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The sign is red, marked with a skull and crossbones and a warning: Danger mines! In parts of Ukraine that were contested or controlled by Russian forces, these are reminders that even in territory Ukraine has defended or retaken, the land itself is not fully liberated from war.

Russias full-scale invasion has made Ukraine one of the most mined countries in the world. In less than two years, the conflict has potentially created one of the largest demining challenges since World War II.

This includes anti-tank mines, which target vehicles though if triggered, they do not distinguish between a battle tank and a school bus. There are also anti-personnel mines, which are intended to kill or hurt people, and more makeshift explosives, like booby traps, that serve similar aims. Unexploded artillery and cluster munitions also litter the landscape. Both sides have been firing off tens of thousands of rounds of artillery each day. Even if only a small percentage of those are duds, they can still detonate, maim, and kill, sometimes long after the fighting.

About 174,000 square kilometers of Ukraine is suspected to be contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, called UXOs. It is an area about the size of Florida, about 30 percent of Ukraines territory. This estimate accounts for land occupied by Russia since its full-scale invasion, along with recaptured areas, everywhere from the Kharkiv region in the east to areas around Kyiv, like Bucha. According to Human Rights Watch, mines have been documented in 11 of Ukraines 27 regions.

Still, the 174,000 square kilometer figure is likely an overestimate, experts and international deminers say. Russia would not have the time, ability, or need to mine every inch of contested land. But until deminers or officials can confirm areas suspected of contamination free from it, the outcomes look the same. That land is off-limits.

For every football pitch that is contaminated, theres probably 100 football pitches that are not, said Paul Heslop, chief technical adviser and program manager for mine action at the United Nations Development Program in Ukraine. The humanitarian impact comes from the land that is contaminated because obviously you dont get hurt if you walk through a minefield that isnt a minefield, Heslop added. But the economic impact, and perhaps the social impact, and the impact on the global economy, on global food security, is coming from the 100 minefields that are not minefields.

What is known that Ukraine is heavily mined and polluted by unexploded remnants of war and what is not where, exactly, these dangers exist are twin problems Ukraine faces. It takes resources, people, and time to declare places largely free from hazards.

And, right now, a lot of Ukrainian land is still inaccessible, under Russian control or too close to the front lines. That makes it unsafe for humanitarian deminers and vulnerable to recontamination. In the areas deminers can access, it takes even more resources and time to map those locations and then undertake the meticulous and perilous process of clearing mines and returning the land, fully, back to Ukraine.

But until either happens, it deepens and compounds the crisis for Ukrainian civilians in wartime. If a power station is suspected of being mined, technicians might not be able to quickly restore electricity if it goes out. An ambulance might have to take a longer route to the hospital to avoid particular roads.

The scale of the problem is so vast in Ukraine and the resources so finite even with increasing international assistance and support that authorities must prioritize. What cant be investigated or cleared immediately may get cordoned off and marked with a warning sign.

The risks remain. As of this summer, the HALO Trust, an international demining NGO, recorded at least 700 civilian casualties because of land mines, likely an undercount. In 2022 alone, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines recorded more than 600 casualties from mines in Ukraine, a tenfold increase from 2021. The Ukrainian government said in November that mines and explosives have killed 260 civilians in 20 months of war. These mines and other unexploded devices will continue to complicate any rebuilding efforts and will injure and kill civilians now and potentially long after the hostilities end.

Even when the guns have stopped firing, said Erik Tollefsen, head of the Weapon Contamination Unit at the International Committee of the Red Cross, the land mines remain active.

This is a long-term challenge. Deminers are still clearing mines and cluster munitions from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia used by Americans in the Vietnam War. Farmers in Belgium and France, even now, find unexploded World War I shells buried in fields.

Ukraine already had demining operations ongoing before Russias full-scale invasion, to find ordnance from World War II and from Russias 2014 incursion. Deminers in Ukraine are still finding munitions from the WWII era now, as they begin, bit by bit, to rescue territory from the ongoing war.

