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More than six years have passed since the so-called Minsk II accords brought an end to the last high-intensity military conflict in Ukraine. But it would be unduly complacent to suppose that this hiatus will last much longer.

Since the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreement [of 5 September 2014] was signed by the representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and the unrecognised leaders of the two self-proclaimed Donbas republics on 12 February 2015, more Ukrainian servicemen have been killed in the ensuing low-intensity conflict than in the time since the conflict in southern and eastern Ukraine began.1

Yet this fact has not discouraged many in the West from treating the precarious post-Minsk conditions as a new status quo, when in fact Minsk produced nothing more than a highly contested and continuously flouted armistice. Despite numerous rounds of subsequent negotiation, two at summit level, the gap in perspective about what the accords stipulate and what obligations they entail has not been narrowed one iota.

Alongside the belief in the emergence of a status quo, a second belief has taken root: that Russia is content with this status quo and simply seeks its ratification. This belief rests on two sound assumptions and two erroneous ones.

The first sound assumption is that so long Russia controls these separate areas [otdelniye rayoniy], as well as the interstate border, Ukraine will not be able to reassert its control without its consent. The second is that, so long as this is the case, NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table.

But the first erroneous assumption is that these achievements define the limit of Russias objectives. To the contrary, even in Yeltsins time, Russias primary goal, in former President Dmitry Medvedevs words, was to synchronise the development of the two states, a goal pursued by hard diplomacy and soft coercion until 2014 and by hybrid war ever since.

By Moscows lights, the Minsk accords guarantee the republics a place in Ukraines structures of power and a de facto veto over its fundamental course. This is an outcome that Ukraine refuses to accept. So far, its Normandy partners, France and Germany, refuse to accept it either, and this is no less true for the United States. Thus for Russia, the armistice is becoming an increasingly exasperating obstacle to the achievement of its objectives. That discrepancy exposes the hollowness of the second assumption: that so long as diplomacy and dialogue take place, conflict will not resume. Yet diplomatic stagnation and the freezing of conflict are not synonymous.

Despite much euphoria elsewhere, within weeks of Volodymr Zelenskys election in April 2019, the Kremlin concluded that he was weak, that his administration was conflicted and that he could be induced to advance Russias overall objectives.

Almost from the start, the contrast between Zelenskys conciliatory approach and Petro Poroshenkos obduracy was all too apparent. To the discomfort of the professionals in Ukraines Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Armed Forces, Zelenskys Chief of Staff, Andrii Yermak an individual with no diplomatic or military credentials became the custodian of back channels to Moscow. Indeed, the full and comprehensive cease-fire established on 22 July 2020, on terms that Ukraines military found incapacitating and unworkable, only reconfirmed Zelenskys cooperativeness.2

Yet for whatever combination of reasons, Zelensky appears to have changed his attitude, and this might be true for Germany and France as well. It is now known that on the eve of the December 2019 summit, the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) prepared five scenarios for overcoming the Minsk impasse. Although the scenarios remain unpublished, they possibly contributed to Zelenskys visible self-confidence at the summit.

Much more recently, in January 2021, Viktor Medvedchuks successor on the Trilateral Contact Group, former president Leonid Kravchuk, announced that the formers role in facilitating the release of Ukrainian hostages would be terminated. This was a bold step. For months, and with Russias backing, Medvedchuk had presented Zelensky with a Hobsons choice: either accept prisoner exchanges under his auspices and to his political benefit or halt the process, to the detriment of Zelenskys humanitarian objectives as well as his popularity.

Moreover, these steps were but the beginning of Medvedchuks woes. Since former President Leonid Kuchma reluctantly appointed him Head of the Presidential Administration in 2002, his place in the Ukrainian political system has been analogous to that of an aneurysm in the brain: dangerous to keep in place and potentially life-threatening to remove. Ukraine is at war with Russia de facto, yet Vladimir Putin is godfather to Medvedchuks daughter.

On 17 March 2014 Medvedchuk was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for his role in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; Canada sanctioned him the same day.3Nevertheless, three months later President Poroshenko appointed him alongside Kuchma as Ukraines representative on the newly established Trilateral Contact Group.

