Then-US Secretary of State John Kerry, (right) Victoria Nuland, Moscow, December 2015 (Source: AP)
According to Kremlin-connected analyst Fedor Lukyanov, the Joseph Biden administration had to work hard with Moscow to make Under Secretary Victoria Nulands visit possible. The United States seeks a mutually accepted modus vivendi with Russia regarding the Donbas problem; and Bidens team is prepared to exert its influence on Ukraine to cooperate toward that goal. Moscow would therefore expect Washington to adjust Ukraines profile downward in the US policy (Bfm.ru, October 10; Global Affairs, October 11).
Nulands revisiting of the 2015 Minsk agreement (see Part One) comes as a surprise. One month ago, President Biden and the other officials receiving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington never mentioned the Minsk agreements or a special status for Donbas. The White House thereby deferred to the Ukrainian delegation, and it seemed that those controversial words had been dropped for good (see EDM, September 7, 9).
For all its satisfaction with the talks on Ukraine, Moscow apparently stalled on proposals that Nuland brought up unrelated to Ukraine (cyber-hacking, embassy personnel parity, visa reciprocity). Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned that a US military presence in Central Asia [to monitor Taliban-ruled Afghanistan] is unacceptable in any form and that Russia will be watching, lest Australia violate the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation after it joins the Australian-British-US (AUKUS) fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (TASS, October 13).
No information, official or unofficial, has surfaced in Kyiv regarding Nulands Moscow visit on the Biden administrations behalf. Whether the visit, directly affecting Ukraine, was discussed with the Ukrainian authorities is not known either. The Ukrainian Presidential Office has only reported one telephone call with Nuland: on October 7, Presidential Office Chief Andriy Yermak and Nuland discussed the security situation around Ukraine, the [deadlocked] Normandy negotiations (Russia, Germany, France, Ukraine), and the importance of strengthening the role of the United States in the processes of peaceful resolution of the conflict (Ukrinform, October 7).
Nuland has re-entered a scene that was hers in 20152016 as Assistant Secretary of State in the Barack Obama administration. She visited Kyiv fairly regularly during that period, several times with thenSecretary of State John Kerry and several times on her own. Nuland tried hard to persuade then-president Petro Poroshenko and the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) to start fulfilling the 2015 Minsk agreements political clauses, but she did not progress too far in that effort. From May 2015 until almost the end of the Obama administration in the fall of 2016 Nuland operated the US side of a bilateral channel of negotiation with Vladislav Surkov (Kozaks predecessor on Ukrainian affairs in Russias presidential administration). Nuland and Surkov held several meetings, of which three became known, and did not achieve results either. No US negotiator is involved at present, whether in an existing group format or as a special envoy. Kyiv has been pleading for the United States to join the Normandy format or for a U.S. negotiator to mediate between Ukraine and Russia or, alternatively, interact bilaterally with a Russian counterpart.
Some speculation exists in Ukraine that the United States may before long decide to enter the negotiations on the Donbas conflict, not in the Normandy format but on a bilateral basis with Russia. In this view, the US and Russia could stabilize the situation in short order, ensure de-escalation and stabilization and, on that basis, introduce a political solution. In that case, the sidelining of the Donbas problem could take the legal-political form of a special status as per the Minsk agreement. Such a scenario would, however, only conserve a precarious, insecure situation.
It is a common observation that the Biden administration views its relations with Russia in part through the prism of the US-China contest. To focus attention and resources on that contest, the administration calls for stable and predictable relations with Russia. Concurrently, it seeks Russias cooperation on problems that affect the US and various allies considerably more than they affect Russiae.g., Iranian and North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation or turmoil in parts of the Middle East.
Major challenges and threats, however, originate for the most part in Russia itself: disinformation operations, extortionist cyber-hacking, instrumentalized energy dependencies, dangerous and threatening military exercises, ongoing warfare in Ukraine, seizures of territory from neighboring countries, military operations in the Middle East and Africa, militarization of the Arctic, Russias hand in Venezuelas collapse. Nevertheless, the Biden administration apparently hopes for Russia to cooperate with US priorities that Russia does not necessarily or fully sharee.g., a new strategic arms treaty and ambitious climate goals.
The official phrase that We seek stable, predictable relations with Russia, launched at the time of Joseph Biden and Vladimir Putins June 2021 summit in Geneva, and heavily used as a talking point by state officials since then, is unfit for purpose. This phrase asks Russia, in effect, to voluntarily give up its strategic and tactical competitive advantages. Asking Russia to give up these amounts almost to supplication. Practically, it conveys a plea that one cannot cope with Russias operational tempo. Russia looks poised to go on thriving on instability and unpredictability.
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The Kremlin Is Pleased After Kozak-Nuland Talks on Ukraine (Part Two) - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation