Mediaboss Marketing

New York Times

Finding Bravado, and Worry, at an Iranian Shrine Where ISIS Struck New York Times I would sit on the thick red carpets with visitors from across Iran and beyond, talking with them about the war in Syria, the latest soap operas and coming elections. Sometimes officials would ask me who I was, only to offer tea and let me be. Despite ... Iran: Island of peace in ocean of troubles?Anadolu Agency Attacks in Iran show Tehran's chickens coming home to roostThe Hill (blog) Iran accuses Saudis of supporting terrorist groupsAljazeera.com Al-Monitor -Reuters -Press TV -Farsnews all 190 news articles »

Read more:
Finding Bravado, and Worry, at an Iranian Shrine Where ISIS Struck - New York Times

Last week ISIS staged an unprecedented terrorist attack in the heart of Iran. At least 17 people were killed and dozens more were injured at two symbolic locations of the Islamic Republic: the parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini.

The reaction from Irans clerical rulers was predictable; they variously blamed their regional and international enemies the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Ignored by Iranian officials and by most expert commentators, however, was any recognition that Tehrans domestic and regional policies were contributing factors. In other words, the expansion of ISIS into Iran was a classic case of Iranian regime blowback.

Daily Emails and Alerts- Get the best of Newsweek delivered to your inbox

The conventional wisdom suggests that Iran would remain immune to ISIS as a global terrorist threat. Given Irans majority Shia population and the fact that ISIS is a deeply anti-Shia cult informed by an extremist Sunni neo-Wahhabism, it has been widely assumed that Iranian recruits to ISIS would be difficult to find.

A gunman is seen entering Iranian parliament building in a still image taken from close circuit television (CCTV), taken on June 7, 2017, in Tehran, Iran. IRIB/Handout via Reuters

We now know that Iranian Kurds were behind the ISIS attack in Tehran. The reasons are broadly similar to what we have learned about the politics and psychology of Islamic radicalization. Marginalized, angry and alienated populations exposed to salafi ideology are susceptible to ISIS recruitment.

Approximately eight percent of Irans population is Sunni, mainly representing Arab, Baluchi, Turkmen and Kurdish minorities. They live on Irans periphery and suffer disproportionately from unemployment and discrimination.

Credible reporting suggests that a small number from these groups have joined ISIS due to the same socio-economic push and pull factors that drives ISIS recruitment worldwide. According to the distinguished Iranian journalist Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, the border towns and villages and tribes along Irans east, west and southern borders are poor and vulnerable to extremism.

This has produced social conditions where young unemployed men can be wooed and recruited. In other words, Iran now has a homegrown terrorist problem of its own. Its regional foreign policy has also been a contributing factor.

ISIS has a genocidal view toward Shia Muslims. Partly because of this, Iran and its proxies are fighting ISIS on various battlefields across the Middle East. At the same time, Irans sectarian foreign policy has indirectly contributed to the rise ISIS.

In Iraq, Tehrans critical support for Shia majoritarianism significantly contributed to Sunni marginalization, indirectly amplifying the ideological appeal of ISIS. Then there is Syria.

When the Arab Spring protests reached Syria in 2011, ISIS didnt exist. Peaceful protesters chanting non-sectarian slogans were confronting the 41-year rule of the House of Assad. From the outset, they were met with state-sanctioned repression that rapidly extended to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Gradually, the uprising militarized and then radicalized as regional actors entered the fray. The subsequent melee is responsible for the worst refugee crisis of the 21 st century and for killing nearly half a million people.

The Assad regime backed by Iran (and Russia) bears the lions share of responsibility for this state of affairs. It is from the killing fields of Syria that the ISIS variant of salafi-jihadism arose and expanded.

Today, Iran justifies it support for Assad by claiming it is fighting ISIS and Al Qaeda. In doing so, however, it conveniently reads the Syrian conflict backward instead of forward.

From the inception of the conflict, and prior to the rise of salafi-jihadism in Syria, Iran strongly backed the Assad regime. Its early intervention had nothing to do with combating religious extremism for the simple reason that this problem barely existed in the early months of the Syrian uprising.

