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Biden Needs an Effectiveand Coercive Iran Strategy – The …

Mark Dubowitz

The Biden administration seems to be on the wrong track. No strategy against the Islamic Republic of Iran can be effective without sustained coercive pressure. Going back in time, the situation is reminiscent of Ronald Reagans moment in history, when he came to believe that coercive measures would work to exploit Moscows weaknesses and help hasten the Soviet regimes collapse. Similarly, the Biden administration should deploy a comprehensive set of coercive tools to combat the full range of Tehrans malign behavior, including its nuclear advances, regional aggression, human rights abuses, and global terrorist networks. The short term objective: To hold and deter the regime. In the longer term: A presidential commitment to use American power to rollback and crack the Islamist regime.

Given Irans conduct, it is safe to assume that any US president would sooner or later need to make the same shiftturning away from reconciliation and adopting a more coercive posture toward the Islamic Republic. This policy shift is made even more urgent by the Islamist victory in Afghanistan. Minor sanctions, unarmed diplomacy, and ineffectual military strikes on Iran-backed militias that are known to have fired on US troops are the current hallmarks of Bidens Iran policy. This is occurring while Washington is signaling its intention to move military assets out of the Gulf region, withdraw US troops from Iraq, and allow the Taliban to take over Afghanistan. Such an approach cannot possibly contain the clerical regimes regional and nuclear aspirations.

The Biden administrations announced desire to go back to the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is weakening American deterrence, as Tehran seeks to squeeze more and more concessions in the Vienna negotiations. President Biden is loath to respond to Iranian acceleration of uranium separation, at levels unmistakably designed to approach military capacity, as well as to the escalation of attacks by proxy across the region. A pattern of dangerous Iranian adventurism has also unfolded, including the firing of dozens of rockets at US troops by Iran-backed proxies in Iraq; the attempted kidnapping in New York of an American citizen by Iranian intelligence officers; the targeting of US and international shipping in the Gulf; and the attacks by Iran-backed proxies like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis against US allies in the Middle East. None of this aggression, however, has produced a meaningful response from the Biden team, even after seven months of Iranian provocations.

The Biden strategy does not take into consideration the vast disquiet within Iran and the regular eruptions of anger toward the theocracy. In late 2017, nationwide protests began to consume the Islamic Republic, occurring regularly in the years since. In November 2019, an eruption of protests spurred the clerical regime to kill as many as 1,500 demonstrators, according to Reuters. In August 2021, protesters gathered to challenge the regime over severe water shortages, leading security forces to kill several people. Other protests since 2017 have challenged the full range of Irans malign policies, including its poor economy, corruption, regional expansionism, and human rights abuses. These developments have increased the vulnerability of the Islamic Republic, making it more susceptible to collapse.

Opponents of the clerical regime could benefit from an American strategy that combines deterrence in the short term and coercion in the medium-to-long term. For now, the strategy should be to hold and deteruntil the current US administration, or a new one, would actively adopt a rollback and crack strategy to intensify the existing weaknesses of the regime and support its dissolution. The Reagan victory strategy against the Soviet Union, a nuclear-armed superpower, shows the way.

Hold and Deter

It is not clear that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will even allow his new president Ebrahim Raisia man after his own liking, and a mass executionerto re-enter the JCPOA. If it happens, it will be a very different agreement than the one concluded in 2015. The Biden administrations leading Iran envoy and chief negotiator, Robert Malley, already has conceded in the negotiations much greater sanctions relief than even former Secretary of State John Kerry and his chief negotiator Wendy Sherman agreed to in 2015. If former Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif is to be believed, by mid-July, the US had agreed to lift sanctions on over 1,000 designated entities, including all Iranian banks except for one. Malley had also agreed to remove sanctions on the supreme leader and his close associates, and take the regimes praetoriansthe Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)off the list of foreign terrorist organizations. What will be left are minor, symbolic sanctions that will do little to interfere with the flow of billions of dollars to the clerical regime. And there could be more concessions to come as a new Iranian president and negotiating team squeeze Malley for more if negotiations resume.

On the nuclear side, Iran is enriching uranium at 60%, manufacturing uranium metal, accumulating large stockpiles of fissile material, testing more advanced centrifuges, and stonewalling the International Atomic Energy Agencys inquiries about nuclear-related activities. Tehran is digging in its heels about maintaining its stockpile of advanced centrifuges, which are likely, at best, to be warehoused instead of destroyed. As JCPOA nuclear restrictions begin expiring in 2024, it is clear that Iran will have maintained pathways to nuclear weapons. By 2027, restrictions on the mass deployment of centrifuges, including advanced models, will begin to sunset with remaining restrictions gone by 2029. By 2031, there will be no cap on enrichment purity levels, including on weapon-grade uranium, as well as on stockpiles; enrichment will be permitted at the buried-beneath-a-mountain Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; new enrichment plants will be permitted; a plutonium reprocessing prohibition will be lifted; heavy water reactors will be allowed; and there will be no cap on heavy-water production or domestic stockpiling.

