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GNA brokers local solution to east Tripoli tensions

On 6 January, a large military deployment by the Government of National Accord (GNA) GNA-affiliated Kani brigade (also known as the GNAs 7th Infantry Division) from Tarhouna took control of the Garabulli coastal checkpoint 40 km east of Tripoli. The kidnapping of two Kani members, and the killing of one, by a gunman from Garabulli is understood to have sparked the offensive. Tensions subsided after the Kani brigade pulled out later the same day. The Garabulli local mayor announced the handover of the checkpoint to local security, and said that it will be manned in conjunction with the GNAs Central Security forces.

The move raised high tensions in Tripoli, in expectation that the assault was a precursor to a larger anti-GNA move by ex-Government of National Congress (GNC) hardliners who were evicted from Tripoli in September 2017. Although the Kani brigade is now affiliated with the GNA, until fairly recently they were aligned with the hardliner GNC alliance led by Khalifa al-Ghwell, and the militia itself is notorious for its brutality and the hardline Islamist ideologies of some of its leadership. It seems the Kani brigade accommodated Serraj in order to retain their power, which they appear to have done successfully.

Both this deployment and that of Usama Juwaili into the Zuwara region were conducted with minimal casualties and both produced (for now) new security arrangements, with mixed local and national army jurisdictions, where the main military forces withdrew leaving in place collocated forces. This means the GNA, headed by Fayez al-Serraj, has further consolidated its military control of the western region, as well as beginning to institutionalize local cooperation with its army units. However, in the case of the Kani operation it does not seem that this was a carefully planned, strategic operation, but rather a response to local rivalries. Nevertheless, the fact that a local security arrangement was agreed shortly after the incident highlights an apparent trend of brokering local solutions to conflict. However, the resilience of such arrangements in the current political standstill plaguing the UN roadmap is to be tested.

Mary Fitzgerald and Mattia Toaldo have recently updated their guide to Libyas main players for the European Council on Foreign Relations. Outlining the key political groups, armed groups, and jihadists the guide also features detail maps of armed groups, centers of power and key infrastructure. In the guide the authors explore the state of some of the Zintani armed groups:

A number of Zintani forces have distanced themselves from Haftar particularly those close to former defence minister Osama Jweili while others remain supportive. As commander of the GNAs western region military zone, Jweili led an offensive in the Wershefana territory on Tripolis hinterland in November 2017 with a coalition that included forces from Zintan, Tripoli among them Haithem Tajouris TRB and Tarhouna. While ostensibly anti-crime, the operation also served to undermine LNA-affiliated groups in the area.

Click here to read the guide.

On 15 October, the UN Support Mission in Libyas (UNSMIL) new Joint Drafting Committee, composed of members of both the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS), met for the second time in Tunis to continue negotiations on amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). As discussions continued the following day, and despite the UNSMIL indicating that both sides had developed a clearer understanding of the selection-mechanism for the Presidency Council, the HoR announced that they were suspending their participation in the dialogue. Detailing frustrations with the HCS for being unwilling to engage with contentious issues and unable to provide conclusive solutions to points of disagreement, the HoR stated that they would not pursue any further discussions until receiving in writing the HCSs position on crucial matters.

The key issues of contention are not detailed, however they are likely to be connected to how individuals are selected for key positions and to Article 8 of the LPA. Article 8 requires all military positions to be vacant upon the formation of the new Libyan government and would see Khalifar Haftar lose his position as commander of the armed forces. Sources say that the HoR wants the decisions of the Supreme Commander of Libyan Army, which under the current terms would be the PC, to be approved by the HoR, while the HCS rejects this.

The situation is likely to put the new UNSMIL road map into a prolonged state of limbo that may provide Haftar with an opportunity to justify and pursue his preference for a military solution to the crisis. Haftar has said the ongoing UN political process is not the only solution to Libyas political crisis, implying that a military solution approved by the people remains possible. During a speech in Benghazi on 14 October, Haftar claimed that the Libyan National Army (LNA) controls territory from Ras al-Jedir to west Zawiyya, and while Tripoli remains outside his grasp, he has on several occasions stated his willingness to take the city by force if necessary. If the LNAs military control and social support for Haftar increases in western Libya, Haftar may no longer see any value in paying lip service to the UN process and could attempt to achieve his aim of taking Tripoli through force or via a series of alliances on the ground.

