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In February, a 26-year-old Eritrean man lost his life when a fire broke out in the overcrowded Dhar El-Jebel detention centerin Zintan. We offered psychological support to survivors of the fire and distributed basic necessities to replace items they had lost, while reiterating our call for the end of arbitrary detention of migrants and refugees in Libya.

The vast majority of the estimated 650,000 migrants currently in Libya live on the streets, exposed to arbitrary arrest and detention, human trafficking, exploitation, and severe violence. Most of those detained are in clandestine prisons and warehouses run by people smugglers rather than official centers. In Bani Walid, our teams offered general health care and medical referrals to refugees and migrants who had escaped from captivity, and to victims of torture and trafficking.

Throughout 2020, refugees and migrants were subjected to numerous violent attacks; for example, at disembarkation points where the Libyan coastguard forcibly returns those who try to flee. On July 28, our teams responded with medical and psychological care after a shooting at a disembarkation site in Khoms that left three teenagers dead.

Tuberculosis (TB) care is another focus of our activities in Libya. Our teams work in three TB facilities: two in Tripoli and one in Misrata, a 17-bed clinic that we opened in March.

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Libya | Our Work & How to Help - Doctors Without Borders (MSF-USA)

TRIPOLI-

The pressure exerted by Russia to appoint a new UN envoy to Libya to succeed Jan Kubis could signal the start of the countdown for the end of mission of the UN Secretary-General special advisor, Stephanie Williams, in Libya.

Williams, who has been acting since last November as the de facto UN envoy to Libya, has not pulled off any notable achievements since her return to the Libyan scene in her new capacity, last November.

In particular, she was unable to ensure the holding of elections on their scheduled date of December 24, hence disappointing most Libya stakeholders who had counted on her ability to pressure the various protagonists into making needed compromises, using her knowledge of the Libyan scene to deliver effective results on the ground.

Despite her insistence on the importance of the elections for ending Libyas continued crisis, the December vote was eventually cancelled, which punctured the halo around the Iron Lady, as Williams was at times called in diplomatic circles.

The high expectations stemmed from her long experience as US charg d'affaires in Tripoli and later as the deputy of former UN envoy Ghassan Salame.

Some Libyans have even blamed her for the electoral fiasco, although the reasons for that impasse are much more complex.

After the aborted vote, Williams was unable to prevent the emergence of a new political divide in the country. The recent elections and constitutional initiatives, which she launched after parliament gave a vote of confidence to the new Fathi Bashagha government, have added to the confusion, as her proposals did not elicit enough interest among political players, especially in the eastern region.

The Security Council is supposed to extend the United Nations political mission in Libya by the end of April, a deadline that coincides with the expiry of Stephanie Williams mandate, which could theoretically be extended. However, Russia's deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyansky, has stressed the need to appoint a new UN envoy "as soon as possible."

Since the resignation of Slovak diplomat Jan Kubis in November, no UN envoy to Libya has been appointed. A diplomatic source told AFP, on condition of anonymity, that the African Union will propose to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres the appointment of an African envoy.

The same source added that this proposal has the support of Russia and China in the UN Security Council. It is assumed that Guterres will receive the names of a number of personalities from which he will pick a nominee whom he will submit to the Security Council.

The demand for an African envoy representing the UN in Libya is not new. In 2020, Africa nominated Algerian and Ghanaian candidates, one after another, but the two proposals were rejected by the United States.

A government formed by former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and supported by the House of Representatives in the east is competing with the outgoing government headed by Abdulhamid Dbeibah, who refuses to step down, although the political agreement which had brought his government to power, stipulates that his term expired on December 24.

On Wednesday, Williams called on the Libyan House of Representatives to "respond quickly and positively" to her proposal to form a joint committee with the State Council (an advisory body) in order to set a constitutional basis that would lead to elections as soon as possible.

Last Friday, Williams had announced, in a series of tweets, an initiative that provides for the formation of a joint committee consisting of six representatives from both the House of Representatives and the State Council, which would have met on March 15 for a period of two weeks, under the auspices of the United Nations, to set a constitutional basis that leads the country to elections.

The joint committee was scheduled to meet on Tuesday to start its work but the House of Representatives has not yet named its representatives, nor has it officially announced its position on the initiative itself, except for a statement put out a week ago by 93 members who rejected the Williams plan.

