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That said, any crisis that occurs is likely to be less severe than the 2008 catastrophe that struck the United States because Iran generally has much less debt in its economy. But the threat remains significant.

The prospect of a banking crisis is so serious that in a speech earlier this year, the head of Iran's central bank, Valiollah Seif, warned financial executives that non-performing loans were a threat to all the gains the Rouhani government is making on the economic front. While he has proposed possible solutions, nothing has been agreed upon.

Turquoise's fund has no bank holdings Rabii said he exited the sector three years ago. He said he believes the central bank may need to intervene in the next 18 months to stave off a major threat.

Year-to-date, Turquoise's signature fund is up 12 percent, easily outpacing Tehran's main benchmark, which is up 3 percent. Turquoise has holdings in Iranian industrials, refined petroleum and the chemical sector.

"We have seen a big increase in European corporations coming to Iran, although inflow of foreign portfolio investment is still slow," he said. "It's better than it was, but it is still slow."

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Iran already has a lot of problems, and the next one could be a banking crisis - CNBC

By Brian Keith Simpkins, Ed.D.

In early July 2017, the Iraqi government regained control of Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), thereby ending a bloody and destructive nine-month campaign. ISIS controlled Mosul for almost three years after seizing control of the city in June 2014. With Mosul back under Iraqi control, the main focus of the fight against ISIS turns to Raqqa in Syria, where international-backed forces are zeroing in on ISIS forces.

[Related: Understanding the Ideology of Terrorism]

While progress is being made against ISIS in Iraq, it is beneficial to examine the intelligence failures that contributed to the ISIS territorial gains in Iraq in 2014 to avoid similar mistakes.

Erik Dahls (2013) Theory of Preventive Action can help examine the Iraq intelligence failures. In fact, Dahls theory can be easily applied to other notable intelligence failures such as 9/11, Pearl Harbor, and the national intelligence estimate that led to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Dahls theory focuses on the type of available intelligence (tactical versus strategic) and policymaker receptivity to the intelligence. More specifically, the theory defines that the collection and production of tactical intelligence has the potential to influence policymaker decisions as it is more specific and highlights the need for immediate and/or specific action. Conversely, strategic intelligence is less precise and focuses more on long-term goals related to foreign policy and international security. As for policymaker receptivity, one can easily deduce that policymakers are more influenced by and prefer tactical intelligence. Using these two concepts (type of intelligence and policymaker receptivity), can help explain the pre-incident intelligence failures leading to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq.

Intelligence Collection Methods

The first factor of Dahls theory deals with the type of intelligence that was collected by the U.S. intelligence community (IC). Prior to the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the U.S. military and the IC collaborated to develop one of the most successful battlefield intelligence systems in history (led by the U.S. militarys Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC]), which relied heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT). Both the U.S. military and CIA utilized extensive networks of operatives and analysts within Iraq focused on HUMINT. The CIA station in Baghdad was the agencys largest overseas station in the world during the Iraq War. Utilizing overt and covert (clandestine) collection methods, HUMINT operations provided tactical intelligence on insurgents and their movements, including those of former Iraqi Republican Guard members, some of whom became important figures in ISIS.

[Related: How Syrians are Using Cyber Community Policing to Fight Terrorism]

However, when the military withdrew in 2011 so did the important intelligence assets, thereby creating an intelligence-collection vacuum in its wake. After the U.S. militarys withdrawal, HUMINT operations ended (even the CIA ceased clandestine operations in Iraq). As a result, the IC had to rely solely on satellite imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT) for intelligence collection.

[Related: Why Overt Intelligence Is Important But Often Undervalued]

The problem with reliance on SIGINT intelligence was that ISIS used human couriers for message transmission (thus nullifying SIGINT) and was able to bypass satellite imagery by blending into the social environment. In essence, ISIS became better at denying HUMINT collection strategies while the IC became worse at HUMINT collection.

As a result of inadequate intelligence collection, the IC started producing more strategic intelligence and warnings instead of the more useful tactical and specific intelligence and warnings. The IC was now relying on intelligence that was overly broad, lacked specifics for senior officials, and provided little benefit when given to the Iraqi army to respond to ISIS.