On 25 September, presidential hopeful Basit Igtet landed in Metiga airport and led small crowds from Tajoura to Martyrs Square to demonstration against the Government of National Accord (GNA). However, the crowds remained relatively small, numbering around 2000 people, and their demands were unclear. Pro-GNA Tripoli militias were deployed in force in most of the main streets in the capital leading towards the square and continue to remain deployed in anticipation of any security instability in the capital. The Tripoli security directorate had previously announced that it was denying permission for the demonstration but they did not try to prevent it on the day.

According to the Libya Herald, the event was peaceful, in spite of the presence of a significant number of anti-Igtet protestors and despite some of the those on both sides said to have taken weapons just in case there was violence. The two sides were kept part by plain clothed security forces, said to belong to Ghneiwas central security authority. According to the Washington Post, hundreds of counter-demonstrators attended and shouted anti-Igtet slogans. Igtet himself was present at one point, but did not speak. As night fell, the two sides clashed with fistfights before security forces intervened and separated them with dozens of vehicles. Most headed home afterwards.

The deflation of expectations for a large, game-changing popular rally in support of Igtet, as well as against the GNA and Khalifa Haftar, is likely to pave the way for the new UN led roadmap to gain stronger momentum and traction in the coming days. While the UN led process is indeed expected to gain positive momentum, especially after the high level UN Summit lending support to the plan, possibilities for further fragmentation and conflict remain high. Military wise, the fomenting conflict in Sabratha may become a catalyst for a groundswell of military action in the coastal region west of Tripoli between pro and anti LNA rivals, and thus could trigger conflict in the capital as well.

Last week, the UN Security Council published its final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011). The long, detailed report touches on a number of significant topics including human rights violations, violations of the arms embargo, and the role of foreign mercenaries in Libyas conflicts. The report states that the panel continues to receive frequent reports of serious human rights violations, including kidnappings, arbitrary detentions and summary executions. Cases investigated by the Panel include abuses against Libyan residents of Tripoli and Benghazi, prisoners of war and migrants.

The Panel documented several instances in which armed groups were involved in actual or potential violations of the arms embargo. Access to military equipment has facilitated the escalation of armed conflicts, notably through air strikes. The report states that the United Arab Emirates have been providing military equipment to the LNA, in violation of the arms embargo, significantly increasing the air support available to LNA. Likewise, the report indicates that armed groups in Misrata have received support from a network of foreign pilots, mercenaries, and arms dealers, including Ecuadorians, which has allowed them to increase their capacity to launch airstrikes.

The report also highlights the direct intervention of Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries in the Libyan conflict, particularly in the Oil Crescent, warning that their actions are a direct threat to the security and economic stability of Libya. The Panel also received reports that commanders of the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi were received in Marj in mid-October 2016. Chadian groups were also hosted in Misrata-controlled bases in Ahjar al-Sawda and in Sabha.

This report highlights the destabilizing impact that external support for rival factions, whether that support is direct or indirect, military or political, has on Libyas fragile dynamics. While such support continues, which it is likely to do particularly in the case of the UAE given the recent strengthening of the anti-Qatar Arab alliance, it will be difficult to de-escalate conflict and bring rival factions to the negotiating table on equal terms.

Click here to accessthe full report.

In a long form article for Norwegian NGO Hate Speech International, Jason Pack and Rhiannon Smith map out the history and context of Libyas myriad jihadist groups.

Six years after protests first erupted in February 2011 against the brutal and repressive rule of Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, Libya remains a country beset by deepening political fragmentation, bloody internecine conflict and accelerating economic decline. The Islamic State (ISIS) capitalised on this instability and in late 2014 established a satellite branch in Libya, successfully seizing territory around the central coastal city of Sirte and expanding its influence across the country. By December 2016, an anti-ISIS military campaign supported by US airstrikes and led by militias aligned with Libyas UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) Libyas internationally recognised government established under the December 2015 Skhirat Libyan Political Agreement had succeeded in driving ISIS out of Sirte. However, the group is far from defeated and ISIS fighters are regrouping in the vast deserts and remote communities of southern Libya.1

Yet, while ISIS undoubtedly continues to pose a threat to security and stability in Libya, the group is neither the strongest nor the most dangerous jihadist2 group in Libya currently. Since those uprisings that culminated in Qadhafis violent death in October 2011, after 42 years in control, jihadist groups have grown in power and influence, often with funding from wealthy international backers. Although they remain largely on the fringes of Libyan politics and society, jihadists of all colours and stripes can influence developments in Libya due to the transitory and almost fickle nature of the countrys political and military alliances, as well as and the increasing polarisation and instability of institutions at the level of central government.