On 19 February, the NSDC did the unthinkable. It sanctioned all property and assets owned by Medvedchuk and his wife for financing terrorism (i.e. the insurgency), following a decree by Zelensky banning broadcasts by the three pro-Russian television channels owned by his ally, Taras Kozak.4 For the Kremlin, even leaving aside the personal factor, this is a major blow, as Medvedchuk, his party and his media holdings had become its principal instrument for changing Ukraines course. In response, Putins spokesman, Dmitriy Peskov opined that Ukraine might now be considering a military solution to the conflict.5

The third new dynamic is an apparent tilt towards Ukraine by its two Normandy partners, Germany and France. Merkel had signalled the first move in this direction when she apparently backed Zelenskys demand to alter several key political provisions of the Minsk accords during the December 2019 summit. On 4 March, Yermak announced a new joint Franco-German and Ukrainian roadmap for Minsk, thereby also defying Russias insistence that the Minsk accords be implemented as written.

The fourth new dynamic, and hardly the least important, is the advent of the Biden administration. In his State Department speech on 4 February, Bidens clear message to Russia was the days of rolling over in the face of Russias actions are over. Just how much substance he can give to this assertion at a time Washingtons eyes are fixed on China is a question that Russians doubtless are asking themselves.

The conclusion of Russias military establishment is well summarised by Pavel Felgengauer: The West is waging hybrid war against Russia on many fronts: in Belarus, in Ukraine, with respect to Alexei Navalny. And Russia must not sit defensively, but actively counter-attack.6

Since the signing of Minsk-II, several war scares have erupted, none of them plausible and none of which bore fruit. The latest brandishing of sabres is different. Russia is losing the political initiative, yet it retains formidable military power. The combination of political necessity and military opportunity is never auspicious.

Since January, several warning indicators have appeared. But of what?

Given these factors, what is least and most likely to happen?

Of all possible scenarios, the annexation of Donbas is the least likely. Were it to take place, the Minsk accords, very much weighted in Russias favour, would fall to the ground. So would any prospect of reintegrating the republics into Ukraine on Russias terms. Russia would thereby lose its most direct means of influencing Ukraines future trajectory. Doubtless for these reasons, Peskov immediately and sharply disavowed Simonyans remarks.11

The launch of full-scale military operations analogous to the Russian combined arms offensives of summer 2014/winter 2015 is less unlikely but still implausible. The scenario runs afoul of three obstacles. First, as noted by the Ukrainian expert, Mikhail Zhirokhov, the invading forces would need to traverse an urbanised zone or natural obstacles that provide only two or three points at which forces could be introduced. Moreover, the encroaching muddy season [rasputitsa] is inhospitable to large-scale operations. Second, such an operation requires hundreds of tanks and a large tail of diesel tankers, difficult to conceal. Photo-reconnaissance of columns of forces heading from Rostov to Ukraine are consistent with localised operations, but not deep penetrations across the demarcation line. Third, as noted by Mikhail Samus, for all its shortcomings, Ukraines army is not the army of 2015, and it would offer proper resistance.

A localised escalation, dramatic and devastating, leading to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the current demarcation line, is probably the most realistic option. In the view of Sergiy Garmash, its aim would be to create a new reality and reformat dynamics in the region. It would have the merit of preserving existing territorial arrangements, at least outwardly, yet it would allow for the revival of military operations at any moment required by Moscow.12Moreover, it is the one military option that fits observable evidence: the movement of forces from Russia and the mobilisation of local reserves.

Nevertheless, it requires a convincing pretext, in other words a Ukrainian attack (if only the retaliation that Kravchuk has called for since 4 March). The likely purpose of todays creeping escalation is to engineer just such a provocation. In 2017, a Russian general (GRU, retd) warned the author that Russia might deploy peacekeepers if Ukraine did not meet its obligations. Then the option was judged to be impractical. Today, options are perceived differently.

Defence Minister Sergey Shoygus recent weekend in the taiga with Putin suggests that such an operation might be weeks away or less. What we can assume with confidence is that he did not travel there to discuss meteorites, drink beer and walk in the forest, as Russian media have reported.13

That a major escalation might rally Ukraine and revitalise Western support for it is eminently possible. But that does not diminish its probability. One looks in vain for signs that experience has refuted the orthodoxy that compelling [Ukraine] by force into brotherly relations is the only method historically shown to be effective.14It is also possible that these rumours of war will dissipate as others have in the past. But if not, no one should be surprised.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).

