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Iraq-Turkey Pipeline: Will Be Ready to Resume This Week, Says Energy Minister - Bloomberg
For the past century, Kirkuk has been the site of ethnic tension. Particularly since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, control of the disputed oil-rich province which is populated by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen has been one of the countrys most contentious and destabilising issues. The semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, led by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), asserts that Kirkuk should be part of its jurisdiction and claimed de facto control from 2014 to 2017. Meanwhile, the Iraqi constitution stipulates that Kirkuks status will be determined by a referendum after a census is held but this is yet to happen. Instead, after the Kurdistan Democratic Partys (KDP) failed independence referendum in September 2017, the central government placed Kirkuk under its direct control.
But hostilities have recently escalated following a shock decision last month by Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to allow the KDP to resume control of their political offices and military base in Kirkuk city. Sudanis decision sparked protests from Arab and Turkmen residents, which, in turn, led to counter-protests by Kurdish residents. Four people were killed in the unrest, prompting the Federal Supreme Court to pause its implementation. These events underscore the risks of Kirkuks unresolved status, which could be exacerbated by upcoming provincial elections in December and spread tensions to neighbouring Turkey and Iran who have Kurdish populations further heightening regional instability.
The events in Kirkuk echo the ethnic divisions that can immobilise Iraq a country governed by a complex network of alliances that Sudani must navigate to keep his coalition government afloat. Although Kirkuk has been the Achilles heel of every Iraqi leader since 2003, the federal government had, until recently, managed to avoid any large escalations in tensions since taking back control from the KRG in 2017. Sudanis relatively effective handling of the countrys challenges, coupled with the dramatic weakening of the KDP since their ill-fated 2017 referendum, made his decision to permit the KDP to return to Kirkuk, and thus rock the boat, unexpected.
Sudanis weak positioning appears to have been driven by the necessity of balancing his fragmented coalition government. Contrary to the prevailing myth that the prime minister is only beholden to the Shia parties (and by extension Iran), he faces pressure from all parties that helped form the coalition government, including Kurdish parties. Sudani has since explained that he was simply implementing one of this coalitions agreements, but its Arab parties, sensing the KDPs weakness, are now unwilling to support the move.
This recent Kirkuk debacle was a clear mistake for a seasoned politician like Sudani. The deaths of four citizens in clashes between Kurdish protesters and security forces were avoidable. It was a costly error that predictably provoked his Arab coalition allies who have long sought to cement federal government control over Kirkuk. Observers assumed that Sudanis tenure would be challenged by the disgruntled Muqtada al-Sadr, or by new protests related to demand for public sector employment, or electricity outages in the summer. But they did not expect him to be challenged by the reignition of ethnic divisions in Kirkuk which Sudani appears to have unwittingly brought upon himself.
While Kirkuk remains contested, risks of destabilisation will continue to hang over Iraq and the Sudani government. Although the prime minister has done well to hold his government together and steer Iraq through ongoing challenges, the reality is that profound questions such as the fate of Kirkuk and the relationship between Baghdad and the KRG remain unaddressed.
For Baghdad, there is a belief that if Kirkuk were to join Iraqi Kurdistan, it would be somehow leaving Iraq. For the KRG, incorporating Kirkuk would re-start their desired process of independence. Both beliefs are misplaced because whether Kirkuk remains a standalone governorate, becomes a region on its own, or joins the pre-existing region of Iraqi Kurdistan, it is part of a consolidated federal Iraqi state. Iraqs political actors should not treat Kirkuk as a zero-sum game. Instead, they need to recognise that its status should be chosen by its citizens via a referendum, as set out in the Iraqi constitution.
Kirkuks unresolved status is a looming disruptor of Baghdad and KRG relations. Even if it is not the crisis of the hour, it is always a hotbed of tension and one ripe for political exploitation.
But for now, Kirkuks unresolved status is a looming disruptor of Baghdad and KRG relations. Even if it is not the crisis of the hour, it is always a hotbed of tension and one ripe for political exploitation. Firstly, while the announcement that Kirkuk will take part in the provincial elections in December its first since 2005 is a small step towards a representative pathway forward, there is a danger that political parties will continue to use the recent events to mobilise their voter base and further fuel polarisation and ethnic tensions. This would only heighten the security threat from Islamic State group (ISIS) sleeper cells who frequently exploit such situations. Secondly, these recent events have exposed a weakness in Sudanis ability to harmonise the divisions in his coalition, increasing the fragility of the Sudani government. Lastly, as tensions between Baghdad and the KRG intensify, it leaves Iraqi Kurdistan vulnerable to meddling by Turkey and Iran, who worry that the Kirkuks sentiment for independence would spread to their own Kurdish population. For example, they have already intervened militarily in northern Iraq against their own Kurdish opposition present there.