These jihadist networks also pose a threat to security outside Libya, as demonstrated by the horrifying suicide bombing against a Manchester arena on 22 May that killed 22 people and injured many more. The attack was claimed by ISIS and conducted by Salman Abedi, a British Libyan whose parents fled to the UK in the 1990s due to their connections to theal-Qaeda linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).3 Abedi visited Tripoli shortly before he carried out the attack, and although at the time of writing it remains unclear whether Abedireceived direct training or supportfor his attack from ISIS cells in Libya, or from associates closer to home, his familial connections to Libyan jihadist networks are significant.4 It is therefore crucial to understand who these Libyan jihadists are, how they interact with other actors, and what influence they can exert.

Click here to read the full article.

Ali Shamekh, the CEO of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) as appointed by theHouse of Representatives and the eastern authorities in August 2016, toldReuters on the sidelines ofGlobal Sovereign Wealth Forum in London on 29 March that he was working to unite the fragmented LIA.TheGovernment of National Accord (GNA) also named a Steering Committee to manage the fund last summer, headed by Ali Mahmoud Hassan Mohamed. However,following a recent Tripoli court ruling freezing the decree that created the GNAs steering committee, AbdulMagid Breish, who was thechairman of the LIA before it split and claims he retains this position, has moved back into the LIAs head office in Tripoli.

Shamekh said the fall in production, lower oil prices and instability in Libya meant he was considering investing part of the funds capital inside the country. There are not enough resources or money coming into the country, he said. LIA can play a role in directing some of its funds into energy and power generation, both traditional and renewables, oil and gas, and infrastructure our ports and airports need rehabilitation.

He said he was considering starting an incubation and acceleration fund to back young entrepreneurs with seed capital, particularly in the IT and financial services sectors. The money for this inward investment could come from the $11 billion Libyan Local Investment and Development Fund, a subsidiary of LIA. Shamekh also wants to reopen a London office.

We are considering having a presence for LIA in London its under evaluation by the board of directors, he said. The United Kingdom and London in particular is a focal point of our future strategy overseas.

Click here to read the full article.

Rhiannon Smith spoke to Voice of Americas Mohamed Elshinnawi on 22 March about the dangers of the escalating situation in Libya and how a shift to greater militarisation of the conflict could result in an endless tug of war between competing factions, no one of whom are powerful enough to control the whole country themselves. She discussed the role the international community could play in reinvigorating the political process by de-incentivising military action.

Please click here and go to 17.33 to hear the full interview.

In an article for Foreign Policy, Karim Mezran and Mattia Toaldo argue that as fighting heats up between rival armed groups and Russia increases its involvement, a power vacuum threatens to tear Libyaapart and therefore the international community needs to be doing more to prevent this.

First, Libya needs a de-conflicting mechanism to avoid escalation. If the U.N. envoy cannot do it, someone else in the West should. What better opportunity for Britain to show its continued relevance after Brexit than this? Or why not the French foreign minister, who could beef up his legacy just weeks before leaving office? This should only be a temporary replacement for a fully functioning U.N. mission capable of working on reconciliation, local cease-fires, and monitoring human rights violations. Both a temporary negotiator and the U.N. could work on a number of confidence-building measures, such as establishing permanent channels of communication, liberating prisoners, reopening roads, and sharing humanitarian aid.

Second, the country needs what economist Hala Bugaighis calls a Libyan Economic Agreement on how to peacefully share its oil wealth. Negotiating a new social contract may take some time, but in the meantime, two measures would represent a good start: The government in Tripoli should strengthen financial support for all of Libyas municipalities, including areas controlled by Haftar, and oil installations should be placed under the control of the independent National Oil Corporation in Tripoli, with attempts to establish parallel economic institutions punished by international sanctions.

