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Abstract

This paper, as a part of an on-going research project, examines Daesh's media (2014-2017) and seeks to provide a deeper understanding of how Daesh spreads its messages. It focuses on the importance of media as one of the main factors behind Daeshs power. It also demonstrates that in order to export a powerful self-image to the outside world, Daesh considers media a significant part of Jihad, and consequently perceives the media war as equally, or even more important than the military war. In this process, Daesh relies on its own media to spread its content, while mainstream media enthusiastically release the news relevant to Daesh. Besides studying Daeshs media, this paper highlights the importance of message for Daesh: to present itself as a powerful and a victorious actor, while seeking to portray a weak and coward-like picture of its enemies to the outside world. This paper also examines the groups communication strategy.

This paper studies Daeshs media, considering it as one of the main reasons behind its power since June 2014. It draws on Gramscis concept of hegemony, which is defined as ruling by consent rather than by force. Gramsci considered media as a part of hegemonic power, besides church, schools, and trade unions, which create consent among people (Gramsci 1973). Besides creating fear among its people through coercive institutions, tools, and methods, Daesh has used media, schools, and mosques to govern its people through consent (Kadivar 2020b). The focus of this paper is on Daeshs media, as important means, which Daesh has used to infiltrate peoples mind and hearts.

To Daesh, the real war, which is parallel to, if not greater than military war, is the media war (Media Man, You Are a Mujhid Too 2015a; 2015b). Since Daesh believes the war against Islam and Muslims occurs through the media, as a means to transform the identity of the Ummah (Muslim Community) and to distort Muslims beliefs and values, it has invested in media activities to counteract enemy propaganda (Media Man, You Are a Mujhid Too 2015a; 2015b). Therefore, in parallel with its military attacks and acts of terrorism in different countries, Daesh has placed a priority on developing a sophisticated communication strategy, and has increased its use of various media as important psychological warfare tools.

There is a large body of literature about Daeshs media activities. Some scholars such as Winkler, et al. (2016) follow the deterministic approach and have built on McLuhans (2005) insight that the medium is the message, and in this case argue that the medium is terrorism (Winkler et al. 2016, 14-15). Unlike the mentioned approach, this paper follows a nondeterministic approach to examine Daeshs media, and considers its media as one factor next to other cultural, political, and economic elements that have increased Daeshs power. It also emphasizes that Daesh's media should not be examined as an isolated phenomenon, but should be studied through perspectives of global Jihad, Salafi-Takfiri ideology, and political circumstances.[1]

The main methods used to collect data in this study are archival research, desk research, and semi-structured interviews with experts familiar with Daeshs activities in different countries.[2] This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, I examine the importance of media, and explore the various media produced by Daesh (since 2014) to understand how the group circulates its messages among its diverse audiences and creates consent among its people. Consequently, Daeshs media strategy, its propaganda system, and the methods that it has used are studied respectively.

Since Daeshs inception in June 2014, in order to effectively release messages, engagement with different types of media has been a significant part of their communications strategy. Daesh believes that the importance of the word is considerable (Majmou Rasa'il wa Moallafat Maktab Al-Buuth wa Al-Dirasat 2017, 1082), so, media play a bigger role, as kuffar capable to enter in all homes and rooms through satellite dishes (Majmou Rasa'il wa Moallafat Maktab Al-Buhuth wa Al-Dirasat 2017, 2703). Daesh has formulated offensive and defensive information Jihad as significant parts of its battle against its enemies (Media Man, You Are a Mujhid Too 2015a; 2015b), and has claimed that words [are] sometimes more powerful than the atomic bomb (Media Man, You Are a Mujhid Too 2015b, 11). One of Daesh's senior media officials claims that jihad in the media is half of our war, if not the majority, and the media men's activities were parallel, if not greater than, the military activities (Media Man, You Are a Mujhid Too 2015a).

