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Today, technology, state power, and development intertwine in a single Gordian knot that no liberal can untangle. After a few decades of geopolitical quiet, we have come to realize that threats to sovereignty have become more insidious, while decisions that lead to its preservation require subtle judgment, especially where the matters concern technology. Awareness of this new state of affairs is particularly acute in the two great powers: the U.S. and China.

The uniqueness of the circumstances was recognized by both Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. In Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State, Tai Ming Cheung recalls that in 2017, Xi gave a speech in which he claimed that if China wanted to ascend to the top, it had to become an innovation powerhouse. Later that year, the Trump administration released a national security strategy in which a national security innovation base is identified as a necessary condition for American prosperity and survival. Both leaders shared the premise that national security requires them to articulate and develop national systems of innovation.

One can view the confrontation between the U.S. and China not in terms of the Thucydides trap, but rather through the lens of the so-called Needham Question. Joseph Needham was a British biochemist and author of a 25-volume history of Chinese science. A key problem emerged from his research: how did it happen that China, which had been at the forefront of science and technology for most of human history, was outpaced by the West? The realization of its own technological weakness was painful, occurring during the first Opium War and after, during the so-called century of humiliation. Today, Chinas Communist elite not only wants to avoid technological vassalization, as Xi put it, but to take the lead in technological progress and astound the West, just as the West astounded China in the 19th century. Chinas national innovation system is meant to be a set of institutions and policies designed to achieve this goal.

According to Cheung, Xi Jinping is the opposite of Deng Xiaoping. In the 1970s, the latter reoriented the state away from military and security issues toward the challenge of capitalist reform. Large military budgets were slashed and priority was given to growth. While Xi doesnt ignore economic indicators, he places more significant focus on technological self-reliance, economic security and the modernization of the military. Cheung quotes him as saying that science and technology power determines changes in the balance of world political and economic power. Xi is a techno-nationalist.

Since the beginning of his rule, Xi has argued that China must accomplish a transition: abandon its role as an imitator and transform itself into an innovator. Only in this way will it become self-sufficient in critical fields of technology. In order to attain this, the Chinese leader is pushing military-civil fusion, a process of exchanging information, resources and capabilities between civilian and military actors in key technological and economic areas. Xi has had the MCF written into the CCP constitution as a national priority.

One of the most important initiatives under the MCF banner is the construction of a network of large laboratories where the civilian and military sides can exchange experiences and work together. Cheung notes, however, that the projects development has been painfully slow. He points to the bureaucratic opposition and fragmentation as the main reasons. Elsewhere, he suggests that the innovation strategy provides cover for the process of consolidating power and overcoming resistance embedded in the state apparatus.

There can be no doubt that, with Xi at the helm, China has ceased to adhere to Dengs maxim, Hide your capacities, bide your time. But did the transition from Deng's economic openness to the pursuit of self-reliance occur suddenly under Xi's leadership? Cheung does not provide compelling evidence for the thesis of a qualitative, rather than simply gradual, change under Xi regarding technological self-sufficiency and economic nationalism.

Over the past years of strained relations between Beijing and Washington, there has been much talk about a Sputnik moment. Opinions differed on what exactly constituted that moment. Some pointed to President Donald Trump, his tariffs and the pressure he applied to Huawei. Others mentioned year 2016, when AlphaGo, a program created by British machine learning experts, beat the best human player in the Chinese go game. Still others claim that the restrictions on semiconductor-related technologies imposed by President Joe Biden Biden last year unleashed an unprecedented mobilization in Beijing.

Cheungs book allows us to expand the historical perspective and propose a hypothesis of a certain continuity, more pronounced than the author himself would admit. In May 1999, the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The CCP responded almost immediately by establishing the 995 New High-Technology Project. The ambition was to dramatically increase spending on weapon R&D. Influential military officials quoted by Cheung assert that without this program the modernization of Chinese military would not have happened on this scale or at this pace. We should be grateful to the Americans, admitted one general. Consider: Total Chinese defense R&D investment between 1999 and 2009 (the first ten years of the 995 program) was more than all the investment in defense R&D in the prior fifty years. Through this prism, Xi would represent only an intensification of a trend, not its source.

