Mediaboss Marketing

Three months after Russias large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Russians have failed to achieve their objectives. U.S. officials now expect a war of attrition, with neither side capable of a decisive military breakthrough. How the war will conclude remains unclear.

On February 24, Russian forces invaded Ukraine from the north, including from Belarus, from the south out of Crimea, and from the east. The multiple axes of attack suggested that the Russian military aimed to quickly capture the capital of Kyiv, depose the democratically-elected government, and occupy perhaps as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine.

The Russians failed. Their forces reached the outskirts of Kyiv but retreated at the end of March. The Russian armys thrust toward Odesa bogged down around Mykolaiv after three weeks. In May, Russian forces attacking Kharkiv, Ukraines second largest city and located just 25 miles from the Russian border, were pushed back, having entered only the citys outskirts.

The Russian military finally secured control over Mariupol in mid-May, when the last Ukrainian forces surrendered after a valiant resistance. Weeks of indiscriminate Russian shelling and bombing have left Mariupol, a predominately Russian-speaking city where almost half of population was ethnic Russian, absolutely devastated.

Following their retreat from Kyiv and northern Ukraine, Russian forces have concentrated on the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. After six weeks, they have made some progress but at considerable cost against determined Ukrainian defenses.

Military analysts ponder whether the Russian army will soon become a spent force exhausted by heavy casualties, high equipment losses, poor morale, and weak logistics, and incapable of mounting another major offensive operation. The Kremlins decision not to declare a full mobilization makes it difficult for the Russian military to replace combat losses. U.S. officials see Russian President Vladimir Putin stubbornly digging in, discern no negotiating path in the near term, and expect a war of attrition, with the sides slugging it out but neither able to score a convincing victory.

Ukraine appears to have already won in one sense: virtually no one believes the Russian military capable of taking Kyiv and occupying one-half to two-thirds of the country. Ukrainians are returning to the capital, and life there has begun to take on an air of normalcy. However the war concludes, an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state will remain on the map of Europe.

Beyond that, things become more difficult to predict. The Kremlin has now focused on taking full control of the Donbas, a substantially downsized goal from its original invasion aims. Moscow may have to further reduce its Donbas objective to full control of Luhansk oblast but not all of Donetsk oblast. Russian forces in southern Ukraine have begun preparing defensive positions.

Ukrainian forces, bolstered by a growing flow of weapons from the West, have carried out successful counterattacks as well as conducting a stout mobile defense. However, transition from defense to a full-scale counteroffensive aimed at driving the Russians out of the territory they have occupied since February 24 would pose a tough challenge. In that case, some of the advantages that favor the defense would accrue to the Russian military.

A military stalemate that could perhaps drag on for many months more thus appears the most likely scenario.

A negotiated settlement offers one path to end a war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared ready for compromise on key questions in March, for example, offering to set aside Kyivs ambitions of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and accept neutrality. But his Russian counterpart did not take up the possibility to secure a neutral Ukraine and perhaps other gains.

In retrospect, that may turn out to be a missed opportunity for Moscow. Ukrainian attitudes toward negotiation have hardened since March. That reflects growing confidence in the abilities of the Ukrainian military and outrage at Russian war crimes, such as the wanton destruction of Mariupol, and atrocities in places such as Bucha and Borodianka. Public anger almost certainly limits the freedom of maneuver that Zelenskyy might have in considering possible concessions.

While Kyiv in March offered a proposal that suggested a readiness to compromise on Crimea, illegally seized and annexed by Russia in March 2014, Ukrainian officials now insist on full restoration of Ukraines borders as of 1991. The West should support that position and reject the Kremlins attempt to redraw international borders by force of arms.

Whether Kyiv would sustain that position if the war drags on is unknown. Barring a total collapse of the Russian military (not to be excluded, but unlikely), it is difficult to see how Ukraine can muster the necessary leverage to regain Crimea. A senior Ukrainian official privately said in September 2014 that perhaps Kyiv should let the then-occupied part of Donbas go they dont think like we do but he quickly added that no serious Ukrainian official could say that publicly and expect to survive. In a recent private discussion, a Ukrainian politician did not argue for giving up Crimea and Donbas but noted that regaining those territories would bring a liability: the return of three or four million pro-Russian voters, which would prove disruptive for Ukraines politics.

How Ukraine resolves this dilemma is a question for the Ukrainian government to decide. Zelenskyy has left the door open for diplomacy. If Moscow changes its approach and moves to a serious negotiation, Zelenskyy will have to weigh the balance of his desire to end the killing of Ukrainians, the imperative of protecting Kyivs positions of principle vs. the possible need for compromise, and the potential political blowback if Ukrainians believe a compromise concedes too much to Russia.

