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What the 18th anniversary of the Iraq War teaches us about the costs of war – Military Times

In the midst of our COVID mourning, we might forget the U.S. began a war in Iraq 18 years ago this week.

The war has had various inspiring names: Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 to 2010, Operation New Dawn from 2010 to 2011, and Operation Inherent Resolve from August 2014 to the present. At the outset, the Bush administration promised the war would eliminate Iraqs weapons of mass destruction. That sanctions could never work. That fighting would be quick, cheap at $50 billion to 60 billion, controllable, remake Iraq into a democracy, and be won with few civilian, allied or U.S. military casualties.

If this sounds too good to be true, its because it is. The Iraq War at 18 offers lessons for understanding the costs of war. Whatever promises and hopes, war is rarely quick, cheap, effective, or controllable.

On March 19, 2003, the war began with a shock and awe aerial assault that left much of Iraqs major cities in rubble, its top flight medical infrastructure damaged, half its doctors dead or running, its museums looted, and its renowned universities destroyed. US and coalition airstrikes alone killed thousands of civilians from 2003-2011. All told, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and injured most of them Iraqi civilians and soldiers in the U.S. occupation and the civil war spawned by the local power vacuum and conflicts prompted by the invasion. Millions of Iraqis fled the country and many have yet to return.

At the peak of the war in 2007, there were about 165,000 U.S. military boots on the ground and thousands more in the region. There were daily reports of traumatic brain injuries, amputations, and active-duty suicides. One of the first Americans to die was Jose Antonio Gutierrez, a 22-year-old U.S. Marine, killed by friendly fire in Iraq on March 21, 2003. Born in Guatemala and raised mostly in an orphanage, Gutierrez entered the United States without papers at age 14 and became a permanent resident at age 18. He wasnt made a U.S. citizen until after his death.

A generation later, and on the very day last year when the U.S. went into its first COVID lockdown, rocket fire rained down once more and killed Army Spc. Juan Covarrubias, age 27, and Marshall Roberts, age 28, of the Air National Guard in Camp Taji, Iraq. In between Lance Cpl. Gutierrezs and Staff Sgt. Roberts deaths, the DoD has recorded about 4,600 other U.S. service members killed, more than 32,570 service members wounded, not to mention that Iraq was left in a state of historic destruction and social disintegration.

When the U.S. withdrew in 2011, Iraq had not become a democracy, and much of the country had yet to be repaired. Three years later, the U.S. returned to fight a new monster of its own creation: The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). When the U.S. returned to Iraq in 2014 to attack ISIS, we once again relied heavily on airpower, to devastating effect. By late 2020, the U.S. led coalition admitted their airstrikes in these regions killed 1,410 civilians. Independent monitoring groups like Airwars think the true number of civilians killed by U.S.-led airstrikes from 2014-2020 is somewhere between 8,310 and 13,187 civilians. The airstrikes were so intense in places like Mosul, that the U.N. estimated over 8,000 Mosul homes were destroyed.

Today there are still about 2,500 soldiers on the ground in Iraq, with many thousands more deployed in the region, and thousands more U.S. contractors also at work and at risk.

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Ten years after the invasion of Iraq, The Costs of War Project which we direct started looking at the Iraq Wars impact. The total number of people who have died from the Iraq War, including soldiers, militants, police, contractors, journalists, humanitarian workers and Iraqi civilians, had reached at least 189,000 people, including at least 123,000 civilians. That number has only grown higher throughout the years.

But lives are not the only casualties of the last 18 years of war.

Truth and transparency went by the wayside before the war in 2002 and early 2003 when the Bush administration argued that the cause of the war was what we now understand were non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Transparency and decency were again assaulted in March 2003 when the Pentagon directed that the press would no longer be allowed to show the caskets of soldiers as their bodies were returned to Dover Air Force Base and when we learned of prisoner abuse by U.S. soldiers and contractors in Iraqi prisons.

And, while the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations were careful to claim that no expense would be spared in the care of American troops, the Pentagon budget almost without exception increased no matter how many troops were actually in the war zone, even when annual Iraq War spending itself declined. The Pentagon and State Department say that the Iraq Wars cost about $1 trillion. Even this astonishing figure is an undercounting, not including for instance, the ongoing obligations to care for veterans of the Iraq War and the ways it has increased overall Pentagon spending. The ballooning military budget is now more than half of all discretionary spending, has essentially starved the rest of U.S. discretionary spending.

Congressional authority to declare war also took a hit as the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force the legal basis for the war against Saddam Husseins alleged weapons of mass destruction has been stretched to cover many other, sometimes marginally related uses of force, not only in Iraq but also in Syria or elsewhere. It is, today, finally under strong congressional consideration for repeal.