Thus, any further escalation in tensions in Kirkuk may have destabilising effects across the region and beyond. European foreign ministries and their missions in Iraq must leverage their democracy-promoting projects to emphasise to Iraqi politicians that their parties are partners of a coalition government and of a federal state that requires commitment to democratic federalism. Without social harmony amongst Iraqs diverse ethnic populations, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the NATO Mission Iraq, along with other European missions, will never achieve their goal.
Though Kirkuk is one province, it represents a regional fault line that can create instability throughout the Middle East. Until now, Sudani has continued to improve relations with neighbours since assuming power, despite having to navigate the internal divisions of his coalition government. However, this juggling act is made more difficult and more precarious when addressing legacy issues like Kirkuk. While a domestic and sensitive issue, European missions should help create the conditions for a solution by reiterating their support for Iraqi federalism and democracy. This can ease fears over Kirkuks status within the Iraqi state, calm relations with neighbouring Turkey and Iran, and prevent harming the security operations of the Global Coalition and the NATO Mission Iraq. This will then allow all three possible scenarios for Kirkuks future to be on equal footing before a status is chosen by the citizens of Kirkuk, via a referendum held by local government as per the Iraqi constitution.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
Saraya al-Salam jihadists in clashes with Iraqi security forces, Baghdad, 30 August 2022
Ahmad al-Rubaye AFP Getty
When ISIS fighters took Mosul, Iraqs second city, on 10 June 2014, the nation suffered a collective shock. The army, anti-terrorism forces, police and other national security bodies had proved unable to defeat a few hundred jihadists and, as state forces retreated, they left behind tonnes of military equipment that was picked up by the Sunni-affiliated Daesh (ISIS) fighters. It was experienced as a national disaster, creating a widespread sense of panic and humiliation.
Three days after Mosul fell, Ali al-Sistani, the highest religious authority in Najaf the heart of Iraqi Shiism issued a fatwa calling for a popular military mobilisation against ISIS.
In response, thousands of young volunteers who would never have considered signing up to Iraqs discredited army joined new or existing militias. To keep control of these diverse militias, the government created a body called the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Committees). Some Iraqi politicians were soon calling it the new Republican Guard, a reference to Saddam Husseins elite corps. The Hashd played a crucial role in defeating ISIS and its influence still largely shapes Iraqi politics.
The militias, united under one banner, have expanded their operations beyond fighting ISIS and its affiliates. Its indicative of the Hashds growing importance that in July 2023 the government budget recorded its headcount as 238,075 (compared to 122,000 in 2021) or 6% of the civil service, with a payroll of around $2.65bn (1.8% of the total national budget). By way of comparison, the army has a staff of 454,000 and the interior ministry 700,000. Understanding how a paramilitary outfit reached such a size and got to have such a significant impact on public finances entails tracing the evolution of post-Saddam Iraq.
For the authorities that took over after Saddam was removed from power on 9 April 2003, the Hashd was a guarantor of survival, much like the Pasdaran who defend Irans Islamic(...)
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In Iraq, the Hashd calls the shots, by Adel Bakawan - Le Monde diplomatique - English edition
Today, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold an important hearing focusing on a perennially difficult topic: how to reform and update the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which was enacted in response to the 9/11 attacks and continues to provide the main legal basis for global U.S. counterterrorism operations more than two decades later.
But as legislators prepare for what is certain to be a contentious debate, they are leaving a lower-hanging fruit to wither on the vine: specifically, a long-standing bipartisan proposal to repeal the separate 2002 AUMF that authorized the U.S. invasion of Iraq. While the Senate overwhelmingly passed a repeal measure in March, the House has spent the past several months dawdling on its own proposal, despite substantial bipartisan support.
At first glance, a repeal of the invasion authorization may seem like a symbolic gesture. After all, the main body of U.S. troops in Iraq withdrew more than a decade ago, and the small force that remains ceased combat operations in 2021. And the Biden administration, which supports the repeal, has made clear that it would have no impact on ongoing U.S. military operations.
But focusing on current operations misses what repeal would accomplish. More than 20 years of practice has substantially expanded the effective scope of the 2002 Iraq AUMF, making it susceptible to unexpected uses beyond its original motivation of removing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from powerincluding in ways that could allow a future president to bypass Congress while pursuing another major war in the Middle East. Repeal is the only way to ensure this doesnt happen, and a prudent step that the House should take regardless of where the broader debate over AUMF reform might lead.
