on television, an injured U.S. Army helicopter pilot was seen being paraded through the streets of Mogadishu by a chanting, gun-wielding mob. President Bill Clinton reacted quickly to the incident. Scrambling to preempt criticism from Congress, the media, and the American public, he set March 31, 1994, as the firm date for the withdrawal of all American forces there regardless of whether the multinational, U.N.-led humanitarian aid mission had been successfully completed or not.

Members of the al-Qaeda movement had both trained and fought alongside the Somali militiamen that fateful day in Mogadishu. To bin Ladens thinking, it had taken the deaths of 241 U.S. marines to get the U.S. out of Lebanon in 1983. A decade later, the loss of less than a tenth of that number had prompted an identical reaction. As bin Laden explained in his 1996 declaration of war on the United States:

[W]hen dozens of your troops were killed in minor battles, and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area defeated, carrying your dead in disappointment and humiliation. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge. But these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. God has dishonored you when you withdrew, and it clearly showed your weaknesses and powerlessness.

Bin Laden was emboldened to believe that if U.S. foreign policy could be influenced by a score of military deaths in an East African backwater, it could be changed fundamentally by thousands of civilian deaths in the United States itself. Thus, the road to 9/11 started in Beirut, led a decade later to Mogadishu, then wound its way through Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Aden before arriving in New York City, Washington, D.C., and a field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. No one could have anticipated the exact chain of events. But the retreats from both Beirut and Mogadishu nonetheless set those events in motion by feeding a dangerous perception of American weakness.

Some analysts have argued that the situation is different now precisely because of the 9/11 attacks. Washington did not take terrorism sufficiently seriously in the 1990s, but since then, the country has built up a huge counter-terrorism bureaucracy that makes staying in Afghanistan unnecessary. Now Washington can protect the homeland by using enhanced intelligence, special operations forces, and precision-guided, stand-off munitions. With these resources, over-the-horizon military and intelligence assets will be able to quickly identify and address any new threats.

This also was the logic behind the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011. But the disastrous consequences were soon felt with the rise of the Islamic State. Washington was overconfident in its counter-terrorism capabilities and underestimated the new terrorist variant it faced. As with Hizballah in the 1980s and al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the results proved tragic. Once again the desire to disengage when confronted by stubborn, resilient non-state adversaries created conditions ripe for terrorist exploitation. The vacuum in Iraq was rapidly filled by new extremist groups. President Barack Obamas curt dismissal of the embryonic Islamic State as a jayvee team would come to haunt him less than six months later, after the terrorist blitzkrieg that conquered western Iraq and stormed across the border into Syria. The Islamic State soon inspired a series of domestic attacks in multiple Western countries. Within months, it had dragged an international coalition that would eventually involve 83 countries back into maw of Middle Eastern conflict.

Today in Afghanistan, the United States is similarly understating and underestimating the threat posed by the Taliban. If anything, the situation in Afghanistan is more dangerous. When America withdrew from Iraq, there was no single terrorist adversary capable of toppling democratically elected Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in Baghdad. The Taliban, however, has that potential and makes no secret of its intention to re-impose theocratic rule over Afghanistan. It therefore poses an existential threat to the democratically elected government of President Ashraf Ghani in a way that no contender had in Iraq a decade ago. Moreover, the Talibans longstanding, close alliances with al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Pakistans Tehrik-i-Taliban endow it with additional attack capabilities that did not exist in Iraq at the time of 2011 U.S. withdrawal.

Against this backdrop, there are two specific risks associated with Americas withdrawal from Afghanistan. First, the international terrorist threat that necessitated invading that country following the 9/11 attacks remains. Al-Qaeda is undefeated. Its intimate, longstanding relationship with the Taliban suggests that al-Qaeda will be the beneficiary of the territorial and political gains its Afghan partners are poised to achieve in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. In 2019, in fact, as negotiations with the United States were underway, Taliban leaders reportedly sought to personally reassure Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Ladens son and the al-Qaeda heir apparent, that the Islamic Emirate would not break its historical ties with al-Qaeda for any price. Indeed, two al-Qaeda operatives recently praised the Taliban for its support. Thanks to Afghans for the protection of comrades-in-arms, a spokesman for the group gushed. Even if the Taliban makes good on its promise to restrain al-Qaeda from attacking the United States and the West from an Afghan base, this does not preclude al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan to destabilize this already highly volatile region. In 2008, a series of coordinated suicide attacks in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba another close al-Qaeda ally brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war. It is worth recalling, too, that both of al-Qaedas most recent new franchises are focused on South Asia generally and on Kashmir specifically.

