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When the last pocket of the self-styled Islamic State (ISIL) was eradicated in west Mosul last week, it was fitting that the 36th Commando Battalion struck the final blows. The 36th was the first Iraqi special forces unit to be developed after Saddams fall. Today it is the longest serving component of the Counter-Terrorism Service a force of less than 8,000 elite troops built by the United States, and the most militarily and politically reliable force at the disposal of the Iraqi government.

The Iraqi Army and Federal Police have regained some public trust since their collapse in June 2014, when Mosul and around twenty other cities fell to ISIL, but only two forces in Iraq have retained the faith of the Iraqi people throughout the war. One is the Counter-Terrorism Service, known in Iraq as the Golden Division, a model for multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian nationalism. The other is the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the volunteer units raised by a religious fatwa and government orders in June 2014, which has fallen under the leadership of an Iranian-backed U.S.-designated terrorist, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

The evolution of these two forces will likely shape the future of Iraq itself. Baghdad will need effective counter-terrorism forces backed by the most advanced intelligence capabilities available to the U.S.-led coalition if it is to pursue ISIL into Iraqs deserts, borderlands, mountains, jungle groves, and urban hideouts. As important, the Iraqi government requires loyalist forces that are under the full command and control of the Iraqi prime minister particularly as PMF leaders such as Muhandis and Hadi al-Ameri (head of the largest PMF faction Badr) continue to act outside prime ministerial control.

In the aftermath of Mosul, the Counter-Terrorism Service is exhausted. Being the best has taken its toll: The U.S. government assesses that the Counter-Terrorism Service suffered forty percent battle losses in Mosul. In this piece, we look at the lessons that have been learned from the first decade of the services existence and apply these to how the U.S.-led coalition should support its rebuilding.

Why the Counter-Terrorism Service Succeeded

One-third of Iraqi army and Federal Police brigades collapsed in June 2014, but the Counter-Terrorism Service lasted and spearheaded the counter-attack at Tikrit, Beyji, Ramadi, and eventually Mosul. The U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Service kept fighting because of the essential correctness of the forces basic conception, recruitment, leadership, and training. What factors made the service so robust when the rest of Iraqs security forces proved so brittle?

Size is a definite factor. The Counter-Terrorism Service stayed small, never exceeding around 12,500 personnel. In comparison, the Iraqi Army achieved a combat manpower of 151,250, and the Federal Police maintained a force of 82,500 at the time of the fall of Mosul. The compact size of the Counter-Terrorism Service meant that selection and training could utilize rigorous standards akin to those used for recruiting U.S. special operations forces. Using one May 2008 training program as an example, of 2,200 candidates in one Counter-Terrorism Service intake, only 401 (18 percent) succeeded in graduating as troopers. The small size of the service also allowed it to receive far better pay, living conditions, and equipment than other Iraqi troops. With pay nearly double that of a typical Iraqi army soldier, and equipped almost identically to a U.S. Special Forces trooper, the Counter-Terrorism Service developed elite espirit de corps and strong retention of skilled manpower, including a high proportion of Iraqs best military officers.

Unsurprisingly, the force displayed superior discipline to other Iraqi units and suffered far less from corruption and militia penetration, to the extent that the United States was comfortable sharing some of its most sensitive military intelligence and equipment from the birth of the Counter-Terrorism Service to this day. The service attained a focus on professionalism, cross-sectarianism, and loyalty to Iraq that remains unparalleled within Iraqs security forces. Unique among Iraqs forces, the Counter-Terrorism Service developed the beginnings of a strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) cadre.

On the battlefield, the Counter-Terrorism Service undertook industrial scale counterterrorism operations in Iraq for nearly seven years, maintaining a grueling, sustained operational tempo unmatched by any other special operations force in world. The service developed intelligence, used in-house judges to generate timely warrants, conducted multiple takedowns of insurgent cells per night across Iraq, operated its own helicopter forces, and undertook the rapid exploitation and fusion of intelligence to drive new cycles of raids. By the time of U.S. withdrawal in 2011, the Counter-Terrorism Service had developed into a finely-tuned counterterrorism machine, and solidified its reputation as one of the finest special operations forces in the Middle East.

