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Controlling the narrative has long been crucial to Russian President Vladimir Putin in his war against Ukraine.

In the worldview he promulgates, the U.S. is an empire of lies, the West is bent on tearing apart Russia, and Ukraine is a Nazi-run country whose statehood is a historical fiction.

Through speeches and propaganda, Putin presents this narrative to his own country and the rest of the world. It is a worldview that is negative, historically and factually false and relies on provocative rhetorical framing. It is a framing that fits well the Russian phrase that translates in English as who is not with us, is against us, forms of which have been popularized through czarist and Soviet years and have returned with a vengeance under Putin.

It is also, as I explore in my new book, a popular form of what is known as cultural othering, which can be used to gain, maintain and exercise power.

Cultural othering is the process of defining a group of people be it a racial, ethnic or national group as different and then treating them as inferior. This other group is assigned negative traits to make them appear lower to the dominant group, and to marginalize them.

Othering has long been a tool employed to assert authority over marginalized groups, such as by European colonizers in Africa and Asia, or by settlers in Native American lands.

Putin and the Russian state are very skilled at practicing cultural othering and have deployed it against Ukrainian enemies as tanks rolled into Ukraine. In the worldview of Putin, their separatist vision was based on Russophobia, fascism and neo-Nazism.

Putins othering predates the 2022 invasion. It was seen in the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, the 2008 conflict in Georgia and the brutal Chechen wars from 1994 onward. All represented Russian attempts to reestablish its control over others Ukrainians, Georgians, Chechens, the Crimean Tatars that under the Soviet system had been reincorporated into an idea of a Great Russia. Their crime, as seen from Moscow, was that they were undermining Putins long-held vision for a return to that great Russian empire.

The curious thing about Putins othering is it focuses on national groups that he has simultaneously claimed to be of the same people as Russia.

From Putins perspective, these would-be breakaway neighbors are former brotherly republics cleaved from Mother Moscow only by the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s an event Putin has described as the biggest geopolitical tragedy of the century. To push this narrative, Putin employs a warped view of history, invoking the Kyivan Rus the medieval state that sought to unite the people of a vast land mass and denouncing Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin as the creator and architect of Ukraine and encouraging nationalist ambitions.

Under Putinism, there are seemingly two options for countries that once formed the Russian, and later Soviet, empire.

The first involves total geopolitical and cultural submission, assimilation and acceptance of pan-Russian sameness, as is seen in Belarus under Putin ally Alexander Lukashenko. The second option is to seek national and cultural self-definition, but be subjected to the most extreme forms of cultural othering for doing so. In other words, it is the choice of being a brother or the other.

To Putin, nations that dared to break away from Russian hegemony and, like Ukraine, developed pro-Western ambitions, turned into an enemy.

Putins cultural othering of Ukraine taps into a history of Russia that goes back centuries. It was evident in imperial Russia and reflected in the literature of the time. Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, in his epic Poltava, and novelist Leo Tolstoy, in A Prisoner in the Caucasus, both glorified Russian martyrdom and heroism while employing othering language and devices against different groups of people, including the French, Swedes, Turks, the Circassians, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. This othering serves to portray those seeking distance from Moscow as subhuman, or at least sub-Russian.

In the Soviet period, cultural othering took the form of demonizing anyone who balked at or actively fought attempts to force a homogeneous Soviet identity over ethnic and class diversity. The punishment for resistance and disobedience was severe, especially under Josef Stalin; the gulag served as the ultimate destination for those who did not assimilate.

Meanwhile, Ukraine paid a terrible price for resistance to assimilation. Stalins human-made starvation of Ukrainian peasants from 1932 and 1933 which many historians attribute in part to an attempt to suppress or punish Ukrainian aspirations of independence killed millions of Ukrainians. And here lies an important aspect of cultural othering: Once a people are othered, their lives are degraded and dehumanized making such atrocities more acceptable to the dominant group.

Eventually to escape repressions and to survive Ukrainians, Georgians, Crimean Tatars and other others reluctantly accepted Soviet brotherhood and political and linguistic submission and cultural assimilation with Russia.

In this way, Russian leaders from emperors to Soviet chiefs have manifested Russian geopolitical and ideological hegemony. Putin is following suit.

Since coming to power, Putin has tried to reconstruct Russias former territorial and ideological might, while simultaneously positioning the country in opposition to its habitual enemy the collective West. When Ukraine chose a pro-European course, Putin saw it as the act of a treacherous enemy.

Putins rhetoric has been fusing Ukraine and the West together in one single enemy ever since. Putin often others the West and, by association, Ukraine by drawing comparisons between Russian traditional values and Western cultural decadence with its LGBTQ+ rights, gender-related debates and other identity issues. Since the beginning of the war, Putin has othered Ukraine by making it both of the West but also Nazi. That has allowed him to frame his war as liberation, demilitarization, and de-nazification. Meanwhile, religious leaders in Russia have framed the conflict as a holy war, with the aim of de-Satanizing Ukraine.