Finally, Tripoli must be the heart of international efforts. The most pressing need is a plan to free the city of all heavy weapons, pushing militias to stock them outside of civilian-populated areas. This is an important condition to allow the Libyan government to operate and to facilitate international assistance.

Click here to read the full article.

The Middle East Eye reported yesterday that on 21 March, the Misrata Military Council led by Ibrahim Bin Rajab claimed it had overthrown the Misrata Local Council, a locally elected body headed by mayor Mohammed Eshtaiwi. Tensions are escalating between more moderate Misratan factions, who largely support the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, and more hardliner factions who areopponents of both the GNA and Haftar and largelysupport Khalifa al-Ghwells resurrected National Salvation government which was evicted from Tripoli last week.

In a statement from the Misrata Military Council (MMC) and its allied militias the Union of Revolutionary Fighters (URF) and the Misrata Security Department MMC chief Ibrahim Bin Rajab said the group had overthrown the municipal council after it refused to negotiate with protesters over its management of the city.

A committee was set up to mediate between the protesters and the municipal council, but the latter refused to meet with the committee without giving any justifications, the Libya Observer cited the statement as saying.

Click here to read the full article.

In an article for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Mattia Toaldo and Karim Mezran argue that at this point in the ongoing crises affecting Libyas governance, economy and security, none of the belligerent parties can militarily defeat the others, but each side thinks it can win and is unwilling to back down. They argue that:

First, the United States, Europe, and regional powers involved in Libya such as Egypt, the UAE, Algeria, Tunisia, and Qatar should put in place a de-conflicting mechanism, cooperating where possible with Russia. Major fighting between the east and the west of the country should be avoided by keeping channels of communication open. These countries should also push UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres to overcome the impasse on his Special Representative for Libya created by the US rejection of Salam Fayyad so that the UN can play an active role in setting up a political process.

Second, as demonstrated by recent fighting, Libyas oil wealth and its distribution remain one of the core drivers of conflict. The US and Europeans should push Prime Minister Serraj to offer to Eastern Libya a Libyan Economic Agreement on how to share oil wealth and energy installations in a way that benefits the Libyan public and stabilizes the country.

Finally, the militia rule in the capital is incompatible with any stabilization effort and threatens any Libyan government while hampering any form of international assistance.

Click here to read the full article.

On 15 March, the Libya Herald reported that fighting between militias in western Tripoli had intensified and spread from Hay al-Andalus and Gurgi towards central Tripoli, with local pro-Government of National Accord (GNA) militias attacking and reportedly ousting Khalifa al-Ghwell and his National Salvation forces from the Rixos hotel compound. There are reports that Ghwell was injured in the fighting.

Haitham Tajouris Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade joined forces with Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli, also known as Ghneiwa, to retake control (of the Rixos), according to the Tripoli operations room. Ghneiwas Abu Sleem Central Security Force is now reported to be protecting the hotel, which was seized by Ghwell last October in an attempted coup rejecting the PC and the UNSMIL-brokered Libyan Political Agreement.

On the evening of 15 March, the Presidential Council (PC) managed to broker a ceasefire in the capital, calling forthe departure of armed factions beyond the law within the frameworkof the Libyan Political Agreement. However, it is unclear whether this ceasefire will be effective, and precisely which militias the PC and its allies want to depart the city.

Click here and here to read more from the Libya Herald.

Rhiannon Smith spoke to the Voice of Americas Africa Today radio show on 8 March about the significant impact that the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB) advance against Haftars Libyan National Army (LNA) forces is likely to have on Libyan political alliances and the ongoing peace process, and how prolonged conflict in the oil crescent is even more likely now that the House of Representatives (HoR) has voted to withdraw from the Libya Political Dialogue. She highlighted how the BDBs handover of Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil ports to Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) may not signify the strength of the GNA but rather its weakness, as by tacitly extending its support to the BDB, the GNA is actually bowing to pressure from the loose Islamist alliance led by Khalifa al-Ghwell in Tripoli.

Click here to listen at 9 minutes into the clip.

The Associated Press has reported that a spokesperson for the House of Representatives (HoR) said yesterday that the body is suspending all peace talks with the UN-backed Presidential Council (PC) and Government of National Accord (GNA).

