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The Parliament of the United Kingdom has called on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to clarify whether the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement will apply to UK-Ukraine political and economic relations after it leaves the EU, according to a report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament, which was posted on Parliaments official website.

It is noted that if the UK is no longer a party to the Association Agreement after it leaves the EU, then the FCO should begin planning a successor agreement.

Clearly the EU relationship with Ukraine will continue and we will need to develop our own bilateral relationship with Ukraine, which we will want to do. It will be supportive of Ukraine and Ukrainian reform and trade, where our interests remain, Tim Barrow, Political Director of the FCO said.

The report says that the FCO should continue to work with the EU, Canada and USA on supporting Ukraine.

In the long term, the UK and its allies should support Ukraine in developing resilience to further Russian encroachment and in building its social, political and physical infrastructure, which will facilitate further engagement with the West and allow Ukraine to engage with Russia on a level playing field, reads the report.

Also, it is noted that 20 million is foreseen in the Good Governance Fund to support Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, Ukraine alone would justify the investment of British resources of hundreds of millions of pounds to improve governance, according to the report.

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British Parliament wants to clarify what will be with Ukraine-EU Association Agreement after Brexit - Ukrinform. Ukraine and world news

My godmother, Nina, told me the truth. When I shared it with my history teacher, he said she was mistaken, or had lied. I was upset. I asked my parents who wasright.

They gave me a book, Russian Oppression in Ukraine, which included firsthand accounts about the Great Famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine. I still have that very same green-covered volume. My first encounter with it was brief. I slammed it shut, shuddering at the black-and-white photographs inside the remains of famine victims being heaved into a cart, the bodies of raped-then-murdered women jumbled on a bed, a massacred communitys corpses exhumed to identify the victims. Even though I looked away quickly, it was too late a Pandoras box of nightmares was freed. Those images, glimpsed decades ago, burden me to this day. Only a few minutes ago I dared look again. They remainharrowing.

The essay I penned got a poor grade. Defiantly, I presented the book to my teacher. Disdainfully, he gave it back, dismissing it as anti-Sovietpropaganda.

He was right. It was. It was also true. It just took a half-century toconfirm.

What brought this decades-old high-school memory to mind was a new film, Bitter Harvest. As it ended, I glanced around the screening room. Some cried quietly. Others seemed uncertain about how to react. I know why. Its a beautifully filmed love story about Natalka (Samantha Barks) and Yuri (Max Irons), set in an almost Edenic landscape saturated with colours evoking a verdant and fruitful life. Very soon, however, almost imperceptibly, it begins to soil, as the brutality of the Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine metastasizes Europes breadbasket into a modern-day Golgotha, a place of skulls. Can love survive such corrupting foulness? I dontknow.

The film is a love story about Natalka (Samantha Barks) and Yuri, set during Boshevik occupation ofUkraine.

More than four million people perished during the Holodomor after Moscows minions stripped Soviet Ukraine of food, exporting grain even as widespread hunger took hold, sealing the borders to prevent anyone leaving or aid getting in, all while insisting there was no famine. Then Stalins shills buried the truth about one of the greatest genocides to befoul modern history, their dissembling given succour by scribblers such as Walter Duranty of The New York Times, who claimed: There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition. Privately, he told British diplomats as many as 10 million people died. Yet London never exposed this great Soviet lie. Why? In June, 1934, the Foreign Offices Laurence Collier provided a humbug of an excuse for posterity: The truth of the matter is, of course, that we have a certain amount of information about famine conditions We do not want to make it public, however, because the Soviet government would resent it and our relations with them would beprejudiced.

No wonder my teacher knew nothing about this man-made famine. Many still dont. Stalins successors in the Kremlin remain Holodomor-deniers while fellow travellers in the West call upon the world to turn a blind eye to continuing Russian imperialism against Ukraine, lest we offend the Great Russians. Director George Mendeluks film will challenge those fake news peddlers. Id wager Putin wont want you to see Bitter Harvest. But I wish U.S. President Donald Trumpwould.

The Kremlin remains Holodomor-deniers, but the film challenges fake newspeddlers.

Its haunting. Scenes portray doomed Ukrainian insurgents charging their oppressors, a boy pawing desperately at dirt barely covering his mothers just-buried remains, a fleeting shadow of self-doubt on a Red Army mans face in a firing squad executing innocents desperate people doing whatever they must to live, even collaborating with the very Communists who were their killers. Millions of Ukraines best sons and daughters were disposed of unceremoniously, tipped into collective boneyards. The survivors were leavings, entombed in a postgenocidal society, victims of a crippling legacy stillunexorcised.

After Nina died, I helped clean her house. Every kitchen shelf was overstocked with non-perishable goods bags of flour, sugar and canned preserves supplies sufficient to sustain anyone for months. Dusk fell as we harvested. Her home slowly hushed. I grew disquieted in this silence, calling to mind her gentle whispering about the glutinous human flesh eaten in her village during the famine. Faced with this abomination, she scavenged worms and weeds rather than sup on what others devoured. She swore never to be without food again. Thats how Nina saved her soul and came to share the truth about Ukraines bitter harvest. As for the food we took from her home that fall day, it went to feed the hungry. She would have liked that.