Only Zelenskyy and his government can weigh the trade-offs and make that delicate decision. The West should follow Kyivs lead in any negotiation, not pressing Ukraine to accept a settlement it does not want and not objecting to a settlement that Kyiv favors and believes meets Ukraines interests. Western countries will have to decide what to do about sanctions on Russia; some may wish to maintain sanctions even after a settlement, though the West should be sensitive to sanctions-easing if Kyiv says that is necessary to secure an otherwise acceptable deal.

Of course, this is an academic discussion as long as the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious negotiation.

Ukraine did nothing to provoke or justify this war of choice, a choice made by Putin. It is a tragedy for the country, one that has resulted in the death of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians and enormous material damage to infrastructure, homes and apartments, and commercial and industrial facilities. (This could also become a tragedy for countries around the world that depend on Ukrainian food exports that are now blockaded.)

The war has also proven a disaster for Russia: tens of thousands of soldiers killed and wounded, major equipment losses, international isolation, sanctions that are inflicting real economic pain, and a galvanized, reinvigorated, rearming NATO that will soon welcome Finland and Sweden into its ranks. Moreover, NATO could well decide to make the presence of alliance forces on its eastern flank (e.g., in the Baltic states and Poland) permanent rather than rotating. Putins war will not succeed in bringing Ukraine closer to Moscows orbit; it is instead imbuing a hatred towards Russia in Ukraine that will take decades to overcome.

The war has a clear victim and a clear aggressor. It is in the Wests interest that the Kremlin fail in its attempt to subjugate Ukraine and deny Ukrainians the right to determine their own course. That means continuing to provide the Ukrainians the means to defend their country and drive back the invading Russian army. That also means ratcheting up sanctions to accelerate the havoc coming to the Russian economy due to Putins disastrous decisions.

In the end, the desired outcome to this war would see the Ukrainians forcing a Russian withdrawal or, at a minimum, getting Moscow to agree to a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv. Ensuring that Russias aggression fails and that Ukraine achieves one of these outcomes should be primary goals for the West.

More:
The Russia-Ukraine war at three months - Brookings Institution

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images hide caption

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law on Monday that lays out a process for his country to seize and sell the assets of people who support Russia's invasion. Zelenskyy says the law will bolster Ukraine's war chest, three months after Russia sparked a bloody conflict with its neighbor.

The law is primarily aimed at Russian-owned assets and property in Ukraine, particularly Russian citizens who have already had their assets blocked by Ukraine's government. Last week, a Ukrainian court seized hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of assets owned by Russian billionaire Mikhail Fridman an oligarch who was born in Ukraine.

The new law lists a number of offenses, such as giving money to Russia's government or glorifying those who are fighting against Ukraine. It also covers people who are found to have helped set up an occupation government in Russian-controlled portions of Ukraine, or those who help organize elections or referendums in occupied territories.

The law contains several elements that aim to ensure a rapid resolution of cases, including a stipulation that a person's failure to appear or be represented at court cannot slow the court's consideration of the claim against them. It also lays out plans for a speedy appeals process, with each party given five days to ask for an appeal. An appeals panel would then have five days to take up the matter.

The new sanction will be in effect for as long as Ukraine operates under martial law, as it has since the invasion began on Feb. 24. On Sunday, the Rada approved extending martial law in Ukraine through late August.

More here:
Ukraine's new law will let it fund the war effort by selling Russian assets - NPR

The International Space Station depends on a mix of U.S. and Russian parts. "I hope we can hold it together as long as we can," says former NASA astronaut Scott Kelly. NASA hide caption

The International Space Station depends on a mix of U.S. and Russian parts. "I hope we can hold it together as long as we can," says former NASA astronaut Scott Kelly.

On the ground, tensions between the U.S. and Russia are running high.

Russian President Vladimir Putin falsely claims the U.S. is working with Nazis in Ukraine, while President Biden calls Putin a "war criminal."

Aboard the jointly controlled International Space Station (ISS), however, the tone is very different: American astronauts live side-by-side with Russian cosmonauts; they regularly check in with mission control centers in both countries; and supplies arrive aboard Russian and U.S. spacecraft alike.

NASA administrator Bill Nelson expects all that to continue for the foreseeable future: "I see nothing that has interrupted that professional relationship," Nelson said at a Senate hearing earlier this month. "No matter how awful Putin is conducting a war with such disastrous results in Ukraine."

But as the decades-old station nears the end of its physical lifespan, some experts worry that the long-standing relationship may come to an end.

"I hope we can hold it together as long as we can," says Scott Kelly, a former astronaut who lived alongside Russian cosmonauts for nearly a year.

But he adds, NASA should prepare for the possibility that Russia might soon end its participation: "I think what they've shown us is they're capable of anything," he says.

For 23 years, the space station has floated above the politics of planet earth as a symbol of unity between several nations around the globe.