1Whilst France and Germany did not sign the accords, President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel negotiated them together with President Poroshenko and President Putin. The representatives of the so-called Donbas republics were not present during the negotiations and played no part in them.

2For the views of Ukrainian experts: Complete ceasefire in Donbas, or problems in detail, Ukrinform, 23 July 2020, http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3069095-povne-pri;

3US Dept of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages; Government of Canada, Sanctions List, http://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/03/sanctions-li

4NSDC hits sanctions on Putins ally Medvedchuk, UNIAN 19 February 2021, http://www.unian.info/politics/medvedchuk-nsdc-sanctions-

5Peskov commented on Kyivs introduction of sanctions against Medvedchuk [Peskov prokommentiroval vvedennye Kievom sanktsii protif Medvedchuka], gazeta.ru, 20 February 2021, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/02/20/n_15645092.

6Donbas: new war or local operation? What is behind the flare-up in eastern Ukraine? [Donbass: novaya voyna ili localnaya operatsiya? S chem svyazano obostrenie na vostoke Ukrainiy?] BBC Russian Service, 11 March 2021, http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-56365032

7Igor Shatrov, Donbass: Lavrov threatens to tear Macron and Merkel out of their hiding place [Donbass: Lavrov prigrozil dostat Makrona i Merkel ] Svobodnaya Pressa, 20 January 2021, svpressa.ru/politic/article/287551/

8Head of RT Simonyan in Donetsk: Mother Russia, take Donbas home [Glava RT Simonyan in Donetsk: Rossiya-matushka, zaberi Donbass domoy], Radio Svoboda, 28 January 2021, http://www.svoboda.org/a/31074432.html

9 TCG spokesman discloses death toll in Ukraine Army in Donbas since latest truce, UNIAN, 27 March,www.unian.info/war/donbas-tcg-spokesman-discloses-

10BBC, op.cit.

11Peskov commented on Simonyans words concerning the inclusion of Donbas into Russia [Peskov prokommentiroval slova Simonyan o vkliuchenii Donbassa v sostav Rossii], gazeta.ru, 29 January 2021, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/01/29/n_15551876.

12Sergiy Garmash, article in Mirror of the Week [Dzerkalo Tyzhnya/Zerkalo Nedeli].

13 In the taiga: Vladimir Putin and Sergey Shoygu spent a weekend in Siberia [V tayge: Vladimir Putin i Sergey Shoygu proveli vykhodniye v Sibiri], 21 March 2021, rg.ru/2021/03/21/vladimir-putin-i-sergej-shojgu-pr

14Vladislav Surkov, Surkov: I am interested in acting against reality [Surkov: mne interesno deystvovat protiv realnosti], Aktualnye Kommentarii, February 26, 2020, actualcomment.ru/surkov-mne-interesno-deystvovat-p.

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Rumours of War: Another Russian Surprise in Ukraine? - RKK ICDS

DUBLIN--(BUSINESS WIRE)--The "Global Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Market 2021" report has been added to ResearchAndMarkets.com's offering.

The "Global Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Market 2021" reveals continuing interest of online retail and payments major global players in cryptocurrency and blockchain-based technology. The publication indicates also that developing countries are leading the market.

Cryptocurrency is gaining momentum globally, with developing markets setting the trends

The report cites studies showing that by 2030, blockchain technology is expected to be a significant contributor to the global GDP, lifting it up by close to USD 2 trillion. Meanwhile, if the situation as at present, developing countries will be setting the trends in cryptocurrency implementation and development.

Currently, Ukraine and Russia are leading the ranking of cryptocurrency adoption. Some African countries made it to the top ten despite their infrastructure challenges, and such Asian countries as China, Vietnam, India, Thailand, Pakistan, are already among the top 20 countries by cryptocurrency adoption. Middle East is also catching up, despite the fact that many countries in the region still do not allow any activities connected to blockchain.

