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Americas withdrawal from Afghanistan should be cause for rejoicing. But conditions in the country today, and the historical record of past U.S. withdrawals from similar conflicts, suggest that it will only create more problems. By leaving, Washington is vindicating an aphorism attributed to a captured Taliban fighter over a decade ago: You have the watches. We have the time.

Proving the Taliban wrong is not a politically unaffordable extravagance. It merely requires retaining a couple of thousand elite special operations, intelligence, and support personnel in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the risk is that this will be the fourth time in as many decades that a U.S. military withdrawal encourages terrorists by showing the weakness of U.S. resolve. When America left Beirut in 1983, Mogadishu a decade later, and Iraq in 2011, the result was more terrorism, not less.

Indeed, no one understood the significance of Americas past retreats better than Osama bin Laden. In a 1997 interview, he recalled how the deaths of 241 U.S. marines in the Beirut barracks bombing had compelled President Ronald Reagan to order a withdrawal from Lebanon within five months. This led to the collapse of the multinational force in Lebanon of which the Marines were the lynchpin and plunged Lebanon into further chaos. The main beneficiary was Hizballah, the shadowy terrorist group responsible for the attack. In the decades since, Hizballahs success influenced other terrorist leaders and groups, including bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

By 1993, the U.S. military was deeply involved in a United Nations mission to restore stability in Somalia and feed starving citizens enmeshed in civil war. But that October, a plan to arrest a local warlords paymaster and chief lieutenant went disastrously awry. Fifteen U.S. Army Rangers and three Delta Force commandos were killed in an uncontrolled spiral of urban combat depicted in the book and film Black Hawk Down. In some of the most gripping footage ever broadcast live on television, an injured U.S. Army helicopter pilot was seen being paraded through the streets of Mogadishu by a chanting, gun-wielding mob. President Bill Clinton reacted quickly to the incident. Scrambling to preempt criticism from Congress, the media, and the American public, he set March 31, 1994, as the firm date for the withdrawal of all American forces there regardless of whether the multinational, U.N.-led humanitarian aid mission had been successfully completed or not.

Members of the al-Qaeda movement had both trained and fought alongside the Somali militiamen that fateful day in Mogadishu. To bin Ladens thinking, it had taken the deaths of 241 U.S. marines to get the U.S. out of Lebanon in 1983. A decade later, the loss of less than a tenth of that number had prompted an identical reaction. As bin Laden explained in his 1996 declaration of war on the United States:

[W]hen dozens of your troops were killed in minor battles, and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area defeated, carrying your dead in disappointment and humiliation. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge. But these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. God has dishonored you when you withdrew, and it clearly showed your weaknesses and powerlessness.

Bin Laden was emboldened to believe that if U.S. foreign policy could be influenced by a score of military deaths in an East African backwater, it could be changed fundamentally by thousands of civilian deaths in the United States itself. Thus, the road to 9/11 started in Beirut, led a decade later to Mogadishu, then wound its way through Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Aden before arriving in New York City, Washington, D.C., and a field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. No one could have anticipated the exact chain of events. But the retreats from both Beirut and Mogadishu nonetheless set those events in motion by feeding a dangerous perception of American weakness.

Some analysts have argued that the situation is different now precisely because of the 9/11 attacks. Washington did not take terrorism sufficiently seriously in the 1990s, but since then, the country has built up a huge counter-terrorism bureaucracy that makes staying in Afghanistan unnecessary. Now Washington can protect the homeland by using enhanced intelligence, special operations forces, and precision-guided, stand-off munitions. With these resources, over-the-horizon military and intelligence assets will be able to quickly identify and address any new threats.

This also was the logic behind the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011. But the disastrous consequences were soon felt with the rise of the Islamic State. Washington was overconfident in its counter-terrorism capabilities and underestimated the new terrorist variant it faced. As with Hizballah in the 1980s and al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the results proved tragic. Once again the desire to disengage when confronted by stubborn, resilient non-state adversaries created conditions ripe for terrorist exploitation. The vacuum in Iraq was rapidly filled by new extremist groups. President Barack Obamas curt dismissal of the embryonic Islamic State as a jayvee team would come to haunt him less than six months later, after the terrorist blitzkrieg that conquered western Iraq and stormed across the border into Syria. The Islamic State soon inspired a series of domestic attacks in multiple Western countries. Within months, it had dragged an international coalition that would eventually involve 83 countries back into maw of Middle Eastern conflict.

