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The war in Afghanistan has been going on for such a long period of time that its almost become a ritual for a new administration to take a bottom-up, comprehensive look at Americas war strategy during its first two months on the job. The movie has been repetitively played over the last decade and a half: the generals running the war are ordered by the new president and his national security adviser to assess whether the plan is working; the generals conduct the review, which usually concludes with the commanders requesting more U.S. troops on the ground; and the administration (with varying degrees of resistance) eventually provides the commanders the authority and resources that they have forwarded to the White House. President Obama was a bit of anomaly in this regard. He did, after all, set a timeline for troop withdrawals that the Pentagon wasnt especially pleased about. But even Obama authorized nearly fifty thousand additional American troops into the conflict during his first year in office.
President Donald Trump is continuing this movie. He recently sent National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster on a two-day trek to Afghanistan to determine whether the strategy, or the means of accomplishing that strategy, is in need of fine-tuning. McMaster met with Afghan president Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah and senior Afghan security officials during his trip. He had nothing but kind words for the Afghan leadership during television interviews. In recent years, at a period of our maximum effort, we didn't have as reliable a partner in the Afghan government as we would've liked, McMaster told ABCs This Week. Now we have a much more reliable Afghan partner and we have reduced considerably the degree and scope of our effort.
The Trump administration has said very little about the longest war in American history. News about Afghanistan is hardly reported from the mainstream media; people have either lost interest in the conflict altogether or have simply come to the conclusion that the intricacies of tribal politics in the country are so difficult to understand that you need to have a PhD in sociology to grasp the constantly shifting alliances and ethnic power struggles. McMaster is one of most knowledgable and celebrated Army officers of his generation, but even he doesn't have the bandwidth.
Everybody has ideas and concepts for what the United States can do to salvage a war that is going in the wrong direction for Washingtons Afghan allies. Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann, former commanding Gen. David Petraeus and former diplomat Earl Anthony Wayne recently wrote that whatever the Trump administration does, it must take a holistic perspective. The trio suggested that the administration stay far away from the annual policy reviews that have dominated past U.S. administrations. Instead, the Trump administration should create an integrated multiyear strategy that presents a sustainable way forward, they said. What that strategy might be is in the eye of the beholder.
In many ways, Neumann, Petraeus and Wayne are absolutely right: the United States would be served well with a honest assessment about how to turn the situation in Afghanistan around. But yet another review from yet another administration would be akin to going through the motions if U.S. officials continue to put hubris and hope above realism and history. If the past sixteen years of war have told us anything, it's that even the mighty United States of America cannot mold a nation in its own image or instill a set of democratic principles within a society like Afghanistan, which has run on tribalism, parochialism and corruption for centuries. McMaster may be adamant that the Afghan Taliban must be defeated for there to be long-term peace and reconciliation in Afghanistanone has to admire the generals can-do attitude. But it would be an enormous mistake for U.S. officials working on the Afghan file to use McMasters words as an excuse to cease asking the tough question that has been buried underneath all of the debates about American troop levels: when is enough, enough?
There is about as much chance of President Trump withdrawing all American military personnel from Afghanistan as Steve Bannon waking up one morning and embracing globalism. Republican hawks like John McCain, Marco Rubio and Tom Cotton would view a full withdrawalindeed, any withdrawalas an act of appeasement that will produce impacts even worse than Obamas premature withdrawal of surge troops in 2011. And there are very good arguments against leaving Afghanistan completely. But if Trump is genuinely committed to shaking up Washingtons foreign-policy establishment and thinking outside-the-box, then he must at least ask the same question that a world-class businessman never ceases to ask when a business transaction starts to get wobbly: is it time to decrease an investment that is showing very little returns? If the answer is yes, then is it time to recalibrate our investment strategy and shoot for a safer bet with lower returns?
These questions are undeniably uncomfortable for many in the U.S. military, State Department and intelligence community who have dedicated years to Afghanistan in order to provide it with a future that is more stable, an economy that is more resilient and a political system that actually works for the Afghan people. But however uncomfortable the questions might be, its time to get real.
Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities.
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Is It Time for America and Afghanistan to Part Ways? | The National ... - The National Interest Online
By Vipul Vivek
The monarchy of Bhutan has remained the biggest beneficiary -- by amount and share -- of Indian foreign aid for 17 years, but over the last nine years, Afghanistan has made it to the distant second spot, preferred over traditional recipients Nepal and Bangladesh, according to an IndiaSpend analysis of Indian foreign ministry data.
Although its share of foreign aid is falling and that of African countries, listed as a group, is growing, Bhutan has remained India's unfailing priority because of its strategic location, its dependence on India and its hydropower potential. Indian aid to Sri Lanka and the Maldives increased fastest, according to aid data between the financial years 2000-01 and 2016-17.
However, the averages over this period conceal substantial fluctuations in aid. For instance, while aid to Sri Lanka fell 69 per cent year-on-year in 2016-17, it rose 118 per cent and 166 per cent in 2012-13 and 2009-10. Similarly, while aid to the Maldives rose 45 per cent in 2016-17, it dropped 89 per cent in 2012-13 after rising nearly 25 times in the previous year.
