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If norms exist in the Chinese Communist Party, perhaps Xi Jinping, the general secretary and de facto president of the Peoples Republic of China, has established one by attending the inauguration of incoming chief executives. He last came to Hong Kong five years ago when Carrie Lam took up the post.

But his visit, whose length did not match the three days of 2017, perhaps from a fear of Covid-19 or a need to concentrate on mitigating its economic and social consequences on the mainland, has deeper significance.

For Xi himself, it is an opportunity to bang the nationalist and patriotic drums in this important year when he intends to continue for a third term in the trinity of top party, army and state posts. This reminder to the Chinese people that the CCP ended the century of foreign humiliation, which began with the ceding of Hong Kong to Britain, portrays Xi as the embodiment of the CCPs success.

For others, the 25th anniversary is significant as a halfway milestone to 2047. Before the 1997 handover of Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping, then paramount leader of the PRC, had promised 50 years no change () as reassurance that his policy of one country, two systems would allow Hong Kongs freedoms to continue and remain different from those on the mainland.

So, where does Hong Kong stand 25 years after the handover?

The answer is not where the people of Hong Kong and the British government hoped back in 1997. At best Hong Kong experiences one country, one and a half systems. 50 years no change was always a way of papering over unresolved differences or worries. The hope was that, by 2047, the PRC would have changed, and thus the gap with the Hong Kong system would have narrowed. Indeed the CCP has changedfor the worseand the gap between past rhetoric and present reality has widened.

Every five years or so since 1997 the clash between Hong Kongs and Beijings interpretation of one country, two systems boiled over into protest. The issues were unsurprising: national security legislation (2003); national education (2012); electoral system (2014); and extradition arrangements, which then led to wider unrest (2019).

The wide scale demonstrations and street violence of 2019 convinced the CCP that its three red linesno harm to national security, no challenge to the central governments authority and the basic law, and no using Hong Kong as a base to undermine the PRChad been crossed. In essence, they embodied the fear that Hong Kongs protests and values might spill over into neighbouring Guangdong province and provoke unrest. The spear point of the CCPs response was the national security law, or NSL, which came into force on 1 July 2020. The NSL centred on four crimes: secession from the PRC, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. Their definitions are elasticintentionallyand their enforcement ubiquitous. Currently, around 150 people are awaiting trial.

While maintaining the slogan of one country, two systems, the CCP has reached into its traditional playbook for ensuring control. No self-respecting and aspiring totalitarian regime can afford to ignore:

Among other signs of reduced differences between Hong Kong and the mainland, there have been increasing interference and self-censorship in the arts and culture, an expansion of technological surveillance, and a greater presence and powers to operate for mainland security forces.

Hong Kongs value to the PRC has been steadily diminishing. Its gross domestic product, once equivalent to over 18% of that of the mainland, is now under 3%. Its port and airport, while formidable, are matched by recently built facilities elsewhere in the south of the PRC. Shanghai, Shenzhen and other cities are increasingly important in meeting the PRCs financial needs.

Yet Hong Kong retains value for Beijing. While the CCP might be happy to see Shanghai and Shenzhen take over the ex-colonys financial role, there are impediments while the Chinese yuan, unlike the Hong Kong dollar, remains a non-convertible currency (and will for many years). Hong Kong has been a good place for Chinese companies to raise money. And it has proved useful for powerful CCP members as a safer place for their families and capital.

But Dengs phrase of 50 years without change still haunts. It implies change after 2047. The CCP has set itself the second centennial goal of becoming a strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious and modern socialist country by 2049, the centenary of its founding of the PRC. Translated from party-speak, this means that the PRC is to become the worlds primary superpower in an international order transformed to its advantage and values. It is surely inconceivable that a CCP so committed to a narrative of nationalism and superiority would be happy for Hong Kong to retain much more than the merest vestiges of one country, two systems. For the CCP, Hong Kong must become no different from any other mainland city, including a move away from the common law system to legal consistency with the mainland.

This absorbing of Hong Kong into the mainland is partly what lies behind Xis emphasis on the greater bay area plan, an intention to mould the 10 major cities of Guangdong province into an unrivalled economic and technological powerhouse. Hong Kongs identity, population and culture would be subsumed and diluted into insignificance within the 126 million people of the neighbouring province. It is no coincidence that in the 28 June Peoples Dailyarticleannouncing Xis visit, a large portion centres on Hong Kongs future in the greater bay area. As 2047 looms, the CCP may be indifferent to whether foreign companies stay in Hong Kong or move north: if they wish to do business in the PRC, they will need a presence in Hong Kong or the mainland.

Sometimes it is the smallest details which reveal the state of things. The mainland press has assured the world that the Hong Kong police detachment of honour will no longer march in its traditional British fashion but with a mainland goose step. Political slogans, never a feature in Hong Kong, have been floating on boats through Victoria Harbour. Outside the Hong Kong police headquarters two banners spread different messages. In Chinese, there is the disconcerting message about a threat as yet unseen in Hong Kong, Remember to report terrorists. The next victim could be you and in English, United we stand. One country, two audiences.

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Xi's anniversary visit marks near-total CCP control of Hong Kong | The Strategist - The Strategist