It launched largely as a U.S.-Russian project in 1998, when it seemed possible the two foes could make a new start. The station was designed so that each side literally needed the other to survive: The U.S. provides power, while Russia keeps the station at the correct altitude and orientation.

At the time "it was in the U.S. national interest to engage with Russia," says Mariel Borowitz, an associate professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The joint program kept Russian rocket scientists employed during a moment when Russia faced political and economic instability, she says.

Kelly notes that by depending solely on Russia systems for certain functions, NASA was able to save money.

In 2011, the interdependency grew even stronger. NASA retired the space shuttle, which regularly carried astronauts and supplies to the station. Without the shuttle, the space agency relied on Russia's space program to get its astronauts to the station. Kelly says the Russian program excelled at launching humans into orbit. "They can reliably put three people into space and bring them home," he says. "That's what they do very, very well."

For nearly a decade, the U.S. relied on Russia's Soyuz rockets to get its astronauts to the space station. NASA/Bill Ingalls/(NASA/Bill Ingalls) hide caption

For nearly a decade, the U.S. relied on Russia's Soyuz rockets to get its astronauts to the space station.

The U.S. may have needed a ride, but they also had plenty of what Russia's space agency required money.

NASA paid billions over the years for its seats aboard the Soyuz rocket, helping keep the venerable Russian space program financially afloat.

The symbiotic relationship has endured even as things on the Earth have deteriorated: Wars, assassination attempts and allegations of political meddling have not been enough to send the space station off course. But a mix of geopolitical and technical factors are now bringing rapid change to the collaboration.

In 2020, SpaceX officially began transporting NASA astronauts to the station, ending America's reliance on Russian rockets.

The end of that vital tie was big at the time, but it pales in comparison to Russia's decision to invade Ukraine. The war has strained almost every aspect of U.S. and Russian relations, and it has already ruptured another long-standing Russian collaboration with the European Space Agency, or ESA.

"There was ongoing cooperation between Europe and Russia on different things, and it's being severed," says Tomas Hrozensky, a research fellow at the European Space Policy Institute in Vienna, Austria. ESA has kicked Russia out of its lunar program, and a long-awaited European mission to Mars is suspended, because it was set to go to space later this year aboard a Russian rocket.

"As a consequence of the war in Ukraine, the member states of ESA have put significant sanctions on Russia," ESA's director general, Josef Aschbacher, said at a recent NASA press conference. The decision to suspend the rover mission "is painful" he conceded.

Russia's interest in Western collaboration has also cooled as the war has heated up.

In response to European sanctions, the country suspended Soyuz launches from ESA's spaceport in French Guiana. And late last month, the head of Russia's space agency, a prickly politician named Dmitry Rogozin, hinted that Russia may soon announce it will pull out of the space station.

"The decision has already been made," Rogozin said during an interview on Russian state television. "We aren't obligated to talk about it publicly. I can only say one thing: that in accordance with our obligations we will notify our partners a year in advance about the end of our work on the ISS."

NASA would like to keep the station running until 2030, but the Russian components are among the oldest parts and are only certified to operate until 2024, says Anatoly Zak, publisher of Russianspaceweb.com, a site that has long tracked the Russian space program. "Beyond that [date], Russia will need to make some additional investments and some political commitments," he says.

Both Zak and Borowitz say they're not sure how seriously to take Rogozin's threats of withdrawal. He has made similar statements in the past, Borowitz notes, but without the space station, or some kind of replacement, "they're going to be in a situation where their cosmonauts don't have a clear mission."

"It would be politically very costly for Russia not to have human spaceflight," Zak says. The space program "has a huge role in Russian propaganda and Russian politics."

Cosmonauts unfurled a Soviet-era victory banner on a recent space walk. The banner, which is used to mark "Victory Day" in Russia, has also been used frequently by Russian forces in Ukraine. Screenshot by NPR/Roscosmos Youtube hide caption

Cosmonauts unfurled a Soviet-era victory banner on a recent space walk. The banner, which is used to mark "Victory Day" in Russia, has also been used frequently by Russian forces in Ukraine.

Indeed the station has played a part in Russia's propaganda efforts around its latest war.

Soviet-era memorabilia has begun to appear in the Russian part of the station, Zak notes. And on a space walk in April, two cosmonauts unfurled a Soviet victory banner to celebrate Russia's "Victory Day" that marks the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. The banner has more recently been flown by Russian forces throughout Ukraine.

NASA astronaut Scott Kelly says the U.S. should start thinking about how to keep the station operating without the Russians. "It would be really really hard, but I think NASA is great at doing really, really hard things," he says.

Kelly, an outspoken opponent of Russia's actions in Ukraine, says he supports continuing to work together in space, for the time being.

But as the war grinds on and the allegations of atrocities grow, he says his views may change: "At some point, things like murdering innocent people, rape, genocide transcend the importance of space cooperation."

