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Picking The Right SEM Operation: Legits Vs. Hacks – Search Engine Journal

Hello, my fellow search industry friends.

I hope this article can help distract you for a few minutes and give you some respite while reminding you that not all elements of your search engine marketing (SEM) accounts are the same and thus need different measurements.

For those that watch, follow, and/or troll my Twitter account, youve seen me on #ppcchat bashing things like Pmax, Auto-Apply Recommendations, and Google Analytics 4 (GA4).

(Thats in addition to my usual rants about the New York Jets and social commentary on the Real Housewives franchises.)

But after 17+ years in the SEM industry, I can no longer be silent about a topic that has been bugging me for a long time: being able to identify reputable SEM marketers vs. the dime-a-dozen hacks that also exist.

Full disclosure: I am not a guru (I truly hate that term), nor am I the best thing since sliced bread in the SEM industry.

But Ive been around long enough to identify what it takes to build a great SEM team while also identifying those who likely lack the skills and might cause you more pain than they will help you.

But Jon, why should I listen to you?

Well, what makes me qualified to tell you what you should be looking for in an SEM team (or even just an individual) is subjective.

I feel somewhat qualified to provide insight, having worked in search marketing for 65% of the industrys existence (as an independent consultant and at some of the biggest agencies in the world). Ive presented at industry conferences, written articles (like the one youre reading now), and even have some awards (even a trophy, see the 9-year-old one below).

When I first entered the industry as an intern (before I was hired full-time in 2005), the number of agencies across the U.S. doing this type of work (and publicizing it) was fewer than 50.

In 2022, in the small Connecticut city where I live, there are at least eight agencies, multiple in-house operations, and more than a dozen freelancers/consultants.

So, the demand has risen, as have the skillsets. And with it, so has the number of operations/folks in the industry doing the bare minimum (or even less).

Depending on your situation, there are several variables here. Typically, you go one of three routes (there are other types as well, but much rarer), with overlap and differences between them.

Once you identify which of the three you are hiring for, you must decide what level of experience you need (in years, not trial by fire experience, though that should also be taken into account).

Typically fresh out of school/college, no experience within the industry.

Important: If youre looking for a freelancer or consultant, never hire someone at this level.

Only tap into these if youre building an in-house team or building up your agency team.

Some experience, usually under two years of hands-on work. This is likely their second or third gig since getting into the industry.

Disclaimer: I dont recommend folks hiring freelancers with such little experience. That said, there are occasionally some needles in the haystack, but they are rare.

Once again, I only recommend hiring this level if youre building an in-house team or building up your agency team.

This usually represents a wide range of experience anywhere from 2-10 years with the majority of it being hands-on.

Note: These are often good hires regardless of what operation you are in, and typically, they have the most hands-on experience at this point in their career.

This label often gets applied to individuals in the space for 8+ years. Most of their career to this point is hands-on, but they often give great strategy recommendations as well.

Note: A great hire for any operation, but truly prime for freelancers/consultants.

Truly the saltiest bunch in the space. Id say this typically starts at 12+ years in the industry, and these folks have seen some things.

Note: Great hire for any operation. Likely to be the most expensive freelancers/consultants, but everyone should be able to have some interaction with them.

Once again, this has several variables to it. But here are the things you should know (not applicable for freelancers/consultants):

Having a college degree is nice but not necessary in this day and age.

If you do require a degree, aim for those with one of the following: Marketing, Management, Digital Advertising, Finance, Economics, Data Science, or Math.

Anyone who wants to work with or for you must, at a bare minimum, know how to do a VLookup, Pivot Table, =SUM, =LEN, and Concatenate. Conditional formatting is a plus.

If youre an agency or in-house, and they cant do these, then they likely arent for you.

For anyone looking to build up their skills, I recommend looking into Maven Analytics: great analytics and Excel education operation run by an Excel wizard named Chris Dutton.

This sounds unrelated and weird, but if you cant correctly budget a checkbook, then you cant properly pace an ad budget.

You may only hire them for SEM, but they should be able to think about how it impacts and is impacted by other media and analytics and how that insight can be helpful to one another.

