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The crew that would come to take over the Democratic Party organized themselves, in the 1980s, around the idea that the party had become discredited among the public because it was in thrall to its more liberal elements. These New Democrats gravitated toward Gary Hart, who unsuccessfully ran for the Democratic Party nomination in 1984, positioned as the candidate of new ideas against Walter Mondale, ostensibly the embodiment of stale Great Society liberalism. Hart, along with allies like Representative Tim Wirth, articulated what Geismer calls larger generational skepticism with large institutions and bureaucracy. In practice, large institutions tended to mean unions and government agencies. The New Democrats were similarly allergic to transactional politics and special interest groups, which Geismer helpfully defines as African Americans, women, white farmers, and, especially, organized labor.

Even by the mid-1980s, Jesse Jackson could correctly note that this definition of special interests happened to define them as the Democratic Partys actual base of support, or, as he put it, members of our family. Hart was notably more popular with white pundits than with Black primary voters. But what the New Democrats truly wanted, and truly believed their policy agenda would win, was the white suburban vote. In the wake of Ronald Reagans reelection, in 1985, the political strategist Al From founded the Democratic Leadership Council, with an inaugural membership of 41 people, including 14 senators and 17 representatives. Of that group, two members were nonwhite, and none were women. The philosophy of the DLC, shaped by early members like From, the political consultant David Osborne, and Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, was to go after the aspiring middle electorate in suburbia rather than the working class and dispossessed, and to appeal to it with an agenda that stressed economic dynamism, free trade, embrace of the tech industry, andvitallythe destruction of the welfare state.

This gets to a central tension in New Democrat thought. Seemingly at no point can anyone conclusively decide if their policy agenda is meant to be politically effectiveto win over white suburbanitesor to implement successful policy, which in this case would mean reforming welfare in a way that would leave poor people better off. Once Bill Clinton was in power, actual welfare reform, the destruction of the New Dealera Aid to Families with Dependent Children assistance program, was passed largely because end welfare as we know it was a Clinton campaign trail promise, and Bruce Reed, of the White House Domestic Policy Council, had come to believe that phrasewhich he had taped up in his officehad been vital to Clintons 1992 victory. Clinton, then running for reelection, was comfortably ahead in the polls when he signed the welfare reform bill. His political adviser Dick Morris had urged him to sign it as insurance.

Read more from the original source:
The Disastrous Legacy of the New Democrats - The New Republic