When Congress first enacted the 2002 Iraq AUMF, there was little ambiguity about how it would be used. The George W. Bush administration had been building the case for toppling Hussein, and the AUMF was a response to Bushs request for congressional support. But the text that Congress enacted was notably less specific, as it authorized the use of force both to enforce relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and as [the president] determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.
As we all know, the U.S. and coalition forces that entered Iraq in March 2003 quickly found that regime change was not as straightforward as it seemed. Resistance came not just from regular Iraqi military forces but from irregular forces and foreign fighters actively supporting the regime across Iraq. Other armed groups were working to advance their own agendas amid the post-invasion chaos, ranging from Iran-backed resistance movements to Iranian dissident group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq.
As the U.S. role in Iraq transitioned from invader to occupying authority, the military mission changed as well. Suddenly, U.S. and allied soldiers were responsible not just for deposing the Hussein regime but for defending Iraq against external threats and preserving its internal security against a rising tide of sectarian violence. This brought U.S. forces into conflict with different factions within Iraq, including remnants of regime sympathizers, Shiite militias, and the violent extremist movement that would come to be called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). On a handful of occasions, it even led the U.S. military to mount operations aimed at capturing Iranian agents who the United States believed were fomenting violence through their support of Shiite militias around the country.
The 2002 AUMF was the main statutory authorization under which U.S. troops engaged in these activities. While Bushs attorneys advanced a broad view of his ability to direct such action on his own constitutional authority, his administration was careful to point to the 2002 AUMF as the legal basis for most of its actions, including by complying with certification and reporting requirements that kept Congress abreast of how the law was being used.
By 2008, the Bush administration maintained that, while the Saddam Hussein regime was the primary threat posed by Iraq at the time the 2002 AUMF was enacted, Congress recognized it was not the only threat. In the administrations view, Congress had intended to authorize the use of force more broadly, including against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Iraq. Moreover, as the authorization to address the continuing threat posed by Iraq was distinct from the authorization to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions, it was not contingent on the U.N. mandate for the multinational force that ended later that year.
The Obama administration largely continued these activities until the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that replaced the U.N. mandate expired at the end of 2011. At that point, following a failed effort to negotiate a new agreement with Baghdad, Washington withdrew U.S. troops and ceased relying on the 2002 AUMF for the first time since 2003. Senior administration officials even expressed support for its repeal on the logic that the 2002 AUMF was no longer needed.
But in June 2014, the extremist group that would soon be known as the Islamic State surged through northern Iraq. At the Iraqi governments urgent request, the Obama administration intervened once again, targeting the Islamic State with airstrikes in Iraq and nearby Syria as the opening of what would become a larger multilateral military campaign. The main legal justification for these actions was not the 2002 Iraq AUMF, but the separate 2001 9/11 AUMF. Specifically, the administration argued that the Islamic State was a successor to AQI, which in turn had splintered off from al Qaeda, a main target of the 2001 AUMF. But the Obama administration also cited the 2002 Iraq AUMF as alternative legal grounds for operations in Iraq and nearby parts of Syria.
In explaining this position, the Obama administration argued that the 2002 AUMF had always been understood to authorize the use of force for the related purposes of helping to establish a stable, democratic Iraq and addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq. After Saddam Husseins regime fell in 2003, it elaborated in a later report, the United States continued to take military action in Iraq under the 2002 AUMF to further these purposesincluding by combating al Qaeda in Iraq. In the Obama administrations view, Congress ratified this understanding of the 2002 AUMF by appropriating billions of dollars to support continued military operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, confirming the understanding that the 2002 Iraq AUMF authorizes the use of force against AQI and related terrorist threats.
Yet this interpretation did not stop with the Islamic State. In 2020, the Trump administration cited the 2002 Iraq AUMFalongside the presidents authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitutionas the legal justification for the airstrike that killed Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the paramilitary Quds Force within Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In justifying this move, the U.S. Justice Department argued that the Qods Force would continue to undermine stability in Iraq and threaten U.S. personnel if left unaddressed, placing the Suleimani strike in line with the 2002 Iraq AUMFs dual purposes. The question remains, however, what other entities might find themselves in a similar position.
There is much to criticize about how the executive branch arrived at this understanding of the 2002 Iraq AUMF. But at this point, there is little to be done about it. Even if U.S. President Joe Biden were to repudiate this view, a future president could return to it. And while the federal courts could step in, they have thus far declined to do so on the grounds that there is, in the words of one district court judge, no impasse or conflict between the political branchesin other words, because Congress has taken no concrete steps to oppose it. Clear legislative action is the only way to roll it back.