The front line in the Ukraine war may be the the most heavily mined terrain on the planet. Russian troops built a formidable defensive belt, laid and relaid, that stymied Ukraines counteroffensive.

Ukraine, too, has laid anti-tank mines to slow Russian advances, and Western partners including the US have transferred anti-tank mines to Ukraine. Human Rights Watch has also alleged that Ukrainian troops fired anti-personnel mines near the town of Izium, in the Kharkiv region, which it recaptured from Russia last year. Ukraine is party to the 1997 convention that bans the use of anti-personnel mines (Russia is not), and Ukrainian authorities have said they will investigate.

The Ukrainian front line extends hundreds of miles, a daunting minefield. But the boundaries are clear and have been largely static, especially in the past year. Deminers know mines will be found here when the war ends.

The challenge exists when mines are not placed in patterns or appropriately mapped (as militaries are supposed to do), and instead are laid haphazardly or in a rush or with the intention of terrorizing, as Russia has done in its withdrawal from parts of Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities have reportedly found mines in refrigerators or in toys. Russian troops have planted booby traps or grenades rigged with tripwires, making them even trickier to remove. Retreating Russian forces have booby trapped the bodies of dead soldiers. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused Russia of mining the bodies of people killed.

The Russians are incredibly crafty when it comes to placing booby traps, and they do it to catch out the unwary, said Col. Bob Seddon, former head of bomb disposal in the British Army. Its not always to catch out the military that weve seen. In some of the villages and towns that the Russians have abandoned, they have left booby traps in civilian dwellings to catch out civilians returning.

Mines are only one slice of the larger problem of UXO contamination. Its the artillery shells, and then its everything that is used in the course of the battle and is potentially hazardous because its explosive, and it hasnt already exploded, said Suzanne Fiederlein, director of the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at James Madison University. Cluster munitions, which the US started sending to Ukraine this summer, release dozens of bomblets when fired, which scatter about and dont always immediately explode as they should. But these cluster bombs, along with other kinds of artillery, can still be triggered later, detonating if theyre just slightly disturbed or picked up or moved.

Just everywhere you can imagine, these things are just lying in wait, said Col. Matt Dimmick (Ret.), Europe Regional Program Manager for Spirit of America, describing the aftermath of combat.

Military deminers and combat engineers must clear mines quickly, often under fire, so troops can advance. It is not about removing every single explosive, but instead creating a safe path to breach defensive lines.

[In the video above, the Ukrainian band has made a music video for its song Im going home that follows the training and journey of a deminer.]

Humanitarian demining and clearance operate under a different set of rules. The standard is clear everything, with as much confidence as possible. Ukraine also has its own national mine action standards, developed from its robust experience of clearing ordnance from World War II and the 2014 conflict in the Donbas.

The first step is determining where the mine or ordnance contamination might be. Right now, Ukraine is working with that wide, wide net basically, anywhere Russian troops entered or held and needs to whittle away from there. The process begins with a nontechnical survey, which is a kind of fact-finding mission. Some places are easy to pinpoint: If active fighting occurred or a land mine or bomb goes off, it is a pretty sure sign the land is hazardous.

It can also mean scouring social media posts and local news reports. This is people with binoculars, people going out with rudimentary search equipment to try and determine where the limits of explosive ordnance contamination exist, Seddon said.

Teams will interview locals, the mayor, policemen, or even the military to try to gather more information. Satellite imagery helps, as do evolving technologies like drones and thermal imaging.

As the potential contaminated area narrows, the techniques become more precise: teams on the ground using metal detectors or dogs. (Patron is Ukraines official mine-sniffing mascot.) The goal of all of this is to reduce and reduce the area to what actually needs to be cleared to finally allow teams to go in and start to remove the mines.

Except, right now in Ukraine, not every mine and unexploded ordnance can be removed. It is an active conflict, and an overhead strike or heavy shelling can recontaminate the land almost instantly. Ukraine does not have the resources, equipment, or people to remove every land mine right now.