Options for Rebuilding

The Counter-Terrorism Service is a different animal three years after the fall of Mosul. The force has fought numerous conventional battles as an elite light infantry force mounted in U.S.-provided Humvees. In the latter half of 2014, it was the Counter-Terrorism Service that held out at the surrounded Beyji refinery, deep behind ISIL lines, until they were relieved by a Counter-Terrorism Service-led column. In 2015, the Counter-Terrorism Service led the urban clearances of Tikrit and Ramadi, followed by Fallujah and Mosul the following year. Veteran NCOs and commandos were lost year after year, followed by the loss of 40 percent of the services frontline troops in Mosul. For instance, beginning with 350 personnel at the start of the Mosul battle, the Najaf Regional Commando Battalion was whittled down to 150 effectives in just 90 days of fighting.

Based on the authors tracking of the services units, if this kind of cumulative attrition were mirrored across all of its combat units, the total strength of service would have fallen to about 7,600 at the time of writing (2,700 in the combat battalions, 1,900 headquarters staff, 2,400 reconnaissance battalion and logistics personnel, and 600 other staff). According to our unit tracking, the establishment strength of CTS should be around 13,920, meaning that CTS is currently 54 percent manned, and only 34 percent manned in combat battalions.

The personnel base of the Counter-Terrorism Service and its specialized capabilities will need to be largely rebuilt. There are two basic models for force regeneration. One is the paring down of Counter-Terrorism Service into one more narrowly focused on traditional counter-terrorism. The services current light infantry functions could be phased out as soon as ISIL is rolled back from the remaining Iraqi territory it holds in towns such as Tall Afar, Hawijah, and Al-Qaim. The service, under this model, would snap back into the shape it held before 2014. The services director Talib Shegati al-Kinani, a retired lieutenant general from the Saddam-era air defense forces, indicated on July 14 that this would be the model in keeping with existing law. The services current 18 commando battalions, four reconnaissance battalions, and numerous headquarters, logistical and intelligence fusion units would be brought up to strength.

An alternative model offers a more expansionary view of what the Counter-Terrorism Service could become. Under this model, the Golden Division would be expanded and given more missions. In addition to its core counter-terrorism tasks, the Counter-Terrorism Service might continue to operate light infantry forces capable of undertaking conventional assaults on fortified positions held by ISIL or other enemy forces. This model harkens back to the mugawir tradition (commando in Arabic), whereby special forces are light infantry that would undertake special missions during conventional military conflicts. This was the Iraqi mode of using special forces in the Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait.

This kind of model was considered by the government of Nouri al-Maliki from 2012 onwards, with Maliki seeking to expand the service into a multi-division, Special Republican Guard praetorian force of over 30,000 troops with armored fighting vehicles capable of outfighting any domestic opponents, whether terrorists, militias, or even army units. The attractiveness of such an option was that the most capable force in the country would be operating directly under the prime ministers control. At the time, the Counter-Terrorism Service was not enshrined in law and was not responsible to the cabinet or parliament, as a legally established ministry would be. The risk was clearly that this force might be used for undemocratic power grabs by a sitting prime minister or by the Counter-Terrorism Service itself. Malikis occasional misuses of the Counter-Terrorism Service to harass political opponents deepened these concerns, but the austerity imposed by crashing oil prices undercut expansion plans.