According to Dan Wang, a tech analyst who spent years in China, Xi has no real ambitions of a great reformer like Deng. The great power he has amassed in his hands is not matched by any great goal. Regarding critical technologies, his results have been disappointing so far: Beijing is fundamentally misunderstanding the chip industry if it can believe that semiconductors can be run as a national space project, estimates Wang.

As Wang notes, China has not made significant advances in either aviation or chips. However, it has managed to gain dominance in other sectors. In the case of EVs, huge subsidies have created a number of companies that are changing the landscape of the automotive market. As Fords CEO remarked, something monumental happened in our industry where China became the number one exporter of vehicles globally. It had always been the Germans and the Japanese. Chinese competition sows panic on the Old Continent; Carlos Tavares, the CEO of Stellantis, complained in an interview with Le Figaro that Europe rolled out the red carpet to Chinese companies, and now it will have to pay a steep price to compete with them. Westerners, says Tavares, are no longer comfortable with change, and rivalry with the Chinese will be Darwinian. How many will be able to adapt?, asks the CEO. China has accumulated unrivaled competence in the EV industry. According to Goldman analysts, in the PRC, construction of a EV factory takes 1/3 of the time required in other countries, while Chinese battery plants are 80 percent cheaper to build than American ones.

The PRC controls clean tech supply chains. Its grip on green technologies is so firm that many experts do not believe the EU can meet its green goals without maintaining close ties with China. When it comes to wind turbines, its share in the production of essential components amounts to over 70 percent, and in the case of solar panels, it reaches 80 percent. Beijings dominance in the area of rare earth metals particularly in refiningis equally strong. Of the 54 mineral commodities that the U.S. Geological Survey deems crucial to the country, America depends on China for as many as 35.

According to Jeffrey Ding, who studies the questions of technology and great power rivalry, it is not narrow technological developments that decide a countrys fate, but so-called general purpose technologies like the steam engine, electricity, or the computer. These are engines of growth that become engines of power, as the rise and fall of nations is ultimately determined by differences in economic growth.

Ding argues that the nature of the American innovation system presents a huge advantage to the U.S. Its decentralized character allows methods, information and technology to diffuse quickly and in multiple directions. At the turn of the 20th century, while other countries had the potential to rival the U.S. in terms of innovation, it was America that was able to diffuse interchangeable manufacturing methods because it had stronger connections between the frontier institutions, entrepreneurs, and engineers. This gave it the edge that would be key to the American Century. It was later to be repeated with computers, when Japanin contrast with the U.S.struggled to integrate them into its economy and institutional practice on a large scale. Ding contends that the U.S. should defend the status quo when it comes to its own innovation diffusion structures, as these are what will keep America ahead of the PRC, including in the coming age of artificial intelligence.

A number of voices suggest that the American innovation system needs a major overhaul. On the surface, it appears that there is a genuine renewal. The CHIPS and Science Act, the Infrastructure Act or the Inflation Reduction Act might imply that the state has regained its ability to mobilize resources and carry out industrial policy. Even if we set aside criticisms, such as the argument that the CHIPS Act doesnt represent a success for the semiconductor industry, but rather a win for the incumbents or simply a rescue plan for Intel, this whole effort may still lead to nowhere. As David Adler and William B. Bonvillian remark, Pathways necessary for diffusing new technologies and getting them to market are missing, including a lack of scale-up financing mechanisms. The vocational education system has withered as has the corporate lab system.

They argue that one of the main culprits was the fascination with information technologies. As a result, industrial policy was eventually dropped and deindustrialization allowed. Yet the problem boils down to more than a misguided notion of the countrys developmentAmerica is not going to turn into one big California, after all. The greatest barrier to technology implementation has become the lack of a technically trained workforce. This problem is also resurfacing in the context of the CHIPS Act. Of the 115,000 new jobs anticipated to be created in the semiconductor industry by 2030, 58 percent are projected to remain unfilled at the current graduation rate. If America wants to build an advanced manufacturing base at home, it must have the right workforce. Unfortunately, the vocational school system, as Adler and Bonvillian write, has collapsed. Without reconstructing it and reducing the gap between higher education and the manufacturing process, neither reindustrialization nor acceleration of technological progress to raise Americans standards of living will be attainable.

