Archive for the ‘Libya’ Category

Libya’s Economic Update October 2020

The Libyan economy has recently been hit by four overlapping shocks: an intensifying conflict that suffocates economic activity, the closure of oil fields that puts the countrys major income-generating activity largely on hold, decreasing oil prices that reduce income from oil production in surviving fields, and the COVID-19 pandemic (with 3,438 confirmed cases and 73 deaths as of August 2020), which threatens to further suppress the economy.

The attack on Tripoli in early 2019 and the blockade of the countrys major oil ports and terminals in January 2020 generated the most serious political, economic, and humanitarian crisis faced by Libya since 2011. The economic impact was already felt in 2019 as real GDP growth slowed sharply to 2.5%, down from what seemed a promising steady recovery during 201718, with a record growth performance of 20.8% on average. As military confrontations escalated, oil production decreased from 1.2 million bpd in December 2019 bpd to 0.1 million bpd in April 2020, choking the lifeline of the economy.

In the absence of significant improvements on the ground, the economic downturn will deepen. If the inability, or severely limited capacity, to produce and export oil might well prevail over the rest of 2020 despite the recent efforts to restart the production, Libya is expected to produce a daily average of only 0.17 million barrels in 2020, which is less than one seventh of last years production. As a result, GDP is expected to shrink by 41% this year. The adopted budget for 2020 partially reflects this dire situation, with a large forecasted deficit, the highest in recent years. Likewise, the current account is expected to run astronomic deficits in 2020. Consequently, reserves will be further declining this year.

Given the extreme volatility and unpredictability surrounding the determinants of economic trends, it is not sensible to produce forecasts beyond the immediate horizon.

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Libya's Economic Update October 2020

Libya’s Economic Update April 2020 – World Bank

The recent economic recovery has been short-lived, stalled in early 2019 by the most serious political crisis facing Libya since 2011. The outbreak of the war around Tripoli in April 2019 prevented Libya from continuing its strong economic expansion. Indeed, after its deep recession over 2013-16, driven by limited oil production (0.6 million bpd in average vs. a potential of 1.6 million bpd), the Libyan economy was able to substantially increase oil production above one million bpd in average over 2017-2019. As a result, real GDP growth reached an average of 21% during 2017-18, but slowed down sharply to 2.5% in 2019, and is expected to be negative in 2020.

The ongoing fight around Tripoli and the subsequent failure of the political rivals to reach a sustained peace deal have taken a heavy toll on the economy, which the Covid-19 pandemic is further exacerbating. In this context, the production and export of oil has almost come to a stop since January 18, 2020, due to the closure of oil ports and terminals. Assuming the disruption stays for up to end April 2020, and oil production resumes slowly to reach last-years average production level by the end of the year, Libya would only produce a daily average of 0.67 million bpd this year (about half of last years). As a result, GDP growth will be negative in 2020 (minus 19.4%), but will rebound by 22.2% in 2021, before stabilizing around 1.4% thereafter.

Risks to the baseline forecast are unusually high and tilted to the downside. First, peace and stability seem illusive given the conflicting agendas of the foreign countries supporting the main parties involved in the fight for power and wealth, which would delay recovery and stability. The disruption of oil production and export may continue for a longer period with disastrous economic and social consequences. Second, the ongoing spread of the COVID-19 infection in Europe is disrupting both demand and supply of commodities. Libya may suffer from lower demand for oil, reducing Libyas income. It might also face lower supply of equipment and final consumption goods, which would disrupt further basic services delivery and increase the hardship of the population. Third, in case the spread of COVID-19 intensifies domestically, exacerbated by weak enforcement of social distancing and its high contagion among displaced people and migrants, it would be hard to address and contain the infection because of the decrepit health system.