The battlefield successes and conventionalization of the Counter-Terrorism Service over the last three years will probably drive reconsideration, both inside the Iraqi government and within the U.S.-led coalition, of an expansion of the Counter-Terrorism Service as a multi-division elite light infantry force. Popular trust of the Iraqi army, Federal Police, and PMF will remain low when it comes to the complex missions of undertaking counter-terrorism and outreach to Sunni populations on in some of Iraqs least hospitable terrain and most divided communities. Military tasks will be drawn to the men who can, especially now that the Counter-Terrorism Service is a legally established, ministry-level government department (as of August 13, 2016). Indeed, the new U.S. Department of Defense 2018 budget request envisions the Counter-Terrorism Service building its non-sectarian force to 20,000 personnel over the next three fiscal years. This suggests that the service would be brought up to establishment strength and then expanded by 43 percent in three years.

International Assistance to the Counter-Terrorism Service

Resources will now be thrown at the Counter-Terrorism Service. As noted by military expert David Witty the author of a forthcoming Brookings Institution study on the Counter-Terrorism Service in 2008-2010, the service received about $225 million per year from the Iraqi government (cobbled together from discretionary spending by the prime ministers office and the Ministry of Defense). To this total, around $55 million worth of U.S. budget assistance each year would be added. This combined $280 million fell short of the services budget requests, which averaged $412 million in the same three-year period. We can surmise from the continued operational capability of the Counter-Terrorism Service that in-kind support from the U.S. intelligence community and special operations command bridged much of the budget gap until U.S. withdrawal in 2011 and a small portion thereafter.

In 2017, the Iraqi budget included its first dedicated line item for the Counter-Terrorism Service, totaling $683 million. If this Iraqi allocation were to be replicated in 2018 and combined with the requested $193 million of U.S. aid to the service, the total would be an unprecedented $876 million more than triple the largest pre-2014 budget that the Counter-Terrorism Service received. What else can be done to ensure the resources are invested wisely and that the Counter-Terrorism Service continues to be effective and a force for good? In particular, what can the U.S.-led coalition do to ensure an optimal outcome?

The first thing the coalition can do is to keep working together. Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve is much more effective and resilient as a broad multinational coalition than a U.S.-Iraq security partnership ever could be. First, the multinational forces bring real capability and burden-sharing to the mission of supporting the Counter-Terrorism Service. Australian, New Zealander, French, Belgian and Spanish special forces have all contributed to training the service in its Baghdad training facility and the Taji training base, both adjacent to Baghdad. Second, the variety of world powers involved including most of the international players on whom Iran depends for foreign investment protects the partnership from attack by Iranian-backed militias operating within the PMF.

The second priority of the U.S.-led coalition is to maintain embedded presence at various levels of the Counter-Terrorism Service. Close collocation and daily contact allowed U.S. advisors to inculcate the service with professional ethics until 2010, and there was a strong correlation between declining service capacity in the counter-terrorism role and the withdrawal of U.S. advisors. The key levels to embed within include:

Can the Counter-Terrorism Service Fix the Iraqi Military?

A final priority for international supporters should be the fostering of close relations between the Counter-Terrorism Service and its sister services in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Iraqi intelligence community. Aside from the common-sense benefits of coordination, the coalition should view interface and exchange of personnel as a means by which the Counter-Terrorism Service could cross-pollinate with other Iraqi institutions. In the past, the Counter-Terrorism Service jealously hoarded its personnel and did not tend to release them back to Ministry of Defense (where they often originated). As a result, other agencies viewed the service as a threat.

Now the opposite is quickly becoming true, at least at the level of senior commanders. Looking for the best talent to reverse Iraqs military disasters, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has drawn heavily on the Counter-Terrorism Service to lead key commands. Deputy commander of the services operational staff, Staff Lt. Gen. Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi, was tapped in January 2015 to lead the northern campaign to liberate Tikrit, Beyji, and then Mosul. Counter-Terrorism Service brigade commander Maj. Gen. Kareem Halfa al-Tamimi was chosen in May 2015 to head the security division in charge of the government center in the International Zone in Baghdad. In July 2016, following the devastating bombing in Baghdads upscale Karrada district, Abadi appointed Staff Maj. Gen. Jalil Abdul-Jabbar al-Rubaie then the services intelligence director to head the Baghdad Operations Command, controlling nearly 60 percent of the total manpower of Iraqs security forces. Most recently, Maj. Gen. Irfan al-Hayali, the long-serving chief of the services Training and Development Directorate, was appointed as minister of defense in January 2017.