According to the head of the U.K. A.I. Foundation Model Taskforce, Ian Hogarth, we are entering an era when geopolitical relations will be transformed, if not destabilized by A.I. The U.S. innovation system will be put to a real test before our eyes with the advent of new general purpose technology.

Paul Scharres Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence is a book about the age of A.I. nationalism. Its main premise is that an A.I. race between the U.S. and China is already underway. Translating this new technology into military or economic power will not be easy, but it will happen eventually. The author does not pay particular attention to the economic aspects of the race, such as the issue of explosive growth, which could give absolute economic advantage to one of the great powers. He is primarily interested in the effect that A.I. development will have on military power, as well as the conditions necessary for A.I. to produce such an effect.

Scharre does not define the essence of the A.I. race. Importantly, this arms race, as the economist Pradyumna Prasad explains, is indefinite: There is no clear finishing line, competitors relative position during the race is of utmost importance and there is always the possibility to reverse any win or loss. He believes that the most important edge that this technology could give in the future is the ability for total mobilization of economic resources in the event of war. What U.S. industry accomplished during World War II, could be achieved by A.I. in the near future. It could solve logistical problems, increase production efficiency, or magnify the effects of research and development.

Sharre describes in a very accessible manner the battlegrounds on which countries are competing in the age of A.I. nationalism. One of them is data. The claim that China is the Saudi Arabia of data is inaccurate; China has a wealth of a certain type of data, but lacks others. While their facial recognition systems can be trained on extensive material, it is unlikely to be used to train fighter jets.

The hardware aspect is overlooked by the public, and perhaps constitutes the most complex issue of the A.I. race, as it involves the globally dispersed semiconductor supply chains, where the Dutch ASML and Taiwans TSMC play such an outsized role.

Algorithms are not a scarce resource. People are, Scharre notes. Chinas potential in this regard is growing steadily: Between 2009 and 2019, the number of AI researchers increased twelvefold. PRC researchers are expected to surpass Americans in 2025 when it comes to ranking in the top 1 percent of most cited articles. However, it is still America that attracts the crme de la crme of A.I. engineers.

The non-obvious battleground in the A.I. race is institutions. Its not just the structure of diffusion of tacit knowledge and innovation that matters, but also their internal dynamism. Scharre cites the example of an American company that worked with the government in the field of A.I. and whose owner concluded that he had no other choice but to let his start-up be acquired by a larger corporation that had entire teams dedicated to government contract compliance. As Scharre writes, the fact that an AI start-up felt it needed to be acquired by a major defense contractor in order to succeed is a major problem for the DoD. The ossified bureaucracy needs reform if the U.S. doesnt want to lose its lead in the technological arms race.

Regulation is another facet of the competition for the best institutions. The European Union has thrown itself with ferocity into the race to regulate AI. It is widely believed that Brussels wants to be the quickest and the toughest, because that way, as in the case of GDPR, it will succeed in imposing AI standards around the world. That being said, its hard to imagine that the U.S., China and especially Big Tech will just stand by and watch. As Brookings analysts have convincingly shown, the so-called Brussels effect has little chance of working in the case of A.I. The regulations designed by the EU are so strict that supposedly none of the so-called foundation models (like GPT4 or LLaMa) meet them. One can risk the thesis that E.U. is well aware that the Brussels effect will not work this time around.The A.I. Act is, as I see it, the Maastricht of A.I.all member states will now be bound by an even tighter web of laws regulating a technology that will perhaps shape our future to a greater extent than the Internet.

The A.I. Act will also establish in each country a new agency associated with European A.I. regulation. In doing so, it will create a new interest group, the A.I. bureaucracy, which may align more closely with the E.U.s interest than with those of member states. A.I. is not an opportunity for Brussels to assert its regulatory power in the world, but to deepen the European integration.

