Mediaboss Marketing

Recent local elections delivered a stunning blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdoan, marking his most significant electoral defeat to date. The loss wasn't just any setback; it saw the secular opposition CHP taking control of 35 cities(representing around 80% of Trkiye's GDP and more than 60% of its population), surpassing the 24 for Erdoans AK Party.

The election result raises questions about whether a seismic shift in domestic politics will alter Turkish foreign policy.

The election was noticeably swayed by the cost-of-living crisis.Inflation hit 68.5%and Trkiye'shunger threshold now exceeds the weekly minimum wage by US$93. Budget shortfall and dwindling currency reserves raise further alarms. The nations economic fabric is closely knit with the West, especially the European Union, which remains Trkiye's top trading partner, absorbing 36% of its exports in 2023. The EU also leads in Trkiye's foreign direct investment, making up 59% of investments over the last 20 years. Thus, modernising the Customs Union to include services remains a priority. The election results also boosted Istanbul Mayor mamolu as a major competitorto Erdoan, making economic recovery even more crucial to maintaining his position.

Other than continuing to promote Trkiye's economic interests, four recent developments illuminate the priorities of Turkish foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

The Ukraine war underscored Trkiye's geopolitical relevance to the West. Immediately after the Russian offensive in 2022, Ankara invoked provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention prohibiting the passage of Russian warships through Turkish straits.

The first is newfound momentum in relations with the United States and Egypt. The recent thaw in Trkiye-US relations is highlighted by the conclusion of a deal to sell Trkiye more F-16 fighter aircraft and Ankaras approval of Swedens entry to NATO. Fulfilment of Erdoans long-sought visit to the White House in May indicated further momentum. However, relations between theUnited States and the Kurdish separatist groups PKK and YPGhinder a full reset the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is classified as a terrorist organisation by Western countries, including the United States, but Trkiye contends that the People's Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militant group based in Syria that attracts US support, is closely tied to the PKK.Trkiyes aspirations to rejoin the F-35 stealth aircraft program, it's desire to seek relief from CAATSA sanctions, and ongoing controversy surrounding Trkiye's acquisition of advanced Russian air defence systemsalso strain relations with the United States.

In February, Erdoan's first visit to Cairo since 2012 to meet President Sisi symbolised Trkiye's wider reconciliation efforts with the Middle East. Ankara's humanitarian role in Rafah, coupled with its potential to facilitate inter-Palestinian dialogue, brings Egypt and Trkiye closer, despite their differing stakes in the Libyan conflict and Eastern Mediterranean issues.

The second development is Trkiye's position on Ukraine, where it must continue its balancing act of being pro-Ukraine without positioning itself as anti-Russia.

The Ukraine war underscored Trkiye's geopolitical relevance to the West. Immediately after the Russian offensive in 2022, Ankara invoked provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention prohibiting the passage of Russian warships through Turkish straits. Subsequently, its mediation of a grain deal between the combatants marked a diplomatic triumph. Ankara wants to maintain this role, backing Ukraine with military equipment but abstaining from aligning with Western sanctions against Russia, keeping its deep trade and energy connections intact.

This balancing act showcases how Ankara views the world, demonstrating a readiness to engage with all parties while maximising its autonomy. Last month, Ankara hosted both Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy.

Third, eliminating PKK/YPG remains a top priority for Ankara. In March, Trkiye and Iraq reached a historic security agreement resulting in the official prohibition of PKK by Iraq. The deal furthers Trkiye's plan to extend a military campaign into northern Iraq aiming to establish a 40km security zone beyond its borders. Trkiye also aims to neutralise the PKK's influence over the advancement of the Development Road Project, which Erdoan promotes as an alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative, supported by Israel and the United Arab Emirates, which bypasses both Trkiye and Iraq.

Erdoan's final priority is Global South outreach.In February, Trkiye and Somalia signed a significant agreement granting Trkiye control over Somalia's maritime zones for the coming decade, positioning it as a key player in the Red Sea amid rising US-Houthi tensions in Yemen and Israels military offensive in Palestine. Somalia stands as a central component of Trkiye's increasing footprint in Africa.

Follow this link:
Erdogan's election blow will shape Trkiye's foreign policy - The Interpreter