Mediaboss Marketing

Editors Note: Some links in this article lead to Iranian media sites. If access to such sites is prohibited by your employers policy, please do not click links in this article from a work computer.

A senior Iranian military leader, Esmail Qaani, traveled in late June to the Syrian border town of Albu Kamal to rally a group of fighters. Normally, this type of visit would not be unusual. Qaani commands the Quds Force the wing of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for external action and is expected to travel to Syria to coordinate Irans efforts to preserve the regime of Bashar al Assad. What made Qaanis trip noteworthy was that he was visiting the Fatemiyoun Division, an Iran-backed proxy force whose foot soldiers are Afghans from the Shiite Hazara community.

While fighters of the Fatemiyoun Division remain active in Syria, so far they have been sidelined in Afghanistan. That could change. The Fatemiyoun constitute a small but potent force with longstanding and extensive ties to Iran and could prove useful to Iranian officials as they craft their Afghan policy, especially if the Taliban continue to press their military advantage. On July 7, Irans political leaders hosted talks between Taliban and Afghan government representatives in Tehran. While Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif used the meeting to celebrate the U.S. departure from Afghanistan, he also warned that continuing clashes between Taliban fighters and the Afghan government would be costly. With the American military exit from Afghanistan due to be completed by Aug. 31, Iranian policymakers are strategizing about their future approach toward Afghanistan. They face a difficult set of decisions, including how they will balance their countrys strong ties to Afghanistans minority Hazara community against Irans diplomatic dance with the Taliban and the Afghan government.

The Fatemiyoun pale in comparison to the Taliban both in numbers and capacity. But they could prove either to be a lever of influence for Iran, if the Taliban and Afghan government do ultimately cut a deal, or a political liability, if an all-out civil war ensues in Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to target the countrys Shiite Hazara community.

There is significant risk of blowback for Iran if Afghanistans conflict takes on an even more sectarian cast with Afghan Hazara Shiites pitted against the predominantly Pashtun Sunni Taliban. If the history of the Afghan conflicts is any guide, such a scenario could draw in Irans regional rivals, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, who would be likely to support the Taliban, as they have in the past. Plus, the United States has already demonstrated, with recent retaliatory airstrikes against Iran-backed proxies in Syria and Iraq, that it is prepared to use any means necessary to check threats to American interests in the region. Going forward, Iranian officials will likely feel a need to tread carefully with both the Fatemiyoun and the Taliban.

The Rise of the Fatemiyoun Division

As we explain in a recent report, the links between Irans revolutionary guard and Afghan and Pakistani Hazaras have their roots in the Iran-Iraq War. After Saddam Husseins Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, Irans revolutionary government cast the war as an opportunity for Shiites to demonstrate their faith. Many Afghan Shiites answered the call by heading to Iran, where they were trained by the revolutionary guard.

During the 1980s, Irans effort to stand up an Afghan paramilitary force underwent several phases, name changes, and reorganizations. As well as training Shiite fighters in Iran, the guard also dispatched several of its officers to serve as cultural and military advisers in Afghanistan, where they embedded with cells in the resistance movement that was fighting the Soviet Unions occupation of that country.

Following the Soviet withdrawal, conflict in Afghanistan raged on as various factions fought for power. Throughout the 1990s, Iran provided support to Afghan Shiite groups and the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban. Qassem Soleimani was among the revolutionary guard personnel involved in that effort. He would become the head of the Quds Force in 1998 and remained its commander until he was killed in a U.S. drone strike last year.

From these deep and longstanding links to Afghanistans Shiite Hazara community, in 2012 Iran established the Fatemiyoun Division as part of its wide-ranging effort to support Syrias Assad regime in its fight against an armed rebellion. Under the supervision and direction of Soleimani, the revolutionary guard recruited todays Afghan Hazara foreign fighters for that purpose. It also established the Fatemiyouns Pakistani sister unit, the Zeynabiyoun Brigade. Thousands of ethnic Afghan and Pakistani Hazara foreign fighters fought and died with those units to help save the Assad regime.