In the past six years, this changed and Iran stepped up its intervention. Mostly notably, it recruited a pan-Shia militia that, along with Hezbollah, has done the bulk of the fighting in defense of the Assad regime.

Irans critical role in Syria has significantly contributed to the spread of sectarianism across the Middle East: ISIS has been a key beneficiary of this. Now the blowback has come to Tehran.

ISIS is fundamentally the product of political authoritarianism in the Sunni Arab world. Its theological home is in Saudi Arabia. The legacy of political tyranny in the Arab world, buttressed by the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq, created social conditions that allowed this extremist cult not only to emerge but also to proliferate. Irans role in this equation has been generally unrecognized.

Though indirect, Irans contribution has been significant. Its domestic policies discriminating against ethnic/religious minorities, and its sectarian foreign policy in Iraq and Syria are key elements that has contributed to ISIS expansion. In other words, Irans chickens have come home to roost.

Nader Hashemiis the Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver. His latest book isSectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East.

Originally posted here:
Surely Some Mistake. Why Did ISIS Attack Iran? - Newsweek

Sailors line the bow of the destroyer USS Cole as it glides past One World Trade Center and the lower Manhattan skyline, May 21, 2014 in New York.

AP

Last Updated Jun 14, 2017 11:27 AM EDT

U.S. officials told CBS News on Wednesday that an Iranian warship had shined a spotlight and laser at an American military helicopter accompanying two U.S. Navy vessels sailing through the strategic Strait of Hormuz during the night.

Military sources told CBS News national security correspondent David Martin that the incident was considered by the U.S. Navy to have been "unsafe and unprofessional."

While Iranian military vessels do occasionally test the patience of U.S. warships in and near the Strait of Hormuz -- a vital international waterway through which nearly a third of all global oil shipments sail -- this incident was unusual because the Iranian ship involved was part of the regular Iranian navy, not the elite Revolutionary Guard.

Play Video

Tensions between the Trump administration and Iran are flaring up. The U.S. hit Iran with new sanctions. Iran responded with a new round of short...

The two U.S. ships involved were the USS Cole destroyer and the USS Bataan amphibious assault ship, a vessel designed to carry and deploy smaller vessels and helicopters.

The last "unsafe" incident in the Strait of Hormuz occurred in March this year, when Iranian vessels had a close encounter with a U.S. surveillance ship.

Martin reported that theUSNS Invincible, which is outfitted with sonar to track submarines and radar to monitor missile tests, was transiting the Strait of Hormuz when it was forced to change its course to avoid a small group of Iranian Revolutionary Guard fast boats that had positioned themselves in front of her.

That encounter came just two days after anIranian navy frigate came within 150 yards of the Invinciblein the Gulf of Oman, just south of the Strait of Hormuz. The gulf separates Oman from southeastern Iran.

Still, neither of those incidents was the most serious of 2017. In January, a U.S.Navy destroyer fired multiple warning shots at Iranian patrol boatsas they sped toward the destroyer in the Strait of Hormuz "with their weapons manned."

The crew of the USS Mahan fired the warning shots after attempting to establish contact with the Iranians and after dropping smoke flares, U.S. officials said.

The U.S. Navy's confrontations with Iranian naval forces in the Persian Gulf do not usually reach the point of prompting warning shots by the U.S.

A U.S. Navy official told CBS News the Mahan was transiting the Strait of Hormuz when the Iranian boats sped toward it and failed to halt despite U.S. cautionary moves.

In May of 2016, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to the United States and its allies if they "threaten" the Islamic Republic.

2017 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Original post:
Iran warship in Strait of Hormuz in "unsafe and unprofessional ... - CBS News

NEW DELHI: Having stood by Iran in its tough times, India expects Tehran to reciprocate by awarding rights of the coveted Farzad-B gas field to its discoverer, ONGC, Oil Minister Dharmendra Pradhan said.