Analysts says the timeframe attached to the initiative was not realistic given the deep differences still separating the House of Representatives and the State Council.

Both the United States and the UN special envoy to Libya seem to fear that in the near future Libyas eastern region tribes could carry on their threats to shut down the oil fields again, in support of the Bashagha government .

US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, proposed Thursday a new mechanism to manage oil revenues in order to help the country avoid economic fallouts from the political crisis.

The rival factions have feuded for years over control of oil production, sales and revenue, fuelling the political chaos and violence that has gripped Libya since the 2011 NATO-backed uprising.

Read more:
Russian pressure on UN to appoint new envoy in Libya could signal end of Williams' mandate | | AW - The Arab Weekly

A boat carrying about two dozen migrants capsized in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya on Saturday, with at least 19 people missing and presumed dead, authorities said.

Libyas coastguard said that a group of 23 migrants Egyptians and Syrians set off from the eastern city of Tobruk earlier in the day. Three migrants were rescued and taken to hospital. Only one body was retrieved and search efforts were continuing, the agency said.

The shipwreck is the latest tragedy at sea involving migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean from the north African nation in a desperate attempt to reach European shores. Libya has emerged as the dominant transit point for migrants fleeing war and poverty in Africa and the Middle East, hoping for a better life in Europe.

Human traffickers in recent years have benefited from the chaos in Libya, smuggling in migrants across the oil-rich countrys lengthy borders with six nations. The migrants are then packed into ill-equipped rubber boats and set off on risky sea voyages.

At least 192 migrants drowned along the Central Mediterranean route in the first two months of 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said. More than 2,930 were intercepted and taken back to Libya. Once back, the migrants are typically taken to government-run detention centres rife with abuse and ill-treatment.

In 2021, at least 32,425 migrants were intercepted and returned to Libya. At least 1,553 are presumed to have drowned last year, according to IOM.

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At least 19 migrants missing after boat capsizes off coast of Libya - The Guardian

Libyan consumers have been complaining about the sudden food price rises upon the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Within days of the war starting, bakeries increased bread prices from four standard loaves per dinar to three loaves per dinar.

Libya is heavily reliant on imported Ukrainian and Russian grain for its bread flour. Prices of other basic foodstuffs such as flour, cooking oil, sugar, and tomato paste also rose.

The public were outraged. Social media commentary complained that the war in Ukraine had barely started when bakeries raised prices. They complained that new grain supplies had not arrived in Libya yet to instantly affect bread prices. They demanded that the government, which subsidises bread flour, act.

The incumbent Aldabaiba-led Libyan Government of National Unity reacted by announcing that basic food supplies such grain supplies for bread flour were plentiful and ordered bakeries to revert to the pre-Ukraine war prices. It wowed to conduct price inspections at bakeries.

The Aldabaiba v Bashagha battle for powerMarkets like political stability. Instability encourages speculation and profiteering. In Libyas case the internal political uncertainty has not helped. Both Caretaker Prime Minister, Abd Alhamid Aldabaiba (installed through the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) process), and newly House of Representatives appointed Prime Minister, Fathi Bashagha, are fighting for the role of exclusive Prime Minister. The fight could get messy and could take Libya back to days of two parallel governments and sovereign institutions and ultimately to an oil production blockade and war.

This political uncertainty has left the door open for profiteering by some merchants who speculate that things could become even more unstable in Libya at least in the short term.

Ramadan: a historically high food consumption month

To add to this international and domestic uncertainty, the holy fasting month of Ramadan is historically a high consumption month of foodstuffs. Unless supplies are equal or higher than demand, prices tend to rise anyway during this time. But beyond high demand and low supply, there are traders who take advantage and raise prices anyway. Some cause artificial supply shortages by hoarding goods.

The fact that the Ukraine war started so close to Ramadan has also meant that Libyan suppliers did not have enough time to react to increased demand and import food supplies from other sources.