Rather than support an expansion of the Counter-Terrorism Service that could make Iraqs special forces less special, the U.S.-led coalition should help the service to serve as an incubator for military talent. This may mean rotating Counter-Terrorism Service personnel back into other ministries, the Iraqi army, and the Federal Police. Such circulation could assist the Iraqi army in strengthening its own commando battalions and special units, and in gaining skill in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

Cross-pollination of personnel could also reduce militia domination of the powerful Ministry of Interior, which is currently led by the Iranian-backed Badr movement, and its Emergency Response Division, which has recently been tied to serious human rights abuses. The service could even absorb manpower from the Popular Mobilization Forces and rotate its officers through the PMF, which might reduce the risk of future tensions between these forces. The Counter-Terrorism Service needs to be better not bigger than its sister agencies, serving as a model of professionalism and loyalty to the Iraqi constitution.

The U.S. effort to develop Iraqs security forces is widely viewed as a monumental and costly failure, but there is at least one element that has been a smashing success: the Counter-Terrorism Service. Of all the institutions that America birthed in Iraq, the Counter-Terrorism Service has been and could remain the most well-conceived and effectively realized. The Counter-Terrorism Service needs sustained U.S. support if the U.S. wishes it to remain as a lasting, living monument to its hopes and good intentions for Iraq.

Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has worked in every Iraqi province and most of the hundred districts, including periods spent embedded with the Iraqi Security Forces, the Peshmerga, and most recently with Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve. Follow @mikeknightsiraq

Alex Mello is the lead Iraq security analyst at Horizon Client Access, an advisory service working with the worlds leading energy companies. Follow @AlexMello02

Image: Staff Sgt. Alex Manne/U.S. Army

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The Best Thing America Built In Iraq: Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service and the Long War Against Militancy - War on the Rocks

Its most certainly not easy serving in the U.S. military in the middle of Iraq, but sometimes a reminder of home makes it a little easier for the brave men and women stationed around the world.

For Army 1st Lt. Jessie Guajardo, Chick-fil-A is that reminder. In a direct Facebook message to the Founders Square location in northern Texas, the soldier explained that Chick-fil-A sauces would go a long way to make the Army-issued chicken a little tastier.

Ordering bottles of sauce is mostly out of the question because of refrigeration after opening, etc., he wrote in a Facebook post over the weekend.It was then that we thought of Chick Fil A individually packaged sauces. I took a shot in the dark and sent a Facebook message to the Chick Fil A Facebook page with a request.

And just two weeks after sending the message,Guajardo received quite the surprise in the mail: Two cases full of sauce one with Chick-fil-A and another with barbecue sauce.

I cant thank Chick Fil A enough for this seemingly small gesture that single handedly picked up the spirits of so many people, he wrote. Thank you Chick Fil A.

The northern Texas restaurant thanked the soldier for his kind words about his hometown Chick-fil-A and said they look forward to the day when he can walk into the fast-food joint himself.

Thank you for your service, Jessie Guajardo and for taking the time to write such kind words about your local Chick-fil-A, the restaurant wrote on Facebook. We hope you and your fellow soldiers enjoy the sauces and we look forward to your return home.

The sauce came just in time, too. As it turns out, the package was delivered on chicken tender day in the Armys dining hall.

View original post here:
US troops in Iraq craving Chick-fil-A get quite the surprise in the mail - TheBlaze.com

Nearly a decade after being honorably discharged from the U.S. Marine Corps, John Gerula is still struggling to fit back into his hometown of Windber, Pennsylvania.