For this reason, Daesh has noticeably invested in its media activities, and has targeted people inside and outside its territory. Therefore, media and message both have been important factors for Daesh's power. Daeshs media tend to be precise, credible, and very professional, which was not the case to similar groups (Hashim, PI 2017). That caused its official texts to be considered seriously by its opponents and enemies.Besides offline media activities inside its territories, putting up billboards and providing Neghat Al-Aalamieh (media points or kiosks) with materials to disseminate, diverse digital media platforms have provided the capacity to directly reach its target audiences around the world.

Although one of the important functions of media for Daesh is communication, it is not limited to this role only. As Nayouf (PI 2017)points out, they have exploited more than any man or political movement in the West all the possibilities of web 2.0.Daesh has therefore benefited from its media to achieve different cultural, political, and economic objectives,including: disseminating its propaganda via various texts; recruiting and obtaining more supporters; defending the Khilafah (Caliphate);representing its Khilafah as a utopia;threatening and intimidating enemies and opponents;gaining public trust, particularly among the Sunni Muslims; fundraising;marketing;communicating with supporters; spreading news; mobilizing its advocates;increasing religious and political polarization.

According to the 3 Years on the Islamic State (2017) infographic, which was published by Yaqeen Media Telegram channel, one of Daesh's unofficial affiliated media, from June 2014 to June 2017, Daesh released 41230 types of content, including 1670 audio releases, 2880 video releases, 4540 text releases, and 32140 photo releases. This infographic shows 46 official media offices among Daesh's media achievements.

Figure 1. Three Years on the Islamic State (Yaqeen Telegram Channel)

The tools and platforms that were used by Daesh and its supporters differed based on their popularity, usefulness, and security in a given geographical area. For example,Saleh (PI 2017) explains different off and online ways of recruitment in various regions and notes that in Muslim societies, recruitment is based mainly on intermediaries of clerics and NGOs. In the West, however, recruitment is done by sending messages to the person themselves by the organizations accounts on Facebook and Twitter, communicating with the person electronically through a relative, or a friend within the Islamic State invites them to immigrate to it and provides them with the required instructions.

While Daesh, like other Salafi groups, uses media in presenting its ideology, it outperforms other active Takfiri groups in understanding the significance and potential of the media in releasing propaganda.[3] In this regard, Fallahpour (PI 2017) argues, other groups are mainly passive and their use of the media is a response to the false claims made by Western media rather than a significant component of their overall strategy.

To understand how Daesh disseminates its messages, the next subsection discusses its various media organizations.

Since Daesh's main media rule is don't hear about us, hear from us, (Weiss and Hassan 2015, 174), a direct examination of its media organizations seems the most appropriate way to figure out how Daesh circulates its messages.

Besides different institutions, including the family, mosques, and schools, as the primary reference groups that create consent, meaning, and identity (Kadivar 2020b), Daesh has used various online and offline media to spread its messages. Daesh has attempted to capitalize on all opportunities to disseminatepropaganda and stop any kind of counterpropaganda to influence a much larger audience. Using this strategy, Daesh created an environment in which people accept its messages more easily and consider these messages as fact, and spread fear amongst enemies constantly.

The Diwan of Media is the body responsible for any content released by Daesh, whether that content is audio, visual, or written. It announces the main media principles and duties, and defines the priorities of publication and broadcasting (The Structure of the Khilafah2016). Daeshs mediacan be categorized into official and unofficialmedia. Almost all officialonline texts have also offline versions, which are distributed among locals.

The main official media producers of Daesh, according to The Structure of the Khilafah (2016) are theAjnad media foundation, Al-Hayat media centre, Al-Furqan media foundation,Al-Bayan radio, Al-Naba newsletter, Al-Himmah publication, and local media offices in different provinces. Also,Dabiq, Rumiyah, French magazine Dar al-Islam, Turkish magazine Al-Qustantaniyah, and Russian magazine Istok (Al-Manba) are among the official magazines of Daesh.