Americas counter-terror resources are also likely to be stretched particularly thin going forward, making managing the threat from afar even less plausible. Afghanistan is now only one of many terrorist hotspots around the globe, which seem to be multiplying. Security conditions are deteriorating in Mozambique and the Sahel, for instance, while sectarian clashes in Northern Ireland raise fears of The Troubles returning. At home, far-right terrorism runs rampant. Even if U.S. intelligence agencies find ways to effectively manage terrorist safe havens without soldiers on the ground, their attention and vigilance will necessarily be spread thin.

The second risk is that withdrawal from Afghanistan will weaken, rather than strengthen, Washington against peer competitors. The United States, rightly or wrongly, is shifting from prioritizing counter-terrorism toward a great-power competition posture. But thinking of the two as zero sum is a mistake. China has prioritized embedding itself in local contexts for years; Russia and Iran have been practicing their irregular warfare strategies in Ukraine, in Yemen, and, most aggressively, in Syria. Indeed, at least one Iran-backed Shiite militia in Iraq has already drawn inspiration from the Talibans success. Qais al Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), observed just the other day that the Afghan way is the only way to make [the United States] leave [Iraq]. Every military setback whether in Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan illuminates a path by which great-power adversaries see they can defeat the United States. It is no coincidence that Russia has provided support to the Taliban, likely aiming to help sap Americas energy and spirit and encourage Americas withdrawal from the region.

Yet rather than heed present risks or past warnings, President Joe Biden, like President Trump before him, seems more concerned with the political capital to be milked from ending Americas longest war. As in Beirut and Mogadishu, Washington appears largely satisfied that our military personnel will no longer be in harms way. But a responsible strategy need not involve gratuitously exposing troops to harm. In fact, the last American combat fatality in Afghanistan was more than a year ago. The current troop level there, approximately 3,500 personnel, accounts for 0.27 percent of Americas active duty forces hardly a drain on the resources of even a declining superpower. Maintaining this small contingent would have a significant force-multiplying effect. It would provide an immediate trip wire to deal with any serious terrorist threat while also bolstering the Afghan government and improving its security forces. Moreover, maintaining a limited, elite presence in a country sharing a border with China might well be in Americas strategic interests as the new cold war heats up. Simply abandoning Afghanistan will not help the counter-terrorism fight and it is unlikely to help with great-power competition either.

There are no perfect options. But instead of turning its back on Afghanistan, the United States should shift its rhetoric in the Global War on Terror away from winning and losing and toward managing and accepting. This would facilitate an ongoing but limited troop presence with a clear homeland security, not nation-building, brief. Keeping a small number of elite troops in Afghanistan, while unlikely to elicit roars of approval at campaign rallies in the 2024 presidential race, would likely keep both the Taliban and al-Qaeda at bay in the country while protecting a forward operating base on Chinas and Russias doorstep. Withdrawal, by contrast, will be universally seen as defeat. As with bin Laden 25 years ago, it will give a rhetorical victory to terrorists the world over. And it will boost the morale of state adversaries that benefit from the perception of U.S. weakness.

Bruce Hoffman is the senior fellow for counterterrorism & homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University. Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Staff Sgt. Kylee Gardner)

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Leaving Afghanistan Will Make America Less Safe - War on the Rocks

Like the U.S. Army today, the British found themselves geographically marooned, and secured favorable terms for withdrawal from their adversaries, but when their column around 16,500 soldiers and camp followers left the gates of Kabul on their way to Jalalabad, the Afghans descended, slaughtering all except one: an army surgeon, William Brydon. When Dr. Brydon the original Lone Survivor arrived on horseback at the gates of Jalalabad, near death himself, with part of his skull sheared off, a sentry asked him where the army was, to which he responded, I am the army.

Although the Soviet army avoided this fate a century later, the regime it left behind fared little better. Mohammad Najibullah, an infamous torturer and former head of Afghanistans intelligence service, the KHAD, as well as a K.G.B. agent, had been installed by the Soviets as president and was able to hold onto power for more than two years after they left. As the Soviet Union collapsed, its financial support of his regime evaporated. Mr. Najibullah was soon deposed and eventually found himself at the end of a Taliban executioners rope when they took control of Kabul. Which raises the question of how long the United States will continue to support the government of President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan after our withdrawal. One year? Two? Three? What is the decent interval, to borrow Nixons phrase from our calamitous withdrawal from Vietnam?

As Jack and I ran, we discussed this history and other complex aspects of Americas withdrawal: how many senior members of the Afghan government possessed dual citizenship and would likely depart the country, leaving behind less capable subordinates to fill critical positions; the challenges of collapsing more remote outposts; and whether the State Department would grant visas to those Afghans whod thrown their lot in with their government and us.

