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Its been nearly four months since Afghans went to the polls in an election fraught with security threats and overshadowed by the faltering progress of US-Taliban peace talks. Although the preliminary results of the election were announced in late December, the final results are yet to be confirmed.

The incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani, was declared the winner of the preliminary results with 50.6% of the vote a paper-thin majority. His main opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, chief executive in the national unity government led by Ghani since 2014, came second.

The introduction of biometric voting machines that used fingerprint scans and photographs in the 2019 election was expected to overcome past allegations of fraud and manipulation. But this did not stop similar allegations emerging over the 2019 election, leading to the eruption of protests and warnings of a crisis.

More than 16,000 complaints were filed about the conduct of the election, although 10,000 were declared invalid by the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) on January 14. Still, around 300,000 votes remain contested 16.4% of the total number of votes deemed valid including 102,000 votes that the biometric election data shows were cast outside of the allocated voting time, between 7am and 5pm on September 28.

Under the current system, the winner needs 50% plus one vote to secure a majority. If a significant number of these disputed votes are invalidated a decision that will be taken by the IECC in early February (if all goes well) its possible Ghanis vote share could dip below 50%. If that happened, there could be a run-off between Ghani and his main opponent Abdullah Abdullah, chief executive in the national unity government.

Turnout at the election was a record low, with less than 19% of the 9.6 million registered voters going to the polls. Only 31% of those who voted were women, down from 38% in 2014. The low turnout was largely attributed to widespread security threats from the Taliban and a lack of trust in the electoral process and presidential candidates.

The use of biometric technology in the presidential election for the first time could also have led to a lower number of valid votes nearly one million votes were reportedly invalidated due to irregularities.

The low turnout rate has sparked discussions on the legitimacy of the next government if there is no run-off.

In Afghanistan, political legitimacy is not based simply around formal election results but also material resources, power and political alliances that emerge from such processes. In a divided society affected by war, legitimacy can also stem from the power of elites to mobilise and their capacity for violence.

The legitimacy of the political system also depends on whether the losers eventually accept the election results, even if they initially challenge them to gain political advantage. The only time a losing candidate in Afghan elections accepted he hadnt won was in 2004.

Meanwhile, Zalmy Khalilzad, the US envoy for the Afghan peace process, is waiting to hear whether the Taliban will agree to reduce violence, deemed a precondition for the resumption of US-Taliban peace talks.

The Taliban continues to categorically reject the legitimacy of the Afghan government, calling it a US-puppet regime and labelling the election a sham. If a peace deal is eventually reached between the US and Taliban, the next stage of peace negotiations between the different parties in Afghanistan will be even more complicated, with clashes expected on whether to maintain the current democratic, republic system or opt for an Islamic emirate. With the Taliban refusing to sit down with the Afghan government, resolving these issues looks a long way off.

Achieving sustainable peace in Afghanistan requires sufficient time as well as a show of genuine will from the parties involved in the armed conflict both at the national and regional level.

If a run-off is eventually needed, it would happen in either April or September. But its questionable whether holding another costly election in the countrys difficult situation is worth it.

Given the prolonged electoral process and its implications on peoples daily lives, many Afghans are also experiencing electoral fatigue. Ethnic bloc voting is a prevalent feature of Afghanistan presidential elections and results usually follow ethno-regional lines. With the security threat also likely to be the same as in September 2019, a run-off would be unlikely to produce a significantly different outcome.

A runoff may revive calls for the formation of an interim government, which could include the Taliban and other politicians. These calls have especially come by those political elites who feel disenfranchised from the states resources and privileges and see the formation of an interim government as an opportunity to renegotiate the distribution of power and resources.

The logic of a run-off would be to encourage candidates to appeal to voters across ethnic groups mainly by forging multi-ethnic alliances. But evidence from the 2014 run-off which was between Ghani and Abdullah shows that it can easily become ethnicised and spiral into a crisis. That election was resolved in a US-brokered deal that created the national unity government, which continues to exist amid the election result delay. But provisions in the deal for formalising the chief executive role as well as an official leader of the opposition were never realised.