In addition to their battlefield impact, the Fatemiyoun have been a significant propaganda asset for the revolutionary guard, which works to persuade constituents in the Shiite community across the region to support the Iranian government and its policies. Touting the daring and successes of Afghan foreign fighters in Syria has played an integral part in that campaign. Iran-financed propaganda about the Fatemiyoun employs strategic narratives related to differences in Sunni and Shiite interpretations of Islamic law and just governance, and it stokes fears among the Hazara about the potency of the predominantly Sunni Taliban and Islamic State forces in Afghanistan and Syria.

Soleimani was the key architect and star of Irans propaganda strategy. He made a habit of snapping frontline selfies with the Fatemiyoun and recounting their heroics. The Fatemiyoun achieved a substantial social media following on YouTube and Twitter until both platforms took down their accounts. Even so, the Fatemiyoun remain active on other social media as a result of Irans investment. They have thousands of followers on encrypted social media platforms such as Telegram and its Iranian government-controlled counterpart, Soroush, which they use to showcase their battlefield exploits in Syria. Fighters shared videos of combat on social media, which proved to be an effective recruiting tool among those who joined the cause were a significant number of American-trained former soldiers in the Afghan National Army and elite Afghan special operations forces.

The revolutionary guards propaganda about the Fatemiyoun could have long-lasting ramifications. The guard corps has pushed sectarian narratives that may prove difficult to control in the future, notably including in relation to Afghanistan. In strengthening the Fatemiyoun, the revolutionary guard has given power to a network that, while deeply indebted to Iran, is not fully under its control. For Iran, managing risks in Afghanistan, where the Fatemiyoun are an important political force, could prove difficult over time if the Taliban continue their aggressive and bloody campaign of targeting Hazara communities. In that event, Iranian officials may be tempted to provide significant support to Fatemiyoun fighters to help Iran maintain its influence over the Hazara community and combat the Taliban.

The Future of the Fatemiyoun and Irans Approach Toward Afghanistan

Even as the Afghan and Pakistani Shiite militias involvement in Syria winds down, their power, and the narratives through which Iran framed their mobilization, will continue to shape South Asia and the Middle East for years to come. This is especially true in Afghanistan, where Irans strategic hedging and years-long quiet campaign to cultivate influence with the Taliban has contributed significantly to the military gains made by the insurgents over the last several years.

It remains to be seen if Iranian officials are able to sustain relations with both their Fatemiyoun proxies and the Taliban after the exit of their common enemy, the United States. Questions abound about whether and when Irans newly elected president, Ebrahim Raisi, might leverage Iranian influence over tens of thousands of Hazaras in Afghanistan and across South Asia who answered Tehrans call to join the fight in Syria almost a decade ago. For Raisi, who has vowed to make Irans economic revival a centerpiece of his tenure, steering political outcomes in Afghanistan, which is one of Irans largest trading partners, is a crucial part of his own political calculus.

There are increasing concerns that the Talibans victories on the ground may translate into the revival of the harsh and bloody targeting of Afghan Shiite Hazaras, which could trigger unwelcome regional instability and have pronounced effects on Irans ailing economy. Iranian officials and media outlets close to the revolutionary guard have argued that the Taliban have changed. Whether that is true or not, Irans approach to dealing with the predominantly Pashtun Taliban will likely continue on Raisis watch in the near term. Playing all three major sides pro-Taliban Pashtuns, ethnic Hazara Shiites, and Afghan elites affiliated with the government in Kabul will likely be critical to Tehrans approach in Afghanistan no matter what Washington does next.

The mixed signals coming out of Tehran on engagement in Afghan affairs may be both a sign of Irans pragmatism and a reflection of a deeper divide between hard-liners aligned with the supreme leader and reform-minded Iranian critics of Ali Khameneis regime. Disagreements between various camps on Irans engagement in Afghanistan have openly erupted in the Iranian press. In a recent column that appeared in Irans centrist online daily Arman, for instance, former Iranian diplomat Seyed Ali Khorram sharply criticized Khameneis engagement with the Taliban, saying it only emboldens the Taliban to continue their aggressive attacks against Afghan Shiite Hazaras. Khorram echoed the complaints of other Iranian reformists and reminded readers that Taliban attacks on Iranian diplomats during the 1990s brought Afghanistan and Iran to the brink of war.

Given that Iran has long positioned itself as the champion and protector of Afghanistans marginalized Shiite Hazara population, the internal rifts emerging over Irans cultivation of the Taliban suggest that Tehrans diplomatic dalliances with the group may result only in a temporary marriage of convenience that could easily disintegrate after the U.S. drawdown is completed this summer. For now, how Iranian officials play their cards in Afghanistan is a game of wait and see.