What is to be done? First, congressional voices on both sides of the aisle, US governors, private attorneys, as well as Israel and the Gulf states should use a combination of market and political deterrence to diminish the economic benefits from an American return to the JCPOA. Some congressional Republicans are already signaling to the marketthrough legislation, resolutions, and open or personal lettersthat when they take back power they will reinstate sanctions and impose significant costs to anyone who has re-entered the Iranian market. Companies may only enjoy a few years of business opportunities before sanctions are returned. US governors can reinforce this market deterrence by expanding state laws to divest public pension funds from companies doing any business with the Islamic Republic. Private attorneys currently hold over $50 billion in outstanding judgments against the clerical regime on behalf of victims of Iranian terrorism. They should seek to attach these judgments to transactions between international companies and Iranian entities.

Israel also needs to protect its companies against the risk that they might inadvertently do business with Iran-linked entities. Jerusalem should publish its own comprehensive list of hostile entities that are engaged in supporting terrorism, missile and weapons proliferation, and human rights abuses, or are connected to Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its military and other governmental entities. Given the Mossads reputation for Iran-related intelligence, this will be a reliable list for the compliance departments of major international banks and companies looking to stay clear of problematic persons, corporations, and other entities.

The Biden administration has made clear that if it suspends measures on banks and companies currently subject to US terrorism and missile sanctions, it will do so on a political basisnot because the conduct underlying those sanctions has changed. These will be unchartered waters for foreign financial institutions and investors who rely on the US Treasury Departments sanctions list to protect them from business dealings with terror financiers and nuclear and missile proliferators. Hundreds of Iranian banks and companies will still be tied to terrorism, missiles, and the IRGC, despite the political decision to suspend sanctionsmaking the establishment of a new, internationally-respected terror and missile-finance watch list all the more important.

At the same time, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have market leverage they can deploy against companies doing business with the Islamic Republic. They can publish their own lists of malign persons and entities, duplicating or enhancing the Israeli list, and they can put companies to a choice between doing business with these Gulf countries or with the mullahs regime. Together, they have market power through the size of their sovereign wealth funds, their energy market, and the large defense, construction, infrastructure, technology and other contracts they award to international companies. Israel and non-governmental organizations can help by providing detailed information on pending contracts and discussions between international companies and Iranian entities.

Economic power is only part of the hold and deter strategy. With the Biden administration signaling its intention to move military assets out of the Middle East and its unwillingness to impose significant military costs on Iran and its proxies, Israel will increasingly be the only serious Western power in the region. The Mossad and Unit 8200, Israels signals intelligence and cyberwar division, have run circles around Irans security establishment through a successful campaign of covert action against Iran-related nuclear, military, and other assets. These have damaged Tehrans atomic program, diminished Iranian regional capabilities in Syria, and have embarrassed the regime. The killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the chief of Irans military-nuclear program, and covert strikes against advanced centrifuge facilities and the Natanz nuclear site have bought Israel (and the world) some much-needed time. The 2020 killing of Irans most notorious military commander, Qasem Soleimani, in an American operation that relied on Israeli intelligence input, seriously undermined Irans regional aspirations. Hundreds of Israeli airstrikes against Iran-linked positions in Syria have prevented Tehran from opening up a third border from which to attack Israeli civilians and infrastructure. Israels intelligence agencies have also gone on offense against the regimes infrastructure inside Iran.

Despite these successes, covert action probably will not be sufficient to stop the Islamist regimes nuclear march. At some point, an Israeli government may decide that it has no choice but to launch military strikes. The biggest concern with this course of action is Jerusalem may well face a Biden administration ardently opposed to the use of force. And any suggestion from Jerusalem that it will only act with American consent implicates Washington if Jerusalem decides it must attack irrespective of past statements. This makes it more difficult for the Biden team to assert plausible deniability. The lasting anger in Washington, especially among Democrats, should not be underestimated.

In the meantime, the Biden administration is running a political-messaging campaign to deter Israeli action and to try and sideline JCPOA-skeptical Democrats like Senator Bob Menendez. The political campaign pivots on rhetoric about a longer and stronger nuclear deal that will correct the deficiencies of the original agreement. There is, of course, near-zero prospect for a better deal, as Tehran has made clear. But the rhetoric may be sufficient to neutralize some critical voices who do not want to have a big fight over Americas role in the Middle East. Republicans and Democrats in Congress will need to be clear-eyed about how unrealistic the administrations rhetoric is about an improved deal.