Among the countries to have benefited most by India's reallocation of aid is Afghanistan.
In eight of last 10 years, Afghanistan makes it to second spot
Before 2007-08, the foreign ministry did not even individually report aid for Afghanistan . Since then, it has been the second biggest beneficiary, by share,in eight of the following 10 years.
In the pre-2007-08 period, Nepal was the second-largest recipient in all years except three, when Bangladesh held that position. Over the 17 years we analysed, Afghanistan received the least aid of the 12 major regions reported by the ministry, the allocation shrinking more than a quarter by amount.
Among regions for which the ministry reports data as a group, African countries are the only significant beneficiaries: India's aid grew 57 times between 2000-01 and 2016-17, rising 4.38 percentage points over the same period. African countries, as a group, were the second biggest beneficiary in 2003-04 and 2004-05 among all regions, countries as well as groups of countries, taken together.
The only constant in this story is Bhutan, but other countries in other regions have been eating into its share at a time when questions are being raised about India's policy of aid to Bhutan's hydropower sector. By change in share over the 17 years, it is better only than Afghanistan, with Bhutan's aid having fallen by 10.45 percentage points.
(In arrangement with IndiaSpend.org, a data-driven, non-profit, public interest journalism platform, with whom Vipul Vivek is an analyst. The views expressed are those of IndiaSpend. Feedback at respond@indiaspend.org)
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Afghanistan, Africa new priorities, but a small monarchy remains India's top foreign-aid priority - Economic Times
From the first day, Kabul pragmatically wished to be a part of two Chinese regional projects the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative and the China-Pakistan Energy Corridor (CPEC). Firstly and historically, Afghanistan considered itself as a transshipment point of commerce, where half of the old worlds roads lead to Bagram [Near Kabul], as prominent historians Louis Dupree and Arnold Toynbee put it. Basically, the foundation of the Silk Road was laid when the prominent and most adventurous of ambassadors Zhang Qian visited Balkh, a northern Afghan province, to get help from Yue-Chi (The Kushans) against the Huing-Yu tribes in China. Although he wasnt able to get Yue-Chis support, in returning to China he advised the Hun Emperor of starting trade with the East.
Secondly, in the past decade and a half, Kabul has pushed for regional integration. In the period since 1980, it has tried to get full membership or observer status in regional economic, security and political organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Central Asia Regional Cooperation Program (CAREC), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and most recently in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). To make progress on transnational projects it initiated the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan (RECCA) in 2005 which until now has held six conferences. Moreover, in order to promote regionalism in Afghan foreign policy and to lead, coordinate and facilitate regional initiatives, processes and organization to which Afghanistan is a part, Kabul established a Regional Cooperation Directorate in the Afghan foreign ministry in 2011. The Lapis Lazuli Corridor, Five Nations Railway Line, and various gas pipeline projects fit well into Chinas regional strategy and the OBOR initiative.
Thirdly, according to a high profile diplomat in the Afghan foreign ministry in a meeting with the Vice President of China, Ashraf Ghani said that among China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Kabul prefers economics over politics and security.
Lastly, domestic Afghan infrastructure projects such as the Afghan Railway Network, developing untapped mineral resources, and the National Afghan ring road correlate with Beijings OBOR.
Extending CPEC to Afghanistan
The former Afghan ambassador to Pakistan, Janan Musazai, and the present ambassador Omar Zakhilwal have already extended supported for the China-Pakistan Energy Corridor (CPEC) and showed interest of joining it. Both the Pakistani military and civilian administration also seems positive when it comes to extending CPEC to Afghanistan. The problem isnt the positive intentions or formal support, but the absence of the debate as to how to extend CPEC into Afghanistan.
If we look into CPEC, it has four main components: Transit and trade, infrastructure, energy cooperation, and economic integration. Afghanistan can be helpful when it comes to all these components. In order to connect Central Asia and Afghanistan with CPEC the following steps, among others, can be taken:
First, the renewal of the expired Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). The Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan and beyond should be included. The inclusion of India, as well, may make an OBOR-supporter of New Delhi. China should also become a part of APTTA, because currently there is no direct route between Afghanistan and China. Afghan transit to and from China should be discussed via the Pakistani Karakoram Highway. Afghan exports to China via the Sino-Afghan Special Railway were stopped due to the absence of a transit agreement with Uzbekistan.
Second, building a trans-Hindukush Motorway and Railway line to Central Asia would link Afghanistan into Chinas regional network. It would diffuse CPEC into the Asian Development Banks CAREC project, a great sign for the region. Both China and Pakistan should support this. Moreover, a railway line from Mes Aynak to Torkham which was initially agreed upon by Chinese Company could also be included into CPEC.