Candace Rondeaux directs the Future Frontlines program at New America and is a professor at the Center on the Future of War at Arizona State University. She has covered the Afghan conflict for 13 years, working variously for the Washington Post, the International Crisis Group, and the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

Amir Toumaj is a nonresident fellow at New America and is the co-founder of the Resistance Axis Monitor.

Arif Ammar is an independent researcher based in Washington and a native of Kabul. He has produced analysis on the Afghan conflict for the International Crisis Group and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database.

Image: Office of the Supreme Leader

Read this article:
Iran's Tricky Balancing Act in Afghanistan - War on the Rocks

Text Size:A- A+

Reports from Afghanistan now refer to a resurgent Talibanas the violent group has now taken more territory thanitever had sinceit waspushed out of power in 2001. While the situation on the ground israpidly shifting, there is no doubt that the Taliban have the upper hand and mean to keep it that way.Alongside isreportageof what everyone knew allalong theTalibanhasntchanged in the slightest. The old rules against music, shaving beards and girlseducation are back.Andyet another wave of refugeesis onthe move.

In Islamabad, Pakistans National Security AdvisorMoeed Yusuf warneda Senate committee that thesituationin Afghanistan was out of Pakistans control. That was of course an inadvertent admission that the Taliban had been, in fact, always under Pakistani control, but the NSA seemed to be trying to make a public case that Pakistan was in danger. It is, but for reasons that the security establishment may be blind to, while it actuallycheersthe victory that it has sought for more than three decades. No one is fooled, except the Pakistani establishment itself. Despite extensive planning and frenetic diplomacy, trouble is coming to Pakistan.

Also read: Imran Khan should know who really messed up in Afghanistan

As the Taliban rampagesacross Afghanistan, another flow of refugees has begun toTurkey,US,UK, and closer home toneighbouringcountries. TinyTajikistansays its ready to take in 100,000 refugees, whileIranis seeing some 10,000 arriving every day through well-known smuggling routesviaPakistan. Oddly, there is no indication of much movement into Pakistani territory.Datacollected by migration mapping agencies indicate that while some 81 per cent plan to stay in Iran and others are aiming for Europe, just two per cent plan togo toPakistan. The reasons for this indicate a carefully planned policy.

First, Pakistan can police its 267-km border better than it pretends to, with88 per centof its border with Afghanistan double fencedand accompanied byditches, bunds and sensors. Its a one-way system that allows the Taliban to go as they please, but no one elsecomesin. Second, Pakistaniparliamentariansnote that the Taliban are roaming freely in Quetta and adjoining areas. Any fleeing Afghan coming to these areasislikely to be sent back as a Taliban recruit faster than the blink of an eye. When asked why these insurgents were not removed,PakistanArmy chief GeneralQamar JavedBajwaand ISI chiefLt General Faiz Hameedwarnedlawmakers that this would result in a blowback on Pakistan.Thats strangefor a countrythathas no compunctions in removing, killing or threatening its Pashtun and Baloch population, not to mention disobedient political parties.

Third, is the fact that much of the territory opposite Pakistan have already been Taliban-controlled for years. Main border crossings like Spin Boldak have recently fallen, even as the Pakistan Air Force threatened airstrikesif the Afghan Army sought to wrench it back. The strategy is aimed at ensuring that the Taliban police the border areas, thus preventing any huge ingress of desperate people.PakistanForeign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshihas declared thatthe countrywill not take in any more refugees. But if matters worsen, as they surely will, Pakistan has the option ofdealing with700,000refugees expected to arrive orshelterthem. The key point is whether the Taliban can take control over all key border crossings, as well as the dozens of mountain trails that cross into the tribal areas.

Also read: India right to wait till Taliban comes in full view. No need to rush into an Afghan strategy

Before blaming the Taliban for being a bunch of rabble-rousers, remember that the fundamentalist ideologythatsustains their ranks, or the mujahideen before them, was part of a deliberate ISI policy to funnel US funds to the most extremistgroups tostem the tide of rising Pashtun nationalism that had erupted even before the USSR walked in.

