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In a cavernous warehouse in Canberras industrial outskirts, two irreconcilable world views are in sharp discord. A F/A-18 Classic Hornet fighter looms spookily above three everyday artefacts: a worn pair of Dunlop Volleys splattered in red; a four-litre paint tin and roller and a tourists snow globe containing the Sydney Opera House in miniature. Its tiny sails bear the words: No War.

On March 20, 2003, a coalition of American, British and Australian troops invaded Iraq on faulty intelligence to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction. A forthcoming gallery at the Australian War Memorial will be devoted to that turmoil with the Hornet jet a centrepiece, along with the No War items and works from former official war artists Charles Green and Lyndell Brown, Lewis Miller and Megan Cope within a larger set of exhibitions about Middle Eastern conflicts since the Gulf War in 1990. The new Iraq War gallery isnt expected to open until 2025, although the memorial managed some brilliant long-lead publicity for it in March this year, coinciding with the 20-year anniversary of the wars commencement. A blaze of news stories promised that the gallery will encompass civilian, diaspora and military views.

Demonstrators Dave Burgess and Will Saunders created an iconic moment in protest culture in 2003 when they carefully painted No War on the Sydney Opera House. Burgess and Saunders were sentenced to nine months of weekend detention for malicious damage, and a compensation bill of $151,000, paid for in part by sales of their No War snow globe merchandise.

The new Iraq War gallery will contextualise their protest keepsakes with an oral history by Burgess. Its about looking at the different ways that people are striving for peace, thats how I actually see both of these stories working, says Dr Kerry Neale, lead curator, of the juxtaposition of the Hornet and Burgesss protest objects. So youve got those who serve, looking to make the world a more peaceful place through their service and protecting different areas that are in conflict, and those that are striving for peace through painting No War.

The war became a discredited and protracted conflict that killed four Australians and lasted a decade. Australian troops were part of an invading force not sanctioned by the United Nations. Though the tally for civilian deaths is murky, the Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003-2011 War study estimates 500,000 Iraqis died.

The memorials new spotlight on peace stories is ostensibly a break from its usual approach to nationalistic memorialisation, which has skewed ever closer to both the defence lobby and government lines in recent years. Priced at $550 million, its new building project has been criticised by a range of historians, heritage experts and museum professionals as expensive, unnecessary and proceeding without proper consultation.

Dr Peter Stanley, who worked as a historian and exhibition curator at the memorial from 1980-2007, told me it only reluctantly grapples with peace movements. An April visit I made to the memorial seemed to bear this out. In the Vietnam War gallery, for instance, two small badges stand in for all objects from the three moratoriums in 1970-71, the largest demonstrations in Australian history at the time. Their inclusion seems cursory compared to the abundance of dioramas, multimedia re-enactments of operations and military hardware.

The experience of walking through the current galleries is more akin to a themed recruitment booth than a military history museum that invites open dialogue and critical reflection. The cafe menu bears a troops full breakfast, the memorial magazine is called Wartime and posters near the entrance bear portraits of current soldiers and the words patriotism, control, chivalry.

Its easy to see why. The memorial tells the Australian Defence Forces history. It needs the ADFs co-operation to gain collection material such as the Hornet fighter. For the new galleries, an ADF advisory committee gives feedback. ADF members are seconded to the memorial so it remembers who its serving. A Last Post ceremony is held daily. The ADFs three service chiefs are legally assured council roles. The council which was described by Dr David Stephens of the Heritage Guardians group as the governing body of a military club approves or asks for modifications of exhibition plans, mission statements and gallery development proposals. Eight of its 12 members are current or former ADF members; Tony Abbott is another.

The Albanese government declined a recommendation in February from its independent National Cultural Policy Advisory Group that the memorial be returned to the Arts portfolio Bob Hawke excised it to Veterans Affairs, part of the Defence portfolio, after intense lobbying from the RSL in the 1980s. No other body does cultural curation within such a politicised structure that serves simultaneously as an arts institution, commemorative body, tourist attraction, archive and centre of research. If they were all part of the Arts portfolio, says Stanley, it wouldnt be bureaucratically possible to give one institution more than all the others.

Its interesting to consider whether another major arts institution might be more even-handed, by, say, presenting documentation of the complaint made against John Howard for war crimes to the International Criminal Court, or a more substantial record of anti-war history. The National Library of Australia, for instance, holds a considerable collection of anti-war objects.

Neale told me the curatorial focus would remain in tune with the memorials emphasis on personal storytelling of those whove served and their experiences.

