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The horror and hatred surrounding last weekend's massacre in a Buffalo supermarket has shocked the nation, sending yet another chilling reminder about the toxic combination of racism, access to guns and mental health that afflicts some young white men in this country. It also renewed the conversation about hate crimes, the right to free speech and the complicity of white supremacist groups in these tragedies. Daniel Medwed, GBH News legal analyst and Northeastern University law professor, joined host Paris Alston on GBHs Morning Edition to talk about the intersection of these issues. This transcript has been edited for clarity and length.

Paris Alston: So Daniel, there's been a lot of evidence coming out around this murder, this mass murder, that it was motivated by racial bias, particularly because the murderer had a white supremacist manifesto. He was influenced by white supremacist vitriol online. And there's talk about it being charged as a hate crime as a result of all that. Do you think that'll happen?

Daniel Medwed: Absolutely. All signs are pointing in that direction, Paris. Under New York law, a murder will be elevated to a hate crime and subject to an enhanced penalty if the perpetrator, quote, intentionally selects the victim or commits the act based on race, national origin, gender or some other protected status. And given the manifesto that you mentioned and all of the other facts surrounding this tragedy, it appears as though prosecutors would have a very strong basis for charging this as a hate crime.

Alston: And how does that compare to how it works here in Massachusetts?

Medwed: It's very similar here in Massachusetts. A crime becomes a hate crime when it's committed with the, quote, intent to intimidate the individual because they belong to a protected group and that the person was chosen because of their protected status. So the semantics are a little bit different, but the gist is largely the same here in the Commonwealth.

Alston: How hard is it for prosecutors to prove that? I mean, does there have to be proof that the bias was the entire reason for the crime, or much of the reason, or just part of the reason?

Medwed: Those are critically important questions. And I think the answer depends on the precise jurisdiction and the statutory language in place. Does it have to be the entire reason, as you point out, a substantial motivating factor or just part of the equation? Fortunately, here in Massachusetts, we have a 2015 SJC decision, Commonwealth v. Kelly, that supplies an answer. In that case, the court said that prosecutors do not have to prove that bias was the predominant factor or even a substantial motivating factor in a hate crime. They just have to show that the bias was part of the narrative. It's a rather benign or lenient standard for the government, which at least in theory may seem to make it a little easier to charge something as a hate crime here than in some other places.

Alston: So, Daniel, thinking about that evidence that we mentioned that we have of the shooter's motive, do defendants in these hate crime cases ever raise a First Amendment defense? You know, maybe they say that elevating an offense to a hate crime would be punishing them for viewpoints that they're entitled to have, even if they may be bigoted and offensive.

Medwed: People often make those types of arguments. It comes up a lot. A defendant will say they're being penalized for their First Amendment views and that that's unconstitutional. But those efforts have largely failed so far. And here's why. First, I think it's important to note that the First Amendment doesn't provide blanket protection for all speech. The government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on even protected speech. And not all speech is subject to robust constitutional safeguards.

Second, and I think more notably, the Supreme Court has already explicitly addressed the nexus between the First Amendment and hate crimes. In a 1993 case called Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the defendant got an enhanced sentence. If I recall, he got seven years instead of two because Wisconsin prosecutors believed that he had intentionally selected the victim based on race. It's a statute that's very similar in Wisconsin to the one in New York that we just mentioned. Mitchell, the defendant, then claimed, hey, this is a First Amendment violation. I'm being punished. I'm being given an extra sentence because of my bigoted views, because of my unpopular viewpoints. And he challenged it all the way through the Wisconsin courts. And the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with him and said that this was unconstitutional. He was being punished in violation of his First Amendment rights. But get this the U.S. Supreme Court then took the case and in a unanimous decision the court said no, Mitchell was not being punished for his speech. He was being punished for conduct that was animated by racial bias.

Alston: So sort of acting on those bigoted views.

Medwed: Exactly. And so motive is always an appropriate factor in sentencing. It's not the speech that's being punished. But as you point out, Paris, it's acting on those racially charged and horrific views. So that case, the Mitchell case, provides to some extent a really good safeguard for prosecutors when facing a First Amendment challenge in this context.