The health crisis affects retail and service sectors unequally

Globally, businesses and consumers are becoming more open to blockchain technology and cryptocurrency, so that for major online retail and payments players there was no choice left, to meet the demand.

As cited in this publication, Visa and Mastercard expand their offerings by incorporating blockchain in different forms, PayPal announced intention to expand its cryptocurrency capabilities, Amazon and Apple are to introduce their digital currency projects, and Square, which was the first public company to allow transactions of Bitcoins via its Cash App, has made serious investments in this area.

All in all, despite these large companies being increasingly active with Blockchain, the market is likely to see many newcomers in the near future.

Report Coverage

Report Structure

Global Overview

Banks Activity and Trends

Companies Mentioned

For more information about this report visit https://www.researchandmarkets.com/r/wle43i

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Global Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Market Report 2021: Ukraine and Russia are Leading the Ranking of Cryptocurrency Adoption -...

Summary

Healthcare workers are at the forefront of Ukraines response to COVID-19, risking their lives and their physical and mental health. The conditions of work of healthcare workers not only affect their own rights, but also impact the rights of health service users, including their access to and quality of health services.

This briefing note examines the impact of the pandemic and the Governments response to it on the rights of healthcare workers in Ukraine, of which 83 per cent are women. It looks, in particular at the right to just and favourable conditions of work, to social security and to effective participation, and how their situation affects essential health services. The briefing note contains recommendations to the Government and local authorities to this end.Healthcare workers in Ukraine are underpaid, receiving salaries, which are below the national average. In many cases, healthcare workers, especially at middle and junior levels, receive a minimum wage that does not provide for a decent living for them and their families.

Temporary bonuses introduced by the Government have partly remedied the situation for some healthcare workers involved in the COVID-19 response, but also raised concerns about lack of pay security, transparency, accountability, equal pay for work of equal value and a further contribution to the gender pay gap.

Healthcare workers lack healthy and safe working conditions, in particular due to lack of sufficient personal protective equipment, effective infection prevention and control mechanism at the workplace and mental health and psychosocial support services. Health care workers also suffer from increased workloads and insufficient time for rest. At the same time, those with other caring responsibilities, mainly women due to prevalent gender roles in Ukraine, face the increased burden of unpaid care work, especially during periods when the Government suspended care and education services in response to COVID-19.

Health care workers also lack adequate social protection. Out of the more than 60,000 cases of health care workers infected by COVID-19 by February 2021, only a small percentage have been recognized by the authorities as work-related, impeding the workers right to compensation.

A lack of effective dialogue between the authorities and health care workers and exclusion of healthcare workers from government policy-making prevents the authorities from developing and implementing effective policy measures aimed at protection of healthcare workers during the pandemic and beyond. Healthcare trade unions stated they were not effectively consulted about the Governments COVID-19 response in healthcare at the national and local levels, nor about the ongoing healthcare reform process. Furthermore, HRMMU is alarmed about cases of reprisals against healthcare workers who publicly exposed the poor preparedness and response of the healthcare sector for the COVID-19 crisis.

Dangerous working conditions and inadequate wages and social security, including for work-related illness, disability or death, have led to healthcare workers leaving their jobs. Given that Ukraine faced a shortage of healthcare workers before the pandemic, their departure is likely to further negatively impact the populations right to health. This in turn will likely impact the chance of Ukraine being able to meet Sustainable Development Goal 3 on ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being at all ages.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in particular Articles 7 and 9, guarantees the right to work and to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, including remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, a decent living for themselves and their families, safety and healthy working conditions, and rest and reasonable limitation of working hours, and the right to social security, in particular social insurance. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also guarantees the right to participate in public affairs and the freedoms of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association.

In line with its international human rights obligations and national commitments, including the Sustainable Development Goals, Ukraine should significantly increase its investments in the health sector to improve working conditions for healthcare workers, including by providing them with decent pay and improved occupational safety and health and social security, and by ensuring an effective mechanism of consultations with healthcare workers at various levels, including through trade unions.

Read more here:
Briefing note: Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on healthcare workers in Ukraine February 2021 - Ukraine - ReliefWeb

A Calgary artist is busy passing down a centuries-old tradition for Easter this year.

Cathy Reitzsays pysanka from the Ukrainian verb pysanty, meaning "to write" is the practiceof creatingintricate Ukrainian Easter eggs.