Today in Afghanistan, the United States is similarly understating and underestimating the threat posed by the Taliban. If anything, the situation in Afghanistan is more dangerous. When America withdrew from Iraq, there was no single terrorist adversary capable of toppling democratically elected Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki in Baghdad. The Taliban, however, has that potential and makes no secret of its intention to re-impose theocratic rule over Afghanistan. It therefore poses an existential threat to the democratically elected government of President Ashraf Ghani in a way that no contender had in Iraq a decade ago. Moreover, the Talibans longstanding, close alliances with al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Pakistans Tehrik-i-Taliban endow it with additional attack capabilities that did not exist in Iraq at the time of 2011 U.S. withdrawal.

Against this backdrop, there are two specific risks associated with Americas withdrawal from Afghanistan. First, the international terrorist threat that necessitated invading that country following the 9/11 attacks remains. Al-Qaeda is undefeated. Its intimate, longstanding relationship with the Taliban suggests that al-Qaeda will be the beneficiary of the territorial and political gains its Afghan partners are poised to achieve in a post-U.S. Afghanistan. In 2019, in fact, as negotiations with the United States were underway, Taliban leaders reportedly sought to personally reassure Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Ladens son and the al-Qaeda heir apparent, that the Islamic Emirate would not break its historical ties with al-Qaeda for any price. Indeed, two al-Qaeda operatives recently praised the Taliban for its support. Thanks to Afghans for the protection of comrades-in-arms, a spokesman for the group gushed. Even if the Taliban makes good on its promise to restrain al-Qaeda from attacking the United States and the West from an Afghan base, this does not preclude al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan to destabilize this already highly volatile region. In 2008, a series of coordinated suicide attacks in Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba another close al-Qaeda ally brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war. It is worth recalling, too, that both of al-Qaedas most recent new franchises are focused on South Asia generally and on Kashmir specifically.

Americas counter-terror resources are also likely to be stretched particularly thin going forward, making managing the threat from afar even less plausible. Afghanistan is now only one of many terrorist hotspots around the globe, which seem to be multiplying. Security conditions are deteriorating in Mozambique and the Sahel, for instance, while sectarian clashes in Northern Ireland raise fears of The Troubles returning. At home, far-right terrorism runs rampant. Even if U.S. intelligence agencies find ways to effectively manage terrorist safe havens without soldiers on the ground, their attention and vigilance will necessarily be spread thin.

The second risk is that withdrawal from Afghanistan will weaken, rather than strengthen, Washington against peer competitors. The United States, rightly or wrongly, is shifting from prioritizing counter-terrorism toward a great-power competition posture. But thinking of the two as zero sum is a mistake. China has prioritized embedding itself in local contexts for years; Russia and Iran have been practicing their irregular warfare strategies in Ukraine, in Yemen, and, most aggressively, in Syria. Indeed, at least one Iran-backed Shiite militia in Iraq has already drawn inspiration from the Talibans success. Qais al Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous), observed just the other day that the Afghan way is the only way to make [the United States] leave [Iraq]. Every military setback whether in Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan illuminates a path by which great-power adversaries see they can defeat the United States. It is no coincidence that Russia has provided support to the Taliban, likely aiming to help sap Americas energy and spirit and encourage Americas withdrawal from the region.

Yet rather than heed present risks or past warnings, President Joe Biden, like President Trump before him, seems more concerned with the political capital to be milked from ending Americas longest war. As in Beirut and Mogadishu, Washington appears largely satisfied that our military personnel will no longer be in harms way. But a responsible strategy need not involve gratuitously exposing troops to harm. In fact, the last American combat fatality in Afghanistan was more than a year ago. The current troop level there, approximately 3,500 personnel, accounts for 0.27 percent of Americas active duty forces hardly a drain on the resources of even a declining superpower. Maintaining this small contingent would have a significant force-multiplying effect. It would provide an immediate trip wire to deal with any serious terrorist threat while also bolstering the Afghan government and improving its security forces. Moreover, maintaining a limited, elite presence in a country sharing a border with China might well be in Americas strategic interests as the new cold war heats up. Simply abandoning Afghanistan will not help the counter-terrorism fight and it is unlikely to help with great-power competition either.