Third, Afghanistan has huge potential to produce and transit energy. According to some estimates, Afghanistan has the potential to produce 223,000 MW of solar energy, 23,000 MW hydropower energy, 68,000 MW of wind energy. But, despite this potential, only 41 percent of Afghans have access to electricity; and the country produces less than 2,000 MWs of electricity. It is thus heavily reliant on importing electricity to fill the demand gap. From 2007-2015, Afghanistan imported electricity at a cost of $973 million.
Pakistan is also facing an energy deficit. Currently the electricity shortfall is greater than 6,000 MWs. So it needs either to produce energy at home or import it in via the planned CASA-1000 network or the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission line (TAP-500v). China, Pakistan and Afghanistan have already agreed to cooperate in making a hydroelectric dam on the Kunar river in the Kabul river basin. According to the estimates of the Afghan inter-ministerial energy commission, the Kabul river basin can produce more than 2,800 MWs of electricity annually. The Chinese investment, and mediation in a water-sharing agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial before anything else. Since 2006, both Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the help of World Bank, failed twice to sign a water sharing agreement.
Projects involving Afghanistan such as TAPI, CASA-1000, TAP-500v, TUTAP and various road and rail projects can become a part of CPEC if the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Bank of China, the Chinese Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund financially contribute to them.
Extending of CPEC into Afghanistan may also be helpful when it comes to decreasing religious and nationalists parties based in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, both of which border Afghanistan. The CPEC route initially passed through FATA and KP province, a the western route. By changing the route of CPEC these Pakistani political parties argue they are being isolated and deprived.
The inclusion of Afghanistan into CPEC will also be helpful when it comes to transforming the region from a hotbed of terrorism, extremism and separatism or the three evils, as identified by Beijing, into a more prosperous region. Although, economics isnt considered as the main driver of the three evils, it surely is a factor to be reckoned with.
Integrating Afghanistan into OBOR
The primary steps to include and integrate Afghanistan into OBOR have already been taken. Afghanistan and China signed an MoU on OBOR last year, and according to an IMF report, Beijing has allocated some money to Afghanistan from the OBOR fund. Furthermore, Afghanistan recently joined the AIIB. But nothing has surfaced practically. The connection between the OBOR and Afghanistan requires taking several steps.
First, integrating Afghan domestic infrastructure projects into OBOR. For instance, the northern zone of the Afghan Railway Network in which the Afghan government wants to build a railway line starting at Sher Khan port on the Panj river, passing from Kunduz to Mazar-e-Sharif and then to Aquina-Herat. This would also pave the way for the Five Nations Railway Corridor between China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran and could thus link into OBOR in Central Asia.
Second, the Lapis Lazuli Transit, Trade and Transport Route between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey should become a part of OBOR. This corridor already has at least partially improved road, rail and sea infrastructure and transit procedures. The OBOR passes through many of these countries. The addition of China to the Lapis Lazuli route will latch OBOR onto an existing process of regional integration regarding transit and trade procedures between these five countries.
Third, the Indian project at Chabahar port in Iran should be seen as complementary to OBOR (as argued in a previous article for The Diplomat) because it would improve infrastructure in the region through which OBOR would pass. Moreover, Chabahar port is neither a military port, nor would it directly and indirectly affect CPEC.
Fourth, a feasibility study of the TATC (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and China) energy pipeline should begin and explore making it a part of OBOR. Currently there is an MoU between the Afghan government and a Chinese company for the project. There is also another project under way to export Afghan gas to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan has also taken interest. It may pave the way for TATC. Moreover, post-nuclear sanction Iran may be interested in a pipeline across Afghanistan, with China the ultimate destination. A Chinese company has also taken interest into this, but with no additional steps taken.
Fifth, incomplete Chinese projects such as Mes Aynak and Amu Basin Oil contracts should also be included into OBOR and completed.
The fusion of CPEC, CAREC and OBOR (especially the mainland route: The Silk Road Economic Belt), would not only make Afghanistan a land bridge between Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and China but would also be in accordance with the U.S. New Silk Road Initiative. Hence, connecting CPEC and OBOR with Afghanistan would also pave the way for possible coordination and cooperation between China and the United States in Afghanistan as well.
However, the taunting question whether it is possible depends upon the security policies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is no doubt on the possibility of the above outline, but the probability of it all happening is a concern. Implementation is another worrisome piece of the puzzle. Currently, there are many agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as APTTA which isnt fully implemented, that now and then become the victims of strained bilateral relations. The absence of conflict resolution procedures is another factor which increases the trust deficit between Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to an Afghan realist Halimullah Kousary, China should take the lead and play a leadership role. CPEC and OBOR with Afghan involvement could become a rust booster between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ahmad Bilal Khalil is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Regional Studies, Kabul (csrskabul). He follows Afghan foreign policy, Islamists, regional geopolitical and geoeconomic matters, and Kabuls relations with its neighbors (especially China, Pakistan, and India). He is the lead researcher of CSRS report Afghanistan in the last one and a half decade and is the author of upcoming book on Sino-Afghan relations: 1955-2017 in Pashto. He tweets at @abilalkhalil
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Linking Afghanistan to China's Belt and Road - The Diplomat