This continued othering of Ukrainians by Putin means that the war is one that goes beyond territory and ideology. Rather, what has been set up is a conflict between two cultural selves that are mutually exclusive. It is, to Putin, the Russian "us against the Western and Ukrainian them.

Read more:
Russian attempt to control narrative in Ukraine employs age-old tactic of 'othering' the enemy - The Conversation Indonesia

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AN OFFER TO become culture minister should have been a no-brainer. As head of Ukraines Institute of National Memory, Anton Drobovych had the background. And for many of the previous months, hed been stuck fighting in the most dangerous operations of Ukraines counter-offensive in the Zaporizhia region, or recuperating from serious injuries in hospital. Mr Drobovych did not reject the proposal outright; but his understanding of the political scene in Kyiv was enough to sow doubts. Could he survive re-emerging ideological tussles, briefings and bureaucratic battles? No, he resolved to return to the ranks of his assault-forces unit. I decided I had more important work on the front lines.

Mr Droboych is one of a number of Ukrainians straddling two increasingly distinct worlds: the grim reality of a trench war; and an ever more waspish political battleground in Kyiv. When Russia began its invasion in February 2022, competitive politics went into hibernation. They returned as the existential threat to Ukraine decreased later that year. Yaroslav Zhelezhnyak, an opposition MP, says there is still broad agreement on fundamental matters of national security. But a prominent MP in the presidents own party says jostling has already made Ukraine unstable. Mistakes are being made on all sides. And presidential attempts to centralise decision-making and shut down dissent are having the opposite effect.

Read more of our recent coverage of theUkraine war

Cracks have emerged not only along political lines but, most worryingly, between the military and political leadership. Relations between President Volodymyr Zelensky and his commander-in-chief, Valery Zaluzhny, are understood to be terrible. The differences of opinion were first reported in summer last year. A recent interview by The Economist with the general, in which he declared that Ukraines war had reached a stalemate, brought that problem into the open. Mr Zelensky publicly rebuked his general for the headlines. In a later interview he appeared to warn Mr Zaluzhny to stick to military affairs rather than do politics.

A senior government source suggests the open conflict in the leadership was a predictable result of a stalled counter-offensive operation that had not gone to plan. The official says Mr Zaluzhny was possibly unwise to contradict the more optimistic public positions of his president, but few inside the government could quibble with his sober conclusions. A blame game is now under way about who is responsible for the failure. The politicians are saying their generals are Soviet-trained twits. And the generals are saying the politicians are interfering twits. Victory has many fathers, but no one wants to parent a stalemate.

Another factor at play is a reported criminal investigation into the defence of southern Ukraine. This was the one area where Russian forces were able to establish a quick and hugely important victory in February and March of 2022, creating a new land corridor to Crimea in a few weeks. Ukrainian turncoats assisted the advance. Bridges were not blown up as they should have been. The army was also ill prepared. Mr Zaluzhny is, say some reports, currently named only as a witness to the probe; but that may change into something more serious. Allies say the possibility of a criminal charge is designed to keep him in line. His media engagement could be seen as an insurance policy, a general-staff source suggests.

Mr Zaluzhny has not declared any political ambitions, and his few steps into the political arena have been anything but deft. That does not mean he poses no threat to Mr Zelensky. The president, a comic performer as recently as 2019, knows how quickly Ukrainian society can make and break its leaders. Internal polling seen by The Economist suggests the president, once lauded for his role in defending the country, has been tarnished by corruption scandals in his government and by concern over the direction of the country. The figures, which date from mid-November, show trust in the president has fallen to a net +32%, less than half that of the still-revered General Mr Zaluzhny (+70%). Ukraines spychief, Kyrylo Budanov, also has better ratings than the president (+45%).

The same polling suggests Mr Zelensky risks losing a presidential election were he ever to go head to head with his commander-in-chief. Ukrainian society would probably not welcome any unprovoked challenge. For now, eight out of ten Ukrainians are against the very idea of holding elections, originally due next March. The president has also ruled them out, citing martial law. But the downward drift of his ratings may yet persuade him to change his mind. Russian propaganda will doubtless make hay if the elections do not take place.

Ukrainian intelligence sources say Russia is already trying to capitalise on the ambitions and tensions. Andriy Cherniak, a spokesman for HUR, the military-intelligence agency, claimed evidence that showed new Russian strategies for different constituencies: one to shore up support in Russia; another to undermine confidence in the West; and a third to amplify grievances in Ukraine. There is a separate disinformation campaign for Ukrainian soldiers, he says, with deep-fake videos purporting to show commanders of various levels encouraging their subordinates to surrender. Russia has not been able to do what they need to do on the battlefield, but they are having real success here.