Someone who shows they are adept at note-taking and/or project management.

Having someone confident is great, but having someone with an ego will create problems for you.

They are free to obtain, and someone showing they have at least the search certificate from Google and Bing (I still refuse to call it Microsoft) is great.

It already helps reduce liability for you, as it shows theyve taken the basic training at the very least.

Paid social and self-serve programmatic are very similar to SEM; if someone knows these, they often make good skillset hires.

Part of it really depends on your business size and type, but here is some solid guidance: Make sure the team/individuals working on your business have up-to-date certifications in search at least (analytics, video, display, and Facebook are also great).

If an agency pushes that they are certified beyond just a note on their website, then buyer beware: these are a you should at the very least have this type of thing, not a selling point.

Freelancers and consultants should have them, but you can be more lenient if they tout them vs. an agency.

Having certifications does not make you the best operation out there, but if an agency or freelancer doesnt have them, it tells you that they have failed to do the bare minimum and their knowledge may be questioned.

If an agency (and occasionally a freelancer) is a Bing Elite or Select Partner and/or a Google Premier Partner (rare to have a Bing one without a Google one), it is a plus.

These operations will have more direct access to dedicated search engine reps and other helpful perks like testing betas.

Single-person consultants and freelancers usually do not qualify for these. It isnt a knock against them, but it is a plus if they do have one.

Consider their onboarding approach. This should be a 30/60/90-day game plan and delivered to you when they pitch you. If they dont have one, then accountability quickly goes out the window,

Check references.

It may seem antiquated, but if youre going to pay a lot of money to an operation to manage your advertising funds, you want to ensure they have current or prior satisfied customers.

Some agencies over the years were just hack operations; those who hired them never checked references and now see no return for their payment.

It should go without saying, but people fall for it: Avoid operations or individuals who promise the world at a low price without logic or justification, or if it sounds too good to be true.

Over the years, more than a few shops have done that, from overpromising and underdelivering to lying and misrepresenting themselves. More than a few have been caught, sued, and/or faced federal charges.

Avoid any operation that is not open about or willing to share its start-up and ongoing QA process.

Things happen in this industry; a reactive and ongoing proactive QA process will save headaches and money. If a shop is not open to sharing theirs, I would steer clear.

This is our SEM QA doc. If you want to see the full one, email/tweet me, and Ill gladly share.

For in-house operations, it ultimately comes down to the level of an individual you want.

For entry-level, the requirements are low. Just make sure they can:

If youre hiring for a level above that, youll want to look for:

The red flags of major avoidance are growing every day.

But where to find them and/or how to identify them gets trickier and will take some of your own homework. Some of these are subjective, but youll get the point:

There are many more, but these are the most common issues I run into within the space.

There are various billing methods today; the three most common are commission, hourly/FTE, and retainer.

Now that Ive legitimately scared you, remember that while there are some complete hacks within this industry, there are also many amazing people.

It is all about researching who you hire rather than blindly saying yes to a price.

And please, make sure they know Excel.

More resources:

Featured Image: fizkes/Shutterstock

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Picking The Right SEM Operation: Legits Vs. Hacks - Search Engine Journal

Secretary Blinken’s Call with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission…

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The following is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell today to reaffirm the importance of a successful Seventh Replenishment Conference for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. President Biden will host the Replenishment Conference September 19, 2022, during the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The United States is committed to helping the Global Fund reach its goal in order to get the world back on track toward ending HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and to building resilient and sustainable systems for health. President Biden has signaled that the United States will make a contribution of $2 billion and an intended pledge of $6 billion for the Seventh Replenishment period, demonstrating the United States readiness to match $1 for every $2 contributed by other donors.

Secretary Blinken and High Representative Borrell also discussed their shared commitment to support the Afghan people through Afghanistans ongoing economic and humanitarian crises as well as the importance of working with the broader international community, to support the education of Afghan girls.

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Secretary Blinken's Call with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission...