The Tobruk body called on all Libyan parties to condemn militias that occupied the two key terminals in what it described as terrorist attacks, saying it was suspending its participation in peace talks until they did so.

The GNA unity government is not legitimate any more, as well as its presidential council and anything to do with this entity, Ablaihig said, urging the international community to lift an embargo on weapons sales to the Libyan army under Hifter.

Meanwhile, Reuters reported thatIdris Bukhamada, recently named by theGNA as the head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard, told Al-Nabaa TV thatWe have been tasked by the BDB to protect the oil ports, adding his oil guard belonged to the state and had no military mission.

Click here to read the AP article and here for Reuters.

On 9 February, Libyan National Army (LNA) forces launched airstrikes against an airbase in Jufra, around 300km south of Sirte, killing two and wounding 13 according to the LNA spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari. He said that the attack was aimed at immobilizing the enemy before an expected attack on the ports. There had been reports in recent days of anti-LNA forces, including the Benghazi Defence Brigades and some Misratan elements, mobilizing in Jufra to launch another offensive to retake the oil crescent ports of Sidra and Ras Lanuf from the LNA. The Libya Herald reports that the LNA planes took off fromAl-Khadim airbase south-east of Marj allegedly usedin recent weeks byaircraft from the UAE.

On 8 February, a convoy of fighters from Misrata arrived in Tripoli. They are led byColonel Mahmoud al-Zaghel, a military commander allied to Khalifa al-Ghwell who has recently re-established the General National Congress (GNC) National Salvation government in Tripoli in an attempt to remove the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) from power.

Zagals force arrived in Tripoli on Wednesday from Misrata, Ghwells home city, in a convoy of several dozen vehicles, triggering heavy clashes with an armed group loyal to the GNA in the southern districts of Salaheddin and Abu Salim.Zagal announced on Thursday the formation of the National Guards, which he said would be used to secure state institutions and diplomatic missions.

Click here to read the Reuters article on this topic.

On 24 January, the Libya Political Dialogue group met in Tunisia and agreed in principle to a number of amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). However, no official decision has been made because there was no House of Representatives (HoR) delegation attending the discussions.

The Libya Herald reports that:

Under the new proposals, a new three-man Presidential Council (PC) with a head and two deputies, separate from the government, would replace the current unwieldy nine-man PC. A different prime minister would be appointed. Additionally, a new military council would be formed comprising the heads of the PC, HoR and the State Council, the Dialogue team said in a statement.

The State Council would also in future comprise all those elected to the former legislative authority, the General National Congress, in July 2012. Replacements would not be acceptable unless they replaced originally elected members who had died or resigned.

Click here to read the full article.

Rhiannon Smith speaks to the Voice of Americas Africa News Tonight show to discuss Khalifa al-Ghwells recent seizure of ministries in Tripoli and analyse his demands for a new political process in Libya to replace the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

Click here to hear the clip the Libya section starts at 12.26.

Continuing my focus on the need for US engagement in Libya at this critical time as Russia appears to be muscling in, Ive written an article for Al-Monitor which follows up on my recent Foreign Affairs piece. I am continuing to push for the Trump Administration to appoint a Special POTUS envoy because I see it as essential.

Russias increasing public support for Hifter and his anti-Islamist strongmancredentials may be the fuel for this particular fire. On Jan. 11, Hifter was flown aboard a Russian aircraft carrier that has recently anchored off Libyas eastern coast. He was given an official tour of the vessel before holding a videoconference with Russias Defense Minister SergeiShoygu and accepting a consignment of medical supplies. The movefollows Russias pledge earlier this month to lift theUN arms embargo to allow Hifter to access weapons as well asrecent visits by Hifter and his political allies to Moscow.No matter which party is victorious in southwest Libya, if Misrata and Hifter begin a full-scale battle for control, then there is little doubt that the whole southern region will be destabilized. There have been calls for calm from a variety of local and international actors, and there is some hope that the rapprochement efforts that have been going on in the background between rival factions may provide channels of communication to de-escalate the conflict. However, the terms of any new political bargain are likely to be far more favorable to Hifter and the eastern faction than those of the existing Libyan Political Agreement The GNAand its Presidential Councilare weak and becoming increasingly fragmented and irrelevant,as highlighted by the resignation of council member Musa al-Koni on Jan. 2. Egypt, Algeria and Russia have been hosting various meetings and negotiations between different Libyan parties to try to find a diplomatic solution to the political impasse that would include Hifter, with Egypt in particular pushing for the Libyan Political Agreementto be reworked to include Hifter as the head of the Libyan Armed Forces (a role the Presidential Council currently holds) and to reduce the size of the council. The United States has yet to respond and risks being outmaneuvered by rival powers. Now is the time for increased US engagement. The Donald Trump administration will come into office with a unique opportunity to mediate a genuine settlement. Its first step should be the appointment of a special presidential envoy tasked with mediating a resolution between Libyas main power blocs.To Read the Full Article Click here.

