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KIEV (Reuters) - The Ukrainian central bank said on Friday it had warned state-owned and private lenders of the appearance of new malware as security services said Ukraine faced cyber attacks like those that knocked out global systems in June.

The June 27 attack, dubbed NotPetya, took down many Ukrainian government agencies and businesses, before spreading rapidly through corporate networks of multinationals with operations or suppliers in eastern Europe.

Kiev's central bank has since been working with the government-backed Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and police to boost the defenses of the Ukrainian banking sector by quickly sharing information.

"Therefore on Aug. 11..., the central bank promptly informed banks about the appearance of new malicious code, its features, compromise indicators and the need to implement precautionary measures to prevent infection," the central bank told Reuters in emailed comments.

According to its letter to banks, seen by Reuters, the new malware is spread by opening email attachments of word documents.

"The nature of this malicious code, its mass distribution, and the fact that at the time of its distribution it was not detected by any anti-virus software, suggest that this attack is preparation for a mass cyber-attack on the corporate networks of Ukrainian businesses," the letter said.

Ukraine - regarded by some, despite Kremlin denials, as a guinea pig for Russian state-sponsored hacks - is fighting an uphill battle in turning pockets of protection into a national strategy to keep state institutions and systemic companies safe.

The state cyber police and Security and Defence Council have said Ukraine could be targeted on Aug. 24 with a NotPetya-style attack aimed at destabilizing the country as it celebrates its 1991 independence from the Soviet Union.

Writing by Alessandra Prentice; editing by Mark Heinrich

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Ukraine central bank warns of new cyber-attack risk - Reuters

Statues and busts of Vladimir Lenin, once ubiquitous in Ukraine, have been torn down in every city across the country as part of a decommunisation drive.

Volodymyr Vyatrovych, head of Ukraine's institute of national memory, said in aninterviewwith local publication Liga.net that 2,389 monuments, including 1,320 monuments to Mr Lenin, have been razed across Ukraine.

Lenin is no more in cities in Ukrainian-controlled territory, Mr Vyatrovych said.

However, some Lenins likely remain in villages or on factory grounds and can be dismantled only when found, since such statues were never registered with the government, he said. The communist leader also lives on in the breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine, where Russia-backed separatists prize the Soviet past and decry the pro-Western Kiev government as a fascist regime.

Most of the Lenin statues were gypsum figures with no historical value, Mr Vyatrovych claimed, and were simply destroyed. Those made of valuable metals were melted down, while a few dozen large monuments were saved for a museum of Soviet propaganda to be established in Kiev.

The latest toppling of Lenin statues, known colloquially as the Leninfall,began when protestors pulled down a Lenin in Kiev during the Euromaidan demonstrations that eventually toppled president Viktor Yanukovych.

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Lenin becomes Lennon: As US struggles with Confederate legacy Ukraine announces end to communist monuments - Telegraph.co.uk

The decision whether or not to provide Ukraine with weapons has now reached the White House. Both the State Department and Pentagon approved this policy and Kurt Volker, President Trumps special envoy for Ukraine, has also done so.

Nevertheless, opponents of this policy have again flooded the media arguing against giving Ukraine these weapons. Their arguments boil down into three categories: Russia allegedly retains escalation dominance and will be provoked if we do so, our allies oppose this move and in any event Ukraine does not merit these weapons due to its democratic or other capability deficits. Unfortunately, all three arguments are unfounded.

Russia commits daily major violations of the Minsk accords x and its forces have killed about 10,000 Ukrainians, devastated eastern and southern Ukraine, imposed ethnic purges if not ethnic cleansing on Crimea and shot down unarmed civilian airliners. Beyond this it has sponsored terrorism in Ukraine and wages an unrelenting information and economic warfare against Ukraine. Finally, it has launched information warfare and constant threats against all of Europe and the U.S.

Yet Russia cannot and dare not launch an all out war against Ukraine because of the limits to its own military capability which amounts to about 100,000 men capable of being operationally deployed against a resolute and steadily improving Ukrainian army. Indeed, these opponents of helping Ukraine refuse to acknowledge the progress made by this army or the resolute fighting spirit of the Ukrainian people lest that detract from their narrative of a Russia unlimited by its own economic weakness and military capabilities. Actually Putin himself had to announce defense cutbacks on August 14.

Russia cannot and dare not sustain a protracted war that would lead to many fatalities and is the inevitable cost of further escalation even though it can always make life miserable for Ukraine.

By giving Ukraine weapons we raise the cost to Russia when it can least afford it and adopt Moscows long-standing tactic by helping Ukraine fight and talk simultaneously. We thus replicate the way we helped drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan and fully accords with our policy since 1947 of helping people who wish to be free defend themselves against naked aggression.

Second, although our allies have decided not to offer weapons, they have stated that they would accept it if we decided to do so. Clearly this is an amber flashing light, not a stop sign. Neither will they pressure Ukraine to accept the Minsk accords when Russia violated them before the ink was dry and still does so. Therefore alleged allied opposition is not only no argument, it is utterly unfounded.

