By Ora John Reuter and David    Szakonyi December 31,    2014  
    The following is a guest post fromOra    John Reuter, an assistant professor of political    science at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee,    andDavid    Szakonyi,a doctoralcandidate in political    science at Columbia University. Follow Szkonyi on Twitter    @dszakonyi.  
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    Ever since online social networking became widespread in the    mid-2000s, observers have been bullish about the ability of    social media to bring about democratic change. Drawing on    examples from around the globe      Iran in 2009,     Egypt,     Tunisiaand Russia in    2011-2012; and     Ukraine and     Hong Kong in 2014 are among the most commonly used         pundits and     social scientists have argued that social media can help    citizens access free information in unfree media environments    and, when the moment is right, help anti-government protesters    organize. At the same time, there have been some    detractors, who point out that social media may actually        help dictators gather information on opponents and cut off    the flow of information between activists.  
    In a recently published article at the     British Journal of Political Science, we use survey data    from the December 2011 parliamentary elections in Russia to    examine one aspect of this debate. Specifically, we look    at how usage of different social networks affected users    awareness of electoral fraud in those elections. That    question is important because the mass protests that broke out    after those elections, the largest in Russia since the fall of    the Soviet Union, were organized primarily in response to    allegations of fraud. Hence, belief in electoral fraud    was an important determinant of protest participation.  
    Our findings indicate that the ownership structure of social    media sites matters greatly. Controlling for a range of    possible confounding factors, we find that users of Western    networks like Facebook and Twitter were more likely than    non-users to believe that there was significant electoral fraud    during the elections. And yet, users of VKontakte and    Odnoklassniki  Russian-owned social networks that each have    four times more users in Russia than Facebook does (in 2011,    only 5percentof Russians were on Facebook)  were    no more likely than non-users to believe that fraud had taken    place. The reason for this discrepancy, we argue, is that    opposition activists politicized Facebook and Twitter with    accounts of electoral fraud, but refrained from doing the same    on domestic networks, which were more vulnerable infiltration    by the regime.  
    Russia is one of a small, but important, group of countries     China and Iran being two others  where domestic social    networks still draw more users than Facebook. In these    countries, we suspect that the effect of online social media on    regime change may be muted. After all, when nondemocratic    governments have leverage over the content and structure of    social networks, users lose the ability to access independent    points of view and learn about government malfeasance. Not only    is information sharing monitored and potentially blocked, but    democracy activists avoid networks connected with government    authorities for fear of reprisals.  
    The story of VKontakte, Russias largest social network,    illustrates this point well. Following the 2011 elections,    pressure mounted on VKontakte to limit opposition activity on    the site. The authorities were especially concerned about    activities related to protest coordination. The companys    founder, Pavel Durov, was reportedly     questioned by the FSB (Russias internal security service)    over opposition activity on his site.  
    Accusations again arose in March    2013 that the company had been sharing data with security    services about how opposition groups utilize the social network    to coordinate their online and offline activities. Durov    claimed that VKontakte had resisted these entreats, but    suspicions flew that the site had been shutting down opposition    groups and disrupting private communication between    opposition figures. The very next month two key partners        sold their 48 percent share in VKontakte to individuals    thought to be well-connected to the Kremlin, intensifying    pressure on Durov to play by the governments rules.  
    The final straw for Durov appears to have been requests from    the FSB to     report on Ukrainians who were publicly critical of the    Russian government on the site. Durov refused to comply,    instead publishing the FSB requests online and further drawing    attention to the censorship being applied.  
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