The European Union Opens Tech Embassy in Silicon Valley Ahead of New Technology Regulations – JD Supra

On September 1, 2022, the European Union will officially open a new liaison office in Californias Silicon Valley. The new office coined the tech embassy follows the European Councils adoption of the Conclusions of EU Digital Diplomacy, which is a broad framework aimed to enhance the EUs regulatory capacity around the world. The office is aimed to liaise with Silicon Valley tech companies affected by the EUs two new technology regulations: the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA).

The DMA and DSA passed by the European Commission in March and April 2022 aim to create a safer digital space for internet users, and a more competitive digital marketplace for tech companies. Both pieces of legislation are set to go into effect this Fall, and are expected to have global implications on tech giants like Google, Apple, Meta, and Amazon.

Specifically, the DMA aims to restrict anti-competitive practices by large tech companies through new prohibitions and requirements for search engines, social networks, mobile apps, and online marketplaces. The DMA imposes, most notably, platform interoperability and data-portability requirements. For example, messaging apps from Apple, Google, and Meta platforms will be required to make end-to-end text messaging interoperable on request by competing services. The DMA also prohibits the use of non-public personal data for targeted advertising without user consent, and bars online marketplaces like Amazon from self-preferencing their own products and services over those of their competitors.

The DSA imposes new regulations on tech companies aimed to protect internet users. The DSA prohibits, among other things, advertising that targets children, and advertising that leverages sensitive personal data like race, religion, or sexual orientation. The DSA also requires online platforms to cooperate in the identification and removal of hate speech and illegal content. In addition, the act imposes heightened obligations for very large online platforms and search engines, defined to include those with more than 45 million active users in Europe. Under the DSA, the very large platforms and search engines must submit to independent audits, and facilitate access to their data and algorithms to authorities and vetted researchers. Both the DMA and DSA carry big fines for non-compliance up to 10% of worldwide sales for violating the DMA (20% for repeat offenders), and up to 6% for violating the DSA.

The DMA and DSA will transform the regulation of digital markets in the EU, and carry significant compliance risks in light of their global reach, broad scope, and the severe penalties for violations. The new legislation also raises significant data privacy and security concerns due to, most notably, the DMAs platform interoperability and data portability requirements.

Footnotes:

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The European Union Opens Tech Embassy in Silicon Valley Ahead of New Technology Regulations - JD Supra

European right renews its assault on the Polisario Front – Atalayar

The relationship between the European Union and the Polisario Front is once again raising suspicions in the European Parliament. French MEP Nicola Bay, the right-hand man in Brussels of controversial far-right MEP Eric Zemmour and a former senior member of Le Pen's party, once again questioned the presence of Polisario representatives at the African Union-EU summit in Brussels in February 2022.

Bay presented on 25 August three questions addressed to the Vice-President of the European Commission and responsible for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, about a possible reconfiguration of the treatment of the Polisario by the European executive. Bay's questions coincide with the slip of the head of European diplomacy, who last week claimed that the European Union and Spain would support a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. A slip-up that earned him complaints from Rabat and even the cancellation of a meeting with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita.

The question arises as to whether the questions registered by the French right-winger in the European Parliament are an attempt to pull the strings in Europe to get the Polisario Front to be considered a terrorist organisation. The first question registered by Bay, "Why did the VP/HR and EEAS agree to the Polisario Front attending the next AU-EU summit?", was already answered by Borrell when Tom Zdechovsk of the European People's Party raised the same question on 7 February 2022, a few days before the AU-EU summit was due to take place. "According to the agreed practice, the Summit was co-organised by the European Union and the African Union, with each organisation responsible for inviting its own members," Borrell replied in writing at the time. The self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has had a seat in the AU since 1982.

Nicolas Bay adds two more questions, which raise the question of the look and tone with which the EU should treat Algeria's proxy group. "Will they hold the Polisario officials in question to account for the criminal acts of which they are accused?" and "Will they seriously examine the activities of the Polisario Front and adopt a firm diplomatic stance towards the group?", Bay wrote in writing on Thursday. Bay cites several reports accusing the separatist organisation of embezzling and diverting EU funding to the Tindouf camps, as well as re-emphasising the incentive for armed Islamist groups in the Sahel that Tindouf provides. The dangerous relationship between Sahel terrorists and the Polisario Front has already been accused by a report by the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a Brussels-based think tank headed by Claudo Moniquet (formerly of the French DGSE) in 2010. This is not the first time such doubts have arisen in the European Parliament, and for some voices among the Moroccan Hashemite people they could be a game changer for European dynamics.