Ihor Bezkaravainyi, Ukraines Deputy Minister of Economy who oversees land mine clearance, said Ukraine is prioritizing demining for civilian needs. The aim is to make the land as usable and as safe as possible until everything can be cleared at a later time. We cant demine all dangerous parts of Ukraine at the same time, he said.

Critical infrastructure is Ukraines top priority, such as roads, electricity lines, gas and water pipes, and power stations. So is civilian safety, making sure people can return to schools or hospitals safely. Then comes areas that intersect with Ukraines economy, specifically the grain fields that underpin the countrys agricultural sector.

This kind of mine clearance is what Heslop called outcomes driven. Full clearance that is, removing every single mine is not feasible with stretched resources and a fluid conflict. Instead, deminers may clear an area around a power station so workers can access it for necessary repairs and maintenance, but marking off the rest for future operations. Teams might remove mines so a farmer can plant at least some of his acreage, but not all of it. In a war, those are the trade-offs Ukraine has to make.

We cleared this area and the power transformer was installed and 5,000 people got electricity. We cleared this area and a bridge was rebuilt, which took down the travel time to a hospital from four hours to 15 minutes, Heslop said.

Every task we do because weve got so few people at the moment has to have impact, has to have a positive outcome, has to be helping Ukraine in some way, he added.

Ryan Hendrickson, a retired Green Beret for the US Army Special Forces and founder of Tip of the Spear Landmine Removal, has been working with a team with on mine clearance in Ukraine. He said in early 2022, when Russia started leaving places like Bucha and Irpin to focus on the Donbas, people slowly started returning to their homes. It reminded him a bit of the aftermath of a hurricane or flood: people returning to see whats left.

As they returned, so did the risks of land mines and other munitions buried among the ruins. The fear is that people, lives already disrupted by war, cannot wait for demining operations. Residents want to restart and rebuild, so they will move and sort through the rubble themselves. Farmers want to plow their fields, and so theyll rig up makeshift machines to try to pull mines up themselves.

People just cant wait for the scarce resource, the clearance resources, so they take matters into their own hands, and perhaps put themselves at risk, but they need to pay the bills and feed their families, Alex van Roy, of the Fondation Suisse de Dminage (FSD), said.

Education and awareness campaigns attempt to mitigate this risk. In Ukraine, announcements warning of land mines broadcast on the radio and blast out across social media. Animated ads run on trains, especially important to warn any Ukrainians who may be newly returning to their homes. Kids get coloring books, warning them not to touch things that look like mines. Patron, Ukraines mine-sniffing dog, visits schools and stars in music videos. Teams go door to door. There are murals everywhere. It looks like propaganda, but we need to do it because its simple rules, and all Ukrainians must know about it, Bezkaravainyi said.

[Patrons theme song is shown in the video above.]

These tools fill the gaps until Ukraine can scale up, which can probably only happen on a large scale when the fighting ends. The US has pledged more than $182 million for humanitarian demining efforts, and other international donors and organizations are dedicating resources there. Ukrainian groups and figures sometimes crowdfund on social media, like Ukrainian comedian Mark Kutsevalov, who is raising money for demining equipment, documenting his efforts on Instagram.

But the World Bank estimates it will cost about $37 billion to demine Ukraine. Even with assistance and expertise from international NGOs and other organizations, much demining is done by Ukrainians themselves school teachers, taxi drivers, and moms who are trained in the incredibly dangerous work. Ukraine has about 3,000 demining specialists, with plans to train more, though Ukrainian officials have said they need thousands more.

Ukraines deep experience with demining has also become something of a hindrance, as rules put in place to protect safety procedures and processes add to the bureaucracy and red tape. Officials in Ukraine are aware of these challenges, but changing the laws requires acts of Parliament. Some of it, too, is Ukraines desire to show its population that demining is a priority and that the government is capable of delivering to its population.