On a moral level, certainly they [white supremacist groups] bear a lot of responsibility for creating this vile environment in which racial hatred could flourish on a legal level, though, Paris, it's much more challenging.

Alston: I see. So, Daniel, in the couple minutes we have left with you, I want to talk to you about this growing white supremacist conspiracy known as replacement theory that's been being floated around because of what we believe to be the shooter's motive. And so this theory claims that the powers that be are pushing a population shift to replace native-born Americans with immigrants and other nonwhite people. And this has been said to be spread by everyone from fringe groups and individuals to people like Tucker Carlson on Fox News. So given that, is there any onus for what happened and maybe could happen later down the road on people or groups who may be pushing this in the media?

Medwed: Well, on a moral level, certainly they bear a lot of responsibility for creating this vile environment in which racial hatred could flourish. And it's foreseeable that some people are going to act on these horrific views. On a legal level, though, Paris, it's much more challenging. So on the one hand, the legal theory here is often complicity or accomplice liability, that these white supremacist groups aid or abet "abet" is just a fancy legal word for encourage they encourage racial hatred and therefore they have acted as accomplices in these racially charged crimes. So you can argue that they've acted, that they've aided or abetted in these crimes.

On the other hand, you're an accomplice if you both act and you have a culpable mental state, you have to act with the purpose for that particular crime to occur. And that's where it becomes difficult for prosecutors to argue that these groups are accomplices because they can always say, hey, our views are very general, they weren't particular to this defendant, to this act. It wasn't our purpose to foment this particular act of violence.

Alston: Well, Daniel, per usual, you have made something very complicated, a lot easier to understand, and we thank you for that.

Read more here:
Hate crimes and free speech: Where do we draw the legal line? - GBH News

Newsbusters' Nicholas Fondacaro highlighted this moment where the ladies of ABC's 'The View' tell House Republican Conference leader Rep. Elise Stefanik to resign: "We're warning you because it's only going to get worse! Quit now!"

"Being black this long, Im aware! I know it's code! I know. We recognize it," Whoopi Goldberg said.

Whoopi Goldberg said: "It's been around for quite some time. It's now upfront. It's no longer me saying, 'hey, does that rub anybody else the wrong way?' It's real. White people see it, black people see it. You gotta fix it. We gotta go."

SUNNY HOSTIN: Yeah. You know, I think to Ana's point, we need to point fingers, and we had Elise Stefanik whose spokesperson also said -- it was a senior adviser for Elise Stefanik -- I have a legal note. A senior adviser for Representative Elise Stefanik said in a statement that, despite sickening and false reporting, the Congresswoman has never advocated for any racist positions.

WHOOPI GOLDBERG: Ohh, not true!

BEHAR: Oh, please!

ANA NAVARRO: Its in writing! We have the receipts! You paid for them!

HOSTIN: Fox News as said that Tucker Carlson wasn't endorsing the white replacement theory, but instead making an argument about voting rights. That's my legal notes. But let me say this very quickly, what he did was he politicized race theory. He politicized it. So, he's saying that Democrats are replacing native-born Americans with immigrant voters.

GOLDBERG: A lot of the Democrats are American voters. What are you talking about, Tucker?

HOSTIN: Its replacement theory. It's code, and we hear him and we know it.

GOLDBERG: Being black this long, Im aware! I know it's code! I know. We recognize it!

HOSTIN: So, they should be allowed to hide behind that!

GOLDBERG: But they are. Because they're allowed to hide behind the First Amendment.

HOSTIN: But they shouldn't be allowed to hide their hateful, racist rhetoric, and to Ana's point, we need to be able to point it out.

SARA HAINES: But Sunny, theyre not hiding.

BEHAR: Lets not forget where this started. It started with birtherism. I mean, it's been in the country --

GOLDBERG: It's been here for many years.

BEHAR: But it got exacerbated with Trump starting with birtherism, and then that Charlottesville March. Jews will not replace us. You remember that? It all sort of came from then, and it's gotten worse and worse and worse.