As Dahl (2013) states, strategic-level intelligence and warnings are surprisingly easy to acquire and are often readily available before major attacks, but they are unlikely to be acted upon by decision makers, and in any case too general to be useful (p. 22). Ultimately, even though the IC raised warnings about ISIS, the inadequacy of the collected intelligence resulted in an underestimation of the will and capability of ISIS and an overestimation of the will and capability of the Iraqi army.

Policymaker Reception to Strategic Intelligence Reports

The second factor of Dahls theory and its application to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq deals with policymaker receptivity. In 2014, the Obama administration was not receptive to the strategic intelligence regarding the ISIS threat in Iraq. This was mainly due to the Obama administrations reluctance to get drawn back into Iraq after pledging and ultimately getting U.S. troops out of Iraq.

Further, at the time, the Obama administration was focused on the Syrian civil war and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, which caused the administration to be blind to the ISIS threat. In addition, the Obama administration felt that ISIS could be checked and rolled back at Fallujah and Ramadi. Despite warnings by senior IC and military officials, the Obama administration was not receptive to the intelligence (which was strategic and not tactical) and, therefore, failed to adequately confront the ISIS threat.

Overall, there were intelligence failures by the IC as well as policy and leadership failures in the Obama administration in response to the ISIS threat in 2014. Based on Dahls Theory of Preventative Action, an attack is most likely to succeed if there is strategic intelligence/warning (instead of tactical intelligence/warning) and low policymaker receptivity.

As illustrated above, this was exactly the situation and pre-incident intelligence failures led to the 2014 ISIS territorial gains in Iraq. Specifically, the IC was collecting inadequate intelligence to inform policy makers (due to the withdrawal of intelligence assets) and providing only strategic intelligence/warning to unreceptive policymakers who were focused on other matters and underestimated the ISIS threat.

The failure in responding to the ISIS threat in 2014 especially underscores the importance of HUMINT operations as well as the need for tactical intelligence and for policymakers to be receptive of, and take action based on, available strategic intelligence when appropriate. The IC must also look back at previous intelligence successes and try to repurpose what has worked in the past. As militant groups associated with ISIS are attempting to gain control of territory in the Philippines, it is imperative that the United States does not let what transpired in Iraq repeat itself elsewhere.

About the Author: Dr. Brian Simpkins is the Principal Investigator and Co-Director of the Bluegrass State Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence (BGS IC CAE) and Associate Director of the Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) Justice and Safety Center. Dr. Simpkins is also a part-time faculty member with EKU where he teaches courses in intelligence, critical infrastructure protection and resiliency, and homeland security technologies. In 2016-2017, Dr. Simpkins served as the Program Director of the Institute for Research, Innovation, and Scholarship (IRIS) for the School of Security and Global Studies (SSGS) at American Military University in which he focused on faculty and student research engagement.

Reference

Dahl, E. (2013). Intelligence and surprise attack: Failure and success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

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How Intelligence Failures Contributed to ISIS Territorial Gain in Iraq - In Public Safety (blog)

Canada plans to send more police officers to Iraq to advise and train their counterparts as the war-torn country gradually moves from military to police control of newly liberated areas, including the city of Mosul.

The Liberal government will shortly announce a significant increase in its authorized police contingent in Iraq, to 20 officers from the current four, CBC News has learned.

And the RCMP-led peacekeeping effort, drawing on provincial and municipal officers, will emphasize the training of female Iraqi officers to improve the country's ability to deal with domestic violence and human trafficking.

Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland recently approved increasing the number of Canadian police trainers in Iraq to 20 from the current four. The renewed mission will emphasize the training of Iraqi women officers. (Adrian Wyld/Canadian Press)

A senior government official, speaking on condition of anonymity,confirmedthe numbers will ramp up over the next year or more, after Canada sends a fourth officer to Iraq next month to fulfil an earlier commitment made in May 2016.