When the Iraq War became less popular, some then U.S. members of Congress were castigated for voting for it. And some, like John McCain, John Kerry and Joe Biden, have admitted regret for voting in favor of the war. Yet most politicians paid little price for supporting the war or for their overly optimistic assessments of its likely course. Instead, we will all pay the price for this war for decades to come not least in care for Iraq War veterans and lost opportunities for public health, infrastructure, energy transition, and education.

Dr. Neta C. Crawford is the Chair of Boston Universitys Department of Political Science and Dr. Catherine Lutz teaches at Brown University. They co-direct the Costs of War project at Boston University and at Browns Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs.

Editors note: This is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com.

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What the 18th anniversary of the Iraq War teaches us about the costs of war - Military Times

FAO Representative in Iraq and Ambassador Safia Al-Suhail discussed ways to enhance and strengthen cooperation and coordination with Baghdad…

17 March 2021 Baghdad: Dr. Salah El Hajj Hassan, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Representative in Iraq, accompanied by H.E Ambassador Safia Al-Suhail, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to FAO, met with the Governor of Baghdad, Mr. Mohammed Jaber al-Atta. The discussion focused on FAO's intervention and programs in Iraq and the agriculture sector's challenges in Iraq.

Mr. Al-Atta discussed ways to enhance and strengthen cooperation and coordination with FAO in Iraq. He expressed hope that, through increased collaboration, the organization would rehabilitate the agricultural sector in Baghdad's rural areas to achieve food security and sustainable agriculture and rural development. Noting that these rural areas around Baghdad city have suffered from crises and climate changes.

Ambassador Al-Suhail praised the important role played by FAO in supporting the agricultural sector, achieving food security and sustainable agricultural development, and stressed the need to support the agricultural sector in rural areas of the Baghdad Governorate.

Dr. El Hajj Hassan presented FAO's projects to the Governor in Iraq that support agricultural livelihoods' by revitalizing food production, value chains, and income generation and aim to secure water systems by rehabilitating the irrigation in Iraq. Dr. El Hajj Hassan thanked the Governor for his willingness to support the agriculture sector in Baghdad's rural areas. El Hajj Hassan also stated, "Through FAO projects, FAO will provide the necessary support to improve the agriculture sector that will positively impact all of Iraq and to achieve rural and pre-urban development

At the end of the meeting, the Governor thanked the FAO delegation. He also praised FAO's efforts in Iraq to revitalize the agriculture sector and reduce poverty through its support to food production development and sustainability. He expressed his offices readiness to fully cooperate in developing the agricultural sector in Baghdad's governorate. Dr. El Hajj Hassan assured that FAO will be providing the necessary support to the farmers in Baghdads rural areas.

For more information, please contact:

FAOR Dr. Salah El Hajj HassanEmail: Salah.elhajjhassan@fao.org+9647740846707

Originally posted here:
FAO Representative in Iraq and Ambassador Safia Al-Suhail discussed ways to enhance and strengthen cooperation and coordination with Baghdad...

Baghdad Denies Trader’s Claim That U.S.-Seized Oil Is From Iraq – Bloomberg

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An oil traders claim that a cargo of crude seized by the U.S. came from Iraq rather than Iran, as Washington asserts, is wrong, according to Baghdad.

SOMO, Baghdads state oil-marketing company, categorically denies that the 2 million barrels of crude -- worth roughly $130 million at todays prices -- are of Iraqi origin, it said in a statement on its website.

Fujairah International Oil & Gas Corp. laid claim to the cargo that Washington seized as part of its efforts to sanction Iranian oil exports. FIOGC, controlled by the ruler of Fujairah, one of the UAEs seven emirates, told a U.S. court last week that the crude came from Iraq and that it had documents from SOMO to prove that.

Read more: UAE Sheikh Lays Claim to Oil Cargo U.S. Says Is From Iran

In case of circulation of those shipping documents bearing the logo of SOMO for these shipments, they are to be considered as forged and incorrect documents, SOMO wrote.

FIOGC didnt immediately respond to a request for comment.

With assistance by Anthony Di Paola

Before it's here, it's on the Bloomberg Terminal.

View original post here:
Baghdad Denies Trader's Claim That U.S.-Seized Oil Is From Iraq - Bloomberg

Letter to the editor: Time to pull open-ended Iraq war powers – pressherald.com

As the 18th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq draws close, so does a promising opportunity to promote peace and end endless war: a bill to repeal the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq.

The 2002 Iraq Authorization for Use of Military Force was passed when some people in our government mistakenly thought that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. It gave our nation permission to invade Iraq and remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Saddam was removed long ago, but the 2002 Iraq Authorization for Use of Military Force is still on the books. It has been misused against forces that had nothing to do with Saddam, and our continual warmongering has cost us countless dollars and lives. It could be used to involve us in a continuous cycle of retaliation.

HR 256 repeals the 2002 Iraq Authorization for Use of Military Force. To bring the bill to the House floor so it can be passed, we need as many co-sponsors as we can get. I see that Maine Rep. Chellie Pingree has co-sponsored HR 256, and I commend her decision. She is in good company, as many representatives on all sides of the political spectrum are pushing this cause.