Were looking at psychological trauma, the impact on families of those whove served, those who return and those who die.

In the existing galleries, this approach depoliticises and neutralises the militaristic messaging. The issue is whose stories are selected. Theyre telling the laudable stories that you can feel proud about, says Stanley. Rarely do they talk about challenging stories. With the recent conflicts, he continues, we were all out there with placards calling on no war. So the thing is, what proportion should [the anti-war representation] occupy [in the new gallery], what scale should it be at?

These are appropriate considerations: at their very core, exhibitions communicate their narratives through spatial dimensions of form, shape, scale, proportion, and the selection and balance of museum artefacts.

Neale says the Hornet fighter jet will provide a lot of visual impact and will take up a lot of space in the gallery. This seems in keeping with the Memorials narrow focus on veterans, service people and the type of war-buff trophies historian Douglas Newton described to me as catering to schoolboy wonderment in weaponry. In his 2019 submission to the Memorial during its consultation period, Newton proffered an alternative institutional vision, to mount exhibitions that constantly explore the very deepest questions about our military engagements: How do we get into war? Why do wars persist? To what end are they fought? How can we limit them? This ought to involve exhibitions that go far beyond exploring our record of military endeavour.

This article was first published in the print edition of The Saturday Paper onMay 20, 2023 as "War stories".

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The Iraq War gallery at the Australian War Memorial - The Saturday Paper

Murtaza Karanfil, the chairperson of the Foreign Economic Relations Board's (DEK) Trkiye-Libya Business Council has called for more investments in Libya stating that a large number of government industrial facilities from previous eras are not functioning.

"Currently, there are over 180 governmental industrial facilities from the era of previous governments that are idle in Libya," Karanfil told Anadolu Agency (AA) on Thursday.

He went on to state that some of these facilities are in good condition, which attracted the attention of Turkish businesspeople.

"The state owns seven facilities in the industrial zone in Tajoura. In 1977, a facility was established to assemble and install trucks and pickup trucks here in Libya. The facility was built with the best equipment at that time," he said.

Karanfil noted that he, along with a delegation of Independent Industrialists and Businessmens Association (MSAD) from the central Turkish province of Konya, met a week ago with Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan Abu Jinnah, saying: "We held special meetings with cities in the country's south and the Southern Development Agency."

Karanfil said that Abu Jinnah invited the mayors of the Fezzan region to a meeting, adding that the Turkish delegation received a warm welcome and serious projects were discussed.

"We evaluated the trade route from the south to sub-Saharan Africa and other issues," he said.

He said that over 20 mayors attended the meeting and that the mayor of the city of Marj, east of Benghazi, said that "Libya's development will be with Trkiye."

Karanfil confirmed that they have been working in Libya for 35 years and that they have created over 1,500 job opportunities in Trkiye, stressing that "Libya is a fertile place for investment."

"We will open a second hospital in Tripoli after Misrata. We are able to establish the Libyan health infrastructure, and we are sure that there will be important changes in terms of health, tourism and trade, and the momentum will increase if Libya and Trkiye start granting entry visas mutually," he said.

Chief Commercial Adviser at the Turkish Embassy in Tripoli, Yusuf Yldz also told AA that they plan to organize an exhibition for exporting Turkish products in Benghazi, eastern Libya, from May 29 to June 1.

Yldz added that about 35 companies from Trkiye will participate in the exhibition in Benghazi.

More:
'Libya needs more investment by Turkish firms' | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

TRIPOLI

Libyas eastern-based parliament voted on Tuesday to replace Fathi Bashagha as prime minister amid signs of shifting alliances in Libyas political moving sands.

The parliament replaced Bashagha with his finance minister Osama Hamad, parliament spokesman Abdullah Belhaiq said.

The decision was announced a few hours after Bashagha published his resignation and designated his deputy, Ali al-Qatrani, to assume his duties.

The parliament said Bashagha will now face an investigation but did not specify the charges that could be brought against him.

Bashagha remained silent while reports circulated about disagreements between him and a number of MPs on financial issues.

Bashagha is said to have written to the parliament earlier on Tuesday saying he was handing his duties over to Qatrani, without saying whether or when he planned to resume this activities. A source close to him claimed Bashagha was taking a personal leave.

In March of last year, Bashagha had taken the oath of office before parliament and began exercising his duties from Sirte after being tasked with forming a new government.

Parliament intended Bashagha to replace Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah after deciding that the Tripoli-based premiers term in office had ended. But Dbeibah refused to step down saying that he would hand over power only to an elected government.