The PRC has opted to be less strict. The Chinese state crafted a set of fairly rigid regulations and put them up for debate by companies working in the industry. In consequence, the initially tough restrictions have been loosened. Still, the most relaxed approach prevails in the United States. This attitudewhich one analyst described as laissez-faire and learnamounts to keeping a vigilant eye on AI, while acknowledging that lawmakers do not yet know enough about the technology to formulate regulations.

Washington's decision not to burden A.I. with excessive regulations demonstrates its confidence in Silicon Valley. Not only are U.S. companies spending more on A.I. than the government, they are also capturing all the available talent: In 2020, 70 percent of PhDs in A.I. were hired by the private sector. On the other hand, while China can count on the complete loyalty of its companies, the U.S. governments relationship with Big Tech is problematic.

Scharre reminds us how 3,000 Google employees protested their employers cooperation with the DoD. If support for American national security was controversial for Google, cooperation with the CCP on the Dragonfly project (it involved a search engine for the Chinese market that would meet Communist censorship requirements) was not. Googles CEO defended the cooperation with China to the very end.

Similar protests over cooperation with the U.S. government have also broken out at Amazon and Microsoft. However, there are companies in the field of AI for which national security is important, like Palantir. Its CEO, Alex Karp, rightly noted that entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley charge themselves with constructing vast technical empires but decline to offer support to the state whose protections and underlying social fabric have provided the necessary conditions for their ascent. They would do well to understand that debt, even if it remains unpaid. Ultimately, the U.S. will have to carve out a narrow path between Big Techs dominance and the governments heavy-handed grip, treating A.I.-building companies as it used to treat Big Oil: supporting them where their interest align with the advancement of the American national interest, while also curbing harmful monopolistic behavior. Nevertheless, the shift to techno-nationalism will be too painful for some techno-cosmopolitan incumbents will be replaced by companies that are not ashamed to work with the U.S. government.

The A.I. race carries obvious but asymmetric risks. It is to be feared that if A.I. gets out of hand, it will happen in the PRC. As Bill Drexel and Hannah Kelley write, Little accountability for mistakes means that business owners tend to play fast and loose with safety, as evidenced by Chinas grisly history of industrial accidents. In those cases where accidents have come to light and been met with public outragelike with the toxic toothpaste incident, the poisoned infant formula, or the collision of two high-speed trainsit has done nothing to improve public safety.

Achieving mutual restraint in this arms race seems to be no easy feat. If the hype proves true, the advantage in AI could dwarf all other factors, becoming, in the parlance of Jake Sullivan, a force multiplier. But even if AI does not translate into a military or economic revolution, it will significantly change both war and the economy, and no great power will miss the opportunity to gain an upper hand in those areas. Scharre mentions that there is a lively discussion in China about AI restraint. However, he cites a U.S. general arguing that those who talk the loudest about restraint are the ones who implement it the least. The trust gap seems unbridgeable.

To ensure that America never has to consider the Needham question in relation to its own development trajectory, it needs to ask itself a different one. What made it rise to first place in terms of technological progress? Many books have been written on the subject and complex arguments constructed to account for American exceptionalism in this regard.Still, there is a perspective that seems neglected. It reveals something about the American character. One study shows that CEOs born in frontier counties are more supportive of innovation than others, and their companies create more and higher quality patents than their competitors, building a culture striving after technological breakthroughs. Fixing the innovation system alone wont be sufficient: the technological frontier could still vanish from the horizon. The frontier spirit has shaped America and expressed a certain moral type, but it is not eternal and may fade away. The fifth battleground is to preserve and cultivate it.

See more here:
The Vanishing Frontier - The American Conservative

Rebranding gives businesses an image refresh and a competitive edge in an era of dynamic markets. Google underwent it in 2015, creating the Alphabet we now know as its parent company. Its birth has made it possible for its divisions to operate independently. Each remains a part of the company while handling projects beyond the internet search engine, advertising, or making new Google Pixel phones.