Lubomyr Luciuk is a professor of political geography at the Royal Military College ofCanada.

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A forgotten history, finally told - The Globe and Mail

Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz is seeking to join Polish gas firm PGNiG in a court case challenging the European Unions decision to give Russias Gazprom more access to the Opal gas pipeline in Germany.

Naftogaz said today (2 March) it had asked permission from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to intervene in the case initiated by state-controlled PGNiG at the end of last year.

In October, the European Commission decided to lift a cap on Gazproms use of Opal, which carries gas from the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea to customers in Germany and the Czech Republic.

Poland, which imports most of the gas it consumes from Russia, said the decision threatened gas supplies to Central and Eastern Europe and would strengthen Gazproms dominant position in the region.

Joining the case initiated by PGNiG will enable Naftogaz to present additional arguments and gain access to the case files. The request by Naftogaz is now awaiting consideration in the court, Naftogaz said in a statement.

It also said the Commissions decision could threaten the stability of gas supplies to Ukraine because of possible of gas flow interruptions from Poland.

The ECJ has already suspended the executives decision on Opal.

In December, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said Ukraine and Poland would act jointly to block projects that could result in Gazprom gaining greater access to the European gas market by bypassing Ukraine.

Originally posted here:
Ukraine hopes to join Poland in challenging EU pipeline decision - EurActiv

A EurasiaNet Partner Post from:

To a casual observer, Moldova and Ukraine appear quite similar with their common Soviet histories, heavily corrupt domestic politics, and a frozen conflict on their eastern borders. However, while Ukraine remains entrapped in a war with Russia over eastern Ukraine, Moldova has maintained amicable relations with both Russia and Ukraine, positioning itself as a bridge between East and West. Some have noted that Moldovas status as an interlocutor between East and West has become threatened with the recent election of President Igor Dodon in December 2016. Dodon has consistently promised closer relations with the Kremlin. Yet, while the Moldovan economy is dependent on Russia and the Moldovan public is exposed to a steady stream of Russian propaganda, these factors do not preclude the development of strong Ukrainian-Moldovan relations as long as a pro-EU coalition retains control of Moldovas parliament. Moldova and Ukraineno matter their differences and disputesmust maintain close relations in order to combat Russian incursions and aggression. Main Interests and Obstacles Traditionally, Ukrainian-Moldovan foreign relations have centered on issues such as border demarcation and property disputes leftover from the collapse of the USSR. For Moldova, its main interests towards Ukraine are the development of infrastructure projects, environmental protection of the Dniester River, closer economic cooperation, and maintaining Ukraines territorial integrity. For Ukraine, interests include resolving the conflict in Transnistria, helping Moldova resist Russian propaganda, settling the state border between Ukraine and Moldova, and promoting economic partnerships. Some of the main issues that have blocked deeper Ukrainian-Moldovan relations include the status of the Dniester HES-2 hydroelectric station, a 1990s land agreement near the village of Giurgiulesti, and a planned railway connecting Moldova to Odessa, which would have bypassed the breakaway region of Transnistria. These long-lasting concerns, combined with the implementation of protective quotas and duties on certain Ukrainian and Moldovan goods in 2016 have hindered relations between the two countries. However, a February 2017 negotiation between President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine and Prime Minister Pavel Filip of Moldova has helped restore cooperation between the two countries. This has led to talks of energy cooperation and restoration of stable electricity supply from Ukraine to Moldova, as well as breakthroughs in discussions of environmental issues concerning the Dniester water basin. Additionally, Moldova decided not to extend restrictive measures to Ukrainian meat and dairy products introduced in 2016. These positive developments in Ukrainian-Moldovan relations are critical at a time when Dodon continues to cozy up to the Kremlin. Russias Role One cannot discuss relations between Ukraine and Moldova without analyzing the countries respective ties to Russia. After the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, observers were concerned that Moldova would follow a similar path as Ukraine due to the similarities between the two countries. However, the pro-EU coalitions within the parliament backed Ukraine and condemned Russias annexation. Former Prime Minister of Moldova Iurie Leanca visited Kyiv after the annexation as a sign of support for the Ukrainian government, while Petro Poroshenko visited Chisinau in November 2014, prior to parliamentary elections, to support the pro-European coalition in Moldova. Attitudes within Moldovan society were split with 29% supporting Russias annexation of Crimea with 44% against. Moreover, the pro-Russian Communist Party of Moldova continued to support Russia and helped to serve as a conduit for the Kremlins narrative of events within the country. Notably, in April 2014, the breakaway region Transnistria held a referendum to join the Russian Federation, leading many to worry that the Kremlin was planning to recreate the Ukraine scenario in Moldova. However, Vladimir Putin did not find it in Russias best interest to formally annex the region, given its de facto control of the territory. Rather, the Kremlin uses existing domestic cleavages within Moldova to shape the countrys politics such as exploiting nostalgia for the Soviet Union and targeting citizens who feel as if theyve not benefited from greater integration with the European Union. While Russias economic leverage over its post-Soviet neighbors is declining, approximately 20% of Moldovan exports still go to Russia. This dependency gives the Kremlin influence over Moldovan politics, which it has used to ban Moldovan wines and implement measures against EU food products when the Moldovan government moves in a pro-European direction. It has not helped that Ukrainian authorities have made it difficult for Moldovan wines to enter the Ukrainian market, further incentivizing closer ties between Moldova and Russia, while breeding resentment amongst local producers. From a domestic standpoint, the major corruption scandal in 2014, where over 1 billion dollars disappeared from Moldovas leading banks, implicated many pro-European politicians and helped strengthen the pro-Russian coalitions in Moldovas government. The pro-Russian opposition expertly utilized the corruption scandal to link the domestic troubles within Moldova to the European Union and the West. Most notably, Former Prime Minister and founder of the pro-EU Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova Vlad Filat was arrested in October 2015, helping pave the way for a pro-Russian president to win the presidential election. Consequences of Moldovas Pro-Russian President With growing distrust towards Europe and the West, the pro-Russian Socialist candidate Igor Dodon managed to win 54 percent in the 2016 presidential election, compared to his pro-European challenger, Maia Sandu, who received just under 45 percent. Since his victory, Dodon has expressed that most Moldovans would support joining the Russia-led Eurasian Union, adding that Moldova has not benefited from European integration, and warned about closer ties with NATO (only 21% of Moldovans expressed support for joining NATO). According to a September 2016 poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI), Russia is consistently seen as a more important economic partner than Ukraine (62% to 27%), and there is an even split between those who want to join the EU (40%) and the Eurasian Customs Union (43%). Perhaps most notably, the percentage of Moldovans who think that Russian troops in Transnistria are not a threat to Moldova has increased from 21% in September 2014 to 39% in September 2016. Moreover, during a January 17 visit to Russia, Dodon noted that he would certainly support a policy that would terminate Moldovas 2014 Association Agreement with the European Union. While he expressed hope that Russian-Ukrainian relations will resume as friendly and brotherly ones, his close relations to the Kremlin do not inspire confidence in those who hope for stronger Ukrainian-Moldovan relations. Future of Ukraine-Moldova Relations Despite these recent developments, it is important not to overemphasize the pro-Russian turn in Moldovas foreign policy. More Moldovans say their country has better relations with the European Union (57%) and Ukraine (47%) than Russia (43%). Additionally, the current parliament continues to express dissatisfaction and opposition towards the presidents pro-Russian orientation. Prime Minister Filip expressed deep displeasure with Dodons statements about terminating the Association Agreement with the European Union and tried to assure international actors of the presidents inability to unilaterally make such decisions for the country. Additionally, Moldova and Ukraine have enduring inter-governmental institutions like the Ukraine-Moldova Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation, which serves as a forum for the two countries to work together to promote their economic and security interests. Therefore despite, Russian economic leverage over the Moldovan economy and targeted Russian propaganda towards Moldovan citizens, it is possible for Moldova to maintain both close relations with Russia and Ukraine as long as a pro-EU coalition controls the parliament to serve as a check on the Moldovan president. Observers of the region and Ukrainian-Moldovan relations should continue to pay close attention to the 2018 parliamentary elections, which could shape Moldovas foreign policy agenda for the foreseeable future.