This is a problem for Ukraine now, as the war, and if and when the fighting ends. This isnt a new lesson of conflict; the worlds experiences with the long-tail dangers to civilians from mines and artillery led to global conventions banning anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. But the efforts to protect civilians, in the near- and long-term, often collide with the realities of the battlefield. Militaries use land mines because, on the battlefield, they believe they work in combat.

But the weapons themselves do not discriminate between tank or ambulance, soldier or civilian. Which means, in Ukraine, some cities and towns exist in a precarious limbo, free of Russian occupation, but not its remnants. I used to go here before February 24. I could go over here, Hendrickson said, describing the frustration of some Ukrainian communities. Why cant I go there now? Why is there red tape and a mine sign in front of this? I want my land back. I want my home back. I want boom.

Translation and additional reporting by Olena Lysenko.

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There are now more land mines in Ukraine than almost anywhere else on the planet - Vox.com

"Nobody wants to be on the frontline," one expert told Euronews, highlighting the grizzly impact of bitter weather on soldiers and civilians.

Winter has only just arrived, but it has already brought an array of difficulties to the Ukraine war. Armies on both sides are being affected and Ukrainian civilians too.

Spare a thought for the Ukrainian defenders in the trenches, Tyler Kustra, assistant professor of politics and international relations at the University of Nottingham, told Euronews.

More than a million Ukrainian and Russian soldiers are currently fighting in eastern Ukraine, as temperatures plummet and winter weather begins to bite.

But that is the start of their worries.

Citing images of rats "the size of a Kalashnikov assault rifle" shared on social media by troops, Kustra said Russia's forces "are dealing with a severe rodent infestation as mice and rats seek warmth and food by going into their trenches.

"Given that the Ukrainians are just on the other side of the front line, I worry that Putin isn't the only vermin that they will have to deal with," he added.

Various social media posts and reports have emerged in recent weeks purporting to show plagues of rodents inside Russian frontlines, a sign of increasingly unsanitary and degrading wartime conditions for troops on the battlefield.

AFP recently reported that mice were chewing cables of important pieces of equipment in Ukraine's trenches, like heaters and internet devices, adding yet another problem.

Fighting in winter, meanwhile, is challenging.

Lying in trenches when it is minus 10 or 20 can give soldiers hypothermia, Marina Miron, a post-doctoral researcher at the Kings College War Studies Department told Euronews, adding that a lack of foliage means they cannot hide out in the open.

Extra fuel and proper clothing are needed just to survive the winter battlefield, she continued, placing a greater resource burden on each countrys army.

That said, both sides know how to operate in winter. It's not anything new, she added.

Still, bleak weather can affect troops mentally, especially when far from family and friends.

Nobody wants to be on the front lines, so morale goes down. People want to be somewhere that is nice and warm, rather than outside, said Miron.

That's the problem, you have a human factor here in both the psychological and physical limitations of operating in winter.

Winter's grasp also poses challenges for strategists in Kyiv, making it difficult to move forward on the battlefield.

"Muddy ground is bad for military advances," said politics professor Kustra, with slippery conditions making it difficult to move troops and tanks. "Frozen ground works better."

Added to these natural issues he cited remarks by Ukrainian General Valery Zaluzhny in TheEconomist that the current technological situation means Ukraine cannot mass forces for an attack.

"They will be spotted by Russian drones and destroyed."

Ukraine's counteroffensive, launched in June, could slow down due to difficult winter weather, having not achieved as much as hoped by some.

Advances are still possible, however.

"Even if operations in the winter are troublesome, they're just different, Miron told Euronews.

She pointed to the Second World War, which saw significant offensive actions in the winter months.

We might not see the same kind of swift action [as in the summer in Ukraine]. But that doesn't necessarily mean that there will be no offensive operations, Miron explained.

Whether or not one side would benefit more than the other is unclear.