Jack concluded, America might be done with Afghanistan, but Afghanistan isnt done with America. In his view, my lunch at the ambassadors residence wouldnt mark the end of the war at all. Not for me. Not for anyone.

After finishing her call, the ambassador apologized for being so inattentive. She confessed that she had an agenda item we hadnt gotten to discuss. She wanted some advice as she was considering writing a book. Like those of the millions of Afghan girls we are now in the process of abandoning, her story is marked by war and overcoming an oppressive version of Islam championed by the Taliban, a personal journey that leads to a final chapter in which she is appointed as the first female Afghan ambassador to the United States. My advice to her was to keep notes, and I told her that she might not be ready to write that final chapter yet. Because she may not be remembered most for having been her governments first female ambassador, but rather for having been, as it related to America, its last.

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Opinion | The Afghanistan War Will End as It Began: In Blood - The New York Times

The Afghan government said it plans to begin talks with 14 countries to discuss what to do with hundreds of their citizens who have been captured while fighting alongside the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Ahmad Zia Seraj, the head of Afghanistan's intelligence agency, National Directorate of Security (NDS), said last week that his government wanted to "find an acceptable solution to the problem."

The foreign nationals in Afghan custody are 408 ISKP members, including 173 women and children. According to the Afghan government, 299 of them are from Pakistan, 37 from Uzbekistan, 16 from China, 13 from Tajikistan, 12 from Kyrgyzstan, five from Russia, five from Jordan, five from Indonesia, four from India, four from Iran, three from Turkey, two from Bangladesh and two from Maldives.

Abdul Wahid Taqat, a former senior intelligence official in the Afghan government, predicted a difficult legal and political process for the repatriation of the ISKP prisoners, saying Kabul will likely need to use international bodies to convince those countries take back their citizens.

Returning these fighters would not be easy because Afghanistan has no treaties to extradite or exchange terrorists with most of these countries, Taqat told VOA, adding that a reasonable option for Afghanistan is to involve the United Nations Human Commission on Human Rights to find a solution.

Most of the countries are hesitant to take back their citizens who have joined terror groups because of legal and security risks these dangerous individuals pose, said Colin Clarke, a senior fellow at the Soufan Center.

Clarke, however, said that some countries will likely be more responsive to the Afghan government request.

More authoritarian countries do not need the proof; countries that are more transparent will need it to prosecute [these individuals], he said. He added that China has interest in taking back its citizens back because it has inflated the threat of terrorism to justify their treatment of Uyghurs.

Reuters reported in 2015 that the Afghan government arrested and handed over a number of Uyghur militants to China as a way to persuade China to help with convincing Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.

Formidable threat

Taqat said the Afghan governments announcement shows that foreign fighters still have bases in the country and that their presence would remain a "formidable threat"after foreign troops leave.

The fighters will pose a greater threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal, said Taqat.

The U.S. and its NATO allies have announced that they will pull out all their forces from Afghanistan by September 11.

The Islamic State branch, ISKP, was formed in January 2015 in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and in northern Pakistan. The group has suffered major setbacks in recent years, including the loss of its key pockets of territory and the removal of its top leadership.

Despite the losses, a U.N. report in May 2020 said that ISKP still has about 2,200 armed fighters in the South Asian country and remains capable of launching different attacks.

Pakistani citizens

During the announcement Tuesday, NDSs chief Saraj said that 299 out of 208 ISKP prisoners were Pakistani citizens because 60%of Daesh fighters are Pakistanis.

Daesh is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State.

Saraj said Aslam Farooqi, an ISKP leader and Pakistani citizen, will be turned over to Pakistani authorities only in exchange for Taliban leadership.

We would only hand him over to Pakistan if we agree on a mutual exchange. When Pakistan hands over some Taliban leaders to us, we will think about it.

Farooqi was arrested with a dozen other ISKP fighters in April 2020 in the southern Kandahar province.

Earlier this month, Pakistan demanded that Afghanistan hand over Farooqi to Pakistan.

Aslam Farooqi was involved in anti-Pakistan activities in Afghanistan, he should be handed over to Pakistan for further investigation, Pakistans foreign office said in a statement.

Regional observers say that most of ISKP fighters were the alienated members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who joined the terror group after it was formed in 2015.

The Afghan government said that in addition to the ISKP fighters, it is holding an additional 309 foreign fighters who are affiliated with al-Qaeda and other militant groups.

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Afghanistan to Discuss Fate of Foreign IS Prisoners with Their Countries - Voice of America