Rollback and Crack

Hold and deter is only a short-term strategy. To keep the threat at bay, the American administration would need to take a page from the playbook Ronald Reagan first used against the Soviet Union. The strategy should be designed to rollback and crack the clerical regime.

In the early 1980s, President Reagan seriously upgraded his predecessors containment strategy by pushing policies that tried to roll back Soviet expansionism. The cornerstone of his strategy was the recognition that the Soviet Union was an aggressive and revolutionary yet internally fragile state that Washington could defeat. Reagans policy was outlined in 1983 in National Security Decision Directive 75, a comprehensive strategy that called for the use of all instruments of American overt and covert power. The plan included a massive defense buildup, economic warfare, support for anti-Soviet proxy forces and dissidents, and an all-out offensive against the regimes ideological legitimacy.

The Biden administrationor, by 2025, perhaps a new presidentshould call for a new version of NSDD-75 and go on offense against the Iranian regime. The administration would be wise to address every aspect of the Iranian menace, not merely the nuclear program. President Obamas narrow focus on disarmament paralyzed American policy. Obamas engagement with the Islamic Republic as an end in itself suffered from the same delusions that American presidents entertained about Communist China. Those delusions of engagement made China wealthy and more powerful but did not moderate Chinas rulers. The recent election of Raisi, a mass murdering cleric close to the supreme leader, who was elected by the lowest number of voters in Irans history, may sober up Team Biden to the unmistakable conclusion: The Islamic Republic cannot be reformed.

President Biden also should avoid the arms control trap that paralyzed Obamas Iran policy. Under Obamas nuclear accord, Tehran does not need to cheat to reach threshold nuclear-weapons capabilities. Merely by waiting for key constraints to sunset, the regime can emerge over the next decade with an industrial-size enrichment program, a near-zero breakout time, an easier clandestine sneakout path to long-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, much better conventional weaponry, regional dominance, and a more powerful economy, increasingly immunized against Western sanctions.

Any new national security directive must indicate how to systemically dismantle Iranian power. Washington should demolish the regimes terrorist networks and influence operations, including their presence in Europe and the US. The American offensive was underway during the Trump administration but it ran out of time: Mike Pompeo, then director of the CIA, put the agency on an aggressive footing against these global networks with the development of a more muscular covert action program and the green-lighting of much closer cooperation with the Mossad.

Most of Washingtons actions that could push back Tehran hinge on severely weakening the Islamic Republics finances. The Trump administration (and even the Obama-era Treasury) ran a successful economic warfare campaign targeting the IRGC and other regime elements that devastated Iranian government finances, led to hyperinflation, spurred a collapse in oil exports and the Iranian currency, and precipitated multiple rounds of street protests. In 2019 Khamenei called the US sanctions unprecedented. In the same year, the then Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, compared conditions in Iran to the countrys devastating economic plight during the IranIraq war from 1980 to 1988.

But Trumps pressure campaign lasted only two years (from the snapback of sanctions in November 2018 to the end of the Trump administration in January 2021). If the Biden administration restores the JCPOA, much of that economic pressure will be reversed, as hundreds of the most economically potent sanctions are lifted. These will need to be reinstated.

Last but not least, the American pressure campaign should seek to undermine Irans rulers by strengthening the pro-democracy forces that erupted in Iran in 2009 and resurfaced from 2017 to 2021. It should target the regimes soft underbelly: its massive corruption and human rights abuses, especially against women. Conventional wisdom assumes that Iran has a stable government. In reality, as the selection of Raisi and the boycott of his election by over 50% of Iranians (and protest ballots by another 20%) demonstrated, the gap between the ruled and their Islamist overlords is expanding. Many Iranians no longer believe that the reformists can change the Islamic Republic from within. After the 2009 uprisings, Khamenei alluded to his regime being on the edge of a cliff. A new Republican president should create the distinct impression that America will help to push it over that edge.

Other key voices in Iran have warned of the regimes precariousness. In 2019 one Iranian lawmaker, Jalil Rahimi Jahanabadi, compared the regimes predicament to the Soviet Unions. When the Soviet Union collapsed, he told the Iranian parliament, it had 13,000 nuclear warheads and had influence in more than 20 countries and a space station, but it was torn apart on the streets of Moscow, losing its security and territorial integrity. Mohammad Reza Tajik, a political adviser to former president Mohammad Khatami, likened Tehran to the Titanic in turbulent waters.