"European elites, including the French parliamentarian Nicolas Bay, take a position on the reality of the separatist front as a terrorist organisation practising oppression against the inhabitants of the Moroccan Sahara. The Polisario leadership has been implicated in serious crimes. Rapes, torture, kidnappings and extrajudicial executions", Mohamed Salem Abdelfatah, president of the Saharawi Observatory for Media and Human Rights, told the Arabic daily Al-arab.

According to Abdelfatah, there is a growing trend in Brussels to support the strategic partnership with Morocco and condemn the Polisario Front. This trend is a perceptible reality through the European Commission's attempts to establish more and more strategic pacts and partnerships with Morocco in economic, security and illegal immigration regulation matters.

The signature condemnation of the Polisario Front, although part of the agenda of the largest parliamentary groups of the European right, has not yet caught on with the executive and its external action, which, as it responded to Joo Ferreira MEP (GUE/NGL) in 2019, considers that 'the Polisario Front, as well as other Saharawi civil society organisations, are some of the interlocutors that the EU turns to when it comes to discussing issues related to Western Sahara'.

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European right renews its assault on the Polisario Front - Atalayar

European Union Demand Reduction Needs to Cope with Russian Gas Cuts – TankTerminals.com

August 31, 2022 [ BRUEGEL ] Without Russian gas, the European Union would have to reduce demand by approximately 15%, with big differences between different parts of Europe

The share of the European Unions gas supply provided by Russia dropped from over 40% in 2021 to just 20% in June 2022. The gap of over 300 terawatt hours in the first six months of 2022 compared to 2021 has so far been filled mostly by 240 TWh of additional imports of liquified natural gas (LNG). Gazprom has broken several long-term supply contracts with its EU commercial partners, and the risk is high that Russia will cut all supplies to the EU ahead of the winter, if it deems this strategically beneficial.

Replacement of Russian gas by LNG has largely reached its limit. Lower imports from Russia can now only be met by reducing EU gas demand. Immediate deployment of a coordinated EU approach offers the best option to reduce substantially the overall gas demand-reduction cost. For the EU as a whole, a total demand reduction over the next 10 months of about 15% compared to average demand in 2019-2021 would be required to compensate for a complete stopping of Russian pipeline imports. For EU countries (arranged into regional groupings), we calculate the required reduction as ranging from zero to -54%.

The EU internal gas market is not perfectly connected, implying that certain country groups will require much steeper demand cuts. Winter temperatures are the key variable driving uncertainty: a long, cold winter would make steeper cuts necessary. We address this by assuming an average winter, and that that storage should not fall below 20% before 1 May 2023.

Countries are relatively well connected and will face similar demand disruptions. For each group we use historic (2019-2021) demand and own production, as well as current storage levels, to assess the development of storage filling throughout the winter. Each groups gas imports and exports are based on the observed gas flows in in the first half of 2022. To assess the impact of a stop to Russian supplies, we calculated the implied share of Russian gas in each groups import mix by aggregating the Russian shares in incoming flows (see here for the methodology). A complete stopping of Russian flows would reduce each intra-EU flow by each country groups calculated dependence on Russian gas.

A limitation is that we assume markets will operate in the same manner as they did in the first half of the year. While it is likely that markets will adjust, many areas of the grid are already running at full capacity and todays flows do offer a good indication. Gas demand and imports are also highly seasonal, but as the first half of the year contains a mix of winter and warmer months, seasonal interference should be reasonably compensated for. We do not include explicitly in our analysis the infrastructure planned to be built in the coming six months, but discuss consequences below.

A closer look at the groups

Portugal, Spain and France are effectively isolated from the wider European market because of limited connections between Spain and France, and France and the north and east. These countries supplies are not vulnerable to a Russian disruption, although weak French nuclear power generation places a strain its neighbours power supply and hence gas demand. Cooperation might allow Algerian gas to be re-routed from Spain to Italy, putting the Spanish spare capacity to better use in a European context.