Upset with the USD 5.5 billion master development plan submitted by ONGC Videsh Ltd - the overseas investment arm of state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) - Iran has signed an initial pact with Russia's Gazprom for developing Farzad-B gas field.

"We value relationships. During difficult days of Iran, when the entire west imposed sanctions, we stood by them and bought substantial amount of crude oil. We also returned every penny when the banking channels reopened," he said.

Now, Iran has to reciprocate. "We have that much expectation from Iran. I hope Iran will comply with that," he said. "Our relationship with Iran is not based on a single commodity or a single transaction."

With Tehran delaying the award of rights to develop the 12.5 trillion cubic feet gas field to its discoverer, OVL, India decided to cut oil imports from Iran by a fifth in 2017 -18.

Iran retaliated by first cutting by one-third the time it gave to Indian refiners to pay for oil they buy from it as also raising ship freight rates, and now by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Russian gas monopoly Gazprom.

The MoU was signed between Gazprom and National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC) in Kremlin on March 28 when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. The agreement spans Farzad-B, the North Pars and Kish fields.

Iran has been unhappy with the USD 5.5 billion investment plan of OVL as it will have to reimburse all of the money that is invested, together with a fixed rate of return. Tehran wants the investment to be lowered and OVL commit to buying gas at a price fixed by it.

OVL, on the other hand, says it will take up development only if the terms are economical and cannot absorb any cost and the price of gas should be comparable to rates in current market.

Sources said Indian refiners have cut oil imports from Iran by a fifth to 1,90,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2017-18 from 2,40,000 bpd in the previous fiscal.

Iran, India's third biggest oil supplier, used to give a 90-day credit period to refiners like Indian Oil Corp (IOC) and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd (MRPL) to pay for the oil they would buy from it.

Now, Tehran has reduced this to 60 days, essentially meaning that IOC and MRPL would have to pay for the oil they buy from Iran in 60 days instead of previous liberal term of 90 days, they said.

Iran oil sale terms were the most attractive for Indian refiners. Besides a liberal credit period, it also shipped the oil to India for a nominal 20 per cent of normal ocean freight.

Other Middle-East sellers offer not more than 15-day credit period.

Sources said NIOC has also decided to cut the discount it offers to Indian buyers on freight from 80 per cent to about 60 per cent.

Since the lifting of western sanctions, Iran has played hardball over award of the field which was discovered by OVL.

The two nations were initially targeting concluding a deal on Farzad-B field development by November 2016 but later mutually agreed to push the timeline to February 2017.

Now, the deal is being targeted to be wrapped up by September after the two sides agree on a price and a rate of return for OVL's investments.

Farzad B was discovered by OVL in the Farsi block about 10 years ago. The project has so far cost the OVL-led consortium, which also includes Oil India Ltd and Indian Oil Corp (IOC), over USD 80 million.

The field in the Farsi block has an in-place gas reserve of 21.7 tcf, of which 12.5 tcf are recoverable.

New Delhi is keen that the gas from the field comes to India to feed the vast energy needs.

Here is the original post:
India wants Iran to reciprocate on gas field award: Dharmendra Pradhan - Economic Times

By Dina Esfandiary By Dina Esfandiary June 14 at 9:00 AM

This month, the Islamic State successfully carried out its first attack on Iranian soil, resulting in 17 dead and some 50 injured. Iran is a top target for the Islamic State and has been since the group rose to prominence in 2014. But Iranian security forces had effectively thwarted the threat through anextensive counterterror program.Iran took pride in keeping the fight against the Islamist militants outside its territory. Until now.

Threats grow from sectarian roots

The Islamic State views Shiite Muslims as apostates. It portrays Iran as a Shiite power threatening the real Muslim community the Sunnis. Because of this and the threat the group poses to Irans interests in the region Tehran views the Islamic State as a national security threat. As a result, it placed no limits on resources to combat it both inside and outside its borders

To tackle the Islamic State, Iran developed an extensive counterterror program. Irans goal is to undermine the Islamic States spread, ideology and vision, while working to prevent attacks on Iranian soil or against Iranian citizens. The Iranian approach to countering the Islamic State is more hands-on than that of the U.S.-led coalition, because by virtue of proximity, Tehran feels the threat more acutely.

