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In 2013, Alfred Stepan and Mirjam Kunkler, two world-renowned American experts on civil-military relations and democracy, talked about twin tolerances in their book Democracy and Islam in Indonesia. They built an argument around creating a socio-political ecosystem for forces of democracy and State to accommodate Islamic radical elements willing to take recourse to democratic values or processes while still retaining their Islamism. Drawing on a detailed case study of Indonesia, the duo concluded that twin tolerances was a possibility and to this end they proposed building a community of public intellectuals that could develop capacity within a religious society for democratic norms.

Pakistans State would like to apply this very formula to Afghanistan.

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The aim is to turn Afghanistan into a State where the Taliban agree to apply some norms that are acceptable to Western democracy without adapting entirely to the Western model. This argument has remained close to the Pakistani militarys heart for a long time. General Pervez Musharraf hadspoken about Western democratic norms being suited to Pakistan or even other societies. Theoretically, there is a case for twin tolerances to be made if Taliban marginally give up violence and collaborate with the West and the rest of the world to fight more radical forces like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), they could turn into any other Right-wing religious group in the region. South Asia, as a region, is increasingly awash with Right-wing radical forces whose violence is limited to home or within the region rather than outside.

Its also Islamabads calculation that the world may turn around to the idea of accommodating the Taliban for their own reasons.

The UK is intalkswith the Taliban via Pakistan at a time when the US is inclined to hold talks more independently. Recently, Washington held the first direct talks with the Taliban post-withdrawal.Surely, London and Washington share notes but the fact that the British military and government both continue to engage with the Taliban give hope to Pakistan that its own plan regarding the future of a Taliban-led Afghanistan may be working. European capitals, though, remain confused about forming a clearer policy. Although the European Commission remains firmonnot engaging with the Taliban unless they meet conditionsaninclusive government, female education,due share towomen and minorities in decision-makinga solid united front based on a clear approach is still lacking. For instance, Germany, which is a significant Statein the region, is concerned about being flooded by Afghan migrants,an issue that is more imagined than real.Islamabad sees this lack of consensusin the West as an opportunity to keep pushing the case for countries to accept the Taliban, which they believe representthePashtun culture.

Islamabads security establishment is definitely not concerned about the rise of conservatism or extremism in Afghanistan, a result of the Taliban being in power. In fact, the popular view within the larger security establishment is that while womens education may be an issue, it is at best secondary when compared to the goal of making this new State run, for which Rawalpindi and Islamabad continue to make a case before the international community.

Also read: I am offshore Pakistani General. My establishment beat India in Pandora Papers

Socio-political extremismin Afghanistanis not a matter of concern,primarily because Pakistan itself is taking a similar direction.

The overall changes in the educational system theSingle National Curriculum (SNC)or steps such asmaking it mandatory for Masters degree candidates in Punjab to demonstrate knowledge of Quran to qualify indicate a gradual shift towards turning Pakistans nationalism even closer to religion, which then gets reflected in the States attitudes towards women and minority groups. While the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISKP denote one end of the religious-extremist spectrum and are a cause of concern, what Pakistan is facing is Barelvi extremism, an ideology that has emerged with force and much more dangerously, especially in the past five years. It has inculcated greater intolerance towards minority groups such as Ahmadiyyas and Shias, and the rapidly disappearing liberals. Though it could be argued that religious-nationalism is the trend that is now pervasive throughout South Asia, there is no parallel to the way it webs Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Interestingly, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region today is a more fundamental reality that extends beyond geo-politics to include socio-politics and political economy.

In Pakistan, both the civil and military leadership subscribe to religious nationalism. Its in the second half of hiscurrent term thatPrime MinisterImran Khan has begun to invest more strategically in religious nationalism. ThePMs recentassurance to the ulemaof not making any lawsthat can beconsidered against Islamic values, as defined by the clergy, is not simply about his personal conservatism but a political choice of strengthening the religious Right that he may depend on one day for his fight against both his political opponents and the army as an institution. He may want to use religious forces to his advantage. Khan understands that the religious extremist, thoughmanufacturedby the military, do scare the generals. My argument may sound counter-intuitive as Imran Khan has demonstrated no desire to fight the military except perhaps for now. Rumours are rife regarding the Prime Ministersreluctanceto notify the new ISI chiefsappointment. But the fact is that every political actor produced by the military ends up with some level of confrontation whenever he or she tries to secure more power or their own future,in government.

Also read: I compared Afghanistan school textbooks with Pakistans. This is what I found

As for the militarys desire to fight the militants, it may do a tactical confrontation but not a strategic one. Its about using military action to influence behaviour and not destroy the forces of religious Right. Contrary to the expectations the Pakistani liberals carry, that the military has the power to eliminate the extremist-militants, Rawalpindis capacity has reduced not the war-fighting capability but the intent. The GHQ is equally invested in the religious Right for its geo-political ambitions. Despite its difficult experience of terrorist attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is fundamentally part of the Afghan Taliban, the military decision-makers remain invested in the Taliban. Khans suggestion of dialogue with the TTPis nota newconcept. Even Nawaz Sharif had suggestedtalkswithRight-wing religious groupsrather than military action. However, the 2015-16 proposal was more of a tactic aimed at co-opting some militants that were ready to talk. Sharifs peace overture to the TTP was also different as he, unlike Imran Khan, took all other parties on board by organising the All-Parties Conference to develop aconsensus.

The Pakistan armywould rather convince militants to give up arms so that the State does not have to fight battles with them. Allowing the extremist-militants to impose their version of sharia in the tribal belt ofPakistanmayjustbe considered a small price to pay. In any case, the popular narrative among Pakistans security community is that Pashtunwali orthePashtun culture is akin to Taliban sharia.Furthermore, some forms of sharia have already touched the households and personal lives of all those involved in military-strategic decision-making in Pakistan from the army chief and many of the corps commanders to the National security Advisor. These are men with greater tolerance for religious conservatismand theironly desire at the moment may be for Pakistan to remain a hybrid theocracy.A set upwithfewspaces for demonstration of socio-cultural liberalism,something whichwouldmake it easier to engage with the world rather than a deeply theocratic form of the Taliban. In 74 years, Pakistan and Afghanistan have begun to look more similar than before.

Ayesha Siddiqa is senior research fellow at Kings College, London and author of Military Inc. Inside Pakistans Military Economy. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.

(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)

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Pakistan wants an Afghanistan acceptable to the West Islam plus democracy - ThePrint