WATCH | See how much detail goes into each egg in the video above

"My great aunt taught me she was taught by her mother before, and her mother before that," she said.

"It was such a deep, meaningful tradition to do at Easter."

Now, shemakes almost 50 pysanky eggs every year, witheach requiring hours ofcreativity and patience.

"To be able to do it here in Calgary is really special, and it's really meaningful. And I'm just one of quite a few in Calgary that are actively keeping up the tradition of pysanka writing."

The eggs may look like a fun Easter craft, but inReitz's case it can take five to nine hours to complete one egg.

"You can see all the hard work, all the hours you put in, and see how it translated," she said.

First, she starts by ensuringall the insides of the egg are completelyremoved.

"It is very heartbreaking after spending hours on a design, when you go to hollow it out afterwards, taking the insides out, and it cracks on you and you're left with a mess," she said.

Once the shells are treated and each egg is blown out, she's ready to start drawing; however, the artist warns a lot of patience is needed during this process.

"In between each layer, you then have a new colour. And you can't start right away. You need to wait for the process, for the colour to dry, before you're able to keep on writing."

While most designs follow Ukraine tradition, Reitz says each symbol has a meaning and sometimes a special wish.

"I have one that I'm doing right now that is for a friend who lost her house before Christmas in a house fire. And it is filled with symbolism of protection, new beginnings, good wishes for the future," she explained.

Ukrainians around the world still gather to write pysanky during Orthodox Easter, which will land on May 2 this year.

But in pre-modern times, the eggs served a more functional purpose: They were thought to have magical properties.

Some were kept inside the home to guard against storms and fire; some were placed with animals to promote fertility;and a few were saved to place in the coffins of loved ones who died during the year.

It was traditionally done every Easter by the women in Ukrainian families and was not supposed to be attempted by children.

However, theworldwide practicenow has a dedicated museum to the art of pysankain the Ukrainian city ofKolomyia.

Reitzsays she has sent one of her own eggs to be featured at the museum.

"Now that I've been able to send one, I actually truly feel like a piece of me is out there to help represent my family, represent their history and have a little piece of my art out there," she said.

Read more:
Calgary artist connects with Ukrainian culture by making dozens of intricate Easter eggs - CBC.ca

A member of an election commission carries a mobile ballot box in Ivano-Frankivsk region during Ukraine's May 2014 presidential election. (REUTERS/Kacper Pempel)

Ukraines public governance system is in dire need of transformation and President Zelenskyy has identified digitization as the best route towards greater accessibility and accountability. Our goal is to make sure that all relations with the state can be carried out with the help of a regular smartphone and the internet, commented Zelenskyy during the presentation of the governments Diia mobile application in February 2020. However, a promised move towards internet voting for Ukrainian elections may be premature for the countrys fledgling democracy.

Ukraines vision for digital transformation is ambitious and includes holding online voting for all elections and referendums. This aspiration to bring Ukraines public governance into the digital age should be applauded, but there are number of serious obstacles that must be taken into account when considering internet voting. Premature implementation of online voting could potentially have dire consequences for Ukraines democratic development, political stability, and electoral integrity.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraines politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

While the use of the internet for remote voting has considerable future potential, it is a new approach that has only been successfully implemented in very few cases and with limited scope. These cases all need to be considered before implementing wide-scale internet voting in Ukraine in order to learn crucial lessons, compare contexts, and realistically evaluate if it is an appropriate step forward for the country.

Internet voting was first used for binding political elections in 2000 in the United States in a pilot across several states targeting out-of-country voters. Since then, approximately a dozen countries have experimented with this technology. A few nations use internet voting in some parts of their country or for certain voters. The list includes Armenia, Australia, Canada, Panama, Switzerland, and the US.

Countries that use internet voting tend to target specific categories of voters. For example, this often includes out-of-country voters, diplomatic or military personnel posted abroad, domestic absentee voters, or voters with disabilities.

Estonia is the only country that uses internet voting nationwide, but this step came following decades of investment in a full e-governance transformation and infrastructure. In Estonia, todays internet voting system was added as part of an overall e-governance system that already had the trust of the public. This system is linked to mandatory electronic ID documents as well as a large-scale e-governance ecosystem that includes an inter-agency data exchange system.

