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Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Lfven, holding a press conference during the European Council Meeting in June 2017. Photo: European Council

As the final piece of our series on Swedens Arctic strategy, this article seeks to shed light on two key characteristics of Swedens EU policy in general. In doing so, it, where applicable, seeks to use Arctic related examples in order to demonstrate or support its arguments.

For Sweden, joining the European Union (EU) was more than just joining an economic club. The EU was portrayed as a political union that would not only allow Sweden to play a more active role in global affairs. Rather, it would also enable Stockholm to regain and strengthen its European identity while simultaneously influencing the EUs institutional and doctrinal developments. Conservative politicians were particularly relentless in their promotion of discourses which essentially equated neutrality with isolationism and the EU membership as a sign of active internationalism.1)Agius, C. (2011), Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality. Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 46(3), pp. 370395

As such, and to further boost their chances of a desired transition to post-neutrality, a concerted and well-orchestrated campaign of media leaks and agenda setting took place which effectively helped to de-mythify the delusion of neutrality.2)Agius, C. (2011), Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality. Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 46(3), pp. 370395 Not only did newspapers begin reporting on Swedens secret arrangements with Western powers but many pundits and politicians alike were now arguing that states can never be truly neutral and hence it (neutrality) had a false relationship to the identity of the nation state.3)Agius, C. (2011), Transformed Beyond Recognition? The Politics of Post-Neutrality. Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 46(3), pp. 370395

Once in the bloc, Stockholms policy stances and its broader conduct have been largely dual in nature: to play a leading role in setting policy norms4)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154 while retaining a high degree of strategic independence so it can go its own way when its interests clash with those of other EU Member States.5)McCallion, M, S. and Brianson, A. (2017). How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol. 48(4), pp. 451-464 And in spite of the common belief, it has not, at least not systematically, sought to form and lead a common Nordic block within the EU. On the contrary, it has been in a soft competition over status and influence with its Nordic counterparts.6)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Starting with its decision to stay out of the Monetary Union, Sweden has demonstrated a persistent determination to follow its own path in the EU and that it has not shied away from revealing policy preferences that differ from the majority of EU members on issues of the environment, social policy, and defence.7)McCallion, M, S. and Brianson, A. (2017). How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol. 48(4), pp. 451-464 Its response to the COVID pandemic is the latest example of this tendency for independence.

This attitude, in turn, has its root in Swedens initial reluctance to join the bloc, its desire for the preservation of its strategic and decision making autonomy, and a sense of, albeit narrowing, uniqueness all of which collectively have earned it the reputation of awkward partner.8)McCallion, M, S. and Brianson, A. (2017). How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Sweden, Regional Awkwardness, and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of Baltic Studies. Vol. 48(4), pp. 451-464 In other words, Swedish awkwardness, or its awkward attitude towards regional integration processes within the EU, has both ideational and material underpinnings.

Moreover, some scholars claim that Swedens conduct within the EU and its general attitude towards the bloc is best described as one revolving around a solid logic of quid pro quo or delicate balancing; that is, it seeks to contribute to certain initiatives or policies in order to stay outside certain others without opening itself to criticism.9)Von Sydow, G. (2004). Frn Ordfrandeskap Till Utanfrskap. Stockholm: SNS Frlag For instance, Von Sydow10)Von Sydow, G. (2004). Frn Ordfrandeskap Till Utanfrskap. Stockholm: SNS Frlag claims that Sweden participated in and contributed to the EUs common foreign and security policy framework in order to cushion its rejection to join the Monetary Union.

With regard to the Arctic, it has been consistent in its call for the articulation and implementation of common European environmental policy frameworks11)Khorrami, N. (2019). Reviewing Stockholms Strategy for Sustainable Regional Development in the Arctic. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/stockholm-strategy-sustainable-regional-development-arctic/ but it has resisted initiatives, such as the Northern Dimension (ND), which facilitate a strong and active role for Brussels in the regions defence and security sectors.12)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Put briefly, the main disagreement between the two with regard to ND boils down to their opposing view on and the weight they assign to the EU and its role within the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe. While Finland prefers a wide-ranging and expanded role for Brussels in the region, Stockholm has traditionally favoured a limited role for the EU and instead has sought to put in place a distinctively regional mechanism for the management of regional affairs with itself at the realm.13)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Sweden has been commonly identified as a staunch norm entrepreneur within the EU.14)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154 Given its lack of military and economic power, Stockholm has consistently utilised its normative credentials to influence, and contribute to, the development of the EUs normative power ever since its joining of the bloc.