Although backed by parliament and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Bashagha lacked real powers.

His governments margin of manoeuvre was in particular limited by budget constraints. Bashagha said in January that the Libyan Central Bank allocated to his cabinet only about 330 million US dollars.

Analysts believe a row subsequently erupted between Bashagha and members of parliament over the financial issue. According to MP Issam al-Jahani the decision to remove Bashagha was triggered by the parliamentarians belief that he failed to fulfill any of expectations that underlied his appointment in the first place.

Bashaghas alliance with the authorities in the east led to the serious atrophy of his support base in the western region. Many people there considered his reconciliation with Haftar and Speaker of Parliament Aguila Saleh a betrayal of the martyrs as they referred to those killed in battles fought by the LNA against militias and militant groups in Benghazi and Tripoli.

Observers at the time thought Haftar and Saleh used Bashagha as a pressure card against Dbeibah to reap certain benefits, such as the removal of Mustafa Sanallah from his position as head of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and his replacement by former central bank governor Farhat Bengdara, as part of a deal between Haftar and Dbeibah that included the payment of the armys debts.

Increasingly, it became clear that Bashaghas mission had ended, from the perspective of Haftar and Aguila Saleh. It will be difficult now for Bashagha, however, to return to the political scene after having burnt all his bridges with former allies in the western region.

Cairo meeting

Over the last few days, Rumours have circulated about Bashagha joining the Dbeibah camp. But such rumours were discounted after the emergence of reports about a forthcoming meeting in Cairo between representatives of Dbeibah and Haftar.

According to these reports, a meeting will be held in Cairo between security and military leaders from the western region and others from the eastern part of the country, including Saddam Haftar (Haftars son) and his brother Belkasim as well as MP Hatem Al-Araibi, and Osama Hamad, who is now assuming the previous duties of Bashagha.

The Cairo meeting is expected to discuss the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Dbeibah government that will include the appointment of new cabinet ministers in such portfolios as finance, foreign affairs, the interior and defence.

The reports about the Cairo meeting seem to have irked the State Council chairman Khaled Al-Mishri who virulently criticised the Parliaments decision to dismiss Fathi Bashagha.

He said on Twitter that the parliaments move to replace Bashagha is a political absurdity and took place in suspicious circumstances.

Libya has had little peace since the 2011 NATO-backed uprising against Muammar Gadhafi. Moreover, it split in 2014 between warring eastern and western factions, though major fighting has been paused since a ceasefire in 2020.

Dbeibahs government was installed through a UN-backed process in 2021 that was aimed at holding elections that year, but the vote was cancelled amid disputes over the rules.

Diplomacy is now focused on bringing the parliament and a consultative body, the State Council, to agree on rules that would allow an election to take place.

However, senior figures in the parliament have pushed for a new interim government before any election, a move their opponents see as a delaying tactic to put off a vote and hang onto their positions.

Link:
Bashagha removed by eastern-based parliament amid Libya's shifting sands | | AW - The Arab Weekly

The convoluted divisions and alliances between Libyas political dinosaursblock progress toward reunifying the rival eastern and western governments. Also, the continued marginalization and instrumentalization of the people and resources of the Fezzan in Libyas southwest keep it the most depressed region of the country, vulnerable to transnational criminal networks and violent extremists. The social and political landscape remains fraught at a time when the U.N. has announced new plans to support Libya to move toward democratic national elections before the end of the year.

The recent Eid al-Fitr holiday exposed how social tensions in Libya can be intertwined with toxic identity politics. The general religious authority for Awqaf in the East and the Dar al Iftaa in the West, which are aligned respectively with the Parliament in Tobruk and the Government of National Unity in Tripoli, disagreed on the day of the official Eid celebration, marking the first time such a division has taken place in Libya.This is just one highly visible example of how the disjointed politics are impacting civil society.

As part of work that started in 2020 under the Berlin Process, Libyas Presidential Council is working with the U.N. and African Union on comprehensive reconciliation initiatives, designed to rebuild trust between all segments of society.While progress has been made, extensive resources will be required to advance many of the transitional justice arrangements necessary to fully heal from conflicts like the 2011-2012 battles between Bani Walid and Misrata;the internal fighting, slayings and expulsions (including of known extremists) in Benghazi in 2014;and the more recent 2019 battles and atrocities in Tarhuna (southeast of Tripoli).