We must continue to rally both the public and our leaders to work to use tools of peace and diplomacy rather than the weapons of destruction that continue the cycle of war.

I thank Rep. Pingree for her support as we work to have harmony replace war.

Beatrice BraeuerScarborough

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Letter to the editor: Time to pull open-ended Iraq war powers - pressherald.com

Seven reasons why a Libyan solution cannot work in Iraq | Ibrahim al-Zobeidi | AW – The Arab Weekly

When a Libyan pessimist, sceptical of the ability of his countrys new government to fulfill its promises, meets an Iraqi who is all too familiar with his own countrys problems and is affected by the corruption of its failed, corrupt governments (the roots of which were laid in laws enacted by US Administrator Paul Bremer), many factors will cause the Iraqi citizen to envy his Libyan brother for blessings God has bestowed upon.

The first is that Libya is not a neighbour of Iran, Turkey, or Syria.

The second is that the Libyan people belong to one sect and are essentially of one ethnic group, despite the existence of small ethnic minorities who are unable to obstruct the reunification process, as is the case in Iraq today.

The third is that the Libyan people number slightly more than seven million in a vast land with resources and riches that are enough to rebuild the country from east to west and from north to south. These can also make Libyan citizens the richest on earth. That wealth would enable them to play an effective and far-reaching role in drawing up regional policies and contributing to international agendas to a far greater extent than, for instance, little Qatar has achieved.

The fourth and most important of all reasons is that the majority of Libyans is favourable to a civil state that separates religion from the state, even though it respects religion and is keen on the freedom to preach, provide religious counsel and practice rituals. The history of the Libyan people since the days of their emancipation from the Italian occupation shows that the role of clerics rarely extended beyond the mosque or the shrine.

Fifth, and despite all the turbulence the country has faced, the professional Libyan National Army has survived albeit with limited manpower, weapons and combat experience. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, despite conflicting views about him, only exhorted soldiers still loyal to military tradition to reject the domination by armed militias over the countrys wealth and people, calling upon them to unite under his leadership. He thus became the leader of an effective armed force that could not be ignored by the outside world and the United Nations when searching for a solution. And that is what has happened.

It was not possible, without his approval and participation, to reach the peaceful settlement with the Tripoli government, Islamist militias and groups of foreign mercenaries which produced the interim government tasked with laying the ground for fair elections by next December. Such a thing cannot happen in Iraq where the militias are in full control and dominate the government and the judiciary. The Iraqi army, since its re-establishment after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, has been the weakest partner in the political process because the Iranians and their Iraqi Shia proxies and their Kurdish allies sought to ensure an army built on their own factions.

The sixth asset for Libya is that unlike Iraq it has no racist parties which since their inception decades ago have put their weapons and fighters under the command of every country hostile to their homeland. This was especially true after the Americans, in the aftermath of the 1990 occupation of Kuwait, gave these parties an independent platform to be a thorn in the side of the Iraqi people, allowing them to prevent full reunification even at the cost of bloodshed.

And the seventh and last reason is that Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria have not tainted the hands of their soldiers and officers with the blood of Libyans, as Iran and Turkey have done with Iraqis. They have not had recourse to the bribery, espionage and plots which is keeping Iraq as long as possible, torn, backward and bankrupt, making certain that a unified, strong, rich and respected Iraq never emerges.

Yes, there are external forces that created Libyas problem on February 17, 2011, and they have indeed fanned the flames of civil war over the past ten years. But these same actors are the ones who worked to encourage the Libyan protagonists, or maybe more accurately, to force them to end the fighting, chaos and devastation and to rebuild what the armies and militias have ravaged. This came about after these external forces realised their interests are better served by a Libyan at peace rather than in conflict.

As for Iraq, it has one neighbour who was able to infiltrate all the states joints and become the de facto and undisputed ruler.

Moreover, the most striking difference is that the US in Libya did not simply force a settlement, but raised its big stick against all parties involved in creating the problem. In Iraq, however, the US was not in the past part of the solution nor is it today nor will it be in the future.

In addition, the radical Islamists driven by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS and others have not been able to transform their influence in Libya into a deep state that imposes its authority over the entire country like they did in Iraq.

Iraqi governments be they from the Dawa Party or those that have followed it, have had the support of the powerful Iranian state as well as official Turkish backing and tacit US approval. And this, even though the US always knew better than others about these governments corruption, extremism and bloodthirstiness. The full extent of the facts were hardly concealed from Americas intelligence services that were never more than an inch way from the public and private lives of the countrys pro-Iranian ministers, directors, and ambassadors, be they Shias or Sunnis, Arabs or Kurds.

Read more:
Seven reasons why a Libyan solution cannot work in Iraq | Ibrahim al-Zobeidi | AW - The Arab Weekly