Google remains the Google you know but falls under Alphabet as a subsidiary and the largest shareholder. It runs alongside Waymo, Calico, and other companies in its diverse portfolio. Learn more about Alphabet, who runs it, and other information in this post.

Alphabet is a multinational technology company that Larry Page and Sergey Brin created on October 2, 2015. Page and Brin are Google's co-founders and restructured the popular technology company to expand and diversify their operations.

Alphabet and Google aren't the same. The former became the parent company, and the latter is now a subsidiary of it. Google shares have also converted to Alphabet stock and retain their ticker symbols as GOOG (Class C shares without voting rights) and GOOGL (Class A common stock) on the NASDAQ stock exchange and other platforms.

According to Page in an open letter, the name Alphabet fits the rebranding as it's a "collection of letters that represent language, one of humanity's most important innovations, and is the core of how we index with Google search." It also reflects in the website address as abc.xyz.

Nothing about how you use Google's products and services has changed. The Workspace apps, YouTube, and Maps, among others, remain intact. The difference is in the corporate structure. Current and future subsidiaries under Alphabet have more autonomy to chase separate goals and enter new markets.

Also, Alphabet began generating financial reports in three segments on a quarterly basis. They report the profit and losses for Google Services, Google Cloud, and Other Bets. Before that, there were reports for only Google and Other Bets. The segments operate as follows:

Google's overhaul makes the new company more accountable. Its introduction of the above divisions allows investors to monitor the financial performance of core services and startup projects. It also isolates the risk attached to each subsidiary, where one could fail or face roadblocks without affecting the others.

Different shareholders and investors own Alphabet as it's a public-traded company. Google's co-founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, hold its Class B shares. It gives them 10 times more voting rights, even though they own a small percentage of the total shares. Class A shares have only one vote per share, while Class C has none.

Also, B shares aren't public. Hence, they don't exist on stock exchanges and allow the founders and CEOs to control the company's direction and decision-making. In terms of executive positions, Sergey Brin was Google's President from the company's founding date in 1998 until 2019.

Meanwhile, Page acted as the CEO three times. First, from the founding date until 2001, then from 2011 to 2015. That same year, he became Alphabet's CEO and handed his position at Google over to Product Chief Sundar Pichai. Both co-founders stepped down from their positions in 2019 but retained board membership and are still major shareholders.

Pichai is now Google and Alphabet's CEO. He was the brain behind ChromeOS and played a pivotal role in Nest's acquisition, among other achievements.

Under the Alphabet umbrella are Google and Other Bets. Other Bets are companies still in their early or experimental stages and operate independently of the core internet services. Below are some of the subsidiaries Alphabet oversees:

Google's transformation story embraces change and progress, an effort that may continue to bring financial success and tackle public scrutiny concerning user data privacy. Post-restructuring, the new company has raised mixed reactions from supporters and critics. Some say that it may be setting unrealistic goals in the name of pursuing new horizons.

One includes Google Fiber and Webpass, two services meant to deliver fast internet and phone privileges to you via a physical line. Already, the company has had to pause operations in numerous cities and made massive layoffs. Speculations are abuzz about low demand and financial setbacks. But innovation is risky, and only time will tell if Alphabet's moonshot projects succeed.

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Alphabet: The complete guide to Google's parent company - Android Police

The ruling centre-right New Democracy party (affiliated with the European Peoples Party EPP) lost the municipalities of Athens and Thessaloniki in the second round of Greeces regional and municipal elections. Analysts now estimate that a new political landscape is emerging with the collaboration of progressive parties to be in the spotlight.

In the first round last week, candidates of New Democracy ranked first in both Athens and Thessaloniki. However, progressive parties joined forces in the second round, changing the picture.

Particularly, in Athens, New Democracys current mayor, Kostas Bakoyannis (nephew of Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis), was defeated by Charis Doukas, a candidate from the socialist Pasok party who was publicly supported by the leftist Syriza candidate Kostas Zachariadis, who ranked third in the first round.

After announcing the results, Doukas thanked Zachariadis publicly for his support.