The Associated Press reports that forces loyal to Khalifa al-Ghwell, head of theself-declared Government of National Salvation, took control of the ministries of defense, labor and the martyrs and the wounded in Tripoli yesterday. Ghwell announced a coup in Tripoli in October, taking control ofthe old GNC building which had housed the High Council of State, but not seizing any political power. His main allies are Islamist militias, many of which are allied with the Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariyani.

A spokesman for Serrajs government dismissed the moves by Ghwells forces, saying they are trying to sow chaos but they have no means to control. He said the ministries Ghwell claimed to have seized are either under maintenance, not controlled by Serrajs government, or were seized briefly before being let go.

In a televised speech, Ghwell declared that all the past arrangements brokered by the U.N. are invalid, and described Serrajs government as expired. Referring to his forces as the Presidential Guard, he ordered them to secure the capital and warned other militias to stand down. He also called for new talks among Libyan factions without foreign mediators.

Click here to read the full article.

The European Council on Foreign Relations has published an excellent and highly informative paper written by Hayder al-Khoei,Ellie Geranmayeh & Mattia Toaldo looking atpost-Isis stabilisation efforts with a special focus on Iraq and Libya, with the aim of assessing where European states can play a more meaningful role in ensuring that the important military gains of recent months are not squandered once the anti-ISIS guns fall quiet. The authors believe this is a track of increased importance given that the incoming US administration is likely to invest less resources than ever in strengthening sustainable stability, and that the fall out of failure will directly impact European interests in terms of the threat of terrorism and challenge posed by ongoing migration.

The papers policy recommendations for Libya are:

Click here to read the full paper.

On 6 December, the UN Special Envoy to Libya Martin Kobler told the UN Security Council that Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) framework signed in Skhirat last yearhas stalled and that its articles are not set in stone. The Libyan Political Agreement even foresees a mechanism for change, should the political circumstances demand. This is significant particularly given that the agreement is due to expire on 17 December and given the current political shifts taking place in Libya following the Misratans declared victory against Islamic State in Sirte, the recent inter-militia clashes in Tripoli and the move by anti-Haftar forces against the Libyan National Army (LNA) forces in the oil crescent.

Click here to read the Libya Heralds report on this topic.

In an article for Religion and Geopolitics, Rhiannon Smith and Jason Pack discuss how recent developments in Libya are causing political alliances to shift and outlinehow these developments might impact the fight against ISIS in Sirte. They conclude that:

In the worst case scenario, Ghwells coup may unleash a new wave of conflict between pro and anti-unity government militias, driving the unity government into exile and possibly establishing a new de-facto government in Tripoli, presided over by Islamist hardliners loyal to Libyas supreme religious leader, the Grand Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariyani. He would actively halt the fight against ISIS to bring all hardline Islamists into his fold. This would lead to the collapse of the UN process with nothing to replace it, short-circuiting attempts to defeat ISIS in Sirte, which would allow the group and other jihadis to extend influence. Conflict in the capital could also strengthen Haftars hand, pushing towards separatism, legitimising military rule and the use of force against Islamist militias, while emboldening those same Islamists to work with ISIS remnants against Haftar.

Time will tell on which of these trajectory Libyas ever-fluid and confusing political landscape is currently evolving, but the direction it takes will certainly influence how much or how little success Libyan forces will have in defeating ISIS.

Click here to view the full article.