One way forward would be to look beyond the current 50% plus one vote majority required to find a political approach that could reduce the winner-takes-all nature of Afghanistans presidential elections. One way to do this could be to include the candidate with second most votes in the government. But instead of focusing on sharing government positions as in 2014 a situation which led to intra-government rivalries inclusion should be done with an eye to ensuring both representation and improving the governments effectiveness.

Another way to reduce the costs of losing the election could be to make political opposition a more attractive path by better defining the oppositions responsibilities for scrutiny and oversight of the government. The opposition should be treated as a government in waiting, and receive enough funding to fulfil its responsibilities.

Either of these scenarios could prevent a potential electoral conflict, ensure relative legitimacy and stability and boost the effectiveness of the government for Afghans. Then the new government with its relative legitimacy could roll up its sleeves to negotiate a political deal with the Taliban, aiming to achieve a sustainable peace. Even if the peace efforts fail, the government would still enjoy the support of elites co-opted in the state apparatus which in turn may reduce political instability.

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Afghanistan voted in September and final results are still not out what's happening? - The Conversation UK

Afghan schoolchildren study amid the rubble of Papen High School in Nangarhar province on July 25, 2019.NOORULLAH SHIRZADA/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

According to Transparency International, Afghanistan has remained among the top 10 corrupt countries in the world in 2019.

Afghanistan was scored 15 out of 100 in 2017, 16 in 2018 and remained in the same place in 2019, according to Transparency International report released on Thursday.

According to the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, Afghanistan was scored 11 out of 100 in 2015, 15 in 2016 and 2017, 16 in 2018 and 2019.

Afghanistan is ranked 176 among 180 countries indexed by Transparency International.

Yamen, Syria, South Sudan, and Somalia are ranked 177, 178, 179 and 180 respectively.

The report indicates that there has not been any progress in fighting against corruption since 2018 in Afghanistan.

The efforts to fight corruption in Afghanistan during the last five years have shown that the campaign has to be revitalized and sustained or it stalls, said Joy Saunders, chairperson of the board of directors for Transparency in Afghanistan.Afghanistan had to focus on campaign financing regulation and enforcement after 2017 since it had a parliamentary election in 2018 and a presidential election in 2019, she added.

The United States withheld 160 million dollars aids to Afghanistan in September 2019 due to corruption.

According to TI, Newzealand and Denmark have secured the first place in Transparency scoring 87 out of 100.

The Khaama Press News Agency is the leading and largest English news service for Afghanistan with over 3 million hits a month.Independent authors/columnists and experts are welcomed to contribute stories, opinions and editorials. Send stories to news@khaama.com.

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Afghanistan remains one of the top 10 corrupt countries in the world: Report - The Khaama Press News Agency

The 10th Mountain Division Headquarters will replace 1st Armored Division Headquarters in Afghanistan this spring, the Army announced Friday.

The deployment is part of a regular rotation to Afghanistan and will occur shortly after about 3,500 soldiers from 10th Mountains 1st Brigade Combat Team arrive in-country, said Lt. Col. Kamil Sztalkoper, a division spokesman.

Division commander Maj. Gen. Brian J. Mennes will lead the 250 personnel brought by his headquarters to the country. The unit will fold into the existing U.S. Forces-Afghanistan mission led by Gen. Austin Miller.

Were plugging into a lot of his staff positions, Sztalkoper said, adding that the deployment will occur in early spring. This has been planned for many months. Business as usual is the best way to put it.

The division is currently stationed at Fort Drum, New York. The 1st Brigade Combat Team will replace the 82nd Airborne Divisions 3rd Brigade Combat Team as part of the Armys commitment to Operation Freedom Sentinel in the country.