To be sure, collapsing a brutally repressive regime like the Islamic Republic will not be easy or predictable. It will require sustained US pressure, a willingness to withstand international opprobrium, and a steely determinationperhaps over a period of yearsto target the full range of Irans malign conduct. Yet cracking the regime remains a solution that Washington should not abjure merely because it is difficult. Ultimately, it remains the best and only way to reduce instability in the region and advance US interests.

The nuclear issue likely will loom large in the immediate future and the years ahead. A willingness to negotiate arms-control agreements (as Reagan did with Moscow) must never come at the expense of continuing a relentless campaign of pressure. Any American administration should present Iran with the choice between a new and better agreement and an unrelenting American pressure campaign, which includes the credible use of force against an expanding nuclear program.

Washington does not need to have a public strategy to collapse the clerical regime; Reagan did not have one for the USSR. Our political leaders should only talk about the inevitability of the fate of the Islamic Republic. An ideologically, politically, and economically bankrupt regime, it will end up on the ash heap of history. Reagan spoke that way about the Soviet Union in his famous 1981 Westminster speech. In 1983, he released NSDD-75. Only seven years later, the Soviet bloc collapsed. Washington should intensify the pressure on the mullahs as Reagan did on the communists. We would be far better off this time round, of course, not to have a dogged enemy armed with atomic weapons if we can possibly avoid it.

Mark Dubowitz is the chief executive of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. An expert on Irans nuclear program, he has advised several US administrations and published dozens of studies on economic sanctions. Follow him on Twitter @mdubowitz. FDD is a nonpartisan think tank focused on foreign policy and national security issues.

Courtesy: (FDD)

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Biden Needs an Effectiveand Coercive Iran Strategy - The ...

Iran calls on US to stop its addiction to sanctions – FRANCE 24

Issued on: 04/09/2021 - 15:48Modified: 04/09/2021 - 15:46

Tehran (AFP)

Iran urged the United States Saturday to stop its addiction to sanctions against the Islamic republic and accused President Joe Biden of following the same "dead end" policies as Donald Trump.

Foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh made his remarks a day after the US Treasury announced financial sanctions against four Iranians accused of planning the kidnapping in the US of an American journalist of Iranian descent.

"Washington must understand that it has no other choice but to abandon its addiction to sanctions and show respect, both in its statements and in its behaviour, towards Iran," Khatibzadeh said in a press release.

On Friday, the Treasury announced sanctions against "four Iranian intelligence operatives" involved in a campaign against Iranian dissidents abroad.

According to a US federal indictment in mid-July, the intelligence officers tried in 2018 to force Masih Alinejad's Iran-based relatives to lure her to a third country to be arrested and taken to Iran to be jailed.

When that failed, they allegedly hired US private investigators to monitor her over the past two years.

Khatibzadeh in July called the American charges "baseless and absurd", referring to them as "Hollywood scenarios".

Under Trump's presidency, Washington unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement between Tehran and six major powers.

The multilateral deal offered Iran relief from sanctions in return for curbs on its nuclear programme.

It was torpedoed by Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from it in 2018.

Biden has said he wants to reintegrate Washington into the pact, but talks in Vienna that began in April have stalled since the ultra-conservative Ebrahim Raisi won Iran's presidential election in June.

At the end of August, supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused Biden's administration of making the same demands as his predecessor in talks to revive the accord.

And on Tuesday, Iran's new Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian suggested that the Vienna talks would not resume for two or three months.

Tehran is demanding the lifting of all sanctions imposed or reimposed on it by the US since 2017.

2021 AFP

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Iran calls on US to stop its addiction to sanctions - FRANCE 24

Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement Is Heading Nowhere – Foreign Policy

Last week, Iraq hosted a regional summit intended to encourage archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran to resolve their differences and ease tensions in several countries in the Middle East that have become their proxy battlegrounds. Reconciliation between the two could pave the path for peace in Yemen, save Lebanon from a total collapse, and aid Iraqs, and maybe in time even Syrias, economic recovery.

Although Iraq was applauded for opening its doors to discuss a possible end to the cold war that has been fought between Riyadh and Tehran for hegemony of the Muslim world, no breakthrough was achieved. Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers merely agreed to continue the conversation that started in April just days after the Biden administration began an indirect dialogue with Iran to revive the Iranian nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA].

The Iranian-Saudi talks have stalled, however, because of Irans insistence on consolidating its gains made by using its armed militias; uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA; and the absence of security guarantees from the United States, upon whom Saudi Arabia is dependent.

Last week, Iraq hosted a regional summit intended to encourage archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran to resolve their differences and ease tensions in several countries in the Middle East that have become their proxy battlegrounds. Reconciliation between the two could pave the path for peace in Yemen, save Lebanon from a total collapse, and aid Iraqs, and maybe in time even Syrias, economic recovery.