The Estonian government has been developing both of these features since the 1990s. Only after extensive use and gradual expansion of preexisting services (in areas like social security, taxation, and property registration) did Estonia launch its online voting efforts, and even then only gradually.

Todays Ukraine exists in a very different context. It has a significantly larger population that does not yet have similar levels of trust in digital technologies, and its digitized identification system is significantly lacking. According to the most recent data, only 5.6 million Ukrainians (out of 40 million) have digital IDs, while the countrys citizen registry requires broad reform and modernization.

Internet voting is still a developing technology when it comes to security and trust. Many countries have chosen not to use it after conducting feasibility studies or pilots due to these concerns. Some did so after limited pilots of internet voting (the United Kingdom and Norway), others initially adopted internet voting but decided to discontinue it (India, France, the Netherlands, and Spain). Even a pilot of this technology, if not properly planned and communicated to voters, could have a lasting negative impact on public trust in electoral technology and election integrity.

Security, as well as the perception of security, should be a key consideration before implementing internet voting. Especially given the ongoing military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, there is a high risk of e-voting technology being compromised. It is important to note the recent leaks of personal information of citizens from state registries, and the recent history of sophisticated cyber attacks against Ukraine.

Countries that experience frequent and sometimes devastating cyber attacks must take all necessary measures to increase the resilience of their existing election infrastructure. At this stage, Ukraine does not have the necessary technological infrastructure to adequately pilot internet voting. If piloting did move forward, it would first have to be carefully researched, planned for and resourced. By no means should a pilot take place as part of a live election event.

Trust is probably the most critical aspect of any election process. Allegations of election fraud or irregularities, even if unfounded, can have a devastating impact on political stability, as we have recently seen in several high-profile elections.

In Ukraine, there is currently significant distrust of internet voting among voters and politicians. This distrust may threaten public willingness to accept election results through this system, particularly if those who lose an election accuse the system of fraud or manipulation.

The example of the recent US election is particularly revealing. Importantly, if an online voting exercise fails and the publics trust in e-democracy is impacted, this could have negative consequences for all tech initiatives and for democratic development itself in Ukraine.

In light of these concerns, the introduction of online voting or the conduct of a pilot exercise tied to a live election event in Ukraine requires a bit more thought. Fifty-four Ukrainian NGOs share this sentiment and co-signed IFESs Joint Statement on Internet Voting Pilot during Local Elections 2020 in early July last year.

Crucially, this does not mean that Ukraine should abandon the idea of digitizing and modernizing the election process. There is a clear need for a more transparent and accessible result management system. Ukraine could also consider implementing solutions for electronic voting and electronic counting including ballot scanners and verified voter paper trails, as well as crucial risk limiting audits.

However, these technological solutions can only be effectively introduced in the controlled environment of an election precinct, not in an individual voters home or on a smartphone, where it is more difficult to police instances of fraud, vote-buying, and coercion. It is also critical to ensure the Central Election Commissions leading role in discussing the implementation of any modern IT solutions for the electoral process, as it is the only institution mandated to take on the challenges of administering them.

Technology can serve as a tool to bring greater electoral integrity to a country, making government interactions with citizens more transparent, efficient, and accountable. Ukraine is right to aspire to this. However, if applied or used inappropriately, technology can also set a country back. Much progress has been made over the past decade to improve Ukraines electoral administration and protect electoral integrity. A misstep in introducing internet voting could now potentially cast doubt on the foundations of democracy in Ukraine and jeopardize this hard-won progress.

Serhii Savelii is the Senior Legal Officer of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in Ukraine. Meredith Applegate is the Program Advisor for the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and co-author of the IFES white paper Considerations on Internet Voting: An Overview for Electoral Decision-Makers.

Wed, Jul 29, 2020

The Ukrainian Institute was established in 2018 in order to make the most of the countrys untapped soft power potential, but this cultural diplomacy initiative faces numerous political and bureaucratic obstacles.

UkraineAlertbyMarina Pesenti

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraines politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Centers mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The risks of rushing to internet voting in Ukraine - Atlantic Council