Five paratroopers from 3rd Brigade Combat Team died in Afghanistan during their nine-month rotation. Two paratroopers were killed by an IED blast in early January near Kandahar Airfield. Another soldier died in an IED attack outside Bagram Airfield in early September. And two paratroopers were killed in what was reported as an insider attack in July.

Five soldiers have been wounded in action so far in 2020, and more than 170 were wounded in action the year before, according to Pentagon casualty figures.

"This historic division continues to be the most deployed in the Army, and we are honored to be part of the global coalition in support of Operation Freedom Sentinel, said Mennes in a prepared statement. Our highly trained, physically fit, and disciplined Soldiers will build upon the success of the 1st Armored Division as we look forward to partnering with coalition forces and the Afghan Security Forces as they continue to build long-term stability for the people of Afghanistan.

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The Army previously announced that the 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade out of Fort Hood, Texas, and the 10th Mountain Division Combat Aviation Brigade were ordered to Afghanistan this winter, as well.

Currently, roughly 13,000 U.S. troops are deployed to Afghanistan. U.S. and Taliban representatives are engaged in ongoing peace negotiations. The Associated Press reported this week that Taliban representatives gave the U.S. envoy a document outlining their offer for a temporary cease-fire in Afghanistan that would last between seven and 10 days.

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10th Mountain leaders will deploy to Afghanistan this spring to replace 1st Armored - ArmyTimes.com

January 22, 2020

By Adrian Morel

In Games without Rules, author and former Asia Foundation colleague Tamim Ansary argues that bringing rural Afghanistan under centralized rule has been the defining challenge of the Afghan state since the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 18th century. He debunks the colonial myth of an unconquerable Afghanistan: it was invaded many times, by Persians, Greeks, Turks, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union. For invading powers and national rulers alike, the real stumbling block was not conquering Afghanistan, but governing it.

Afghan kings ruled by forging alliances with local strongmen. Even the influence of tribal leaders waned quickly, however, as one left the towns for the mountains or the desert. Ansary describes rural Afghanistan as a universe of village-republics, self-reliant social units where daily life remained unaltered by events in the capital. The wars of the past decades have changed this. National and global politics have left deep scars in the social fabric of rural Afghanistan: bombs and mines turned fertile valleys into deserts; millions left their villages for the cities, Pakistan, or Iran. But to a large extent, these wars have illustrated once again the resistance of rural Afghanistan to central rule.

Afghanistans borderlands are an extreme illustration of this governance challenge: border residents tend to have stronger economic and cultural ties with people across the border than with Kabul. And yet, these areas play a central role in the security and economy of the country. Border security is inseparable from the larger war effort, as insurgents take advantage of porous borders and kinship networks to take refuge in neighboring countries.

This satellite photo of Bahramcha, a border town in Helmand Province, strikingly illustrates how the Durand Line (in yellow), which marks the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, runs straight through border communities. Bahramcha is also a Taliban-controlled border crossing on the KandaharQuetta route, and a major export route for narcotics.

The borders are also vital to the Afghan economy. Customs duties are the most important single source of government revenue after foreign aid. Despite significant improvements in customs collection since 2015, considerable leakage persists because of insecurity, entrenched corruption, and insufficient processing points along thousands of miles of permeable borders. Security dynamics and cross-border trade are interrelated in complex ways. In his 2000 book, Taliban, Ahmed Rashid exposed the role of Quettas trucking mafia in financing the expansion of the fundamentalist movement in the mid-90s. Insurgents levy taxes on trafficking and trade in areas that they control.