A briefing note for Foreign Affairs Minister ChrystiaFreelandand Marie-Claude Bibeau, the international development minister, spells out the rationale:"This increase will enable Canada, as a member of the global coalition against Daesh, to build key capacities in Iraqi security institutions and support transitions to new policing approaches."

The Feb. 24 document outlining the mission, approved jointly by Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale, Freeland and Bibeau, was obtained by CBC News under the Access to Information Act.

The document estimates the annual cost of providing 20 Canadian officers to Iraq at $7 million, paid for out of RCMP and Global Affairs Canada peacekeeping funds.

"As military operations to recapture Mosul progress, the government of Iraq is looking beyond immediate security needs and toward the sustainable reform of its security institutions, including the rebuilding of Iraq's police forces," says the document.

"This is a critical step toward enabling Iraqi police to play a more stabilizing role in Iraq and to manage threats such as Daesh," also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has sought to establish a caliphate based in northern Iraq.

Earlier this month, the Iraq government declared victory over ISIS forces in Mosul, the city seized in 2014 by extremists and subject to hard fighting in the last eightmonths.

Canada has been under pressure to contribute as many as 45 police trainers to Iraq, including to an Italian-led police training mission. But the Liberal government has resisted the demands, as Canada had little direct experience of Iraq's policing sector.

But with three Canadian officers now on the ground, and a March visit to Iraq by officials with the RCMP-led Canadian Police Arrangement group, which manages overseas deployments of Canada's police trainers, the government is committing up to 20 officers until March 31, 2019.

The briefing note says some of them may be sent to support the Kurdish regional government in the north.

The beefed-up mission will emphasize the training of women officers in Iraq, where there are only about 10,000 to 12,000 female police compared with more than 600,000 male officers.

"Male and female officers are provided different training at separate training institutes," says the note to Freeland and Bibeau. "Among female police, 9,000 are uniformed and work primarily to search women and children upon arrest or at checkpoints.

"As many as 3,000 [female] officers have administrative duties."

The expanded Canadian mission will look for opportunities to recruit and train more Iraqi women for broader police work.

"Canadian officials have met with female officers and trainees, noting they are educated and eager, though they lack dedicated resources, access to the same training as men, family and societal support."

The United Nations' peacekeeping web page says that as of last month, there were 58 Canadian police deployed to UN-sanctioned missions, with the vast majority in Haiti.

Walter Dorn of the Canadian Forces College applauds the increased deployment of Canadian police officers to Iraq, but says number should not be counted as part of Canada's commitment of 150 officers to UN-sanctioned missions. (Mike Blanchfield/Canadian Press)

Walter Dorn, an associate professor at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, welcomed the increased numbers to Iraq.

"I think it's a valuable thing to do to help Iraq get back on its feet after ISIS had taken a large part of Iraq territory, and policing is a major factor in creating stability," he said.

But he noted that the Iraq mission is not UN-supported, and so Canada's commitment last year to deploy 150 peacekeeping police officers to various UN missionsstill stands.

Earlier this year, Canada agreed to send up to 10 police officers to Colombia to help in an international UN-led effort to demobilize guerrilla groups and monitor a ceasefire.

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Canada to beef up police presence in Iraq after fall of Mosul - CBC.ca

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Petrofac wins $100 million in contracts in Iraq MarketWatch LN) said Wednesday it has secured a contract extension and a new award with a combined value of more than $100 million for construction management, engineering, commissioning and start-up services for two International Oil Companies in Iraq. Shares at ... Petrofac shares rise on $100m order boost in IraqArab News Petrofac announces Iraq contracts worth $100 millionThe National Petrofac wins two deals in IraqUpstream Online all 14 news articles »

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Petrofac wins $100 million in contracts in Iraq - MarketWatch

Emmanuel Macron looks on as Fayez al-Sarraj shakes hands with General Khalifa Haftar after talks aimed at easing tensions in Libya, in La Celle-Saint-Cloud, near Paris, on July 25, 2017.

A French-led effort to reunify fractured Libya failed to consult powerful local forces and risks achieving little beyond boosting the legitimacy of a renegade general who has recently racked up significant battlefield gains.