Regional dynamics are also worrying. Putting aside complicated political ties, the porous borders with Algeria, Niger, Chad and Sudan continue to be genuine security threats. Libya is likely to be greatly impacted by the raging conflict in Sudan, as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been responsible for securing the Sudanese side of the border, may increase illicit trafficking into Libya to help fund the war. For years, Sudanese Janjaweed militias, many of which are now integrated into the RSF, have fought and harassed civilians in the Fezzan.They have been accused of kidnapping, torture and other human rights abuses.The collapse into civil war in Sudan now may make the problems worse.

In March, the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM) released its final report (A/HRC/RES/43/39),which is likely to put pressure on high-ranking officials and powerful armed group leaders. The report accuses individuals linked to groups, such as the Rada Special Deterrence Force, based in Mitiga Airport; the Tripoli-based Internal Security Agency; and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) of committing a multitude of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, enslavement and extrajudicial killings. The FFM predicts that things will only get worse in the near term.

These are just a few of the intensifying factors putting pressure on, and complicating, the political transition that the U.N. and the international community have now reinvested in.

At a recent gathering in Washington, Western and regional special envoys reiterated their unified support to the United Nations plans to help break the current political impasse in Libya. Much more importantly, the United Nations is the only body that can implement dividends at scale for the Libyan people in a way that ensures enough momentum for democratic elections, effective security and good governance.

Therefore, when Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily announced his plan to support a pathway to elections in 2023, it was met, however cautiously, with optimism by many Libyans and international stakeholders. His stated goal is to broaden the negotiation process and establish an electoral roadmap with clear timelines, ensuring inclusive, free and fair elections.

Under the auspices of the Libyan Political Dialogue provisions of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, SRSG Bathily is forming a high-level panel to support Libyan-led efforts of the High National Election Commission (HNEC) and the parliamentary and executive bodies working on national reconciliation and an agreed constitutional basis for national elections, but if the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) builds on past progress, accesses the breadth of its resources, and draws from strong partnerships, then much can be done this year.

So far, some analysts have described UNSMILs ongoing efforts as a two-track process. Track one is a leadership track, involving influential Libyan political actors helping to broker a deal that ensures that elections can proceed. UNSMIL is eager to collaborate with the Presidential Council in Tripoli to help facilitate track one. They believe a Presidential Council, unified among its three geographic representatives (East, West and South), is crucial for this Libyan-led initiative to gain credibility and international support.

Track two of UNSMILs initiative involves engaging political parties, civil society, women, youth, and minority groups to identify stakeholders who can actively promote national reconciliation and public support for the political process. Track two should aim to go even further than dialogue and outreach to broad constituencies. This has been done before during the National Dialogue Process preparations from 2016-2019, and then quite successfully as part of the work of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in 2020 and 2021.

Upon successful completion of both tracks, a high-level panel composed of stakeholders from both tracks will be established, with its responsibilities to be determined based on clear action points from the two tracks.

Track one undoubtedly garners the most attention. The U.N. and international community have LAAF leader Khalifa Haftar to accept parliamentary elections without insisting on presidential elections and eligibility for his own candidacy. Some have been trying to work through members of his inner circle to try to get crucial eastern buy-in for the UNSMILs discussions. To effectively execute a two-track strategy, SRSG Bathily will need to lead a strong UNSMIL team, with the mediation skills necessary to draw out a consensus from the famously obstinate Libyan elites.

Since 2012, there have been many national, regional and international efforts to broker interim power sharing arrangements, transitional government and constitutional parameters for elections. These efforts tend to rely on various models of elite bargaining, oscillating from one model to another depending on the political economy and the military/paramilitary capacities of the opposing parties in Libya.

But while many continue to argue about what models best describe the situation, the answer is too often narrowly focused onwhoshould be empowered to usher Libya out of crisis. What these conversations do not address ishowLibya will sustain peace.

Alongside any political progress supported by the SRSGs high-level panel, there must be a way to provide all Libyans with incremental peace dividends to ensure their enduring support for political negotiations. When the fighting stops, and agreements are made for transitional arrangements, many Libyan people are infused with hope. Indeed, they hope for a clear pathway to democratic elections but they also hope for the good governance required to address their long-held grievances related to security and rule of law, basic services, devolution of authority to subnational bodies, local economic development and more. In addition to the disappointment from missed election deadlines, when political deals fail to deliver any change in peoples daily lives, the hope fades to cynicism. To stop these cycles of hope and cynicism, the political deals must be accompanied by meaningful reforms and development activities starting with the security sector.

Nothing can be done unless the political tracks are tightly connected to improving security. Both will require great investment from the international community to transfer negotiated arrangements between elites into real change for peoples everyday lives.