The situation was similar in Thessaloniki and other municipalities, as almost everywhere progressive parties joined forces, they managed to beat ruling New Democracy candidates.

On a regional level, New Democracy lost five out of six regions as their candidates were defeated by independent right-wing candidates who did not have the support of the ruling party or by other progressive candidates.

It wasnt a particularly good night, Greek PM Mitsotakis said.

Greek media reported that the results were a blow to the ruling New Democracy and the Greek PM himself, considering that between the first and second rounds, Mitsotakis got actively involved by openly supporting his partys candidates in public appearances and statements.

The main opposition, the Syriza party (EU Left), commented that the results were a first step to ending the countrys nepotism.

Heres what the progressive world does when it comes together [] Tonight is the first major crack in the Mitsotakis regime, a Syriza source told media.

The newly elected Syriza leader, Stefanos Kasselakis, who, after the first round, called on the partys voters to back progressive candidates against conservatives, hailed the result, saying the next milestone will be the 2024 EU elections.

The collaboration between socialist Pasok and leftist Syriza has been in the spotlight for a long time but re-emerged on the surface again after the July national elections, in which New Democracy triumphed.

According to the current polls, Syriza remains the main opposition, followed by Pasok.

In Brussels, the official member of the EU socialist party is Pasok, while Syriza belongs to the EU left. However, EU socialists consider Syriza ideologically close to them and invited former leftist leader Alexis Tsipras to their meetings.

Many EU socialists in the past publicly expressed their hope for these two parties to join forces to take down conservatives. However, based on Greek political features, such a collaboration on a national level still has a long way to go.

Syriza has been more open to such an alliance, while Pasok is more reluctant.

People need a strong progressive force that will send New Democracy into opposition, Pasok leader Nikos Androulakis said on Sunday.

Androulakis hopes Pasok will eventually become the main opposition force and lead the progressive camp in Greeces political spectrum.

Pasok also does not see in a positive light the flirt between Syriza and the EU socialists.

Analysts estimate that the results of the regional and local elections will mount pressure on Pasok to reconsider its stance.

(Sarantis Michalopoulos | Euractiv.com)

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Greek progressives deal ruling New Democracy severe blow in local elections - EURACTIV

We do not live by facts. Some people may think they do, but they dont. They live by values. It is values that direct our actions; facts merely tell us how to get where we want to go. Whether we should provide healthcare access to all, or just to those who can afford it, is a values question (and the correct value answer is to all). But whether our country can afford to provide healthcare access for all is a fact question (and the fact is that yes, we can). Those who say that we cannot afford it are ignoring the real facts because they dont want to acknowledge those facts. Their real issue is that they follow a different value system, but they usually prefer not to say so out loud, so they pretend to use facts.

Now, because those people dont really care about facts, it may seem that using facts against them is a waste of time. But this is a mistaken conclusion; facts still matter in the United States (and the rest of the civilized world), and even though having the facts on your side doesnt guarantee an easy victory, it certainly helps, since most people will go along with facts that have enough evidence behind them. (See Galileo, Semmelweis, and/or Wegener.) Even though Republicans are banking heavily on that no longer being true, America still tends to be a mostly fact-based society, where the difficulties have more to do with persuading people what the facts really are, rather than persuading them to use facts in the first place.

But as we stress the importance of facts in making decisions, it is important to remember that facts apply equally to both sides. There is no such thing as a liberal fact or a conservative fact. Liberal and conservative values are different, but facts are the same for everybody. Therefore, if the facts turn out to contradict a Progressive idea, then Progressives must be prepared to adjust or abandon that idea, so that they dont do the very thing that they (rightly) accuse Conservatives of doing.

As an instructive example, lets consider a major Progressive mistake: reforming the teaching of reading in public schools.

There have long been two general methods for teaching children how to read. The traditional method is usually called phonics. The other method is variously described as look-say or whole word or whole language. Through most of the 1800s in the United States the phonics method dominated, although there were some teachers who used the alternate method. But by the early 1900s many leading educational reformers (i.e. Educational Progressives) were strongly arguing that look-say produced better results. That is, children who were taught with the look-say method were able to read better, and, more importantly, they learned to read with better comprehension. Eventually this view came to dominate American public education. In 1930 the best-known product of the look-say revolution was published: the famous Dick and Jane reading books. The Progressive victory seemed complete.