As a world leader in environmental sustainability and home to an environmentally conscious population, for example, Stockholm has sought to influence the EUs climate change and Arctic strategies by contributing to the articulation and implementation of detailed measures aimed at reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases.15)Khorrami, N. 2019. Swedens Arctic Strategy: An Overview. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/ Similarly, it has been relentless in its efforts to ensure that EUs Arctic policies are, at least partly, reflexive of its own ideals of individual rights to security and prosperity, and thus enough attention is paid to the needs and interests of local communities and their resiliency.16)Khorrami, N. 2019. Swedens Arctic Strategy: An Overview. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/

To this end, it has used various techniques and tactics, including framing, agenda setting, and use of presidency, in order to promote its own values and interests and align EU foreign and strategic decision making with its own. The EU is an ideal platform or arena for such undertakings since there is a natural synergy between its norms and values as a peace project and those of Stockholm as a liberal democracy.17)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154

For a small state like Sweden in particular this is of paramount importance because it enables it to exercise power and yield influence by transferring its own domestic norms into the decision making procedures of a larger and more powerful actor. Norms and their wide adaptation do influence action and decision making and thus one can gain authority if its norms and values guide conduct and behaviour.18)Bjrkdahl, A. 2008. Norm Advocacy: A Small State Strategy to Influence the EU. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 15(1), pp. 135-154

There is a common assumption outside academic circles that Nordic members of the EU act in tandem, and that they tend to coordinate their policy stances at the EU. Their common history, close socio-cultural links, and geographical proximities are commonly singled out as the key facilitating factors.

However, a closer look at their conducts demonstrate a rather wide-ranging and substantial level of soft competition and disagreement over numerous issues.19)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Part of this soft competition is due to their differing historical trajectories as well as political and national identities. This creates differing threat perceptions and interests with regard to the role of the EU in their region and how best to address security and commercial challenges.20)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

However, it is also due to their rivalry over status whereby these very similar nations small and well functioning democracies seek to outcompete one another over both the attainment of leadership pole in their own subregion and greater strategic worth in the eyes of their mightier European counterparts.21)Wohlforth, W, C, Carvalho, B, D, Leira, H, and Neumann, I, B. (2018). Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies. Vol. (44)3, pp. 526546 In fact, the nature of this status rivalry is particularly fierce amongst relevant comparison or ideational groups simply because they all have similar attributes and thus differentiating oneself from others could become a complex, and at times controversial, affair.22)Wohlforth, W, C, Carvalho, B, D, Leira, H, and Neumann, I, B. (2018). Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status Seeking. Review of International Studies. Vol. (44)3, pp. 526546

This is best demonstrated if one analyses Finland and Sweden. Given their common EU membership and close historical and communal ties, one might assume that they both pursue a similar strategy towards the Arctic. Until very recently, however, this had hardly been the case.

While Finland prefers a wide-ranging and expansive role for Brussels in the Arctic that include defence and security,23)Heininen, L. (2014). Foreign Policy Interests of Finland in the Arctic in Spruds, A and Rostoks, T. (2014) Perceptions and Strategies of Arcticness in Sub-Arctic Europe. Riga: SIA Hansa Print Stockholm has traditionally favoured a limited role for the EU when it comes to security policy. Instead it has sought to put in place a distinctively regional mechanism for the management of regional affairs with itself at the realm.24)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390 This explains why Stockholm persistently sought to frustrate Brussels and Helsinki efforts in implementing the Nordic Dimension. 25)Gebhard, C. (2013). Soft Competition: Finland, Sweden and the Northern Dimension of the European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies. Vol. 36(4), pp. 365-390

Overall, given its track record on Arctic related policies and initiatives at the EU as well as the minimal mentioning of the EU in its 2011 Arctic Strategy Document,26)There are only five sentences on the role of EU in the Arctic it is fair to suggest that Stockholms policy towards the block as an Arctic player has been traditionally ambivalent at best and unarticulated at worst. By a way of analogy, its attitude towards the EU in the Arctic has been akin to an individual who desires both having a committed partner and being in an open relationship simultaneously.

This, in combination with its soft competition with other Arctic states of the EU, in turn, have been a complicating factor in EUs efforts to develop a coherent Arctic strategy even though Brussels has, arguably, benefited from the Nordic states soft competitions; they have had the effect of halting the emergence of a united Nordic bloc.

Based on its recently released Arctic Strategy, however, it appears that Stockholms attitude towards the EU is softening; that is, it is now, similar to Helsinki, calling for a strong EU presence in the region.

A resurgent Russia, a declining America, and an overall increase of commercial and military activities by both Arctic and non-Arctic states seem to have convinced Swedish decision makers that the EU provides the least bad option in their search for a reliable economic and defence/security partner; at the very least, they can influence decision making in Brussels. Both Nordic cooperation as well as old in case of the US and new in case of Canada bilateral relations are still deemed as essential. However, it is the EU which is now at the centre-point of the countrys Arctic strategy. And the fact that its new Arctic ambassador is a veteran EU diplomat adds a degree of cogency to this observation.27)Raspotnik, A. 2020. The Great Illusion Revisited: The Future of the European Unions Arctic Engagement. Available from https://www.kas.de/en/web/nordische/single-title/-/content/the-great-illusion-revisited-the-future-of-the-european-union-s-arctic-engagement

See the article here:
Partnership with a Healthy Dose of Distance: Sweden's Changing Attitude towards the EU as an Arctic Player - The Arctic Institute