At the national level, there has been much success in maintaining a general cessation of hostilities since the October 2020 cease-fire brokered by the U.N. As part of the cease-fire agreement, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) was established with the mandate to monitor and enforce the cease-fire. The work of the JMC, alongside UNSMIL and within the Berlin Process has successfully upheld the cease-fire and kept the peace between the major security actors.

This progress has continued into April of this year, when military units and security formations from the East, West, and South met and agreed on several confidence-building measures, including the LAAF release of six detainees from western Libya.Additionally, the two chiefs of staff of the Libyan armies, General Haddad and General Naduri, met in Benghazi on April 13 and affirmed their commitments to reconciliation and supporting the electoral process.

Maintaining the cease-fire and agreeing on productive confidence-building mechanisms are critical, but comprehensive security sector reform as well as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration (DDR/I) of the armed groups is also essential for providing basic security throughout the country. Specifically, former U.N. Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Libya Stephanie Williams recently noted that DDR/I programs should focus on devolution of the processes to local communities, individual vetting, and human rights training, among other efforts.

Unfortunately, in Libya, this is a daunting task. There are numerous illegitimate armed groups aligned with the GNU, the LAAF and other smaller non-state actors.Alliances among government officials and non-state actors make it hard to fully understand the depth of the integration of illegitimate non-state armed groups and the state.

Earlier this year, the JMC endorsed terms of reference for its Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Joint Technical Sub-Committee, which is mandated, among other things, to categorize the armed groups.This is a great start, but much more should be done in parallel with the political process.

The real work of security sector reform (SSR) and DDR/I will be difficult, but not impossible. It will require substantial programming resources from international donors on a number of fronts, but it is precisely because of this breadth and expense that SSR and DDR/I have been regularly discussed by policymakers since 2014, but rarely prioritized and never properly resourced.

In recent years, part of the problem has been a failure to adequately fund and activate programming jointly implemented by UNSMIL and the U.N. agencies. When the U.N. missions and agencies work together, they can establish a clear division of labor and complementary roles that allow for political and security agreements to materialize into tangible gains for peoples everyday lives. Missions can provide strategic direction and national buy-in at the highest levels, and they can provide political guidance and oversight. The agencies, meanwhile, can take the lead in program implementation, manage local partnerships, and ensure that resources are allocated effectively. In terms of resource mobilization, the U.N. missions and agencies can work together to identify funding sources and channel them to specific programs and initiatives that most suitably progress the political process.

In Libya, joint programs like this, including those in support of the security sector, have had success in the past. But over the last two to three years, many have been abandoned or vastly under-funded.

Despite the challenges, the JMC and UNSMIL have continued to work toward implementing DDR/I and SSR programs in Libya. This includes conducting consultations with local communities and armed groups, providing training and support to security sector institutions, and promoting dialogue and reconciliation between different groups. Now, they will need to garner support from generous donors to launch comprehensive, joint UNSMIL and U.N. agency programs.

Going forward, this is the only way a negotiated security agreement can transform into material gains for people on the ground. Without these tangible achievements, public support will also be absent. Any path toward sustained peace and stability for Libya will require leaders to deliver dividends to the Libyan people for their confidence and supportfirst and foremost in the form of basic security, and beyond that, in overall governance reforms and economic development.

This analysis was originally published by Manara Magazine.

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Libya Can Move Past Its Political Deadlock, But It Will Take Work to ... - United States Institute of Peace

Morocco will host a meeting of the Libyan steering committee to prepare for elections on which hopes are pinned to break the deadlock that left the oil-rich and war-torn country politically divided.

The news was reported by Italys Nova news agency citing Libyan House of Representative spokesman Abdullah Belhaq.

He said views are converging between the rivals after they agreed on mechanisms to make progress towards elections.

A political process to resolve more than a decade of conflict in Libya has been stalled since an election scheduled for December 2021 collapsed amid disputes over the eligibility of major candidates.

The U.N.-backed government in the capital of Tripoli has very loose control over about a third of the country. To the east, Libya is controlled by a renegade general leading what they have called the Libyan National Army, which has tried and failed to topple the government in Tripoli.

Morocco has by the past hosted meetings between Libyan rivals including the Skhirate agreement which still serves as a reference for a political and peaceful settlement of the crisis in Libya.

Libya has descended into chaos since 2011 as the country is de-factor divided between a Tripoli-based government in the west and vast swathes of the east under the control of renegade general Khalifa Haftar.

Excerpt from:
Morocco to host new round of Libyan election talks The North ... - The North Africa Post