But then. . .well, I wont recount here the history of the phonics wars between Progressives and Traditionalists, except to say that a war erupted, and it dragged on for years. But the important point, as far as facts are concerned, is that in 1967 a Harvard professor, Dr. Jeanne Chall, published a comprehensive book that described the available research on the effectiveness of the competing methods of reading instruction, and concluded that the phonics method (which she called decoding) was unquestionably the more effective method. In 1983 she published a follow-on book that concluded even more strongly than before that decoding produced not only better rote reading but also produced better comprehension. The facts were in, and they were conclusive. The reformers were wrong.

And that should have been the end of the war. Well, in some ways it was, but there still remained some people who clung to the whole word method despite the evidence that proved beyond doubt that it was not the better method. But, ironically, they were now the Conservatives who had become accustomed to a particular point of view and were now unwilling to move on from it. The point is that even in Progressive circles there are some who cling to an idea that they like even if the facts dont support it. And if that is wrong when Conservatives do it, then it is equally wrong when Progressives do it. If we are going to call ourselves fact-based, then we have to live it, not just say it.

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Progressives, as much as Conservatives, ought to adjust their ideas to fit actual facts - Daily Kos

Progressives are facing backlash over their initial responses to the attacks on Israel by Hamas militants, revealing the degree to which they’re at odds with others in the Democratic caucus over the issue.

Members of the Squad such as Reps. Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) and Cori Bush (D-Mo.) took heat from fellow Democrats this week over statements criticized for being too tepid in the wake of the violent attacks against Israeli civilians. 

Meanwhile, after mounting pressure, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) condemned the “bigotry and callousness” at a pro-Palestinian rally aligned with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) in New York City.

The condemnation directed at certain segments of the left underscores the fissures within the Democratic Party when it comes to Israel. It also suggests progressives will have to navigate an increasingly difficult political environment in which they will be expected to unequivocally support Israel’s right to exist while also advocating for Palestinian rights. 

“The challenge is to continue to respond, as I think a lot of progressive members have already done … to acknowledge the common humanity of all of us, of both people,” Matt Duss, a former senior foreign policy adviser to Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), told The Hill.

“We’re going to be getting to a moment where some people are going to be required to show real courage and take a page from Congresswoman Barbara Lee in the wake of 9/11,” said Duss, referring to the California progressive’s vote against the invasion of Afghanistan.

“To say, let’s think about this a little bit. We could be starting something that we’re not quite ready for, quite sure about,” he said.

Bush and Tlaib, the only Palestinian American in Congress, were among the most harshly criticized in the immediate aftermath of the initial wave of attacks in Israel. Tlaib suggested withholding United States support to fund Israel’s “apartheid government,” a comment that infuriated fellow lawmakers who found it offensive as the death toll continued to rise. She also categorized the terrorist attack as part of a “resistance” effort. 

Bush, an equally outspoken House progressive, echoed Tlaib’s sentiments.

Some voices on the left saw their public remarks as appropriate calls for de-escalation that recognized the plight of both sides. They argued for an acknowledgment of suffering among civilians in both camps and denounced Hamas as a terrorist organization.

“Rep. Tlaib and Rep. Bush both issued statements that mourned the loss of Israeli and Palestinian civilian lives, and then said we need to address the root causes of violence to get to peace, and they are now being attacked,” said Beth Miller, the political director of Jewish Voice for Peace Action, a progressive Jewish group.

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But others in the party were enraged by the statements. Some of the Democratic caucus’s most pro-Israel members, including Reps. Ritchie Torres (N.Y.) and Josh Gottheimer (N.J.), expressed their full disapproval.

“Shame on anyone who glorifies as ‘resistance’ the largest single-day mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust,” Torres said, calling the statement “reprehensible and repulsive.”