If anything, helping Ukraine defend itself and fulfilling our own prior assurances of its sovereignty and integrity in the 1994 Budapest document would strengthen allied confidence unlike the craven past policy of abandoning our commitments once Russia invaded Ukraine.

Third, admittedly Ukraine suffers from many well known and extensively reported democratic and other defects so do w , as recent events clearly show. Thus Ukraine is hardly unique. And in any case the quality of its governance and democratic credentials is ultimately irrelevant to the issue of a country struggling to build democracy that must fight for its life, freedom, territorial integrity and sovereignty against naked aggression.

It is clearly in our interest as the guarantor of European and Ukrainian security as well as as the upholder of a liberal world order that aggression not be rewarded. Therefore failure to act not only rewards Russian aggression it actually increases the chances of U.S. troops fighting in Europe.

Ukraine may not be perfect. But it will defend its freedom and only wants us to give it the tools to finish the job as we assured Ukraine we would. Moreover, the longer this war drags on the less likely it is that Ukraine will become more democratic or that it will be able to reform its economy by itself. That would be impossible in wartime. Neither does giving Ukraine the means of self-defense prevent us and our allies from leaning on Kyiv to continue reforms. If anything, doing so gives us more leverage for Ukraine will not long heed people whom it feels abandoned it during its crisis. Thus the arguments for opposition lack a basis in reality and should be dismissed.

President Trump should authorize the provision of these weapons for Ukraine today, just like Polish members of Solidarity in the 1980s are not only fighting for their freedom, they are fighting for ours.

Stephen Blank is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is the author of numerous foreign policy-related articles, white papers and monographs, specifically focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia. He is a former MacArthur Fellow at the U.S. Army War College.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.

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Why we should help Ukraine defend itself - The Hill (blog)

Between 2014 and 2017, Ukraines leadership failed to transform the countrys old post-Soviet Russia oligarchic system into a European and Western-style democracy. The transformation isinefficient and slow, and this entails risk, writes Roman Rukomeda.

Roman Rukomeda is a political expert.

There is no doubt that Russia continues to influence Ukraine by all possible means available. Cyber warfare became the main direction of Russias undeclared war against Ukraine in the first half of 2017.

However, the Ukrainian authorities are alleged to be using the undeclared war with Russia as the main reason for the lack of reforms and transformations in the country.

One of the key risks in Ukraine is the perception of people of the absence of effective efforts to fight corruption on all levels. During the July EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv, President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker said Ukraine needs to speed up its fight against corruption.

Otherwise, there will be no serious progress in the dialogue with the EU regarding financial support (the next 600 million tranche from the EU to Ukraine is dependent on real results in the fight against corruption).

For that reason, the Ukrainian president will be keen to show some results in fighting corruption at the middle level. However, without any major agreements with internal players in Ukraine, it is rather unlikely that real measures to fight corruption on the top level will be carried out.

Another important risk for Ukraine is retaining an oligarchic model of power that does not promote the development of strong and transparent democratic institutions, an advanced level of political institutional culture, or build integrity and implement European values.

President Poroshenko is criticised for playing the role of the chief oligarch in Ukraine, using his political position to secure strong influence over the media, various industries, the financial sector, security, law enforcement and the courts.

At the same time, as President, he exercises informal control over the somewhat unstable coalition in Parliament and over the cabinet of ministers. Consequently, all the other main oligarchs in Ukraine now either support the president or oppose him, resulting in several challenges in sorting out the national economy properly.

The third most important risk is the open threat from Russia. It is present not only in the form of military operations in Donbas but also potentially in the spheres of economy, media, information technology and energy, to mention but a few.

It is very clear that Russia is currently by no means ready to recognise the independence of the Ukraine state and its right to decide on what level of relationship it would have and what position it would take on the issue of integration with the EU and the Euro-Atlantic community. Consequently, this complicated situation will continue for quite some time.

I see three scenarios. Lets start withthe optimistic one. Following his declarations, Ukraine will intensify its internal reforms and transformations. Besides the implementation of NATO approaches and standards in the defence and security sector, the Ukrainian authorities will initiate a real and massive fight against corruption.

For that purpose, the judicial reform will be urgently conducted and the first wave of high-level corrupt officials (MPs, ministers and deputy ministers, prosecutors, judges etc.) will go to jail after open court trials, with transparency for public decisions. The rule of law will be strengthened, and the oligarchic model will start to shift towards a democratic model.

This will ruin the existing monopolistic schemes in the national economy and open up markets, making Ukraine attractive for foreign investors. NATO will continue to support Ukraineand will start discussing the possibility of a Membership Action Plan for Kyiv after 2020.

The EU will confirm that Ukraines reforms are satisfactory and launch the new plan of economic support for Ukraine in autumn of 2017. Russia will slowly prepare the withdrawal of its troops from Donbas under pressure from Western sanctions and growing internal problems.

The pessimistic scenario.

Ukraine will sink into deep internal controversy. The fight for the decreasing amount of state resources between the oligarchic groups will escalate, resulting in political instability (early parliamentarian or even presidential elections).