You cannot say it favours the Ukrainians or the Russians, said Miron. It favours the side that is best prepared for such operations and has implemented all the things that should be implemented early on.

Now is not the time to judge.

Western countries last year hastily shipped winter clothing as frozen temperatures then became one of the most feared foes on both sides of the frontline.

More decisive factors, such as ammunition shortages or manpower issues, could impair operations on the Ukraine side, Miron warned.

EU states have committed to supplying one million shells to Kyiv by March, though this ambitious objective already seems unattainable.

But it is not only soldiers that suffer from the chill.

I'm worried about Ukrainian civilians as temperatures dip, said Kustra.

Last winter Putin attacked Ukrainian power plants to try to freeze the civilian population. He may well try again this winter. Thwarting his plans and keeping the heat will be a concern for the Ukrainian military.

Russian strikes hammered Ukraines energy infrastructure during the dark depths of winter, plunging the country into darkness for extended periods and denying civilians light and heating.

Its targeted campaign destroyed approximately 61% of Ukraines electricity generation capacity, and damaged more than 50% of the countrys energy sector, according to the Atlantic Council, a US think-tank.

Average temperatures in Ukraine range from -4.8 C to 2 C between December and March, with harsh weather conditions like snow and ice frequent.

Dr Jade McGlynn, Research Fellow in War Studies at King's College London, told Euronews earlier this year, that Moscow was deliberately "terror bombing" Ukraine.

"The ultimate intention is to break the will of the population so that they will at some point give in and accept Russia," she explained in June, claiming it was personally "directed" by the Russian President.

"Putin believes the West will give up and Ukrainians will just be grateful for an end to the terror."

Go here to read the rest:
Rats the size of AK-47s and grimy mud: Winter comes to Ukraine war - Euronews

From left to right, top: former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, former President Donald Trump, former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie. From left to right, bottom: Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, North Dakota Gov. Doug Burgum and Vivek Ramaswamy. Joe Raedle/Getty Images; Brandon Bell/Getty Images; Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images; Scott Olson/Getty Images; Justin Sullivan/Getty Images hide caption

From left to right, top: former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, former President Donald Trump, former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie. From left to right, bottom: Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, North Dakota Gov. Doug Burgum and Vivek Ramaswamy.

There's a common belief that foreign policy does not win presidential elections, but 2024 may be the exception.

It's a tense time on the world stage. The U.S. is playing a supporting role in two foreign wars, Ukraine and Gaza, while simultaneously trying to shift its national security focus to the challenges posed by China.

If there were any questions about the role of foreign policy in the Republican primaries, the answers came following the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas on Israel. At the last debate in Miami, Republicans clashed over their support for Israel.

In a November Des Moines Register/NBC News/Mediacom poll, 57% of likely Iowa GOP caucus-goers said the Israel-Hamas war is "extremely important" to them as they evaluate candidates.

On the campaign trail, former President Donald Trump has been tapping into these fears about foreign conflicts, boasting that he's the "only one that will prevent World War III."

The increased attention on global affairs has coincided with former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley's rise in the polls. She's been able to lean on her experience as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

Foreign policy is one of the few areas where there are real differences in strategy among the candidates, particularly between those with more traditional hawkish roots and the rise of more conservative populist candidates.

The Republican field has largely lined up behind Israel, as is the typical conservative ideology, and rejected calls for a cease-fire though there have been some differences.

Trump initially criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and referred to the Iran-backed Hezbollah, another militant group in the region, as "very smart."

Those comments were widely criticized by both Republicans and Democrats. Trump later vowed to "fully support" Israel following the outcry.

Haley attacked Vivek Ramaswamy for suggesting initially that the U.S. phase out aid to Israel. At the Miami debate in November, Ramaswamy then said he would advise the Israeli leader to "smoke those terrorists on his southern border and ... I'll be smoking the terrorists on our southern border."

Former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie actually visited Israel after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack and met with survivors, the first GOP presidential candidate to do so since the war began.