There are no perfect options. But instead of turning its back on Afghanistan, the United States should shift its rhetoric in the Global War on Terror away from winning and losing and toward managing and accepting. This would facilitate an ongoing but limited troop presence with a clear homeland security, not nation-building, brief. Keeping a small number of elite troops in Afghanistan, while unlikely to elicit roars of approval at campaign rallies in the 2024 presidential race, would likely keep both the Taliban and al-Qaeda at bay in the country while protecting a forward operating base on Chinas and Russias doorstep. Withdrawal, by contrast, will be universally seen as defeat. As with bin Laden 25 years ago, it will give a rhetorical victory to terrorists the world over. And it will boost the morale of state adversaries that benefit from the perception of U.S. weakness.

Bruce Hoffman is the senior fellow for counterterrorism & homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations and a professor at Georgetown University. Jacob Ware is a research associate for counterterrorism at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Staff Sgt. Kylee Gardner)

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Leaving Afghanistan Will Make America Less Safe - War on the Rocks

Like the U.S. Army today, the British found themselves geographically marooned, and secured favorable terms for withdrawal from their adversaries, but when their column around 16,500 soldiers and camp followers left the gates of Kabul on their way to Jalalabad, the Afghans descended, slaughtering all except one: an army surgeon, William Brydon. When Dr. Brydon the original Lone Survivor arrived on horseback at the gates of Jalalabad, near death himself, with part of his skull sheared off, a sentry asked him where the army was, to which he responded, I am the army.

Although the Soviet army avoided this fate a century later, the regime it left behind fared little better. Mohammad Najibullah, an infamous torturer and former head of Afghanistans intelligence service, the KHAD, as well as a K.G.B. agent, had been installed by the Soviets as president and was able to hold onto power for more than two years after they left. As the Soviet Union collapsed, its financial support of his regime evaporated. Mr. Najibullah was soon deposed and eventually found himself at the end of a Taliban executioners rope when they took control of Kabul. Which raises the question of how long the United States will continue to support the government of President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan after our withdrawal. One year? Two? Three? What is the decent interval, to borrow Nixons phrase from our calamitous withdrawal from Vietnam?

As Jack and I ran, we discussed this history and other complex aspects of Americas withdrawal: how many senior members of the Afghan government possessed dual citizenship and would likely depart the country, leaving behind less capable subordinates to fill critical positions; the challenges of collapsing more remote outposts; and whether the State Department would grant visas to those Afghans whod thrown their lot in with their government and us.

Jack concluded, America might be done with Afghanistan, but Afghanistan isnt done with America. In his view, my lunch at the ambassadors residence wouldnt mark the end of the war at all. Not for me. Not for anyone.

After finishing her call, the ambassador apologized for being so inattentive. She confessed that she had an agenda item we hadnt gotten to discuss. She wanted some advice as she was considering writing a book. Like those of the millions of Afghan girls we are now in the process of abandoning, her story is marked by war and overcoming an oppressive version of Islam championed by the Taliban, a personal journey that leads to a final chapter in which she is appointed as the first female Afghan ambassador to the United States. My advice to her was to keep notes, and I told her that she might not be ready to write that final chapter yet. Because she may not be remembered most for having been her governments first female ambassador, but rather for having been, as it related to America, its last.

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Opinion | The Afghanistan War Will End as It Began: In Blood - The New York Times

The Afghan government said it plans to begin talks with 14 countries to discuss what to do with hundreds of their citizens who have been captured while fighting alongside the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Ahmad Zia Seraj, the head of Afghanistan's intelligence agency, National Directorate of Security (NDS), said last week that his government wanted to "find an acceptable solution to the problem."

The foreign nationals in Afghan custody are 408 ISKP members, including 173 women and children. According to the Afghan government, 299 of them are from Pakistan, 37 from Uzbekistan, 16 from China, 13 from Tajikistan, 12 from Kyrgyzstan, five from Russia, five from Jordan, five from Indonesia, four from India, four from Iran, three from Turkey, two from Bangladesh and two from Maldives.

Abdul Wahid Taqat, a former senior intelligence official in the Afghan government, predicted a difficult legal and political process for the repatriation of the ISKP prisoners, saying Kabul will likely need to use international bodies to convince those countries take back their citizens.