On paper, the step taken by Libyas rival leaders on Tuesday -- guided by French President Emmanuel Macron and a United Nations envoy -- was their boldest yet toward resolving Libyas six-year crisis. After talks at a country mansion outside Paris, UN-backed Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and eastern military strongman Khalifa Haftar agreed to -- but didnt sign -- a text calling for a ceasefire, combining the North African crude producers divided state oil company and holding elections as soon as possible.

Yet the accord will struggle to survive the transition from French chateau to Libyas fiercely contested politics, according to analysts including Riccardo Fabiani at Eurasia Group.

All we have is a very good photo op, which Macron and Haftar exploited very well,said Fabiani,senior analyst for the Middle East and North Africa. The agreement accorded Haftar a veneer of respect on the international arena -- a major achievement for a leader whose authority has so far been backed largely by Russias Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President -- and former military chief -- Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. It was, though, reached without input from regional officials, or myriad militias and political parties whose cooperation will be needed to make it stick, he said.

Playing out just across the Mediterranean Sea, Libyas descent into chaos since the uprising that toppled Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 has fueled the two most severe cross-border challenges facing many European leaders -- the flow of poor migrants desperate to build better lives and the opportunist movement of Islamic State extremists. Macrons initiative comes after abortive attempts by Italy, the former colonizing power, to forge a peace.

While a UN-mediated peace deal was meant to unite Libya, Serraj has struggled to expand his influence outside the capitalsince arriving in Tripoli in March 2016. Haftars Libyan National Army controls large parts of the country from its base in the east, this month capturing the key city of Benghazi after years of fighting with Islamist militias and earlier Islamic State jihadists.

There is a political legitimacy thats in the hands of Prime Minister Al-Serraj and a military legitimacy thats held by General Haftar, Macron said as the deal was announced. They have decided to work together on a political process, on a security process, and for a unified economy that will benefit the Libyan people.

Serraj and Haftar met in Abu Dhabi in May for the first time since early last year. Initially hailed as a breakthrough, analysts said later the meeting was fruitless. Each side issued its own communique after the meeting, and battlefield developments in the south of Libya soon eroded any goodwill.

With his military dominance now cemented, Haftar appears to have gone furtherin the talks at the Chateau de la Celle than he did in Abu Dhabi in a search for more political recognition from European countries, according to an aide to Macron.

Even so, its unlikely to breach the political stalemate that has endured in Libya for years, said Oded Berkowitz, senior analyst for the Middle East and North Africa with geopolitical risk consultancy Max Security in Israel. Haftar controls the main oil fields and ports, and his prominence now shows theres international recognition that Haftar has to be involved in any political settlement, he said. Hes now a force to be reckoned with.

French officials said the goal of Tuesdays meeting was to define general guidelines that would help the UNs Special Representative to Libya,Ghassan Salame, reach an agreement leading to elections next year. Macron saluted earlier efforts of countries such as Italy, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and the U.A.E. to seek a solution and said theyd all been involved in the preparations for the talks in France.

Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano, in an interview with the newspaper La Stampa published on Tuesday,had voiced his countrys irritation at Macrons initiative. Italy sees former colony Libya as part of its sphere of influence.

Italy and France have both been actively seeking a unified Libya because the disorder in the country has led to weapons flowing to Islamic militants in former French colonies in West Africa, such as Mali and Chad, and to human traffickers using Libyan beaches to ship migrants toward Italian shores.

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The Libyan people need this peace, and the Mediterranean deserves this peace, Macron said. We are directly affected. In an interview with France 24 television, Serraj said it was too early for him to decide whether or not to contest any election held under the plan. But while acknowledging there was much to do, he stressed real achievements. Haftar had agreed a ballot was the only way to solve the crisis and that the military must fall under a civilian executive authority, he said.

The ball is in Haftars court, according to Berkowitz, who added that the military leader stood to gain the most from the declaration in France.

With assistance by Salma El Wardany, Ahmed Feteha, and Gregory Viscusi

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Libya Peace Deal Must Survive Shift From Chateau to Battlefield - Bloomberg