In border regions, a vast share of the local population makes a living from legal trade, smuggling, or the grey area in between. A 2019 study by The Asia Foundation looked into livelihoods and trade in the districts of Spin Boldak, in Kandahar province, and Muhmand Dara, in Nangarhar province. The two busiest official crossing points between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Torkham and Wesh-Chaman, are located in these districts. Torkham links Kabul to Peshawar via the Khyber Pass; Wesh-Chaman connects Kandahar to Quetta. A representative survey in these districts found that two-thirds of respondents had crossed the border at least once in the past year, and nearly one in five was conducting regular business with Pakistan residents other than family. A large majority reported that their community (71 percent) or their household (56 percent) depended on such trade for their economic welfare, and 47 percent depended on it for their own occupation. The study paints a picture of large traders and smuggling barons profiting most from business opportunities and ineffective border controls, while many more earn a modest living as truck drivers and cargo handlers, or by transporting licit and illicit goods along local trails.

The proportion of business activity, family well-being, and respondents occupation that relies on cross-border trade, Spin Boldak and Muhmand Dara districts

From the perspective of local residents, the border is an artificial line that divides families but also provides economic opportunity. Although they acknowledge the contribution of porous borders to national insecurity, border residents do not see lax controls as a threat to their own safety. Instead, they worry about the impact of tighter controls on their lifestyle and livelihoods. In the past few years, a series of measures by Pakistan have drastically limited their traditional freedom of movement. These measures include fencing the border, establishing additional security posts, and requiring incoming Afghans to show proper passport and visa documents. (Previously, border tribes were allowed to cross without them.) Pakistan has also occasionally closed the border, sometimes for days or weeks at a stretch, usually in response to security incidents.

Eight official crossing points along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Illustration: International Organization for Migration)

From the perspective of Pakistan, these measures are part of a legitimate effort to enforce border security, curb smuggling, and boost legal bilateral trade. The goal is to encourage people and goods to pass through official border crossings, where they can be more easily controlled and taxed. Security measures such as the border fence are combined with positive incentives: in September, Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurated the 24/7 opening of the Torkham gate, which used to be closed at night. This measure was intended to reduce the long wait times at the border, a major grievance of Afghans trading fresh produce. Afghans say delays persist despite Khans initiative, and it remains to be seen whether these policies will have the intended long-term effects. One way or another, they will durably affect the vast majority of border residents whose livelihoods, and often healthcare or education, have long been dependent on their ability to cross into Pakistan.

Why does this matter for peace? Western commentators have focused on geopolitics and ideology to explain past and current Afghan wars. Tamim Ansary and Ahmed Rashid remind us, however, that the rise of the Taliban in the 90s was not just a religious reaction to the instability and insecurity of the Afghan civil war; it was also a revolt of southern tribes rooted in historical grievances and a sense of marginalization. Improving border management and the rule of law in border regions might be a legitimate goal, but unless the needs of local populations are taken into account, such efforts may feed a fresh cycle of frustration and sow mistrust in the benefits of peace.

A view of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, from the Pakistan side (Photo: Reuters)

Last year, U.S.-Taliban peace talks raised hopes for an agreement on a political process to end the war. It remains unclear whether the talks will resume, and if they do there is no guarantee that they will succeed. Nonetheless, key governance issues that have been pushed aside by the war will eventually reclaim their place in the Afghan public debate: What role for the central state in border regions? How to protect borders against traffickers and insurgents and improve customs revenues without hurting livelihoods and fueling local grievances?

These are questions that The Asia Foundation wants to help answer. Over the next four years, our offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan will undertake joint research to document changes in policy and other conditions along the border and their favorable or adverse effects on local livelihoods, trade, and security. This work will be done through the X-Border Local Research Network, a partnership with the Carnegie Middle East Center and the Rift Valley Institute, supported by DFID, to study conflict-affected borderlands in Asia, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa and suggest more effective responses from the international community and national governments. Our research this year will focus on how border residents on either side adjust to tighter border controls. Future studies may look at the integration of Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, bilateral trade, and other relevant topics. Stay tuned for updates on this work by visiting the X-Border Local Research Network webpage.