Editor's note:

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Moldova and Ukraine: Diverging Neighbors? - EurasiaNet

Ukraines navy is looking into the possibility of purchasing decommissioned NATO ships in order to add to its fleet, Ukraines Channel 5 reports.

Speaking on air, the navys commander, Ihor Voronchenko, said that to satisfy Ukraines role in occupying a significant portion of the Black Sea coastline, it should be better equipped to police these waters.

Ukraine is a transit state and we are obliged as naval forces to ensure the peaceful sailing of all vessels in the Black Sea, he said. We cannot fulfill the full spectrum of this work with only one minesweeper, Henichesk, that we obtained.

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Vice Admiral Ihor Voronchenko, commander of the Ukrainian Navy, speaks during an interview with Reuters in Kiev, Ukraine, October 27, 2016. He has just proposed using old NATO ships to boost Ukraine's coastal fleet. Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters

The navy received the ship in question from the Black Sea Fleeta Crimea-based Soviet-era unit that in modern times existed under much facility-sharing between Ukraine, on whose territory the main port of the unit fell, and Russia. Henichesk was one of the handful of ships Ukraine received in the messy divorce between the two navies after Russias annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Voronchenko said a Ukrainian naval delegation recently returned from a NATO state that he was not authorized to name, where they discussed purchasing older Western ships to fill out Ukraines ranks.

Several options were looked at and we decided that for the resources that we have, we will be able to buy a mine-sweeping set, he said. The same (solution) is being worked on for acquiring ships for the coastal area.

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Ukraine Looks Into Beefing Up Navy With Old NATO Ships - Newsweek