Figure 2. Daeshs Official Media

Al-Munasirun (Supporters) and the Languages and Translations departments are two significant branches inside the Diwan of Media.

The Al-FurqanMedia Foundation, the oldest media branch of Daesh, started its activities in November 2006. Initially, it was responsible for media production for the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) releasing official statements, various videos, CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products (KhilafaTimes 2015). Since 2006, Al-Furqan has released different official statements and audio messages of Daesh and its predecessors leaders. Video of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadis Khutbah (sermon) during Friday prayers at the Grand Mosque, Mosul, July 4, 2014, was released by Al-Furqan Media. Al-Furqan released the latest recorded speech of Daeshs spokesman Abu Hamza Al Quraishi's on October 19, 2020.

The Al-HayatMedia Centre was established in mid 2014 (KhilafaTimes 2015). It has distributed Daeshs propaganda, such as videos, magazines (Islamic State Report, Dabiq Magazine(mostly in English), Dar Al-Islam Magazine (in French), Al-Manba Magazine(in Russian), Al-Qustantiniya Magazine (in Turkish), and Rumiyah Magazine (in different languages), MujaTweets, and nasheed clips.[4] All Daesh magazines have been discontinued without any announced reasons. The End of Sykes Picot (2014), The Dark Rise of Banknotes and the Return of the Gold Dinar (2015), Inside the khilafah 1-8 (2017), Flames of War I- II (2014, 2017) videos and For The Sake of Allah nasheed (2015) are among the most important productions of Al-Hayat media. Al Hayat Media promoted a video last year calling on supporters to carry out arson Jihad (Incite the Believers 2020). Al-Hayat has mainly targeted Western audiences.

The AjnadMedia Foundation is one of the official media wings of Daesh, which produces Daeshs nasheeds and Quran recitations. It was established in January 2014 and specializes in audio productions.It has released more than 150 nasheeds, such as Salil al-Sawarem (2014), Shariat Rabbuna Nouran (2014), Ghariban Ghariba (2015), Ghamat Al-Dawalah (2016), Dawlati Baqiya (2017), Dawlati la Tuqhar (2017), Rayat Al-Tawhid (2018).

The Al-Bayan was Daeshs official radio station, it started its activities in 2014. Daesh ran the FM radio stationAl-Bayan, which broadcast news of the Khilafah. Radio news bulletins in Arabic, English, and some other languages were also distributed through social media, especially in different Telegram channels in audio and texts. The Al-Bayan Network radio station covered official messages, general news of military operations in various provinces, religious programs, nasheeds, Fatwas,[5] interviews, along with other reports regarding the organization. A considerable archive of Daeshs ideological audios that were released by Al-Bayan is still available in different platforms and several of them, such as Silsilat al-Ilmiyyah fi Bayan Masail al-Minhajiyyah (Scientific series in the statement of methodological issues 2017) were published as books in recent years.

Al-Hayat began publishingDabiqmagazine in Ramadan 1435 (July 2014). After two years of being active and releasing 15 issues in the process, in September 2016 Daesh stopped Dabiq publication and replaced it with Rumiyah. Every issue of Dabiq contained Abu Musab al-Zarqawis (Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad leader) quote: The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify by Allahs permission until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.(Dabiq 1-15 2014-2016, 2)

Rumiyahwas a monthly online magazine. Its first issue was published in September 2016. Rumiyah replaced Dabiq, Dar Al-Islam (a French online magazine) and other magazines. Rumiyah was published in different languages, such as English, French, German, Pashto, Russian, Turkish, Indonesian, and Uyghur (Khilafatimes 2016) bythe Al-HayatMedia Centre. Since its release, each issue opens with a quote by Abu-Hamza Al-Muhajir, Amir of the Islamic State of Iraq (2006-2010): O muwahhidin, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome) (Rumiyah 1-13 2016-2017, 2). On September 9, 2017, Daesh released the 13th edition as the final issue of Rumiyah.