Adrian Morel is associate director for conflict and fragility in The Asia Foundations Program Specialists Group. He can be reached at adrian.morel@asiafoundation.org. This essay is adapted from an article published previously in Peripheral Vision. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author, not those of The Asia Foundation or the UK government.

Excerpt from:
Afghanistan's Borderlands: Unruly, Unruled, and Central to Peace - The Asia Foundation - In Asia

Key point: A proxy war that we are still paying for.

In 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Pakistans civilian president in a coup. He proceeded to institute hardline Islamist laws throughout Pakistan, and began rebuilding Pakistani military power after its humiliating defeat in a 1971 war with India.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Washington found that Zias policies dovetailed conveniently with getting Pakistani assistance in supporting Mujahideen insurgents fighting Communist forces. Thus, Pakistani and U.S. agents collaborated in organizing and arming militants proliferating in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

In retaliation, Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force (DRAAF) jet bombers began crossing into Pakistani airspace to blast those refugee camps. The Pakistani military deployed J-6 fighters (Chinese-built MiG-19 clones) capable of Mach 1 speed and two radars to defend the border, but these proved too slow and the patrol and radar coverage too spotty, so none of the raids were intercepted.

Thus in 1981, Zia persuaded the Reagan administration to authorize sale of forty F-16As and two-seat F-16Bs, which would be received between 1983-1986. The then cutting-edge fourth-generation fighter was affordable, extremely maneuverable due to its aerodynamically unstable design (compensated for with fly-by-wire controls), and could still attain high speeds and carry heavy payloads.

However, early production F-16s lacked the capability to fire radar-guided beyond-visual range missiles. This meant Pakistani Falcons needed to get up close to their opponents to use their AIM-9P and more advanced AIM-9L Sidewinder heat-seeking missilesor their 20-millimeter Vulcan cannons.

In 1986, the F-16s of the PAFs No. 9 Griffin and 14 Shaheen squadrons were finally ready to begin flying combat air patrols along the Afghan border. That year, Soviet and Afghan forces began a series of offensive targeting mujahideen bases in the Panshir valley, supported with intensified bombardments of refugee camps.

On May 17, 1986 two F-16As were vectored towards two DRAAF Su-22M3K penetrating Pakistani airspace near Parachinar. The Sukhois were rugged swing-wing supersonic fighter bombers that often suffered heavy losses in Cold War conflicts.

The PAF F-16s closed within six miles and Squadron Leader Hameed Qadri launched a Sidewinder which failed to hit. The Su-22 promptly belted back for the Afghan border. Qadri fired off a second AIM-9L which first flew wide off the Sukhoi, then curled around and slammed into its target.

In an account published by the PAF, Qadri describes that he raced towards the second Su-22, which he engaged with a gun:

The other aircraft was in a left turn. His radius of turn and my energy state gave me enough confidence that I could easily achieve kill parameters both with missile and guns. During the turn, I found myself hitting the fringes of AIM-9P missile. I pulled a high yo-yo as I was in a totally offensive position. My target was now in a nose-down and heading towards Afghan territory. After apexing, I quickly rolled back and fired a three-second burst on the exiting Su-22. I stopped firing when a trail of smoke and flash from his aircraft confirmed a lethal kill. Through a split 'S', I headed east of Parachinar.

However, the Afghan Air Force confirmed losing only one jet, though the engagement led to a major decrease in attacks on refugee camps. Furthermore, the Soviet VVS deployed MiG-23MLD fighters to protect Afghan Su-22s.

Qadri encountered the MiGs a month later, but neither side opened fire. Nearly a year later on April 16 1987, F-16s chased down DRAAF Su-22s again near Thal, managing to overtake the supersonic jets despite having to attack from lower altitude. Squadron Leader Badar-us-Islam shot down the Sukhoi of Lt. Col. Abdul Jameel, who ejected and was captured on Pakistani soil.

By 1987, Soviets records indicate that Pakistani fighters had begun roaming into Afghan airspaceparticularly harassing efforts to provide aerial resupply to besieged garrisons like Khost, only ten miles across the border.