The mounting pushback came as Israelis publicly mourned the severity of the ambush as videos showing the atrocities — many of them inflicted on women and children — spread across social media.

As of Wednesday afternoon, the attack by Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, had left more than 1,200 Israelis dead, starting a war in which more than 2,300 people have been killed in total. The U.S. government said that 22 U.S. citizens had been killed in the conflict, and 17 were still unaccounted for.

In a sign of the growing pressure on progressives, Ocasio-Cortez earlier this week criticized the DSA-aligned rally in New York City’s Times Square, a stance that came after she was chided for supporting a ceasefire.

The rally, which was held in support of Palestinians, drew swift rebukes from leaders across the political spectrum. Ocasio-Cortez, whose district is not far from where the protests were held, eventually released a statement condemning it.

“The bigotry and callousness expressed in Times Square on Sunday were unacceptable and harmful in this devastating moment,” Ocasio-Cortez said in a statement reported by Politico. “It also did not speak for the thousands of New Yorkers who are capable of rejecting both Hamas’ horrifying attacks against innocent civilians as well as the grave injustices and violence Palestinians face under occupation.”

Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) speaks during a House Oversight and Accountability Committee hearing for the basis of the impeachment inquiry of President Biden on Thursday, September 28, 2023.

The clash between DSA affiliates and its usual allies such as Ocasio-Cortez highlights the delicate nature of the issue and its evolution on the left. While Democrats are reliable allies of Israel, the party has seen cracks in its support, as many on the progressive left have also pushed for Palestinian rights.

Duss said conversations are already happening between progressive lawmakers and outside advocates about addressing the conflict in a constructive and nuanced way — a potential uphill battle given the severity of the situation on the ground. 

“This horror is very fresh. We’re still learning more about this hour by hour. It keeps getting more awful,” he said. “I do think people are thinking about ways to talk about this in the most constructive way possible.”

“Even in ‘normal’ times, this is a difficult discussion to have. It is far more difficult now for obvious reasons,” Duss added.

Sanders, who is Jewish and has sometimes clashed with pro-Israel Democrats, released a statement Wednesday addressing the conflict. He said Hamas committed a “terrorist assault on Israel” that could have “horrific short- and long-term consequences.” 

His position — which included a reference to “justice for the Palestinian people” and called Israel’s tactics in response to the attack “a serious violation of international law” — went further than others in the Senate.

“Longer term, this attack is a major setback for any hope of peace and reconciliation in the region — and justice for the Palestinian people. For years, people of good will throughout the world, including some brave Israelis, have struggled against the blockade of Gaza, the daily humiliations of occupation in the West Bank, and the horrendous living conditions faced by so many Palestinians,” the Vermont senator wrote. 

Some progressive Jewish activists say Capitol Hill Democrats should formally emphasize de-escalation and are looking to members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, the top body of elected liberals in the House, to lead the way.  

“It has never been so important that we fight harder, because it just got a lot steeper,” said Miller, whose group is in regular communication with lawmakers. “And that means we need to be louder.”

Blurring the lines further among the left flank, other progressive officeholders offered staunch support for Israel.

Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and John Fetterman (D-Pa.) went further than other Senate progressives for Israel, with Warren tearing up while discussing the devastating losses and Fetterman making it clear that he is in support of Israel “neutralizing the terrorists responsible for this barbarism.”

Meanwhile, many Democrats applauded President Biden’s speech Tuesday, in which he called the Hamas terrorist attack “pure, unadulterated evil” and reconfirmed his administration’s unwavering support for Israel.  

In progressive circles, there is also hope that he and the administration will also acknowledge the struggles of Palestinians and are pushing for a conversation around de-escalation both in Congress and on Pennsylvania Ave. It’s their goal for that discussion to happen sooner than later.

“I understand you want to show complete support and sympathy for the Israelis,” said Duss, who added that the severity of the moment means the president should speak to the full depth of his country’s diversity. 

“This is a president who has taken important steps to address issues of racial injustice and equality. I think a lot of progressives just want him to extend that to foreign policy,” he said.

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Progressives face backlash over response to Israel attacks - The Hill