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Rising Libyan food prices on the eve of Ramadan: caused by Ukraine war and other external factors or simple profiteering? - Libya Herald

Libya is at a perilous crossroads again. On 1 March, the countrys Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives, voted to endorse a new interim government headed by former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, giving it the greenlight to take over from the sitting prime minister, Abdulhamid Dabaiba. The votes proponents insist that the procedure was sound, but factions in the capital Tripoli say it was fraudulent. The latter reject the new cabinet and oppose appointing a new executive entirely. As the camps square off, omens of renewed fighting are visible for the first time since an October 2020 ceasefire ended six years of political feuds and intermittent conflict. Armed groups allied with the Tripoli-based government have already closed Libyan airspace to prevent incumbent ministers from travelling to Tobruk to take part in Bashaghas swearing-in ceremony. With others gearing up for confrontation, what happens next will depend largely on how foreign powers react. A splintered international response could encourage an institutional split and military mobilisation. But a united international condemnation of the use of force coupled with a call on Libyans to chart a consensual way forward with UN assistance could avoid this scenario.

The 1 March vote risks breaking apart theunified interim governmentthat formed in the months after a ceasefire declared in October 2020. That government brought together the countrys rival power centres, one based in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk, which formed after contested parliamentary elections cleaved the country in two in 2014. Efforts to instal a new government have been under way since early 2022, after the national electoral commission indefinitely postponed a presidential election that had been slated for 24 December, citing insurmountable legal disputes regarding the candidates running for the countrys top position.Libyas main political camps have put forward conflicting ideas for resolving the impasse.

Since then, Libyas main political camps have put forward conflicting ideas for resolving the impasse. The Tobruk-based group, which includes House speaker Aghila Saleh, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (who led forces that besieged Tripoli in 2019) and Tripoli-based factions that want to oust Dabaiba, said politicians should form a new government and amend a draft constitution before new elections. The other, which includes western Libyas main political blocs, wanted Dabaiba to stay in power until a new legislature is elected and can choose a new executive. Even presidential hopeful Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of the late dictator, who is historically at odds with the second camp, echoed the need to keep the Dabaiba government in place and proceed with a legislative ballot.

The polarisation between these two broad camps deepened after 10 February, when the House appointed Bashagha as prime minister-designate and tasked him with forming a government by the end of the month. This appointment was the result of a deal among Bashagha, Saleh, Haftar and their respective allies in the House. At first, the agreement also had the approval of Khaled al-Mishri, the chairman of the High State Council, the rival assembly located in Tripoli. But Mishri withdrew his support in late February, seemingly under pressure from several members of the Council he heads, who opposed the move to put a new government in place. The pro-Dabaiba camp responded to the Houses manoeuvres by announcing that the government was working on its own roadmap to hold a legislative ballot in June. They said the Tobruk-based parliament had no right to appoint a new executive and that Dabaiba would hand over power only to a successor backed by a popular vote.

Divisions among foreign actors mirrored Libyas cleavages. Cairo and Moscow gave their initial blessing to the Houses efforts to instal a new government, seemingly believing that Libya would benefit from an alliance among former enemies like Bashagha and Haftar. Beginning in early 2022, Egyptian officials actively supported reaching an understanding between the two and proceeding with the plan based on their deal. Turkey, while maintaining friendly ties with Bashagha, stuck by Dabaiba and called for fresh elections, banking on polls being a better guarantee of long-term stability. The UAE backed Dabaiba, while its Gulf adversary Qatar, made discreet overtures to Bashagha while still bankrolling its traditional allies aligned with Dabaiba. In effect, the Gulf monarchies allegiances have shifted: barely a year ago, Abu Dhabi was aiding Haftar militarily, while Doha was providing diplomatic and financial support to the Tripoli-based authorities. Amid these fast-changing developments, the U.S. and other Western states have adopted a wait-and-see approach.

The UN did not oppose the attempt to replace the government. But the UN Secretary-Generals special adviser, Stephanie Williams, imposed conditions for accepting the move. First, she said, the new governments appointment should be consensual and have the High State Councils buy-in. Secondly, the confidence vote in a new interim premier should be transparent and meet legal requirements though her office never clarified what these might be. Foreign diplomats said the vote would be valid only if at least 50 per cent of House members plus one supported the new government. But House members advanced their own interpretations. Another point lacking clarity was how many lawmakers the House would need for a quorum. Many of its original 200 members had defected to the Tripoli-based authorities, said they would boycott the proceedings or been replaced. Legislators gave the UN conflicting estimates of the remaining number of parliamentarians, ranging from 164 to 188. As a result, estimates of the quorum for a valid confidence vote varied between 82 and 94. After the High State Council withdrew its support, Williams knew her first condition would not be met and could not be sure her second condition would be, either.