Afghans were never fundamentalist; they had it thrust upon them. Now it seems the Taliban are reiterating that with a vengeance.Reportafterreporttalk of the Taliban preventing girls from attending schools, barring the wearing of red and green clothes (the colour of the Afghan flag), shaving and listening to songs. This lunacy haslargelyemanated from Pakistans madrassas, with major madrassaleadersdeclaring their pride at Taliban alumni, and seeing their victories as vindication of this revanchist ideology. The end result is thatgroups like the extremeRight-wing Tehreek-e-Labbaik(TLP)do well in provincial elections, and a former office-bearer of theTehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)has been nominated by Islamabad for the ulema seat in PoK elections.Parliamentis no exception, with passionate statements declaring the Talibanasa protective barrier for Pakistan. Islamist parties and even common people are united in their admiration of Taliban victory against a superpower.

This is ideology coming home to roost; and like all extreme ideologies, it could swallow up its creators.

Also read: Team Bajwa now betting on UK to promote Taliban to get to US indirectly

While the Talibanison a winning spree, itsnot going to be a walkover. Former warlords and the Opposition in Kabul arebanding togetherfor their own survival. Within all this, outside powers are fishing for newproxiesamong the second generation leaders like the son of Ahmed Shah Masood, or even Uzbek warlordAbdul RashidDostum.

Despite the Taliban being sent around to major world capitals such as Beijing, Moscow, and Teheran, few want a Taliban-dominated government in place, despite the best efforts of a sophisticated PR machine that nearly sold the argument of a changed Taliban, particularly to US academics. Such a civil war scenario, where each will backtheirown grouping is Islamabads worst nightmare. There is an even worse scenario. That once within sight of power, the Taliban itself will splinter along its weakest points. Success in insurgency has its own price when each leader wants a share of the pie. Ironically, chances of a civil war are the highest if Kabul falls, with warlords like Atta Mohammad Noor likely to try and carve out their own territory.

The only ones who will welcome civil war are the terrorists. As a recentUN Report observed, theal-Qaeda is still around, aligned with the Taliban through the offices of the Haqqani network in a complex network of intermarriage and operations. This deadly combinationof terrorist groupsis fighting and sharing victories with the Taliban and are therefore largely on the right side of Pakistans intelligence agencies. But this is an uncivil war. With enough money and spunk, any or all of these can be bought by various actors, orthey canjust decide to do their own thing. Its already apparent in the tribal areas wheretwo Pakistani soldierswere recently killed and several wounded incross-border attacks. A flareup of unrest in these areas, bracketed with wounded Pashtun pride, could mean Waziristan redux, or return of the war that sucked in thousands of Pakistani troops in intermittent operations between 2003 and 2014. In that case, Pakistan will find that ithasleft itself wide open to total chaos. Allthe black ravens it has let loose,willfinally come home to roost.Pakistans game of thrones in Afghanistan has gone on for much too long. The audience is simply tired of it.

The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views are personal.

Subscribe to our channels on YouTube & Telegram

Why news media is in crisis & How you can fix it

India needs free, fair, non-hyphenated and questioning journalism even more as it faces multiple crises.

But the news media is in a crisis of its own. There have been brutal layoffs and pay-cuts. The best of journalism is shrinking, yielding to crude prime-time spectacle.

ThePrint has the finest young reporters, columnists and editors working for it. Sustaining journalism of this quality needs smart and thinking people like you to pay for it. Whether you live in India or overseas, you can do it here.

Support Our Journalism

More:
Trouble is coming to Pakistan. No matter its double fence on Afghanistan border - ThePrint

Judy Woodruff:

In just over one month, according to President Biden, the U.S. will have completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, after 20 years.

But for those two decades, Afghanistan's neighbor to the east, Pakistan, has been a key player in the regional dynamics, and stands long accused by the United States and Afghanistan of supporting Taliban insurgents.

In a moment, I will have an interview with Pakistan's prime minister, Imran Khan, but, first, some background on him and the fraught relationship with the U.S. and Afghanistan.

From the 1970s to the early 90's, Imran Khan was a professional athlete, a cricket star, guiding Pakistan's national team to victory. Now, as Pakistan's prime minister, he's leading his country at a time of regional tumult.