Massive internal protests (partly inspired by different oligarchic groups) could lead to serious unrest, conflicts with the police or National Guard and civilian casualties. Ukraine could once again move towards a new internal revolution on the basis of total war between different oligarchic groups that will try to seek support from outside players (EU, USA and Russia).

Consequently, the state system will become less effective and economic, social and technological development will fail, as will integration into the EU and NATO. Ukraine will effectively follow the pattern of third world countries, creating a large number of security risks in the region for all of its neighbours.

Russia will exploit this situation and try to launch a new military offensive in Donbas or establish control over the Ukrainian authorities through political, economic, media and other ways of manipulation. The state will be seized from the Ukrainian people by oligarchs.

The realistic scenario.

This scenario is the most probable and will combine elements of the two scenarios mentioned above. It is more likely that the current Ukrainian government will continue to reform the country, but at a slow pace, preparing the grounds for controlling key media actors as well as continuing to exercise control over major economic and financial resources in the country.

The main political partner will continue to be the National Front party. Oligarchs will redirect business to the west. The Government will try to fight corruption at a low and medium level, but impunity for corruption will continue at a high level.

The EU and NATO will nevertheless continue to support Ukraine but without deep integration in the absence of structural internal changes. Ukraine will slowly move along the path of a developing democracy, but the road will be long and painful. A joint solution on Donbas may eventually be reached in the conflict with Russia, while the issue of Crimea will be put on hold indefinitely.

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Three risks and three scenarios for Ukraine - EURACTIV

Yesterday I went into detail about the founding father of modern Ukraine, Stepan Bandera, who is seen as a hero in western Ukraine but deemed a Nazi collaborator in the eastern part of the country.

For decades, Ukraine has been deeply divided both historically and culturally between its east and west. That deep division actually dates back long before both Bandera and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).

Today western Ukraine generally refers to the area that was formerly known as Galicia in history textbooks. Inhabited predominantly by ethnic Ukrainians, Galicia, along with the nearby Lodomeria, formed an autonomous kingdom under the Austro-Hungarian Empire through the 19th century right until the end of the First World War.

The kingdom adopted Ukrainian, Polish and German as its official languages simultaneously, and was among the most populous and prosperous areas within the Habsburg empire in those days.

However, the end of the First World War and the subsequent disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire spelt a sudden end to the golden era of Galicia.

Under the Treaty of Riga concluded in 1921 among the European powers, Galicia was officially incorporated into the newly independent Poland, despite the fact that the majority of Galicians at that time actually preferred to build an independent state of their own.

During the inter-war years, a series of military clashes broke out between Poland and the independent Ukraine over the sovereignty of Galicia, with the latter seeking to build a greater Ukraine and unify with the former autonomous kingdom.

However, in face of growing Soviet aggression in the east, both Kiev and Warsaw quickly set aside their differences and formed an alliance against Moscow. And under their bilateral deal, Warsaw agreed to grant Galicia a high degree of autonomy as long as it remained in Poland.

Unfortunately, Galicias fate once again took a nasty twist in August 1939 when the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact.

Under the secret pact, Berlin and Moscow agreed that they would divide up Poland, after which Galicia would become part of Ukraine, which itself had already become a member republic of the Soviet Union by the time the treaty was signed.

During the Second World War, Galicia, which had then already become the western part of Ukraine, was subject to totalitarian and brutal rule by Moscow, during which an estimated 200,000 ethnic Ukrainians were forced into exile in Siberia, and the vast majority of them were eventually massacred by the Soviet secret police.

At the Yalta Conference held in February 1945, the sovereignty of Galicia became a major sticking point among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. However, eventually both the US and Britain decided that it would be in their best interests to acknowledge Moscows sovereignty over Galicia because they still very much needed the partnership of the Soviet Union to defeat both Germany and Japan.

As we can see, Galicia, or the modern western Ukraine, used to be an independent political entity in its own right and had a unique sense of national identity of its own. And that sense of national identity has survived the entire Soviet era and remains strong even to this day.

Given their unique historical background, western Ukrainians today still identify themselves strongly with western Europeans culturally and religiously, with the majority of them being Catholics. They strongly resist being assimilated into Russia like the eastern Ukrainians have been, and hence the current divisions and tensions between western and eastern Ukraine.

After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, there were calls among western Ukrainian nationalists for seceding from the rest of Ukraine and re-establishing an independent Galicia.

Galicia independence is not necessarily a wild dream. It is because as long as the western Ukrainians are able to gain the support of the European Union, they could press ahead with their independence plan like the people in Kosovo did back in 2008, although it would inevitably further undermine the political stability of Ukraine.

Ironically, however, unlike in the past, this time Moscow is likely to throw its weight behind the separatist movement in western Ukraine.

It is because a weakened, volatile and politically divided Ukraine is exactly what Russian President Vladimir Putin wants, so that it can continue to serve as a buffer state between Russia and NATO countries.

This article appeared in the Hong Kong Economic Journal on Aug 17

Translation by Alan Lee

[Chinese version ]

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Can western Ukraine re-establish an independent Galicia? - EJ Insight