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Libya's Economic Update April 2020 - World Bank

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https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview

The World Bank is committed to supporting Libya with technical assistance and analytical services, as well as trust fund and grant financing, but the resumption of armed hostilities has placed its program to Libya on hold.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya

The World Bank is committed to supporting Libya with technical assistance and analytical services, as well as trust fund and grant financing, but the resumption of armed hostilities has placed its program to Libya on hold.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/research

Latest research from the World Bank on development in Libya, including reports, studies, publications, working papers and articles.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/publication/economic-update-april-2020

Libya may suffer from lower demand for oil, reducing Libyas income. It might also face lower supply of equipment and final consumption goods, which would disrupt further basic services delivery and increase the hardship of the population. Third, in case the spread of COVID-19 intensifies domestically, exacerbated by weak enforcement of ...

https://www.worldbank.org/en/search?q=libya

The World Bank is committed to supporting Libya with technical assistance and analytical services, as well as trust fund and grant financing, but the resumption of armed hostilities has placed its program to Libya on hold. Libya's Economic Update October 2020.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/publication/economic-update-october-2020

The Libyan economy has recently been hit by four overlapping shocks: an intensifying conflict that suffocates economic activity, the closure of oil fields that puts the countrys major income-generating activity largely on hold, decreasing oil prices that reduce income from oil production in surviving fields, and the COVID-19 pandemic (with 3,438 confirmed cases and 73 deaths as of August ...

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/publication/economic-update-october-2019

The war around Tripoli that erupted in April 2019 between the two main political rivals reversed the momentum of the relative economic recovery over 2017-18. Indeed, Libya managed to more than double its oil production over the two-year recovery period, to reach 1.17 million barrel per day (bpd) in April 2019.

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WHO Libya: Health response to COVID-19 in Libya, update # 23 (Reporting period: 24 December 2020 to 31 January 2021) – Libya – ReliefWeb

In a recent meeting with WHO, the deputy Minister of Health informed the WHO Representative that all MOH warehouses were practically empty and the country was facing stockouts of critical vaccines and medicines including COVID-19 treatments, insulin, blood products, medicines to treat patients with HIV, TB and noncommunicable diseases, as well as surgical and trauma supplies. The situation is exacerbated by the disrupted supply chain (manufacturers who previously supplied Libya have not been paid and are refusing to fill new orders).

WHO is working with different MOH departments to prepare lists of critically needed medicines and supplies. Once the lists are ready, it will ask the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya to release immediate funds to replenish critical supplies. WHO will also work with the government to set up a strengthened supply chain that includes a reliable payment mechanism.

Libya has transferred USD 9.7 million to the COVAX Facility to secure 2.8 million doses of vaccine. This will be enough to vaccinate around 1.25 million people (two doses per person plus 10% in wastage).

The government is revising the national COVID-19 vaccination plan to add a component addressing vaccination of the approximately 570 000 migrants and refugees in Libya. Once the revised plan is ready,WHO will ask the Global Vaccine Alliance (GAVI) to consider making vaccines available for around 16 200 high-risk migrants and refugees under its Humanitarian Buffer fund. The government will pay the costs of administering these vaccines to migrants and refugees but will not cover the costs of the vaccines themselves.

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WHO Libya: Health response to COVID-19 in Libya, update # 23 (Reporting period: 24 December 2020 to 31 January 2021) - Libya - ReliefWeb

The Conflict in Libya Is Getting Even Messier – Foreign Policy

A new United Nations report alleges that the United Arab Emirates has established direct contact with armed Sudanese groups fighting in Libyas proxy conflict on the side of Khalifa Haftar.

The report by the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, released in January, says that for around a year the UAE has had direct relations with armed groups from Sudans Darfur region fighting in Libya on the side of Haftars Libyan National Army. Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that the UAE had, in violation of a U.N. arms embargo, increased its deliveries of weapons to Haftar, who ended his unsuccessful 14-month assault on the capital, Tripoli, last June.

The UAEs contact with the Sudanese armed groups in Libya, bypassing Haftars forces, is seen by some experts as a sign of the countrys appetite for a more hands-on role in the conflict and of growing mistrust of the renegade general.