Returning these fighters would not be easy because Afghanistan has no treaties to extradite or exchange terrorists with most of these countries, Taqat told VOA, adding that a reasonable option for Afghanistan is to involve the United Nations Human Commission on Human Rights to find a solution.

Most of the countries are hesitant to take back their citizens who have joined terror groups because of legal and security risks these dangerous individuals pose, said Colin Clarke, a senior fellow at the Soufan Center.

Clarke, however, said that some countries will likely be more responsive to the Afghan government request.

More authoritarian countries do not need the proof; countries that are more transparent will need it to prosecute [these individuals], he said. He added that China has interest in taking back its citizens back because it has inflated the threat of terrorism to justify their treatment of Uyghurs.

Reuters reported in 2015 that the Afghan government arrested and handed over a number of Uyghur militants to China as a way to persuade China to help with convincing Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.

Formidable threat

Taqat said the Afghan governments announcement shows that foreign fighters still have bases in the country and that their presence would remain a "formidable threat"after foreign troops leave.

The fighters will pose a greater threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal, said Taqat.

The U.S. and its NATO allies have announced that they will pull out all their forces from Afghanistan by September 11.

The Islamic State branch, ISKP, was formed in January 2015 in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and in northern Pakistan. The group has suffered major setbacks in recent years, including the loss of its key pockets of territory and the removal of its top leadership.

Despite the losses, a U.N. report in May 2020 said that ISKP still has about 2,200 armed fighters in the South Asian country and remains capable of launching different attacks.

Pakistani citizens

During the announcement Tuesday, NDSs chief Saraj said that 299 out of 208 ISKP prisoners were Pakistani citizens because 60%of Daesh fighters are Pakistanis.

Daesh is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State.

Saraj said Aslam Farooqi, an ISKP leader and Pakistani citizen, will be turned over to Pakistani authorities only in exchange for Taliban leadership.

We would only hand him over to Pakistan if we agree on a mutual exchange. When Pakistan hands over some Taliban leaders to us, we will think about it.

Farooqi was arrested with a dozen other ISKP fighters in April 2020 in the southern Kandahar province.

Earlier this month, Pakistan demanded that Afghanistan hand over Farooqi to Pakistan.

Aslam Farooqi was involved in anti-Pakistan activities in Afghanistan, he should be handed over to Pakistan for further investigation, Pakistans foreign office said in a statement.

Regional observers say that most of ISKP fighters were the alienated members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who joined the terror group after it was formed in 2015.

The Afghan government said that in addition to the ISKP fighters, it is holding an additional 309 foreign fighters who are affiliated with al-Qaeda and other militant groups.

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Afghanistan to Discuss Fate of Foreign IS Prisoners with Their Countries - Voice of America

After an initial honeymoon, security deteriorated. The conflict became politically toxic in Britain, and when the U.S. surged in 2007 London had no appetite to do the same. Instead British commanders arranged a secret deal with Shiite militias, trading prisoner releases for a cessation of attacks on British bases.

This accommodation fell apart in March 2008 when Iraqs prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, abruptly sent troops south. The British commanding general was on vacation in a ski resort and Maliki publicly snubbed his deputy. U.S. and Iraqi troops went into action while the British, until late in the day, stayed at the airport.

The events in Basra cast a long shadow. Later in Kabul a British officer asked Gen. David Petraeus how long it would take the U.S. to forget what happened there. A generation? he asked. Petraeuss reply was telling. Slightly longer, he said.

The U.S. military, for all its scale and resources, did not win in Iraq or Afghanistan either. But the conflicts damaged British military standing with its most important ally.

What are the central problems of the British Armys experience and performance since 2001?

I see four interlinked areas. First, accountability. Almost every senior British military commander who passed through Iraq and Afghanistan was promoted, no matter how badly things went wrong in the field. Meanwhile, in parallel, Britain implemented a novel system of probes for junior malfeasance on the battlefield, from court cases permitted by the creeping reach of European Human Rights law to massive public inquiries. (Some of these investigations were baseless, but in other cases the army did commit atrocities.)

The key point is that Britain allowed a glut and void situation to develop, with excess accountability low down and none higher up. That created moral hazard and meant top commanders were incentivized to take bad action over no action.