What would repeal mean in practice then? The Biden administration is no doubt correct that it would not affect any ongoing military operations. Counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Syria are primarily authorized by the separate 2001 AUMF, which will remain in place even if the 2002 Iraq AUMF is repealed. And the executive branch maintains that the U.S. Constitution gives the president broad authority to use military force in pursuit of U.S. interests, including in defense of U.S. diplomatic and military personnelauthority that Biden has used against Iran-backed Shiite militias multiple times since entering office.
But this doesnt make repeal meaningless. Recent presidents have acknowledged that there may be constitutional limits on their ability to engage in hostilities that are expected to lead to an armed conflict of substantial nature, scope, and duration. Similarly, while the 1973 War Powers Resolution allows the president to use military force on his own authority, it also demands that he stop within 60 to 90 days unless Congress gives its approval (or cannot convene). These restrictionswith which the executive branch generally complies, even though it sometimes pushes their boundaries or questions their constitutionalityare supposed to lock away the presidents ability to start a major, extended war without Congress. Statutes like the 2002 Iraq AUMF, however, provide the key to open that lock.
Leaving open the door to a major armed conflict could lead to bad outcomes in many corners of the world. But in the context of Iraq, one factor makes it particularly concerning: the regime in Iran, which has spent years trying to maximize its influence in Iraq while weakening Iraqi political institutions. In particular, it has supported an array of Shiite militias that act with impunity across Iraq, including by targeting both the government and U.S. diplomatic and military facilities with rocket attacks. It is not hard to imagine some future president following the Trump administrations lead and framing these actions as threats to a stable, democratic Iraq or as terrorist threats emanating from Iraq, putting Iran itself squarely within the 2002 Iraq AUMFs crosshairs.
Perhaps there will be a legitimate case for such military action one day. But if there is, then the president should make his or her case to Congress and the American people, not rely on a decades-old statute designed for a very different purpose. And if Congress still wants to have a role in such debates, then it needs to cut off the routes around congressional authorization that the executive branch has made clear it believes are open. Repealing the 2002 Iraq AUMF would be one important step in this direction.
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Iraq War's Authorization by Congress Is Still on the Books and ... - Foreign Policy
Baghdad 29 September 2023,
On the International Day of Awareness of Food Loss and Waste (IDAFLW), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) come together with a renewed commitment to tackle a pressing global challenge: food loss and waste. In a world marked by climate change, conflicts, and economic uncertainties, this collective mission has never been more critical.
The 2023 report of the State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World has unveiled a stark reality: between 691 and 783 million people faced hunger in 2022, an increase of 122 million people since 2019, before the pandemic. WFP's hunger monitoring systems indicate that 33 million in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region do not have sufficient food consumption.
Globally, about 13% of all the food produced is lost in the supply chain, and another 17% is discarded by households, restaurants, and stores. These losses represent not only a missed opportunity to alleviate hunger but also a significant strain on our environment and resources.
Responsible for a third of total greenhouse gas emissions and contributing to biodiversity loss, global agri-food systems are under threat. As the world's population continues to grow, we face the daunting reality that by 2050 we will need nearly three Earth-sized planets to sustain current lifestyles. It is imperative that we transform our food systems to be more efficient, inclusive, sustainable, and resilient.
In our joint commitment to address food loss and waste for a sustainable Iraq, we support the efforts of the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to develop and implement national targets and strategies aligned with SDG 12.3. This includes fostering supply chain collaboration to reduce food waste at every stage, from production to processing and storage. Equally important is encouraging new habits and attitudes to change and decrease the amount of food people throw away.
We encourage the private sector to actively engage in supporting sustainable food supply chains and promoting responsible consumption. Businesses should invest in the modernization of food supply chains and the adoption of sustainable practices. Recognizing the vital role of mobile-based business-to-business supply platforms in enhancing efficiency, we emphasize their importance.
We highlight the benefits of reducing food waste and provide practical tips for consumers. We call on individuals to make conscious choices that reduce food waste within their homes. Additionally, we encourage consumers to actively participate in public-private partnerships aimed at reducing food loss and waste.
As we mark IDAFLW in 2023, FAO and WFP reaffirm our commitment to addressing food loss and waste in Iraq. Given the alarming statistics of undernourishment and environmental costs, urgent action is needed. Together, we envision a future where no one in Iraq goes to bed hungry, where food is valued and not wasted, and where our agrifood systems are efficient, sustainable, and resilient.
For additional information please contact:
Ruben Pulido Rodriguez Communications Officer UN World Food Programme (WFP) ruben.rodriguez@wfp.org
Khawla Ben Aicha International Communications Specialist Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Khawla.benaicha@fao.org
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Joint Declaration: Addressing Food Loss and Waste for a ... - ReliefWeb