During the Miami debate, Christie said he'd tell Netanyahu, "America is here, no matter what it is you need."

While there is broad agreement about support for Israel, Republicans are increasingly divided over the idea of sending additional military aid to Ukraine.

As the war has dragged on and public interest has declined, the war has become a key indicator of how presidential hopefuls believe the U.S. should engage with the world.

And no issue in the arena of foreign policy probably illustrates the growing divide between Republican isolationists and foreign policy hawks more than Ukraine.

On the one side are candidates like Trump and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, who have both pushed U.S. leaders to focus more resources on domestic issues. On the other side, are more GOP traditionalists like Haley and Christie who argue the U.S. must stand up to adversaries like Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Republican candidates not only agree that China poses the greatest threat to the United States, but they appear to be competing for who is the biggest hawk against Beijing.

As president, Trump imposed a series of tariffs on Beijing. He now plans to go further, promising a decoupling of the U.S.-China economies.

Haley has accused the former president of being "singularly focused" on trade and missing the military threat posed by Beijing.

"China was military stronger militarily stronger when President Trump left office than when he entered. That's bad," Haley said during a speech at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.

She says the U.S. needs to modernize its military and end trade relations until China takes greater action on fentanyl.

DeSantis has compared the threat posed by Beijing as being equal or greater than the one posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. He's pledged to "reorient" U.S. foreign policy toward China.

But there is nuance among their positions when it comes to using military force against China.

Read the original post:
Where the Republican presidential candidates stand on Israel, Ukraine and China - NPR

This state of affairs suggests the current level of support for Ukraine is no longer sufficient to shift the balance of the war. Ukraines President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to appeal to Western countries to increase arms supplies. But due to the conflict between Israel and Hamas, and the weariness of Americans over the seemingly endless Ukrainian conflict, in which US resources are being drained, the media is increasingly discussing the possibility of a ceasefire.

As a result, the question arises: is it time to pursue a truce between Kyiv and Moscow? Several reasons point towards this outcome.

Second, the United States has depleted Europes stocks of former Soviet military equipment by convincing governments to transfer them to Ukraine. This strategic move has not only resulted in long-term contracts to shore up the production and maintenance of US military equipment but has also sidelined Russian companies.

As a consequence, the US military-industrial complex has emerged as the primary supplier of new military equipment for Europe. It is noteworthy, however, that Germany is also supplying weapons to Kyiv, posing a potential challenge to US dominance in the arms sector in the future.

03:42

Ukraine says Russian strike killed over 50 in one of the deadliest attacks of the war

Ukraine says Russian strike killed over 50 in one of the deadliest attacks of the war

What if a US under Trump or DeSantis turns its back on the Ukraine war?

Prioritising aid to Ukraine over implementing more effective inflation-combating measures has led to public dissatisfaction with the White House. European countries are also expressing war fatigue and increasingly divided on the wisdom of continuing to support Kyiv. Additionally, the effectiveness of financial aid to Kyiv is seen as diminishing due to the countrys high level of corruption.

01:03

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky calls on UN to strip criminal Russia of veto power

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky calls on UN to strip criminal Russia of veto power

While the US officially supports Ukraines fight, Kyivs aspirations are being hindered by the depletion of its military resources. Moreover, there is increasing discussion among Ukrainian politicians about the need to mobilise more people, including younger people and more women.

As a result, Biden is faced with the crucial task of persuading Zelensky to initiate negotiations with Putin, while also being careful not to overtly pressure him.

Even though the Kremlin holds the advantage on the battlefield, the White House dominates the information sphere. The US government should prepare the international community for a potential ceasefire and present a peace agreement between Kyiv and Moscow as a victory for the collective West.

Peter Sojka, a fellow at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specialises in foreign relations and geopolitics

See the article here:
Why the US needs to get Ukraine to swallow a truce with Russia - South China Morning Post

NATOs policy on Ukraine is inadvertently encouraging Putin to continue the war. It is time for a change.