The senior government source suggests Russian propaganda has gained traction because it has material to play with. There is corruption, he admits. Management is often ineffective. Ukraine has not put its economy on enough of a war footing. But only Russia stands to gain if the president were forced out. Some of our politicians dont worry enough about the Russian threat, and it makes me angry. They think they can challenge for power, destroy Zelensky, and it will be of no consequence. The security services had effectively eliminated most levers of Russian influence since the start of the war, he added. The most effective levers were now Ukrainians themselves.

On the front lines, Russia is enjoying a relatively good period of the war. It is satisfying much of its manpower needs by recruiting from the poor and prisons; a convicted cannibal was recently pardoned to fight. Ukraine, in contrast, is struggling to mobilise from the general population. Army bosses are recruiting at a level that just about covers natural losses on the frontline. But if the majority of those mobilised at the start of the war knew what they were fighting for, few of the new recruits are as willing, and filling the recruitment quotas is getting harder. Political tensions are unlikely to help that process.

Doubts at home and abroad about the direction of the war are also beginning to reach soldiers on the front lines. They do not appear to have changed behaviour or morale in any significant way, at least not yet. People under fire couldnt give a damn if Zaluzhny had a quarrel with Zelensky or not, one commander says. Mr Drobovych agrees. When he chats to his comrades at the front, no one is talking about the need to return to Kyiv to fix politics. The only discussion is about staying alive. For this cohort of Ukrainians, there is no doubting the risk the enemy still poses. Russia is asking a simple question of us: life or death. That will keep us fighting, regardless of what happens in Kyiv or Washington.

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Originally posted here:
Russia is poised to take advantage of political splits in Ukraine - The Economist

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin will likely center his presidential campaign on Russias alleged domestic stability and increased criticism of the West instead of focusing on the war, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its latest report.

Putin and other Russian government officials have already signaled their intention to intensify censorship efforts by claiming that some Russian citizens who left Russia and others still in Russia have begun efforts to discredit the upcoming Russian presidential elections and that Russia will do everything necessary to prevent election meddling.

Russian authorities have also attempted to consolidate control over the Russian information space and have intensified measures encouraging self-censorship.

The ISW indicated that the war in Ukraine has created "new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within Russia," which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing Kremlin censorship efforts.

Russian military bloggers suggested that Russian political officials financing Telegram channels ordered bloggers to cease debates and criticisms about the Russian military prior to the Russian presidential elections. "The Kremlin has likely attempted to shore up popular support for Putin throughout Russia by establishing a network of proxies to campaign on Putins behalf," the ISW said.

Read also: Ukraine war latest: Zelensky visits Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia oblasts as harsh winter looms on front line

Weve been working hard to bring you independent, locally-sourced news from Ukraine. Consider supporting the Kyiv Independent.

Originally posted here:
ISW: Kremlin concerned about how shifting Russian views on Ukraine war might impact 2024 presidential election - Yahoo News

Citizens of Russia and Belarus are unlikely to pass the selection process for the Azov brigades of Ukraines National Guard.

Source: Lev Pashko, an officer of the Azov Special Operations Detachment of the National Guard of Ukraine and Hero of Ukraine, in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda

Quote: "This is a complex issue. If we discover during the interview that the candidate is from Russia or Belarus, and there are certain subtleties, put it this way, in the conversation, then although we could arrange it, I think the unit would decline [to accept this person ed.].

If a person has close ties with the Russian Federation or with some dubious individuals, then that person may also not get through the internal verification by our security service."

Details: Pashko added that foreign citizens in general can apply to be selected for Azov, because this is permitted by law.

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Why Russians and Belarusians are unlikely to serve in Ukraine's Azov Brigade - Yahoo News

The Russian forces based in occupied Crimea have launched the Shahed attack drones in the direction of mainland Ukraine.

Source: Ukraines Air Force on Telegram

Quote: "The launch of Shahed attack drones from Chauda (Crimea) has been recorded."

Details: Ukraines Air Force has advised people to follow its reports and not to ignore an air-raid warning.

Updated: At 20:04, the Air Force reported that there was a threat of Russian forces attacking Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with attack UAVs.

An air-raid warning was issued in the region.

Soon later, the Air Force also reported that a threat of using attack drones had emerged in Kirovohrad Oblast.

As of 22:35, an air-raid warning was issued in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. The Air Force reported that Shahed UAVs were moving towards Mykolaiv through the north.

Background:

On 29 November, a Shahed-131/136 attack drone launched by the Russian invaders towards the south of Ukraine crashed in occupied Crimea as a result of extreme weather on the sea coast.

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Shahed drones launched from Crimea drift through Ukraine Ukraine's Armed Forces - Yahoo News