GOLDBERG: It's been around for quite some time. It's now upfront. It's no longer me saying, hey, does that rub anybody else the wrong way? It's real.

HOSTIN: But you have people like Elise saying, but I'm not racist. I'm not pushing it.

BEHAR: She's a liar! She's a liar!

Originally posted here:
Whoopi Goldberg: Racists Like Elise Stefanik And Tucker Carlson Are Allowed To Hide Behind The First Amendment But "We Recognize The Code" -...

My Fellow Morganites,

As we prepare for this weeks Commencement Exercises, I greet you with a heavy heart. It is difficult for many of us to accept the harsh reality that five mass shootings occurred this past weekend within our nation. And, like many of you, I felt the fatal incident in Buffalo, New York, strike at the heart of our historically Black institution, because the 10 lives lost were African-American.

Approximately two years ago, our great nation erupted in protest in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd. However, despite the overwhelming groundswell that ensued, it shockingly, and dishearteningly, appears that the normalization of social injustice and racial violence in this country continues. In the face of this trend, it is imperative that we all are assured, and make it clear to others, that violence has no place in a civilized society. We cannot allow hatred to feel welcomed in our communities no matter the race, color, ethnicity or religion. We cannot sit idly by during what may be one of the most challenging and pivotal moments in U.S. history since the Civil War.

In the days preceding our Commencement Exercises this week, I remind the entire Morgan family that here at Morgan, we Grow the Future to Lead the World. We intentionally and unapologetically equip our students with the education and training necessary to make this world a better place. We all have a role in creating a better world. When heinous attacks against humanity occur, we need to stop and check ourselves to make sure we are doing our part to stop its unwelcomed progression from taking residence in our communities, our workplaces and our nation.

I remind all of us of Morgans indisputable legacy of battling racism and racial hatred, which dates as far back as 1910, when our first graduate, George W.F. McMechen, and his law partner, W. Ashbie Hawkins, a graduate of Morgans predecessor, Centenary Biblical Institute boldly challenged the residential color line in western Baltimore City. At the turn of the century, our first graduate was one of Marylands earliest freedom fighters. And, he provided an excellent model for us. As Morganites, we do not stand down in the face of adversity; we stand tall in its face. We are no strangers to injustice or racial hatred. And, even with the best laboratory testing available, fear simply cant be found in our Morgan DNA. We will engage this challenging season the same way we have met foes in the past: head on.

I encourage each of you to take a moment sometime today and write to your elected officials. Express your outrage about the state of current affairs, particularly as they relate to gun control, and advocate for tougher legislation. Push your representatives, at all levels local, state and federal to capably address hate crimes and domestic terrorism with ironclad legislation that prosecutes perpetrators to the fullest extent of the law. We all value the First Amendment, as a seminal tenet of our democratic republic. But, the First Amendment was intended to be exercised with great responsibility. We must be both responsible and accountable to one another as Americans, and above all, as a human race.

Let our faith in one another be renewed as we come together in celebration of the majestic milestone of Morgan matriculation and degree conferment. Let us be reminded that what happens in one community can happen in any community, and that one act of racial violence is a threat to peace everywhere. As Morganites, we will continue to stand in solidarity with those who stand for peace. Our thoughts and prayers go out to all of those who tragically lost their lives this weekend, and to their surviving families, friends and communities.

Respectfully,

David K. WilsonPresident

More:
Morgan State University President David K. Wilson Reflects on Mass Shooting and Hate Crimes - Morgan State University

RELIST WATCH ByJohn Elwood on Apr 20, 2022 at 10:09 am

The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has relisted for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available here.

We have a fair amount of movement on the relist rolls this week. To begin with, one familiar nine-time relist is leaving us: Love v. Texas, involving allegations that a racially biased juror, who commented during voir dire that non-white races were statistically more violent than whites, served on petitioner Kristopher Loves capital sentencing jury. The court denied cert on Monday. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, filed an opinion dissenting from the courts denial of summary vacatur.

We have four new relisted cases this week, raising basically three issues.