Second, the army needs to overhaul its attitude to learning lessons. While the institution became adept at taking on board low-level tactical experience, over and over again initiatives that aimed to identify what had gone wrong on a broader remit were either suppressed or kept on a problematically close hold. Throughout the Iraq and Afghan conflicts avoiding senior embarrassment ranked higher than a comprehensive post-operational washup.

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The British Armys Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan - The New York Times

When news broke that President Biden plans to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021, ending a 20-year campaign that has tragically cost 2,300 American lives, many across the country breathed a sigh of relief. Redeploying our troops home from Afghanistan brings an end to our longest war, but it does not bring an end to each individuals personal struggles. We can physically bring our troops home and out of harms way, but the full journey back will involve more than a change in geography.

For many of those who return home, a part of them never will. We must remember that their sacrifice went beyond the physical. Even after everything they have fought for and survived, the mental health crisis plaguing our returning veterans is one we must not leave them to battle alone. We supported them on the battlefield and in honor of all that these American heroes have done for our country, it is our collective responsibility to help them face the challenges theyll find at home.

According to research released by the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, 40 percent of the veterans who have returned from Afghanistan suffer from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While PTSD is complicated enough on its own, many veterans also battle depression, anxiety, relationship issues, financial pressures and substance abuse, making their diagnosis and treatment that much more challenging. Studies also show that PTSD can lead to suicide ideation and behavior, and when combined with a secondary mental health condition, the risk increases significantly that the veteran may die by suicide.

The Department of Veterans Affairs, recognizing the ongoing challenges, proposed a 10 percent increase to the 2021 fiscal year budget to better address mental health and suicide prevention. But the assumption continues to be that veterans will raise their hand, pick up a phone or send a text seeking help for their struggles, when in reality, only 55 percent of veterans seek the mental health care they need. On the battlefield, they had the resources allocated to them to accomplish the mission. This same proactive approach is needed now to support them as they transition back.

Our response to veterans in need must be designed in a way that removes the barriers keeping millions from seeking treatment. Between the lack of accessibility in rural areas of the U.S. and the perceived social stigma surrounding mental illness, many returning service members opt to stay silent, try to solve the riddle themselves thus end up suffering alone. But if all veterans returning from a warzone or transitioning out of service, were provided with not only an initial screening and time-based check-ins, but were supported by a proactive outreach as well to catch those negative coping mechanisms and evidence-based risk drivers sooner, we could change our response from reactive to proactive and save the lives of hundreds who may be hesitant or afraid to come forward.

When our sons, daughters, spouses, partners, and friends return, we also need to be ready to guide them toward the resources and professionals qualified to treat them. Education plays a key role in preparedness, so we must make sure we can recognize the signs and symptoms of PTSD, and we must be sure to keep lines of communication open. It might seem like an insignificant gesture, but asking our Veterans to grab a Coke, sit down and have that initial conversation is an important first step. Connectedness enhances individual protective measures.

And its not enough to wait until theyre home to develop a system to help them. We must start preparing to meet their needs immediately and be ready to stand with them as soon as they return. We must ensure that the same sense of tribe and team that enabled them to fight and win over there can be replicated back home, especially for those who leave the military.

For the past two decades, millions of brave men and women have fought for their country and sacrificed to keep us safe. Now that they will finally be coming home from Afghanistan, we must band together to support them with the same commitment they have shown to us. Their mental scars may be invisible, but their need is not, and it is vital that we be ready and waiting to support them. We need a system built to identify their struggles sooner that does not require them to take the first step. We need to be forward leaning, as a community and a nation, to get them the support they need and have earned. We must not seek to fix them we must seek to empower them.

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We owe our veterans a debt that can never be repaid. But as they return home and transition back to life as civilians and face the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead, we must support them and become their advocates, supporters and resources. We must help them accomplish new tasks and harness the power of their service to this nation standing beside them as they have stood up for us.

Retired Col. Michael Hudson served in the Marine Corps for 30 years commanding a helicopter squadron, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and in his last active duty billet, as the USMCs Sexual Assault Prevention and Response lead. He is now the vice president of government solutions at ClearForce, an early risk detection company.

Editors note: This is an op-ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman,haltman@militarytimes.com.

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As our nation seeks to leave the war in Afghanistan behind, let's not forget our troops' sacrifice - Military Times