The now 33-year-old Iraq War veteran signed up for the Marines at the age of 18 -- two weeks after working as a first responder during the September 11 attacks. Gerula's first disaster call as a junior firefighter was to the crash of United Airlines Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

John Gerula, 33, served in the U.S. Marine Corps for six years.

CBS News

"I was one of the first responders there. We were the first vehicle on the scene," Gerula told CBS News. "That actually pushed me to join the military. I graduated high school early to join the Marine Corps."

During his six years in the Marines, Gerula spent one year deployed in Iraq, served as part of a military intelligence unit and fought in "Operation Phantom Fury" -- the Second Battle of Fallujah, where U.S. troops fought against al Qaeda militants.

He survived numerous IED explosions.

"There were a lot of long, hot days in the sun and a lot of time off the Forward Operating Base," Gerula recalled.

When Gerula returned home in May 2007, he didn't think things would simply "go back to normal" -- but he never expected the transition to be as hard as it was.

He suffered from a traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which has caused added anxiety and stress for the veteran.

"It's tough trying to fit back into a society where veterans are having a hard time getting back in," Gerula said. "It's easy to put the uniform on, but it's very hard to get back in society when you have been doing that for so long."

To help work through his challenges, Gerula receives weekly counseling at a nearby VA facility.

"It's been hard. Coming back ... there's not much support when it comes to veterans," Gerula said. "It was tough in the beginning, but there are some groups out there now that are starting to help veterans."

One of those groups, Gerula says, is American Humane.

It's through the non-profit's new Shelter to Service program, which rescues homeless pets from shelters across the country and trains them to become service dogs for veterans, that Gerula met his new best friend: Oliver.

John Gerula, 33, and his new PTSD service dog, Oliver, meet for the first time.

American Humane

The one-and-a-half-year-old terrier mix was abandoned by his owner and rescued from a shelter in Colorado. After three months of training, the dog was finally able to meet his new owner for the first time last week.

"It was an emotional experience. Me and him clicked right away," Gerula said. "He started giving me hugs. We were a match the first minute I touched his leash."

On Friday, Gerula attended a day-long training with Oliver, where he practiced basic commands with the dog.

The dog is trained to keep spaces between Gerula and others, sense when his owner gets stressed and even retrieve any medication he may need.

"When he puts that vest on, he's all business," Gerula said. "He's hyper-vigilant. He looks around. He stays on my left side and he will not move unless I tell him."

John Gerula and his new PTSD service dog completed a day-long training on Friday, July 14.

American Humane

Amy McCullough, Ph.D., the national director of military of affairs at American Humane, recalls the day she recruited Oliver for the Shelter to Service program.

"He was standing there in his kennel, looking beautiful. He had been there for over two months with no one taking a look at him," McCullough told CBS News. "I brought him out. I met him. He was sweet, sensitive, so attuned to humans that he was the best candidate there."

It's not the breed of the dog that matters -- it's the temperament, McCullough explained.

And Oliver certainly has the right temperament for the job.

"He's very affectionate. Very loving. He loves to have attention. The attention has to be on him, and that's good, that keeps my attention on him," Gerula said. He described it as like having two different dogs: "Oliver the working dog and Oliver the play dog."

On Monday, Gerula took Oliver home to Windber, Pennsylvania, where he'll spend his days running around a one-acre yard, standing by Gerula's side as he works in his wood shop and volunteers at the local fire department.

John Gerula, 33, pets his new PTSD service dog, Oliver, who will help provide support for the Marine Corps. veteran.

CBS News

"He'll go everywhere with me. He's very welcome at the fire department. They can't wait to meet him. They say he's the firehouse mascot," Gerula joked.

So far, three veterans, including Gerula, have been placed with service dogs through American Humane. Next year, McCullough hopes to increase that number fourfold.