On March 30, 1987 two F-16s intercepted an An-26 twin-turboprop cargo plane near Khost, each striking it with one Sidewinder from just under a mile away. The ponderous cargo plane crashed into the snowy mountains below, killing all 39 aboard. Over the course of the conflict, Pakistani F-16 pilots also claimed the destruction of several Mi-8 transports helicopter, another An-26 on a reconnaissance mission in 1989, and a maneuver kill versus an An-24 transport which was actually attempting to defect.

However, the Pakistani fighter jocks luck turned two weeks later when two No.9 Squadron F-16s ambushed four MiG-23s of the Soviet 120th Fighter Regiment as they plastered a mujahideen supply bases in Djaware, Pakistan with cluster bombs. As Soviet Lt. Col. Pochitalkin led his unit in evasive maneuvers he saw an airplane plummet towards the earth in flames below him.

This was not a MiG, but the F-16 of Lt. Shahi Sikander, who had inadvertently been acquired by an AIM-9L fired by his wingman. Sikander parachuted down to Afghan soil, where he and the wreckage of his plane were smuggled back to Pakistan by Mujahideen. Some Russian sources claim Sikander was actually shot down by a Soviet jetthough the MiGs were not carrying air-to-air missilesor had somehow plowed into the rain of cluster bomblets.

In 1988, as Soviet ground forces withdrew from Afghanistan, DRAAF and Soviet aviation units began a ferocious new bombardment campaign in a last-ditch effort to save the crumbling Afghan Communist government.

On August 8, Col Alexander Rutskoy, commander of a regiment of slow but heavily armored Su-25 Frogfoot attack jetswas leading a night raid on the Maranshah refugee camp when his four-ship flight was bounced by two F-16As of the 14th fighter squadron. Rutskoy turned hard towards the F-16s, perhaps seeking to draw them away, and believing the heat-seeking missile would lose its track if his planes hot tail-pipe was facing away from it. But the AIM-9L was designed to engage targets from all aspects, and the detonations of its proximity warhead broke the flying tank in two.

Rutskoy ejected over Pakistani soil and was captured. Exchanged back to Russia, he was decorated as a hero of the Soviet Union and went onto become vice president of Russia under Boris Yeltsin, before leading an attempted coup in 1993.

A month after Rutskoys shootdown, a formation of twelve Soviet MiG-23seight loaded with bombs, and four carrying R-24 air-to-air missiles, zipped into Pakistani airspace near the Kunar valley at 32,000 feetprobably seeking to lure PAF F-16s into an ambush.

Obligingly, two F-16s raced towards the swing-wing fighters at only 11,000 feet. However, the Soviet radars failed to detect the lower-flying F-16s amidst the ground clutter. A Sidewinder fired at a steep angle by Squadron Leader Khalid Mahmood managed to riddle one MiG-23 with shrapnel, which limped back home for a crash landing. Two MiGs peeled away to engage the F-16s in a dogfight. But while Pakistani pilots claimed two MiG-23 kills, Soviet records show no additional aircraft were lost.

On November 3, 1988 the PAF would bag its final jet kill when Lt. Khalid Mahmood shot down a DRAAF Su-2M4K. Pakistan formally credits its F-16 pilots with 10 kills during the conflict, while Soviet records confirm the loss of three Su-22s, an Su-25 and An-26. Some sources claim the PAF shot down at least a dozen more aircraft during the Soviet war in Afghanistan which ostensibly were not formally credited because they involved violations of Afghan airspace. Those interested in a more extensive accounting of the Pakistani-Afghan air battles are recommended to consult the following compilations of Pakistani air combat narratives.

Sbastien Roblin holds a masters degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.

Image: Wikipedia.

Excerpt from:
The Soviet's War In Afghanistan Had Russian Pilots Fighting Pakistani F-16s - The National Interest Online