Although Iraq was applauded for opening its doors to discuss a possible end to the cold war that has been fought between Riyadh and Tehran for hegemony of the Muslim world, no breakthrough was achieved. Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers merely agreed to continue the conversation that started in April just days after the Biden administration began an indirect dialogue with Iran to revive the Iranian nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA].

The Iranian-Saudi talks have stalled, however, because of Irans insistence on consolidating its gains made by using its armed militias; uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA; and the absence of security guarantees from the United States, upon whom Saudi Arabia is dependent.

Irans government is keen for the resumption of diplomatic ties with the Saudis, which would help it entrench its currently contested international legitimacy and possibly lay the groundwork for greater regional engagement, economic and social, that would also bolster the government domestically. Iran wants to show its people that it is not completely isolated, and that the economic straits in which it is suffering are largely a result of American hostilitynot the regimes costly interventions in the Middle East, which have become targets of angry protest.

The government of Irans new president, Ebrahim Raisi, can count on some domestic support for this narrative, especially after Raisis decisive election victory; and of course he has the full backing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline factions such as those that dominate the Revolutionary Guard. But that is unlikely to quell protests in Iran that have complained that the policy of supporting militias from Lebanon to Yemen is too costly when money is short at homeand only attracts further sanctions.

The complication in this scenario is that Raisi intends neither to rein in those militias nor to agree to changes in the nuclear deal. Irans development of long-range ballistic missiles, which the United States would like to include in further talks, raises a particular threat to Saudi Arabia. As long as Iran is not ready to concede on these key fronts, the Saudis simply do not see the prospect of a deal.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, an Iranian policymaker who served on Irans nuclear diplomacy team in negotiations with the European Union in 2015, summarized Iranian presidents thinking: As I understand, President Raisis approach will be for the P5+1 and Iran to be committed to JCPOA as is and full compliance vs. full compliance,' Mousavian said. That means the broader issues the United States and its allies such as Saudi Arabia (let alone Israel) see as important next steps are not currently on the table.

Simon Henderson, Baker Fellow and director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington Institute, said that he thought Iran would continue to support militias across the so-called Shia crescent. Any adjustment will be for tactical rather than strategic reasons, Henderson said.

Raisis presidential inauguration teemed with a horde of leaders of non-state militias it backs, many of whom have spent years or decades carving away Saudi influence in the region in favor of Irans presence. Their presence and prominence at the event certainly did not boost Saudi confidence in the talks.

Joost Hiltermann, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the International Crisis Group, said Iran sees these armed partners as critical to its posture in the surrounding region. However, these militias also pursue a domestic agenda that does not always perfectly coincide with Irans regional design, Hiltermann added.

It could get more interesting if these groups over-reach in their domestic environments, he said. This could happen especially in Iraq, where the Iran-backed militias, as well as many of the others, could run afoul of popular sentiment when they become predatory and act as especially violent auxiliaries of the state without accountability, or are seen to be fighting on behalf of Iran instead of Iraqi national interest.

In Lebanon, too, criticism of Hezbollah has increased. Although the group still has broad support in its strongholds, it is losing ground in the rest of the country. Most people in Lebanon blame the political elite for rampant corruption and ruining the countrys economy. But many also see Hezbollah as the reason behind the United States and Saudi Arabias reluctance to extract the country from its financial crisis.

These flickerings of regional opposition to the Iranian project, together with the possibility of a breakdown of the JCPOA talks, seem to have given the Saudis the sense their leverage over Iran may grow. They may even hope that Irans intransigence will cause the collapse of the Vienna talks, leaving Iran under sanctions and less able to support its broader regional objectives. Rather than make any concessions to help Iran, Saudi Arabia would prefer to keep it on its trajectory of deepening isolation.

Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, said that if the United States-Iran nuclear deal is not restored, Tehran and Washington will remain at daggers drawn, and under those circumstances, Iran-Saudi de-escalation is unlikely, if not impossible.

He added that any resolution between the regional foes would depend on the division of areas of influence. Ultimately, both countries would have to agree on a set of rules and to potentially determine zones of influence in the region, Vaez said.

Analysts suggest that, as far as mutual concessions go, Syria is low-hanging fruit for Saudis and Yemen is the same for Iranians. Saudi Arabia could join the United Arab Emirates in pushing for diplomatic recognition of the Assad regime, while Iran could push its local allies the Houthis into a deal with the Saudi-backed government of Yemen. Compromises could be found for both Iraq and Lebanon.