The Baltics have historically been highly dependent on Russia. The region is now heavily reliant on imports via the Klaipeda LNG terminal in Lithuania, while a new interconnection (Santaka) with Poland is important because it connects the region to the wider European market. For now, the connection is used to supply Poland, but allows for flexibility in terms of reductions in Poland and the Baltics. A Floating Storage and Regasification Unit under construction in Estonia might provide an extra 2 TWh/month. The Baltics have so far achieved the largest demand response in Europe, while also experiencing some of the highest energy price increases. Finlands ability to switch fuels has led to a more than halving of national gas demand.

Poland relies on eastward flows from Germany to complement imports from the big LNG terminal in winoujcie (6 TWh/month). Polish storage at time of writing is full and reasonably large. By the end of 2022, the Baltic pipe should allow direct imports of 8 TWh/month from Norway. This cannot all be attributed to Poland as flows will potentially transit Poland into the Baltics via the new Santaka connection (1.5 TWh/month), to Germany or possibly even south to Slovakia via a new interconnector.

Denmark and Sweden form a joint balancing zone. Normally the countries would be largely self-sufficient for gas but the Danish Tyro field is under maintenance until June 2023, creating a dependence on imports from Germany, which are exposed to Russian disruptions.

Romania has substantial own production capacities. However sizeable imports come from Ukraine and Bulgaria (both based on Russian gas). There might be options for re-routing through Bulgaria other gas (LNG arriving in Turkey or Greece, or other gas transited through Turkey). However, Bulgaria serves as a key transit country into the south-east European region, being the point of entry for Turkstream. Thus if flows through the pipeline slow, many countries will look to Bulgaria for gas transit.

Czechia, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia will depend heavily on Germany should Russian flows through Ukraine stop. A key variable will be how demand responds in southern Germany and whether sufficient gas continues to pass through into Czechia and Austria. Austrian storage is relatively large, meaning the country group has a major opportunity to prepare for the winter over the next couple of months.

Croatia and Greeces LNG terminals are key points of entry into the market. Some Azeri gas imported through Greece might be diverted northward to feed Bulgaria. If Italian demand for Azeri gas were reduced, more might be freed up to head into Bulgaria. An expansion of the Croatian KrK terminal later in the year might bring another 0.3TWh/month capacity, which would be welcome for a terminal currently running at very high capacity. A newly operational interconnection between Greece and Bulgaria (2.5TWh/month) also improves the situation. With Serbia signing a new deal for more Russian gas in recent days, and Hungarys negotiated exemption from the oil embargo, it is likely that Turkstream will anyway be the last Russian pipe still operating.

Italys dependence on Russia comes via imports through Austria. The slowing of these flows will be felt particularly in the north of Italy, while Italy overall has quite substantial options for diversification. A key variable, not only for Italy but also for Italys ability to help neighbouring countries, is the ability to transmit gas from the south to the north of the country. Another particularity is the high share of gas in power generation in Italy (43%). Reducing power consumption or tapping into alternative electricity sources would thus substantially reduce gas consumption, currently standing at 22 TWh of gas in power generation per month.

For Belgium, the Zeebrugge LNG terminal will remain vital, as will imports from the UK which might be at risk in case of a cold winter in the UK. Some gas passes from France to Belgium. The Netherlands has significant own-production capacities, and good LNG import capacities. Exports to neighbouring countries drives the need for lower consumption in the Netherlands, where a large share of power generation is also gas-fired. In the first four months of 2022, Dutch gas-fired power consumption was 33% below 2021 levels (2.5 TWh/month).

Germany will rely on flows from Norway, domestic gas from the Netherlands and LNG imports via Belgium. As an important transit country, the volume of re-exported gas is a key variable. The German government has already initiated phase 2 (out of 3) of its emergency gas-rationing plan. Emergency plans are also in place to bring a new LNG terminal on line in Wilhelmshaven (8TWh/month).

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European Union Demand Reduction Needs to Cope with Russian Gas Cuts - TankTerminals.com