Al-Nabais an Arabic weekly newsletter on provincial military activities and regional events by Daesh (KhilafaTimes 2015) and is still, at the time of publication of this study, published weekly. It is published regularly (every Thursday) by the Diwan of Media, and includes news, analysis, infographics, religious content including fatwa, and advertisement of other media productions, among others.It is published in both print forms and online, and distributed in different places simultaneously.

Figure 3. A fighter reading Al-Naba' newsletter

Its publication has developed through seven stages since 2011. According to Al-Naba issue 1 (2015, 2) these stages are:

1-The first issue of Al Naba was published in Jumd al-khirah 1431 (May-June 2010)

2- Al Naba became a monthly newsletter in Jumd al-khirah 1432 (May-June 2011)

3- Its first Weekly Statistics were issued in Dh al-ijjah 1433 (October-November 2012) including 4500 documents in 198 pages and its second Weekly Statistics were released in Dh al-ijjah 1434 (October-November 2013) including 7981 documents in 410 pages.

4- Al Naba published news of Wilayat Sham in Rab ath-thn 1434 (Feb-March 2013). Al Naba Issue 39 was its first issue after announcing Islamic State of Iraq and Sham.

5- Al Naba became a semiweekly newsletter in 1435 (2013).

6- Al Naba altered to a weekly newsletter on 16 Shawwal 1436 (Aug 2, 2015), published political articles, photos, and the announcements of Diwan Media publications.

7- On 3 Muharram 1437 (17 Oct 2015) Al-Naba started its activity as an official weekly newsletter (Al-Naba1, 2015, 2).

Figure 4. Seven stages of publishing Al-Naba

Maktabatal-Himmah

Maktabatal-Himmah (Al-Himmahpublication) is one of the most important official sources of Daeshs propaganda that produces content for various audience groups.It has released different types of content,ranging from wall posters and billboards (for example about Jihad, Hijab, shariah law, promoting Daesh as a functional state, Remaining and Expanding), brochures, and books (such as Fiqh al-Jihad or the Wahhabi texts) to smallleaflets about different issues (such as slavery, Zakat, Jihad, Fasting, and Hijab). It also released an app that teaches children reading and writing Arabic.

Figure 5. One of the Al-Himmah publications leaflets

Despite the closure of several written media, such as Dabiq and Rumiyah, the Al-Himmah publication has remained active and produces various types of materials in different languages for its audiences. However, with the defeat of Daesh in Iraq and Syria, the distribution of its offline materials is difficult; its online content is still circulating by Daesh supporters and members on various platforms.

Each province has its own media office, which is in coordination with the military and security officials in the region. According to Al-Masri (2015) its director should be in direct contact with the media official in the Base Foundation. These media offices have produced content related to their local areas, including news, photos, videos, and nasheeds. Millat Al-Kufr Wahidah (Al-Kufr is one Religion), Jayl Al-Khilafah (Generation of the Caliphate), Ummato Walud (The Fertile Nation) (1-5) are among the most significant videos produced by the provincial media offices. On Jan 8, 2021, Wilayat Sinai released its newest video, Nazif Al-Hamalat (Bleeding campaign), which was about IED attacks, kidnappings, and executions.

Figure 6. The Fertile Nation 4 (Wilayat Raqqa)

There are also several important media, such as Al-Itisam, Amaq, and Nashirthat were not mentioned as Daeshs official media by its authorized official centres and productions. However, many experts have considered them as significant as other official media in Daeshs propaganda activities.