The 1 March parliament confidence vote made matters worse. The House speaker counted 101 members in attendance, and 92 voted in favour. This number was close to or higher than the earlier quorum estimates. Butvideo footageshowed fewer attendees than 101, and only 88 names were read out during the roll call for the vote. The number of parliamentarians who pronounced the word confidence (thiqqa) was unclear because they did not speak into microphones. On 2 March, parliamentclarifiedthat the discrepancy in numbers came about because eight lawmakers had dialled in from remote locations for security or health reasons, while others preferred to cast their votes anonymously after receiving threats from pro-Dabaiba armed groups. The House also changed the total number of those in favour of the new government to 96, adding to the confusion. Bashagha said the ballot was clear and transparent and vowed to take office in Tripoli in a peaceful manner. The next day, however, Dabaibacalledthe vote a coup attempted through fraud. On 3 March, Bashagha and most of his ministers took the oath of office in Tobruk. On that occasion, House speaker Saleh listed all 96 names of the lawmakers who had supported the new executive, in one last attempt to dispel doubts about the vote of confidence.[The power struggle] risks undermining reconstruction efforts and the wider economy.

The power struggle could disrupt the calm Libya has enjoyed since factions signed the October 2020 ceasefire agreement. It risks undermining reconstruction efforts and the wider economy. Political rivals are also becoming more dependent on armed loyalists. Gunmen allied with the Tripoli-based government reportedly detained two new ministers, preventing them from assuming their duties. It is unclear how Haftar-led forces, who control the east of the country and are allied with the Bashagha cabinet, will respond. The risk of war depends both on the answer to this question and on what the sides foreign backers decide to do. For now, the foes in the civil war appear unlikely to take up arms again, due to general war fatigue. Neither do outside powers seem eager for renewed conflict. That said, rising animosity between the two governments could change this calculation.

Geopolitical shifts could also affect tensions in Libya. The precarious balance between Turkey and Russia, both of which have military personnel in Libya, could be rapidly upended. Turkey is allied with the Tripoli-based government. Russia deployed fighter jets and the Wagner Groups private military contractors to support Haftar-led forces in the 2019-2020 war, and while it has subsequently sent some of its assets elsewhere, it retains a presence on the ground alongside Haftar. As fighting in Ukraine intensifies, there is a risk of spillover that could drag Libya into a new proxy war. For now, Moscow is the only foreign capital toofficially welcomethe Bashagha government. The Kremlins confrontation with the West over Ukraine makes its strategy in Libya unpredictable.

Other capitals have thus far kept a deafening silence, perhaps waiting to see how the UN responds. On 2 March, the UN Secretary-General said the vote fell short of the expected standards of transparency and procedures and included acts of intimidation prior to the session. This wording is likely to push foreign powers in the direction of refusing the new government recognition, which would be a blow to those backing the Bashagha-Haftar deal.

Notwithstanding their divisions, external actors should speak with one voice in pressing all Libyan parties to show restraint and condemning the forcible detention of the new governments supporters. Such a minimum international consensus should be attainable, given that outside powershave a common interest in preventing a return to a divided Libya or a relapse into civil war at a moment of already great geopolitical upheaval. The two sides in Libya should accept UN mediation to break their deadlock and return to negotiating a realistic political roadmap for the way forward. Finding a consensus between the two rival governments admittedly will not be easy, but for each there are good reasons and incentives to accept external mediation: the Bashagha government will be short-lived if it does not receive broad international recognition or, alternatively, gain access to state funds (both of which will be difficult without the UNs support); the Dabaiba government risks losing out if member states begin to gradually flip their recognition in favour of the new executive. The UNs Williams should call on the parties to refrain from violence and urge them to accept her good offices for mediation. Foreign governments should follow her lead in calling for negotiations.

Source: This article was published by the International Crisis Group

Excerpt from:
International Unity Needed To Prevent A Divided Libya Analysis - Eurasia Review