I think theres an argument to be made that they distrust Haftars battlefield competence. Many outside backers have [distrusted it], including the Russians, said Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Haftars international backers have stuck by him so far out of concern that eastern Libya could descend further into chaos fueled by fracturing rebel groups in the absence of clear leadership. But in establishing closer direct ties with Sudanese groups in Libya, the UAE could be well positioned to shift its support to another leader, should one emerge.

Whoever takes on Haftars mantle later on, theyll definitely try to endow him with the same sort of support that includes, inter alia, the mercenaries, said Emadeddin Badi, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Program of the Atlantic Council.

The UAE is one of several countries that have waded into the complex conflict in Libya as they jostle to further their own objectives in the fragile North African nation. The proxy war has pitted allies against each other. France, Egypt, and Russia (through the Wagner mercenary group) have thrown their support to Haftar and his Libyan National Army. Turkey, Italy, and Qatar have provided military backing to the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Complicating matters further is the presence of militias from Sudan, Chad, and Syria.

A report by the U.S. Department of Defenses inspector general for counterterrorism operations in Africa last year assessed that the UAE was possibly helping to fund the activities of the Russian mercenary group Wagner in Libya. The Emirati ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, strenuously denied the claims.

In October 2020, the U.N.-backed government and Haftars Libyan National Army signed a peace deal that stipulated that all foreign parties leave the country by Jan. 23. But satellite imagery reveals that Russian fighters are digging enormous trenches, and the UAEs outreach to Sudanese groups suggests that foreign parties are in no hurry to disentangle themselves from the conflict.

According to the U.N. report, leading Darfuri commanders had regular meetings with Emirati officers in Benghazi, Libya, to discuss how the UAE could support the logistical and financial needs of the groups. The report details how Abu Dhabi sought to cultivate close ties with the senior commanders, and it alleges that at least two of them spent several weeks in the UAE in late 2020, where they reportedly met with members of the countrys security services.

Analysts have suggested that the UAEs intervention in Libya stems from a deep fear of political Islam and is intended to send a message about the perils of popular uprisings. The Libyan story is meant to push an almost moral lesson not just to the Libyans but other populations that if you revolt against the ruler, it brings instability, Badi said.

The embassy of the UAE in Washington declined to comment. Last week, the UAE ambassador to the U.N., Lana Nusseibeh, called for a renewed diplomatic effort to bring the conflict to an end.

A peace deal signed between the Sudanese government and an alliance of rebel groups this past August called on all members of armed groups to return to the country, but the authors of the U.N. report noted they expected a significant Sudanese presence to remain in Libyathough its unclear how many even remain there now.

One commander from the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi group told the U.N. panel that they had recruited 3,000 new fighters since mid-2019. That group and the Justice and Equality Movement recruited fighters in Darfur and in refugee camps in eastern Chad, according to the report. The U.N. panel noted that the Justice and Equality Movement had focused its activities in Libya on smuggling and was the only major Darfurian group not aligned with Haftars forces.

Sudanese fighters have a long history in Libya. Theyve been used as pawns in the Libyan conflict since 2011, said Wehrey of the Carnegie Endowment. Its estimated that former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi recruited as many as 10,000 fighters from Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger to fight on his behalf before he was ousted and killed in the wake of the Arab Spring protests in 2011.

In November 2020, Human Rights Watch reported that an Emirati security company, Black Shield Security Services, had recruited more than 390 Sudanese men on the pretense of working as security guards in the UAE, before transferring them to Ras Lanuf in oil-rich eastern Libya, controlled by Haftar. Several men interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they lived alongside Haftars forces and were expected to guard oil facilities in the region. The company has previously denied any allegations of misleading the Sudanese men about the nature of their work in Libya, and it said that it does not offer any services that are military in nature.

Katie Livingstone contributed to this report.

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The Conflict in Libya Is Getting Even Messier - Foreign Policy