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To the editor: Historian Joseph J. Ellis states that, given the ethnic and religious diversity of Iraq, the country should aim not for traditional nationhood but instead for a loose federation similar to the pre-Constitution United States after the Revolutionary War under the Articles of Confederation. ("The American union's first stage could be a model for the Mideast," Op-Ed, Sept. 25)

At this point, Ellis is probably right. But the situation in Iraq presents a larger lesson for our foreign policy: Do not attempt to force democracy on those who are not ready for it.

In retrospect, our best move after beating the tar out of the Iraqi army and toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003 would have been to replace him with a "good" Hussein, one who would understand what happens to tyrants who gas their people and threaten the United States. Past hegemonists such as Great Britain were successful by not attempting to change the world, but rather in managing it in conformity with their needs.

Democracy took many centuries to develop in the West, and it is not for everyone.

Jack Kaczorowski, Los Angeles

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To the editor: Ellis overstates the idea that the Articles of Confederation did not establish a new nation, but only "a confederation of sovereign states, loosely bound together in a diplomatic alliance."

The articles, ratified in 1781, were entitled "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" (my italics). Five years earlier, the statement in the Declaration of Independence, "When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another," indicated that Americans felt themselves a single people.

The fact that George Washington, who was from Virginia, led an army for eight years made up in large part of New Englanders and Pennsylvanians points to the same conclusion. And when Nathan Hale said before his execution by the British, "I only regret that I have but one life to give for my country," he wasn't talking about Connecticut.

These facts clearly argue against Ellis' statement that "allegiances remained local and regional at best." The people of Iraq do not seem to be at the same stage of national feeling as the people of the United States were in 1776 or 1781.

Originally posted here:
How much can Iraq learn from early post-Revolutionary War America?