But Iran sees such an idea as an unnecessary volte-face: Irans local allies, including the Syrian army and Hezbollah, have with Russian backing already routed Sunni-led opposition groups from regime-held territory in Syria; and the Houthis are currently winning the war in Yemen. And Iran has already succeeded in planting proxies inside the governments of both Iraq and Lebanon.

Iran has expanded its influence in the Middle East, and in that sense it has won the unconventional war it has been fighting. But many of the regions countries, including Iran itself, are economically miserable. They are either mired in active conflicts, brought low by the effects of wars and sanctions, or like Lebanon are suffering self-imposed financial crises.The Saudis for now have little to gain from acknowledging Irans victories and cementing them in place. Until that changes, Iranians, as well as the citizens of other nations stuck in the middle of the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry, will continue to lose out.

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Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement Is Heading Nowhere - Foreign Policy

All Types of Iran Tours – Tehran Times

Traveling to Iran can be one of the most memorable things you can do in your life. However, it can become one of the most annoying things if your trip does not match your preferences and travel style.

You are going on a vacation to a new country to have a better time than usual. Therefore, it is very crucial to choose your Iran travel type wisely. The variety of Iran travel itineraries can bring forth a wide range of different experiences for travelers.

Iran tourscan be divided into different groups based on the different personalities and travel types. Therefore, you get to choose the type that fits you. So, you are sure you reserve a tour that will be one of those vacations you will remember for good.

Iran Cultural Tours: the Path to the Unheard Stories

Undoubtedly, traveling is far more than spending your vacations in a new place for leisure and recreation. From the moment you step into the destination, you unfold the unheard narratives of its cultures. Thus, some Iran tours intend to take the visitors into a deeper aspect of the Iranian lifestyle, Persian culture, and history. They take you to the gist of the trip on the streets of cities, among locals, in the luxury or local restaurants, and through a time tunnel-like journey in the historical sites. TheseIran cultural toursinvolve a great deal of our Persian culture, history, customs, and everything. So, the range of the things you may want to see is diverse. That is why you should get to know your preferences. Do you prefer more historical sites or more interaction with people? Do you want to spend more time in urban places or natural spots? All the journey moments including diverse nature, historical heritage, local food, magnificent architecture, as well as hospitable people of Iran, are exciting parts of every Iran cultural tour. But, it depends on you and your interests to modify which one is involved and how much.

Iran Trekking Tours: the Unknown Wild

Iran is a country of different climates; it has mountains, jungles, deserts, and various plains. This diversity of scenery and experience has madeIran hiking toursa perfect mixture. Besides, Iran trekking tours widen your perspective. They break the narratives portrayed in the media from Iran as a country of deserts. From the greenery of mountains to the many mineral hot springs on the hiking trails, youd get to explore the variety of sceneries that Iran has to offer in different Iran tour packages.

However, trekking mountains are not just about the trails and their natural beauty. Its also about the local life and the stories youll get to explore. In different mountainous regions, you meet the nomads that travel by season. Or youll get to meet hikers from different countries in Iran. They can tell you more about the unseen trekking routes on your way to explore some of the Middle Easts highest summits in Iran! Also, it is always the right time to climb in Iran because it is a 4-season country. You can do it all year round. For instance, you didnt make it to be in Iran in the summer? Dont worry! The south of Iran has a pleasant climate for hiking in winter. Besides, you can head for swimming in the Persian Gulf at the end of your trip!

Iran Damavand Tours: Exploring the Mystic Mountain

Damavand Mountain is a great challenge for all! It is accessible for anyone who is prepared for hiking and trekking. Particularly in the summer, it doesnt need much professional hiking gear. Many people of different ages and various levels of professionalism will climb up the lush trails towards Irans highest peak. Not only Damavand is the highest mountain in Iran, but also it is the highest summit in the Middle East. Its also the highest volcanic summit in Asia. Its the 12th prominence summit in the world. Damavand is known as the ceiling of Iran in the list of 7 volcanic summits of the world. With its extraordinary view and a variety of flora and fauna, Damavand trekking tours will fill any eyes with joy!

Iran Desert Tours: A Trip to the Land of Serenity

The cultural and trekking tours are not mere types of Iran tour packages. Now, its time to get to the special item on our menu: Iran deserts. This vast country can offer you many natural wonders. But you will find out that these golden dunes are as lively as green jungles and blue waters. There are old cities and villages on the verge of drylands where their residents have overcome the severity of deserts and made their lives. The fantastic water supply system, Qanat, or the miraculous Shazde Garden in the heart of the desert are some examples. This ancient lifestyle is an exclusive Iran attraction. Yet, the main story starts when you step on the sands of Lut or Kavir Deserts. The white and mirror-like salt lakes, enormous stone sculptures, dune hills one after the other, and finally the azure sky of the night with the polka dot of stars all over it is all the extraordinary beautiful scenes you'll remember from Iran desert tours.