The alliances position thus far has affirmed that Ukraine will become a member in the long run, but not while Russia continues its war on Ukraine. NATO is concerned that Ukraines admission would trigger a direct and immediate NATO war with Kremlin forces, and that this might escalate to nuclear weapons use.

This view is a fallacy, and it sends a signal to Vladimir Putin that he should continue fighting. As long as he keeps going, NATO will not admit Ukraine as a member, and thus Putin believes that he still has a chance of winning.

NATO must send the opposite message: that no matter what he does, Putin will never succeed in defeating Ukraine. Continuing the war would therefore be pointless and devastating for Russia. Moving forward with Ukrainian membership in NATO will send this message.

This message is also crucial for Ukraines economic recovery. There is a symbiosis between military and economic support for Ukraine. For example, there is no greater economic benefit to Ukraine than opening its ports to normal shipping. Yet that can only be achieved through military security operations, such as demining, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. Moreover, investors will not place big bets on Ukraine unless they are sure it will be a secure country in the future.

If security measures can help Ukraine achieve GDP growth of $25bn, this would be enough to produce a $5bn windfall for the state budget, thus alleviating the need for Western budgetary support.

What are the fallacies in the current NATO approach? Firstly, NATOs Article 5 does not establish any specific requirement that Western ground troops must fight on the front lines against Russian forces.

Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty reads as follows:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently, they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

In other words, there will be a collective response to any aggression against a NATO member, but the treaty does not specify what that collective response will be. It does not state that NATO members must send troops to the front line, although that is certainly a possibility.

One should recall that NATO members have been involved in many conflicts over the past 70 years, from Algeria to Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Libya, and yet Article 5 was not invoked, and NATO as an alliance did not join the fight.

The only time Article 5 has been invoked in NATOs entire history was in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. And yet, in this case, NATOs Article 5 response was not to send troops to fight terrorists.

Instead, NATO countries sent aircraft to assist the United States by conducting air policing missions in US airspace. When the United States ousted the Taliban from Afghanistan, it did so together with UK, Australian and Polish forces as a coalition of the willing. There was no NATO role. Indeed, it was several months after a UN-authorized peacekeeping mission had been established in Afghanistan (ISAF) that NATO took on any role there and that role was not an Article 5 commitment.

In other words, Article 5 is not an automatic tripwire for the use of ground forces. It might be for example, if the Baltic states, with their small territories and population, were attacked by Russia. In that case, NATO countries would indeed have to intervene directly under Article 5, including with ground troops, to counter Russia (something already apparent from the NATO battlegroups present in all three.) There are no other options. But that is a matter for the North Atlantic Council to decide at the time, based on the circumstances.

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In Ukraine, a vast country with a large population, there are multiple options beyond the immediate use of NATO ground forces.

The second fallacy is to assume that Vladimir Putin could escalate the war in Ukraine if he wanted, but he is refraining from doing so because NATO has not offered membership to Ukraine. This is far from the truth.

If Putin had an option to escalate conventionally in Ukraine, he would already have done so. The reality is that he has lost half of Russias conventional forces fighting Ukraine, and cannot now reconstitute them. He relies on Iran and North Korea for drones and outdated artillery shells and sends untrained troops to the front as cannon fodder, simply to keep the war going.

As for horizontal escalation i.e., attacking a current NATO member this is the last thing Putin would do, as he knows it would draw an immediate alliance response directly against Russian forces.

As for nuclear escalation, Putin knows and even more importantly, the Russian military knows that any nuclear use would not achieve any military objective in Ukraine, while it would certainly draw a direct response against Russian forces. It would also spark universal condemnation of Russia, including from China and other non-Western states.

The idea that NATO membership is the trigger for Putins aggression is a third fallacy: Ukraine had little chance of NATO membership when Putin attacked in 2014 and 2022. Moreover, Russia has existing borders with alliance territory in Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the United States, and has not attacked. When Finland became a NATO member this year (soon to be joined by Sweden), Russia barely took notice. The issue for Putin is not NATO membership, but the existence of Ukraine as a nation-state.