As the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, the Taliban is making swift territorial advances. When the Taliban recently took over a key Afghan-Pakistani border crossing, residents on the Pakistani side seemed to celebrate, waving Taliban flags and honking horns.

Recently, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made a longstanding accusation: Pakistan provides insurgents safe haven.

ASHRAF GHANI, President of Afghanistan: Intelligence estimates indicate the influx of over 10,000 jihadi fighters from Pakistan and other places in the last month, as well as support from their affiliates in the transnational terrorist organization.

Read the original here:
U.S. 'really messed it up' in Afghanistan, Pakistan PM says - PBS NewsHour

The U.S. military is physically withdrawing from Afghanistan, and Afghan nationals who aided the American military are trying to evacuate as the Taliban gains ground in remote areas. GBH News analyst Charlie Sennott called into Boston Public Radio on Monday from Kabul, Afghanistan, to give a sense of the situation on the ground.

Sennott, formerly a Middle East bureau chief for the Boston Globe covering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, said the nation is in a moment of "tremendous uncertainty."

"You can really feel sort of the barometric pressure dropping with the U.S. pullout underway," said Sennott. "The situation on the ground is, you don't see U.S. military on the streets the way you used to see them."

"This place has always lived with violence, it's always lived with a great deal of nerve-wracking fighting going on with the Taliban for many many years," he said, but added that this moment, as the Taliban surges in outer provinces, feels unique in just how much is changing quickly.

Sennott, who was last in the country in 2016, said that while the Taliban is gaining ground outside the cities, it still feels relatively normal in metropolitan areas.

"[There's a] really strange mix of inspiring and hopeful commitment and endurance to sort of daily life going on: the vegetable markets are there, you see the butchers on the street, you see people out and about and shopping, and then ... this feeling of tremendous uncertainty with a total lack of U.S. military presence, and many questions about what that's going to mean in the weeks and months ahead," said Sennott.

Human rights groups and monitors in Afghanistan are reporting a rise in civilian casualties and executions, with the Taliban responsible for the bulk of the offenses. Sennott said his reporting so far reflects a sense that "the Taliban is going to be a part of the future of Afghanistan."

"I spoke today to a young man who was very openly in favor of the Taliban and he felt like the Taliban has changed," said Sennott, noting that footage coming out of Afghanistan showing beheadings and the slaughter of surrendering troops, shows "completely the opposite."

"I think the young people who are educated here, like the young man I spoke with, he said to me that yes he supports some of the aspects of the Taliban a sense of traditional Islam, of living by Sharia but that he would never tolerate girls not to be educated or women not to be in the workplace, and that no one his age would support that."

75% of Afghans are 25 years old or younger, said Sennott.

While the Taliban has gained ground in remote areas of the country, Sennott said he doesn't believe "they are going to come into power and surge into taking over Kabul any time soon."

"The clearest assessment I have is a shift in strategy, that the Afghan national army and security forces here have decided they're going to concentrate on the urban centers, and that's going to mean letting go of some of the outposts in more distant regions," he said.

Charlie Sennott is a GBH News analyst and founder and CEO of the Groundtruth Project.

See more here:
On The Ground In Kabul: The 'Barometric Pressure Is Dropping' In Afghanistan As US Troops Withdraw - wgbh.org

Between 29 and 31 July alone, MSF treated 70 war-wounded patients. In total from 3 May until 31 July, we have treated 482 war-wounded people, nearly all (92 per cent) for injuries caused by shells and bullets, and around a quarter (26 per cent) aged under 18. The patients seen by MSF are just a fraction of the totalnumber injured by the violence.

The fighting exacerbates health needs beyond trauma care. Given the lack of well-functioning and affordable medical facilities in Helmand, people rely on the 300-bed Boost hospital, the only referral hospital in the province, for essential neonatal, paediatric, inpatient, intensive care, maternity, malnutrition, and surgical services among others.

Since May,however, MSF staff have witnessed an alarming increase in the severity of patients illnesses when they arrive at the hospital. People have described how, despite needing medical care, they have been forced to wait at home until the fighting subsides or to take dangerous alternate routes. With fighting taking place not far from Boost hospital, and people too afraid to leave their homes due to the violence, access to healthcare is dangerously limited.

Here is the original post:
Intense fighting leads to severe trauma causalities in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan | MSF - Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF) International