"Every day 20 veterans take their own lives and over half a million shelter dogs are euthanized every year, so as an organization who has worked to help both these groups for over a century we're compelled to really address this challenge," McCullough said.

Read the original here:
Iraq War veteran and PTSD service dog form instant bond - CBS News

Published: Tue, July 18, 2017 @ 10:55 p.m.

YOUNGSTOWN

Judge John M. Durkin of Mahoning County Common Pleas court expects to have a verdict in Dr. Joseph Yurichs vehicular homicide trial Wednesday.

Dr. Yurich, 38, of Poland, faces several charges stemming from a fatal Berlin Reservoir boat crash May 9, 2015, that left one man dead and another man injured.

Dr. Yurich testified Monday that he heard an explosion when the boats collided, which caused him to relive a battlefield explosion from his time in Iraq.

The last thing I remember is an explosion, he said. That explosion triggered memories. I dont remember anything else until I got to the state park near the south side of the reservoir.

Dr. Yurich did three tours of duty in Iraq as part of a medical unit. He became choked up while remembering an explosion that hit about 100 yards away from him during his first tour. He was knocked to the ground and had to operate on a number of nurses who were injured in the explosion.

I remember being scared, he testified about the moment he recovered his senses near the state park. I was not sure what the explosion was. I remember wanting to get home.

Read more about the case in Wednesday's Vindicator or on Vindy.com.

Read the original here:
Yurich testifies boat explosion triggered flashback to Iraq battle - Youngstown Vindicator

Reprinted with permission from AlterNet.

TheNew York Times Tim Arango took what could have been an interesting topic for war journalismIrans increased role in Iraqand morphed it into a revisionist history of American and Saudi involvement in the Middle East. In doing so, Arango paints the U.S. as a noble, freedom-loving nation on a mission to improve the lives of average Iraqis, and Iran as a sinister imperial force working to expand its sphere of influence across the region.

Arango sets the table by citing examples of Iranian influence in Iraq, framing the disparate motives at work. He suggests that the U.S. invaded Iraq for pro-democratic purposes, while Irans response to this unilateral invasion (which its government, of course,vehemently opposed) is portrayed as sinister and plotting:

When the United States invaded Iraq 14 years ago to topple Saddam Hussein, it saw Iraq as a potential cornerstone of a democratic and Western-facing Middle East, and vast amounts of blood and treasure about 4,500 American lives lost, more than $1 trillion spent were poured into the cause.

From Day 1, Iran saw something else: a chance to make a client state of Iraq, a former enemy against which it fought a war in the 1980s so brutal, with chemical weapons and trench warfare, that historians look to World War I for analogies. If it succeeded, Iraq would never again pose a threat, and it could serve as a jumping-off point to spread Iranian influence around the region.

Theres so much unmitigated ideology at work in these two passages, we need to take a minute to break it down. Lets begin with the controversial assertion that the [U.S.] saw Iraq as a potential cornerstone of a democratic and Western-facing Middle East.

This was the public relations talking point the U.S. gave for invading Iraq, but was it true? Does Arango provide any evidence or link to an analysis that shows it to be true?Dove beauty products tells me their mission is to empower women, but it seems far more likely its really to sell soap and that this line is marketing pablum. This is a distinction a freshman PR student can make, but evidently not Arango who, for some reason, thinks the same administration that repeatedly lied about Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Saddams links to al Qaeda was on the up-and-up about the pro-democracy motives behind their devastating invasion.

If one wants to know what role democracy played in Bush administration officials decision, perhaps Arango could have asked Condoleezza Rice, Bushs national security advisor, secretary of state and key architect of the war. In an interview withABC in 2011, Rice was crystal clear that we didnt go to Iraq to bring democracy to the Iraqis. And I try in the book to really explain that that wasnt the purpose.

So, did the U.S. see Iraq as a potential cornerstone of a democratic and Western-facing Middle East? Or did it really not care either way?