The Al-ItisamMedia Centre is one of the most important media wings of Daesh, andhas produced and distributed propaganda videos since it was formed in 2013. According to Stern and Berger (2015, 153), Daesh set up its first official media foundation under the name al-I'tisam.The announcement of Al-Itisammedia centreaffiliated with the Islamic State of Iraqwas issued by the Global Islamic Media Front (E'elan an Nashr Mussisat Al-Itisam 2013). Al-Itisam has produced many high-quality videos, such as Nawafidh ala Al-Ard Al-Malahim (Windows on the Land of Epic Battles 2013-2014), Kasr Al-Hodud (Breaking of the Border 2014), and Risalah Al-Mujahid 1-5 (Message of the Mujahid 2014). (Al-Itisaam Media2014)

Beside the above official media,the Amaq news agency, which is considered Daesh'smouthpiece,is among its important media, and is used to break news about Daeshs activities. Amaq was launched in 2014. It had a WordPress-based blog, which was removed in April 2016, and later continued its activities on Telegram. Amaq publishes short news texts, photos, audios, and videos. Its name was not mentioned in The Structure of the Khilafah (2016)video as one of Daeshs official media outlets though.However, as Mustafa Al-Iraqi (2107), one of Daesh's supporters active in the English Telegram channelCALIPHATE_MEDIA,notes:

Amaq Agency is official but at the same time unofficial. Because:

1: Its run inside the State

2: Its run by State officials

But at the same time, when Islamic State mentions their official medias they never mention Amaq.And another difference between official reports and Amaq reports:Islamic State uses Islamic terms or names they themselves renamed.

Example of official reports:When naming their enemies:Rfidhah, Nusayriah, Sahwt, Crusaders, Mushrikin etc.Names of places: Renamed Deir Ezzor to Wilayat al-Khayr, Hasakah to Wilayat Barakah.

While Amaq reports are more political like: Shiah, Syrian regime, Syrian rebels, Americans, Christians, and they don't use the State's renamed provinces but uses the original.

The Nashir news agency forms another propaganda arm of Daesh. It publishes photos, videos, audio, and short news in different languages. The tune of Nashirs content is completely different from Amaq. It also republishes Amaq and other content produced in the provinces.

Figure 7. Nahir News agency Telegram Channel

As the above logo displays, Nashir introduces itself as Specialized in the official news of the Islamic State Caliphate.

There are many unofficial media associated with Daesh, including Al-Battar, Al-Yaqeen, Tarjumn al-swirt for Media Production,Fursan Al-Balagh Media, Halummu, Alghuraba Media,Remah Media Production, etc. There are also thousandsof private accounts of individualsin different platforms that werefollowed by thousands of Internet users (Munaserin), whichhave a significant role in spreading Daesh's propaganda. Moreover, Daesh has used traditional Internet sites and web blogs for broadcasting news in war fronts, organizational announcements, and ideological objectives.

After losing most of its territories in Iraq and Syria, the number of Daeshs content decreased considerably, and Daesh'sown survival overshadowed different proceedings, including its media activities. However, Amaq and Nashir news agencies, several official (such as Al-Naba, Al-Furqan, Wilayat media, and Al-Himmah) and unofficial media remain active (as of the publication date of this study) and produce content, which indicates that Daesh still seeks to portray a powerful self-image to the outside world by its media in spite of the defeats it suffered on the battlefield. For example, two-three days after Netflix released a film entitled Mosul (2020), Daeshs supporters released a video entitled Al-Mosul Rewayat Al-Ukhra (Mosul Another perspective) (2020), with a Netflix logo, focusing on the takeover of Mosul from Iraq. It displayed Daesh as a victorious and powerful actor, supported by the local population. The main point of this video is that people were happy about Daesh's takeover. Another example is the publication of Sawt Al-Hind (Voice of Hind) magazine by a pro Daesh media group in India (2021).

Media points (Neghat Al-Aalamieh) play the same rolefor Daeshin the real world, as different online platforms play in the virtual world, which is to disseminate Daeshs propaganda to its target audiences.They arethe links between the public and Daeshs media, which are established by media offices in different areas under Daesh control.