So what would Article 5 mean in practice for Ukraine?

There are a number of ways in which the alliance can act collectively to defend Ukraine, many of which the allies are already doing. They are providing massive amounts of equipment to Ukraine, as well as providing training, finance, logistics, intelligence, operational planning, and more. This is already significant.

Some NATO nations, including the United States, have decided to help Ukraine acquire and use F-16 aircraft. This is a significant, long-term commitment to the future of Ukraine. Given the substantial logistics, maintenance, training and infrastructure requirements of a successful F-16 program, this is just the kind of signal Putin needs to see in order to come to grips with the fact that he will not defeat Ukraine.

The European Unions decision to open accession talks with Ukraine also sends a significant signal to Putin that there is no scenario ahead in which he wins. Ukraine is a part of the European family and will survive and prosper as a sovereign, independent European democracy.

Yet NATO could still do more under Article 5 than it is currently doing. Four things come immediately to mind:

It is significant that Russian forces are unable to make ground advances. Russias only reliable military tactic is to target Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. NATO nations could agree to participate directly in Ukraines air defense to protect Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. This might involve a combination of air defense systems stationed on NATO territory and the deployment of alliance air defense capabilities in western Ukraine and in NATO territory near Ukraine to protect Ukrainian civilians as well as potential impacts on NATO territory from Russian bombardment. At a minimum, it should be possible to keep Ukraine west of the Dnipro River (including Kyiv, Odesa, and Lviv) safe from Russian attacks.

These four steps and perhaps others could therefore become NATOs Article 5 commitment to Ukraine discussed and agreed within the NATO-Ukraine Council. It must not rule out the provision of ground troops at a later date if needed but there is no need to commit such troops today. Putin must know that escalation is on our side, even if we choose not to escalate.

Note that such a formula does not set territorial limits on the application of Article 5. To do so would relegate Russian-occupied territory to a long-term occupied status. Rather, it defines specifically the type of response NATO will provide under Article 5, without accepting any limits on NATOs support for Ukraine recovering its 1991 borders.

In this context, we should recall that NATO admitted West Germany as a member when East Germany was still under Soviet occupation and that the EU accepted Cyprus as a member, even though northern Cyprus was under Turkish control..

Now let us suppose NATO were to take these four concrete steps to defend Ukraine as soon as possible even without Ukrainian membership. It would make a significant difference in Ukraines success in the war effort, and in its future as a European democracy.

But even more important, if NATO took these steps today without any formal declaration about Ukrainian NATO membership it would not evoke any Russian response beyond what Russia is already doing. Indeed, it would expose Russias bluff that such steps, or indeed NATO membership itself, are some kind of red line.

Once these measures were implemented, however, the alliance would have then solved the potentially contentious issue of what Article 5 would mean in practice. Since there would be no mystery about what Article 5 would mean (we would already be doing it), and also no mystery about Russias response would be (we would have already seen it), we should be able to move ahead with alacrity to invite Ukraine into NATO.

The path would be clear for a membership invitation at NATOs Washington Summit in July 2024. Ratification should also be on a fast track in the case of the United States, before the January 2025 Presidential Inauguration.

Indeed, Americas 2024 Presidential election adds a yet greater sense of urgency to the discussion. With the outcome completely unknown, it may be too difficult to advance Ukraines NATO membership after the election. Yet Americas and Europes security depends on a secure Ukraine that defeats Russia. This provides all the more reason to act swiftly to bring Ukraine into our great alliance.

AmbassadorKurt Volkeris a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. A leading expert in US foreign and national security policy, he served as US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations from 2017-2019, and as US Ambassador to NATO from 2008-2009.

Europes Edgeis CEPAs online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or viewsof the institutions they representor the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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Bringing Ukraine Into NATO Without World War III - Center for European Policy Analysis