See the rest here:
Ukraine war strains space station ties between Russia and US - NPR

Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko says OPEC is on the wrong side of history in choosing to stick with Russia.

Future Publishing | Future Publishing | Getty Images

The chief executive of Ukrainian state energy giant Naftogaz says oil producer group OPEC is on the wrong side of history in choosing to stick with Russia to stabilize energy markets.

Speaking to CNBC's Hadley Gamble at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Monday, Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko warned the Middle East-dominated group of exporting countries to recognize the Kremlin's onslaught in Ukraine as a challenge to their wealth.

When asked whether OPEC was in danger of being out of sync with the international community over Russia's widely condemned invasion, Vitrenko replied: "Yes, it seems like they are on the wrong side of history."

"They have a vested interest in the economic development of the world, in the sustainability of the world and Putin is challenging this sustainability. He is challenging their wealth. Maybe they don't understand it at the moment but if we live in the world that Putin wants us to live in, there will be no wealth for the Gulf countries," he continued.

"Again, everything they have been building for years will just disappear. They have to be fully aware of it," Vitrenko said.

A spokesperson for OPEC was not immediately available to comment.

Governments around the world have imposed a barrage of unprecedented punitive sanctions and severed economic ties with Russia in response to President Vladimir Putin's war with Ukraine. However, OPEC does not appear willing to take similar action against Moscow.

Russia is a key partner in the wider OPEC+ energy alliance and is itself a major exporter of oil.

OPEC kingpin Saudi Arabia has previously said the group would keep politics out of its output decisions.

Speaking to CNBC in late March, Saudi Arabia's Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz said that OPEC's very existence was dependent on the separation of its mission to stabilize oil prices from other geopolitical factors.

CNBC's Elliot Smith contributed to this report.

Follow CNBC International onTwitterandFacebook.

Read more here:
OPEC is on the wrong side of history in sticking with Russia, Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO says - CNBC

YouTube has taken down more than 70,000 videos and 9,000 channels related to the war in Ukraine for violating content guidelines, including removal of videos that referred to the invasion as a liberation mission.

The platform is hugely popular in Russia, where, unlike some of its US peers, it has not been shut down despite hosting content from opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny. YouTube has also been able to operate in Russia despite cracking down on pro-Kremlin content that has broken guidelines including its major violent events policy, which prohibits denying or trivialising the invasion.

Since the conflict began in February, YouTube has taken down channels including that of the pro-Kremlin journalist Vladimir Solovyov. Channels associated with Russias Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs have also been temporarily suspended from uploading videos in recent months for describing the war as a liberation mission.

YouTubes chief product officer, Neal Mohan, said: We have a major violent events policy and that applies to things like denial of major violent events: everything from the Holocaust to Sandy Hook. And of course, whats happening in Ukraine is a major violent event. And so weve used that policy to take unprecedented action.

In an interview with the Guardian, Mohan added that YouTubes news content on the conflict had received more than 40m views in Ukraine alone.

The first and probably most paramount responsibility is making sure that people who are looking for information about this event can get accurate, high-quality, credible information on YouTube, he said. The consumption of authoritative channels on our platform has grown significantly, of course in Ukraine, but also in countries surrounding Ukraine, Poland, and also within Russia itself.

YouTube did not provide a breakdown of the taken-down content and channels but Mohan said much of it represented Kremlin narratives about the invasion. I dont have the specific numbers, but you can imagine a lot of it being the narratives that are coming from Russian government, or Russian actors on behalf of the Russian government, he said.

Sign up to First Edition, our free daily newsletter every weekday morning at 7am BST

YouTube has an estimated 90 million users in Russia, although it no longer allows advertising on the platform in the country. The decision by YouTubes parent company, Google, has drawn protests from Navalny, who said well-targeted ads helped counteract Kremlin propaganda.

YouTube remains the largest video-sharing site up and running in Russia itself, said Mohan. So YouTube is a place where Russian citizens can get uncensored information about the war, including from many of the same authoritative channels that we all have access to outside of the country. We remain an important platform for Russian citizens themselves as this crisis continues to evolve.

Last week, the Russian minister for digital development, Maksut Shadaev, said the country would not block YouTube, despite disputes over content that have resulted in the platform being fined in court for not removing banned videos.

Shadaev indicated that blocking Russias most popular social media platform would affect users. We are not planning to close YouTube, the minister said. Above all, when we restrict something, we should clearly understand that our users wont suffer.

YouTube has also placed a worldwide ban on channels associated with Russian state media, including Russia Today and Sputnik. Facebook and Instagram are banned in Russia and access to Twitter has been restricted, in response to the platforms own bans on Russian state-owned media.

See the original post:
YouTube removes more than 9,000 channels relating to Ukraine war - The Guardian