Jason Pack appeared live on Al Jazeera English to discuss the significance of former GNC member Khalifa Ghwells coup attempt last week (despite it not being a coup in the sense that no tangible political power has been seized) and how this might affectthe Libyan political process going forward.

According to the AP,

The United States launched multiple airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Libya on Monday, opening a new, more persistent front against the group at the request of the United Nations-backed government, Libyan and U.S. officials said Serraj said his government is joining the coalition against IS, adding, This is the time for the international community to live up to its promises to the Libyan people.

Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said President Barack Obama authorized the strikes following a recommendation from Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Cook told reporters that U.S. Africa Command will coordinate any strikes with the Libyans and that the new air campaign will last as long as the Libyans request assistance to eliminate IS from Sirte. The U.S. is also providing airborne surveillance and intelligence.Mohammed al-Ghasri, the commander of a pro-government militia known as al-Bonyan al-Marsous, said his forces gave target coordinates of Islamic State positions to the U.S.You can read the whole article here.

According to Jason Pack, I think the short term impact is outrage on the libyan street that their government is in such open cahoots with the West. The medium term impact is that a sustained campaign could help BM breakthrough against ISIS in Sirte. But the long term impact is only negative because the US has agreed to help with airstrikes without a genuine anti-ISIS coalition being formed and without that it is irrelevant. Even if Sirte were to be liberated, ISIS will still persist in Libya and the political impasse will not be solved. What is needed is sustained political engagement, not just airstrikes.

Confusion over Saif, Muammar Gaddafis sons alleged-release from prison in Zintan last week, demonstrates that Libyas main players are no closer to putting aside grievances for the common good, say Jason Pack and Rhiannon Smith.

Being Western educated with a PhD from the London School of Economics and the spearhead of the movement liberalizing Libyas economy from 2003-2010, hewas thought by manyto be the wave of the future which would bring Libya into the worlds 21st century economy and society. But when the 2011 revolts broke out, he firmly allied with his father, Colonel Gaddafi,and referred to the rebels as rats who should be crushed.

In the aftermath of Gaddafis defeat and death, Saif was captured by Zintani militiamen and been held there ever since.

The Zintanis were always uneasy bedfellows with the Misratan, Islamist, Berber, and jihadi militias who they fought alongside to help overthrow Gaddafi. Zintan struggled to compete both strategically and financially with Misrata, Libyas third largest city and the countrys commercial maritime hub. However, Saif gave them crucial leverageleading the National Transitional Council (NTC) to offer thedefence minister portfolioin the first post-Gaddafi cabinet to Zintan. Since that point they have refused to turn Saif over to any of Libyas transitional governments.With the takeover of Tripoli by Misratan and Islamist militias supporting the Tripoli-based General National Council (GNC) in 2014, and the subsequent bifurcation of Libya into two governments, the Zintanis became the major force in western Libya to support the House of Representatives (HoR) and its eastern government based in Tubroq and Beida. This eastern government has key former Gaddafi officials in top positions most notably General Khalifa Haftar and this has been the main grievance against them from the Misratans and Islamists who suffered disproportionately under Gaddafis rule.

Saifs alleged-release

Since the Zintanis and Haftar have been tarred and feathered as Gaddafis troops, there has long been speculation that they might work with Saif and release him as a rallying cry for former Gaddafi elements to join them in the fight against the Misratans and whichever political body they are opposing, whether it be the GNC or the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA). Therefore, last weeks sensational news of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafis release did not seem all that improbable. It seemed possible that the HoR and the Zintanis would want to send a message and create a new coalition.

Divergent reactions to Saifs release

The news of Saifs release caused a wave of panic mainly amongst hardline revolutionaries, Islamist groups and Government of National Accord (GNA) supporters, reinforcing their fears of a complete counter revolution by ex-regime forces facilitated by the HoR and the UN mediation process. The local council in Zintanissued a statement denying his release, but sourcesin the city say that the local council has no relevance to Saifs case or his whereabouts, and issued the statement only to take political heat off the city.

Saifs pseudo release demonstrates that the main players are no closer to putting aside their grievances for the common good than they were even before the GNA was formed. This, is the real tragedy revealed by this debacle. No one seems ready to put aside past grievances to work together for Libyas future.

Read the rest here:
GNC | Libya Analysis