Figure 8. A media point in Wilyat Barakah

Daesh established a network of media kiosks across Iraq and Syria, which targeted people in all age groups.In June 2017, Yaqeen Media a pro-Daesh Telegram channel released an infographic about Daeshs accomplishments in different areas since June 2014 and estimated that there are 1000 media points in the Khilafah.

Winter (PI 2017) explains thatthese range from open air cinemas to mobile kiosks, there'll literally be a minivan with a printer and a wide screen TV in the back.Daesh also expanded its media points from booths to mosques and hospitals in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, Daesh has set up an integrated media archive at the media points in different languages (for example: from English, French, and Kurdish to Turkish, Farsi, and Bangla) as a resource for the public (Al-Naba 21 2016, 12). The media point has been a media and summons (dawah) project that distributes different kinds of information to the ordinary people, which they then circulate through means such as cell phones, flash drives, and CDs. Another purpose is to distribute Daeshs newsletters, magazines, books, pamphlets, announcements, and flyers. The media points are also used for screening films that document the current fights (Ibid.).

Daesh has also created mobile media points to deliver its content to remote regions.Using these media kiosks,Daesh delivers its own narrative to the locals. As Winter (PI 2017) stresses:they are in symphony with a policy of creeping censorship whereby the Internet and satellite televisions were removed from the local civilian population. Heexplains that a very important part of Daesh's offline propaganda strategy came in the form of direct engagement, with media officials walking around, talking to people, handing out dawah materials and new propaganda releases, handing out sweets, and holding spectacles in town squares (Winter 2017).

Figure 9. A media point in Wilyat Nnaw

Studying media points indicates their important role in indoctrination and creating consent among local people inside the Khilafah, who did not have access to other kinds of media under Daeshs rule.

Next, Daeshs effective and sophisticated communication strategy will be investigated.

Similar to other global actors, and consistent with Gramscis writings, Daesh's activities have been based on consent and coercion. To create consent and fear andin order to advance its aims,Daesh has employed a sophisticated media strategy. Based on its main motto remaining and expanding, which has been repeated in different official statements and media content (such as: Al-Adnani 2015a; 2015b; Al-Nab 34, 2016:3; Dawlati Baghiya 2017), and besides its military strategy, Daesh's media have been focused on producing diverse propaganda texts and techniques to show itself as: a powerful actor; communicating its ideology; neutralizing enemies propaganda; intimidating adversaries; encouraging new recruits to the Khilafah territories.

Daesh has used diverse propaganda methods and platforms to expand its power and spread its messages through its media far beyond its borders. It believes using more platforms, accounts, and channels increases its effectivity, helps it grow faster, and portrays a stronger picture to audiences. In its media activities, Daesh has learned many lessons from other Salafi-Takfiri groups to be self-reliant. As Nayouf (PI 2017) highlights:

Daesh is far from having invented everything. The jihadist filmography begins with the war in Afghanistan, continuing to improve in visual and technical quality, then expanding the means, themes and places of jihad (Bosnia, Algeria, then the wave of attacks of Al-Qaeda...). Using the international media (including Al-Jazeera), the Salafist video library is gradually challenging the monopoly of the image of Westerners. Al-Qaeda already had its news agency... In 2010, Al-Qaeda launched Inspire, the first online jihadist magazine, written entirely in English...

Daesh also learned from other non-Muslims countries, for example China and Cuba.In this regard, Ingram (2015) explains the core mechanics of Islamic State communications strategy are broadly reflected in the writings of Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and others.Furthermore, Daesh adopted the strategies used by several leading social media figures, such as being intimate (like Katy Perry), networking (like Taylor Swift), and starting arguments with other high-profile figures, which then draws further attention to himself (like Donald Trump) (Singer and Brooking 2015).El-Meshoh (PI 2017) stresses, The Islamic State did not invent something extraordinary. They merely used the tools and technologies available to everyone, even amateurs.With that said,Daesh has pursued the strategies outlined below in its media to find more audiences for its messages.

