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There is no shortage of candidates to host the trans-Saharan gas pipeline. The project, valued at 13 billion euros, is succulent. It could supply around 30 billion cubic metres of gas per year to Europe, according to initial estimates. This is almost double the amount of gas imported from Russia by EU members in 2021. Its implementation would provide a solid alternative to Russian gas, whose dependence has undermined the ability of continental allies to act in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

The plan was first proposed just over four decades ago. In 2009 some agreements were signed between countries, but did not come to fruition. This time, with Europe in the midst of an unprecedented energy crisis, the project to build the trans-Saharan gas pipeline makes sense again. This explains why Nigeria, the country with the largest energy reserves in Africa and the main promoter of the plan, has restarted contacts to put the pipeline into operation as soon as possible, in record time. Brussels is calling for cruising speed in order to have everything ready within two years.

The route has yet to be mapped out. According to experts, there are two viable proposals on the table. The first is from Algeria and the second from Morocco. Nigeria has already signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the two countries, which are locked in a perpetual standoff over the Western Sahara dispute and rivals for hegemony in the Maghreb. Bilateral relations have been formally severed since August 2021. Therefore, beyond the geographical conditions, it is incompatible that the two initiatives could coexist or converge at any point. Only one can remain.

Algiers has an advantage. The length of the infrastructure is shorter than that proposed by Rabat, and it would only need to pass through Niger, the backbone of the tripartite MoU signed in July. For its part, the Moroccan proposal includes a dozen countries, those of the Gulf of Guinea plus Mauritania, Senegal and Gambia, among others. Too many actors, most of them quite unstable. It is true that the jihadist insurgency has been shaking Niger's foundations for years, but the crisis, though acute, is more or less manageable. No firm decision has yet been taken.

However, Libya has, against all odds, entered the running to host the trans-Saharan gas pipeline. The Government of National Unity (GNU) revealed in September that it had formally submitted its bid to Nigeria during the African Petroleum Producers Organisation (APPO) ministerial summit. This was announced at a press conference by the Libyan oil minister, Mohamed Aoun, whose ministry had months earlier launched "technical and economic studies on the feasibility of the project", according to the spokesman for the acting government, Mohamed Hammouda.

The starting conditions, at least from a geographical perspective, would be more profitable than those envisaged in the Algerian proposal. The distance would be shortened by approximately 1,000 kilometres and it would only be necessary to cross Chad, a country also threatened by jihadism and the political crisis reopened after Mahamat Dby's coup d'tat. Less distance translates into lower costs and shorter construction times. And that, in turn, means lower gas prices. These characteristics make the Libyan proposal feasible.

But there are major hurdles to overcome on this route. First, the political instability that has plagued the country since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Libya has been a wasteland ever since. The current institutional division and the duplicity of administrations, one in the west based in Tripoli and the other in the east based in Tobruk, undermine any chance of development. The rift between Abdul Hamid Dbeib's Government of National Unity (GNU) and Fathi Bashagha's Government of National Stability (GSN), allied with Parliamentary Speaker Aguila Saleh and General Khalifa Haftar, is complete.

The presence of Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in Libya also threatens Tripoli's plans. The Kremlin's PMC controls much of the oil installations and prevents the Dbeib government from accessing the oil fields. They are acting on behalf of General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army, their host on Libyan soil. Analyst Robert Uniacke writes in Foreign Policy that their presence 'positions the Kremlin as a spoiler in these future calculations, or at least as a card to play in the negotiations'.

It is by no means out of the question that Russia will use its destabilisation capacity to sabotage the trans-Saharan gas pipeline in the event that Libya succeeds in getting its project approved. All the more so given that its implementation would provide a clear alternative to Russian gas, which is still flowing to Europe in dribs and drabs. This factor is compounded by the presence of Daesh-affiliated militants in the far south of Libya, an area that the infrastructure should also pass through. Attacks against the security forces are a regular occurrence there, although normality is trying to make inroads.

With all the facts on the table, the undertaking seems complicated. But Tripoli is not alone in this persuasion campaign. According to the pan-Arab daily Al Arab, Ankara is on its side. Recep Tayyip Erdoan's circle could be putting pressure on Abuja to fulfil the plans of Dbeib's Government of National Unity (GNU). The Turkish business sector could benefit from a project that would turn the vast Maghreb country into the energy nexus between Africa and Europe. Big words.

Algeria is well advanced in the negotiations and is unlikely to give in. Even less so in this area, even if there are fluid relations between the Algerian leadership and Dbeib's Government of National Unity. Algeria backed Fayez al-Sarraj's Government of National Accord (GNA) and before that, the Islamists. It also has good relations with Erdoan's Turkey, but here there are insurmountable cross-interests.

The alliance between Ankara and Tripoli was strengthened after Monday's diplomatic visit, which resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for hydrocarbon exploration, implying a consolidation of support for the interim government of Dbeib, but in reality "Turkey does not agree with the time that the acting prime minister has been in power", explains Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist and associate member of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Turkey is thus playing both sides of the fence, maintaining contacts with both factions so as not to irritate its internal and external partners.

Harchaoui stresses that Turkey "acts according to Erdoan's needs". The president needs political capital to be re-elected in the next elections, and the polls are not favourable for the Islamist leader. This type of agreement "improves his image", the analyst told Atalayar, because, among other things, "Libya is really useful for Turkey, especially from a nationalist point of view", he added.

The MoU signed by the parties on Monday put Turkish businessmen in the front line to take advantage of Libya's vast energy resources, both on land and sea. "At the moment, nothing has been done to favour Turkish companies," Harchaoui says. In the hypothetical future, if the institutional rift is resolved and the Dbeib government takes back control of the National Oil Company (NOC), this is likely to be the case. If the Libyan plan for the trans-Saharan pipeline is approved, Ankara stands to gain because, among other things, 'Dbeib cannot refuse any deal. He is not in a position to say no because of his position of vulnerability", the analyst argues.

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Is Turkey behind Libya's bid to host the trans-Saharan gas pipeline? - Atalayar