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All Types of Iran Tours - Tehran Times

What’s Iran’s Nuclear Deal? – War on the Rocks

President Joe Bidens much-discussed plans to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal are off to a bad start. After six rounds, indirect talks between Washington and Tehran were put on hold last June until Irans new president, Ebrahim Raisi, could take office on Aug. 5. Now, almost a month later, there is still no indication of when the next diplomatic session will take place.

By all accounts, Iranian leaders are eager to alleviate sanctions and revive the Islamic Republics moribund economy. However, they also took a number of steps, such as rapid uranium enrichment and research into uranium metals, that make a return to the deal difficult. Only by correctly interpreting the source of these mixed signals from Tehran will it be possible to determine whether the current impasse in talks can ultimately be overcome.

Iran appears to have embarked on a confusing high-stakes negotiating strategy as a result of both domestic political fissures and President Donald Trumps maximum pressure campaign. Trumps withdrawal from the nuclear deal and renewal of sanctions, along with a series of high-profile assassinations and sabotage attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, increased the popularity of Iranian hardliners and facilitated their return to power. In December 2020, while the moderate Rouhani administration was still in charge of the government, hardliners in Irans parliament (Majles) passed a law that requires Iran to advance its nuclear program in threatening ways until sanctions are lifted. This law, promoted over the objections of the departing administration, substantially limits the flexibility of Iranian diplomats and is a major obstacle to reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The question now is how the hardliners, after taking control of the government, will deal with the consequences of their December law and other escalatory moves. The ball is in Tehrans court, and there is little that Biden and the rest of the world can do besides hold their ground and wait to see what the regime decides.

Raising the Stakes

As a result of the Iranian parliaments actions, Irans nuclear program has advanced substantially. Iran is now enriching uranium up to 60 percent, far above the nuclear deals cap of 3.67 percent. Further, as part of a multi-stage process to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, Iran is also producing uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently confirmed that Iran has produced 200 grams of this metal, up from 3.6 grams in February.

Uranium metal can be used for civilian purposes or to make the core of a nuclear bomb. While the international community remains skeptical, Iran claims that it aims to produce uranium silicide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. In practice, the reactor would irradiate uranium silicide pellets to produce medical isotopes, commonly used in diagnostic procedures for cancer and heart disease. However, on the road to producing this sophisticated uranium fuel, Iran must work with uranium metal, and this sort of metallurgy was banned for 15 years under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Russias response offers perhaps the best illustration of how serious Irans escalation is: In a break from its past whitewashing of Irans nuclear behavior, Moscow now believes that Iran seems to be going too far. In a joint statement, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also registered their grave concern, arguing that Irans enrichment and production of uranium metal are both key steps in the development of a nuclear weapon and that Iran has no credible civilian need for either measure.

Raising the stakes further, these new activities are occurring while Iran has suspended a special monitoring agreement with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. With its December law, the Majles imposed a deadline to restrict inspectors access to Iranian nuclear facilities absent sanctions relief from the United States. At that point the agency and the Rouhani government negotiated a three-month work-around agreement that reportedly provided inspectors with the means to reconstitute a full picture of Irans nuclear program if the nuclear deal were to be revived. While the agency is flying blind for now, when sanctions are lifted they should subsequently get access to monitoring equipment that continues to watch Irans program in the meantime. The three months ended in May, but Tehran may have unofficially allowed monitoring to continue. Now, however, some of the recording devices need to be replaced and if they are not, the world may never be able to fully account for the activities of Irans nuclear program during this period. The resulting uncertainty could exacerbate existing tensions between the United States and Iran, as well as accelerate anxiety in Israel, which has long threatened a dangerous preemptive strike against Irans nuclear program.

What Is Tehran Trying to Signal?

Contrary to the image often found in U.S. media, Irans foreign policy apparatus is not a monolith, nor can it be simply characterized as a top-down decision-making structure with the supreme leader exercising full authority from above. Ariane Tabatabai, now a senior adviser at the State Department, wrote in 2019 that Irans national security decision-making process can be better characterized as a bargaining process, in which infighting and consensus-building shape policy outputs.

These tensions and disagreements within the system were on full display in the debate over last Decembers nuclear law. Following the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, Irans parliament voted to manufacture uranium metal, suspend international nuclear inspections, and vastly increase uranium enrichment. Former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and others associated with his administration have specifically blamed the Majles and the December 2020 nuclear law for the subsequent failure to lift U.S. sanctions. My administration did all the things to lift the sanctions, Rouhani recently argued. If the parliament law had not stopped us, we would have lifted the sanctions almost before Norouz [March 21, 2021]. His spokesman Ali Rabiei also criticized parliamentary interference with the executive branch, saying, The government was from day one consistently opposed to parliaments unusual path.