Daesh has improved its media strategy alongside its military strategy and has viewed its battlefield as broader than the ground upon which it fights. Daesh's media operatives have been present in the battleground beside the soldiers, and have produced videos, audio, written texts, photos, and news. Without their activities, Daesh would not be able to release its first-hand content depicting its combat. According to Daesh, media activity is a Jihad in the way of Allah, which has extensive potential to change the balance with respect to the war between the Muslims and their enemies,andis more powerful than a nuclear bomb(Media Man, You are a Mujahid too, 2015a; 2015b).It also considers every media operative, with their media works, as mujahid in the way of Allah (Media Man, You are a Mujahid too, 2015a; 2015b)). As Al-Hashimi (PI 2017) mentions, Daesh has a media arsenal. A clever media discourse that seeks to intimidate its opponents and inflict the most psychological damage to their soldiers, leaders, and social and political incubators.

Figure 10. A fighter with a head camera in the battleground

Because of this close relationship between media and armed activities,thereis a direct relationship between the quantity and quality of Daeshs media productions and its activities in the battleground.For example, the rate of Daesh's productions has reduced since its military defeats in 2016 and the death of its key media strategists. Nevertheless, it still has enough content to spread fear among its enemies and bring back hope and consent to its supporters.To release its propaganda, Daesh, unlike any group before it, commanded an online army of great magnitude and effectiveness (J.Magnier, PI 2017). At the highest level, it recognized the importance of using cyberspace to weaponize the media and spread its story widely (Bartetzko, PI 2017; Winter, PI 2017).

Like other successful propagandists, Daesh has used propaganda as a form of communication and persuasion to create consent, manipulate views and attitudes, influence behaviours, and manage public opinion to encourage or discourage certain forms of behavior. Furthermore, Daesh has employed propaganda as psychological warfare to confuse, mislead, demoralize, and dehumanize enemies; to win the sympathies of the population; and to create hatred towards foes.

Daesh has also made its propaganda eye-catching, consistent with the dominant beliefs of its people, and in line with their demands for change. It has used different kinds of signs and symbols in its propaganda such as words, slogans, heroic and attractive nasheeds, flags, clothing, and religious designs on its coins to convey its messages and to influence its diverse audiences.

Through its propaganda, Daesh has tried to recruit more fighters and attract more supporters outside its Khilafah (Ramadan, PI 2017; Saleh, PI 2017; Shaban, PI 2017). It has also sought to alienate, manipulate, and indoctrinate its people to influence their opinions or behaviors, and create consent among them (Al-Hashimi, PI 2017; J.Magnier, PI 2017). Moreover, Daeshs propaganda has attempted to nullify its opponents acts and to terrify its enemies (Al-Tukmehchi, PI 2017; Hashem, PI 2017). Another aim of Daesh's propaganda has been to spread its news and transmit its ideological views to larger target audiences (Ramadan, PI 2017; Shabaan, PI 2017; Ornek, PI 2017; Ontikov, PI 2017).

In testimony, a former member of Daeshs security apparatus stressed their tendency to lie in their media (Al-Iraqi 2019, 8), and explains two important methods of its media:

Improving the image of the 'Dawla', and portraying it as just and pious for those inside it generally and those outside it in particular, so that they would be able to draw in the monotheists thirsty for the law of God from different regions outside the 'Dawla'.

Showing the claimed force and might of the 'Dawla' in order to deceive the Muslims living in the lands of the 'Dawla' and outside it that the 'Dawla' is invincible, and that everything is under control, so they should not worry! (Al-Iraqi 2019, 8)

Al-Iraqi explains another of Daeshs propaganda techniques and argues that Daeshs media refrains from publishing some visual recordings for a long time so that they always have new material in their archive in times of resource scarcity (Al-Iraqi 2019, 9). Moreover, Daesh has controlled and influenced the minds, hearts, and behaviors of its target audiences, and stabilized its power using different techniques, such as: appeal to authority; appeal to fear; black-and-white fallacy; labelling and demonizing the enemy; faulty analogy; exaggeration; cherry-picking; and control of information.