As Inoted in FAIR last month, nominally down-the-middle reporters are allowed to mind-read U.S. policy makers motives so long as they conclude that those motives were noble and in good faith. Never are reporters allowed to ascribe sinister motives to U.S. officialsthis is only permissible when covering Americas enemies which Arango does in the next paragraph, insisting that from Day 1, Iran saw something else: a chance to make a client state of Iraq.

Note that the U.S. did not seek to make Iraq a client state, but rather a democracy. Big bad Iran however (which not only had nothing to do with the invasion and openly opposed it), was plotting all along to exploit the U.S. invasion to establish a puppet regime. Its a masterful work of 180-degree reality inversion.

The second thing wrong with the opening frame is that Arango mentions the 4,500 American lives lost and the $1 trillion spent but makes no mention of the 500,000 to 1 million Iraqis killed. He mentions the use of chemical weapons but doesnt say who used themit was Iraq, not Iran. He also omits the country that supplied them to Saddam: the United States.

Throughout the piece, Arango couches subjective opinions on Irans sinister motives as something analysts say or believe. Yet the only analyst he actually interviews, Ali Vaez, works at theU.S-government-fundedInternational Crisis Group and provides a vague quote about the Iran-Iraq war shaping Irans leadership.

Everything Iran does is painted as proactive, sinister aggression and everything the U.S. and Sunni monarchies do is done in reaction to this aggression. Take this dubious passage: [Iran]s dominance over Iraq has heightened sectarian tensions around the region, with Sunni states, and American allies, like Saudi Arabia mobilizing to oppose Iranian expansionism.

So here we have Sunni states, and American allies, like Saudi Arabia mobilizing to oppose Iranian expansionism. There is no Sunni expansionism or American expansionism or Saudi expansionismexpansionism (whatever that means) is the purview of Iranian aggressors. Saudi Arabia floodingSalafist fightersinto post-invasion Iraq is never mentioned.SaudiandQataribacking of Salafist militias in Syria since at the very least 2011 is never mentioned. The U.S. invasion is not framed as expansionism. Iran always draws first blood, while Gulf monarchies, painted as the besieged victims of the Shia empire, are always reacting, mobilizing to oppose Iran expansionism.

TheTimesflubbed analysis has to be seen within the wider context of American designs in the region. Arangos article serves primarily to advance the Shia crescent concept pushed by Gulf monarchies, neocons, Israel, and liberal foreign policy hawks. This narrative conjures a specter of Iranian influence from Tehran to Beirut, with total regional domination on the horizon. Stopping this sinister plot is the primary pretext for increased military involvement of the U.S. in eastern Syria, where American special forces have set up a de facto base and attacked Syrian and Iranian military assets. Its also Israels justification for its stepped-up military activity in Syria, where it has beenbackinganti-Hezbollah, anti-government rebels in Southern Syria. TheTimesarticle, whether by accident or intent, props up the entire moral and political framework for increased U.S. militarism in Syria and Iraq as territorial ISIS faces its final months.

The problem with Arangos analysis is not that Irans increased role in Iraq isnt a story; it certainly is. Its the revisionist notion that Iran had hatched a devious plot from day one of the U.S. invasion rather than react to shifting forces on the ground from an instinct to surviveespecially after watching its two neighbors get invaded by the U.S. and its arch regional enemy, Saudi Arabia, fund and arm Salafist mercenaries throughout the Middle East. Throw in the absurd, debunked notion the U.S. was motivated by a desire to spread democracy and what you have is a deeply cynical piece of pro-Pentagon myth-making, instead of an informative look at Irans increased regional influence.

Adam Johnson is a contributing analyst at FAIR and contributing writer for AlterNet. Follow him on Twitter@AdamJohnsonNYC.

This article was made possible by the readers and supporters of AlterNet.

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NY Times Rewrites History Of Iraq War, Painting US As Noble Democracy-Lover, Iran As Sinister Imperialist - The National Memo (blog)