Now, however, hardliners dominate the government, and it will be their strategy that determines the fate of nuclear negotiations. During the 2020 parliamentary elections, Irans Guardian Council excluded many of the more moderate and reformist candidates from contention, leaving the conservative Principalists faction with a decisive majority. Winning 221 of the 290 seats, they more than doubled their presence in the Majles. Moreover, the Supreme Leader handpicked Raisi to be president, endorsing the new presidents belief that only a powerful government can properly implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The supreme leader also exerts considerable control over much of Raisis cabinet.

After Raisis election, an implementation committee was formed to help forge an internal consensus on how to approach nuclear negotiations. Created by the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Irans top decision-making body, it consists of representatives from the Rouhani administration, the incoming Raisi administration, and the Majles. It is unknown if the committee has come to a consensus yet. In July, this committee reportedly determined that the draft roadmap that Rouhanis team had negotiated is incompatible with the law passed by parliament in December about resuming Irans nuclear program. The question is whether this is simply political posturing aimed at increasing Raisis leverage or, more ominously, a firm red line from the Iranian regime.

The Ball Is in Irans Court

It remains likely that the hardliners running Iran see a resumption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with any concessions and sanctions relief that can be squeezed out of Washington, to be in their best interest. However, negotiations require flexibility and can easily be derailed by existing red lines. The December law was a show of force by hardliners while the Rouhani administration was in office. Hardliners are now in control of the negotiations and are realizing that their maximalist stance is not going to achieve much. Unhappy with the status quo, they would like to see a breakthrough but seem to be hesitating over what strategy to adopt. This has led to a short-term approach that combines radical escalation and very partial compliance. The result, so far, is confusion, delays, and stalemate.

If Raisi and his government stick to maximalist demands like making sanctions relief irreversible while moving ahead with their escalatory measures, a return to the deal may soon become impossible. Iran would likely continue to advance its nuclear program, which could lead the United States to retaliate with more punitive economic sanctions. If tensions do escalate, it is possible that Iran could further reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its nuclear program could be referred back to the United Nations Security Council. At this point, Russias position on whether Iran had gone too far would become crucial.

Where Will Biden Go From Here?

The Biden administrations initial optimism about reviving the nuclear deal is rapidly waning. Bidens point man on the issue, Robert Malley, now assesses the future of the deal as just one big question mark. Senior U.S. diplomats appear set on rejecting any concessions to Irans escalatory negotiating strategy. As one official said, If they think they can get more, or give less to return to a deal it is illusory. Furthermore, the Biden administration will be wary not to waste additional domestic political capital on foreign policy, especially after Afghanistan. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, We have clearly demonstrated our good faith and desire to return to mutual compliance with the nuclear agreement The ball remains in Irans court and we will see if theyre prepared to make the decisions necessary to come back into compliance.

This is the right approach. For now, U.S. negotiators should continue to wait and see whether Iran is willing to return to talks in Vienna. Ultimately, compromises on both sides will be necessary. But there are several reasons why it would not make sense to preemptively offer the hardliners a better deal. First, Iran is now far from the guidelines of the original deal. Enriching uranium to 60 percent, even if this is in response to an act of sabotage against the Natanz nuclear facility, demonstrates the pursuit of capabilities with no civilian purpose. Second, Washington should not give the hardliners an easy win. Allowing them to use their undemocratic election to accumulate greater leverage would undermine the administrations efforts to promote more moderate interlocutors in Iran. Finally, the better deal Iran wants may not be possible. Tehran would like to see Biden guarantee that a future U.S. president cannot reimpose sanctions. But the nature of American democracy means that this isnt a promise that Biden can make.

Despite all of the obstacles, reviving the nuclear deal should theoretically be easy. Iran wants sanctions relief, and the United States wants constraints on Irans nuclear program. While both the United States and Iran have accumulated bargaining chips, further escalation is possible, and it will be up to the new Iranian government to decide how to move forward and manage its own domestic politics. There is room for compromise on the timing and sequencing of a return to compliance with the nuclear deal. But hard decisions should be made now before the situation needlessly spirals out of hand.

Samuel M. Hickey is a research analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. His areas of focus include the geopolitics of nuclear power developments in the Middle East, nuclear security, missile defense, and non-proliferation.

Manuel Reinert is a Ph.D. candidate at American University, consultant with the World Bank, and adjunct faculty at Georgetown University.

Image: Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations (Vienna)

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