Iran draws on its relatively strong and stable state, with its notoriously effective security services to implement its counterterror measures. Tehran targets the Islamic State directly to disrupt its operations. It sends advisers, military personnel and supplies and money to tackle the group in Syria and Iraq to avoid conflict within its own borders. It also conducts a messaging campaign to tackle the groups ideology by highlighting unity among Muslims and signals its commitment to the fight by showcasing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) presence outside its borders.

To lessen the sectarian aspect of the conflict after all, Iran wants to lead all Muslims, not just the Shiite minority Tehran engages with various political and religious groups fighting the Islamic State, including the Iraqi government and Army, Kurdish fighters and Sunni groups.

Inside Iran

Domestically, Iran undertook a number of anti-radicalization measures, in coordination with the minority Sunni community to tackle the Islamic States effort to recruit inside Iran. While somewhat successful to begin with, in 2016, Iranian official admitted that the Islamic State had tapped into Irans Sunni minority for recruits.

It carried out extensive intelligence operations to thwart planned attacks. In July, for example, Irans Intelligence Ministry successfully defused an Islamic State plan to conduct a large-scale terrorist attack across Tehran, involving 50 targets using more than 200 pounds of explosives.

But given that Iran was a major target, it was unlikely to escape attacks completely.

Islamic State fighters increase focus on Iran

By summer 2016, the Islamic State reportedly lost almost 50 percent of its territorial gains in Iraq. As the fight continues to make progress, the group is lashing out. In the past few months, it upped its anti-Iran propaganda and outlined its vision to conquer Iran to return it to Sunni rule. Iranian officials were quick to dismiss the threats, sayingthe Islamic State could not create insecurity in Iran. The group also published four issues of its online publication Rumiyah, in Persian.

After a number of failed attacks, the Islamic State succeeded in simultaneously targeting Irans parliament and the shrine to Irans religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; symbols of democracy and revolution in Iran. The attack will significantly boost the Islamic State morale, at a time where it is facing a losing battle in Iraq and retreating in Syria.

Whats next for Iran?

The attack will spark calls for revenge and a display of strength by the government from conservative quarters. Hard-liners, recently defeated in a presidential election, will point to the attack as proof that President Hassan Rouhanis focus on moderation doesnt work.

The attack will increase public support for the IRGC, who are viewed as the countrys protectors. They were first to respond to the attacks and dealt with the terrorists swiftly, earning themselves the praise of both those caught in the attack and the government. The attack will also spark calls for an expansion of efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, despite the lack of popularity of Irans efforts in Syria.

And yet if the politics in Iran around regional policy will change as a result of the attack, its unlikely that the actual policy will. Iran is already heavily invested in both countries. It doesnt have unlimited resources, and it is already losing soldiers and political capital in both countries.

Most notably, the attackers were Iranians. But the Iranian population will be looking for someone to blame. Saudi Arabias deputy crown prince gave them the opportunity: Last month, hesaid they would take the battle to Iran. Some Iranians, encouraged by the IRGC, drew links between his statements and the attack itself. The alreadyunpopularidea of dialogue with Gulf Arab neighbors will become significantly less popular, and more difficult. And this, at a time when regional coordination is necessary to tackle the threat of terrorism.

Irans extensive and multilayered counterterrorism program was successful in preventing an attack within Irans borders and against Iranian civilians. Until last weeks attack. It is unsurprising that an Islamic State-sponsored attack slipped through the cracks, given Irans significance as a target for the group. The attack, a boon for the Islamic States morale, will make Rouhanis goal of engagement with Gulf Arab neighbors more difficult, but given its limited resources will not see Tehran significantly increasing its efforts in neighboring Iraq and Syria.

Dina Esfandiary is a Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) fellow in the War Studies Department at Kings College London and an adjunct fellow (nonresident) in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Link:
How Iran fights the Islamic State - Washington Post