Polarization is a significant part of Daeshs communication strategy. Daesh has highlighted the dichotomybetween itself and its enemies in its media. Daesh has claimed the authority to speak, not only on behalf of all people under its control, but also on behalf of the entire Muslim world, using we. It also directly and indirectly, addresses others uniformly as they. As Al-Derzi notes: Daesh depends on dividing the world into two parts: The Islamic World and the Kufr World (PI 2017). Similarly, Ghanem Yazbeck (PI 2017) insists that IS (and all Salafist-Jihadists) built their base, their conception of life and the world on a Manichean viewand this is why it is attractive to people. This attitude has been reflected in Daeshs media.

Daeshs media are filled with claims and arguments that have a positive representation of the in-group and a negative representation of the out-group. They present the self as Dar al-Islam in that the rule of Islam is dominant, and negatively portray enemies and opponents as Dar Al-Kufr, responsible for Sunni Muslims marginalization and humiliation. It has depicted the oppression that Muslims are subjected to everywhere, painted a victimized image of them and drawnthe attractions of the Khilafah, where they only can provide the Muslims' rights, respect, and dignity. Daesh's media represent the Islamic State as the only defender and supporter of Sunni Muslims, which is a sign of in-group identity.

Daesh has tried to humiliateothers in its media, and show itself as a powerful actor by producing videos or publishing images of kangaroo courts, uncommon violence and unusual killings, foreign-hostage executions, immolation and drowning of local citizens to frighten its opponents and enemies. Other aspects of polarization in Daesh's propaganda entail downgrading its enemies power, exaggerating its military successesin the battleground or operations in different countries, and downplaying or ignoring territorial and leadership losses in its various media, reframing its military defeats as tests from Allah, and convincing its audiences that Daesh continues to remain and expand its power.

Daesh has been flexible and up to date with technology and recent advancements. Its productions are very professional, high resolution, and high quality by any standards (Al-Tukmehchi, PI 2017; El.Meshoh, PI 2017; Ontikov, PI 2017). Besides benefiting from decades of cumulative media experiences in the world of Salafi-Takfiri groups, it has utilized a powerful media team and the latest technologies in producing videos, images, nasheeds, newsletters, and magazines to release its propaganda.

Daesh has been able to employ modern media tools of photography and cinematography and artistic direction to spread its messages, influence its audiences, and the international general public.According to Saleh (PI 2017), Daesh ideologically was not as strong as Al-Qaeda's in the region, and therefore it had to rely on modern technological methods to attract fighters. Similarly, Nayouf (PI 2017) claims that their propagandists arehighly trained staff, reallydigital natives of digital-age children, social networks... They know more about the functioning of the Internet and video games than about the Quran.Moreover, Al-Hashimi (PI 2017) highlights the participation of foreign members who have technical and theoretical media expertise, which can be utilised to serve the organization and provide high technical media support. He explains:

Daesh has usedCGI (computer-generated imagery) for some of its films, such as Healing of the Believers Chest, andAVIDtechnology for editing various videos, such as Flames of War,which are bothvery expensive and complicated, and require professional producers and editors (Al-Hashimi, PI 2017).

Thus, Daesh has benefited from expert teams, professional media personnel, and sophisticated tools (for example, advanced cameras, sliders, cranes, green screens) to spread its messages among audiences.

Daesh has tried to show its ubiquitous and powerful propaganda on different online platforms. As Daesh considers the social media [sic] to be a means of jihad for the sake of God, and as key elements of its success, as well as to support its strength, (Rafiqi, PI 2017) it has invested in this domain considerably.

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Daesh and the Power of Media and Message - Arab Media & Society