The due process clause of the 14th Amendment limits where defendants can be sued. Defendants can be sued in states where they are at home (which, for corporations, is where they are incorporated or have their principal place of business or headquarters) a concept known as general personal jurisdiction. Corporations can also be sued if they have certain minimal contacts in a state related to the conduct giving rise to the suit known as specific personal jurisdiction. Two pending petitions raise the question of the constitutionality of state statutes providing that corporations are deemed to have consented to general personal jurisdiction by virtue of having registered to do business in a state. Some older Supreme Court decisions support that theory of consent. But as Justice Neil Gorsuch recently wrote, It is unclear what remains of the old consent theory. Some courts read [Supreme Court precedent] as effectively foreclosing [this consent-by-registration theory of jurisdiction], while others insist it remains viable.

InCooper Tire & Rubber Company v. McCall, a tire manufacturer resists Georgia courts exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the states registration statute for foreign corporations. Tyrance McCall, a Florida resident, filed suit in Georgia against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Ohio, after a 2016 accident in Florida resulted from the alleged failure of a tire that Cooper manufactured in Arkansas. Coopers activities in Georgia had no connection to McCalls claims against Cooper, meaning that Georgia courts lacked specific jurisdiction over Cooper. Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld general jurisdiction over Cooper on the ground that Cooper, by registering as a foreign corporation in Georgia, had consented to suit in Georgia as a condition of doing business in the state. The court ruled that the Supreme Court had not formally overruled earlier case law supporting the theory that registration supports general jurisdiction.

The petition in Cooper was filed by the defendant in a lawsuit resisting personal jurisdiction. By contrast, the petition in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., was filed by a plaintiff seeking to enforce a similar registration statute. Robert Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern Railway for almost 20 years and claims he developed colon cancer because of his workplace exposure to asbestos and other toxic chemicals. Although the railroads principal place of business is Virginia, it is registered to do business in Pennsylvania as a foreign corporation, and Mallory sued there. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that states consent-by-registration statute to be unconstitutional under the due process clause. Mallory notes the petition in Cooper Tire raises the same issue with the support of business groups as amici. But Mallory contends that Cooper Tire suffers from serious problems that render it an inferior vehicle to address the question presented, because the Georgia statute does not explicitly provide notice that obtaining authorization subjects them to general jurisdiction in the courts. Norfolk Southern takes the position that the court shouldnt take either case but if the court is going to review the issue, it should do so in the Mallory case. It seems like the odds of a grant are good in one or both cases.

Next up is Kelly v. Animal Legal Defense Fund. A Kansas law provides criminal penalties for trespassing at animal facilities with intent to damage the enterprise, and defines trespass to include entering the facility with the consent of the owners when gained by deception. The law defines an animal facility as any place that houses or breeds animals used for food production, agriculture, or research. In 2018, the Animal Legal Defense Fund sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction on the ground that the law violates the First Amendments free speech clause. According to the petitioner, Kansas Gov. Laura Kelly, the group planned to use deception to gain access to animal facilities in order to gain information about them.

The district court agreed with the defense fund that the law violates the First Amendment because it targets negative views about animal facilities. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed. To the majority, the law regulates speech because it excludes consent obtained by deception, and the law implicates speech because speech-creating activity, such as taking pictures, would occur at the animal facility. The majority held that the law impermissibly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint because it targets those who wish to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility, not those who wish to laud the facility or who act for neutral reasons. In her petition, Kelly argues that the 10th Circuit ruled incorrectly because trespass by deception is not speech, or at least not protected speech, and because the intent to damage component of the law is not viewpoint discrimination. Kelly further claims the circuits are divided on the issue, with a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit upholding a similar Iowa law.

Last up is Grzegorczyk v. United States. Zenon Grzegorczyk, perhaps embittered that neither of his names had ever been spelled correctly on a Starbucks cup or dinner reservation, hired two people to commit a series of six murders. Unfortunately for Grzegorczyk (but fortunately for a half-dozen other people), they were federal agents. Grzegorczyk pleaded guilty to one count of using a facility of interstate commerce with intent that a murder be committed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (namely, the Section 1958(a) count), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Section 924(c) defines crime of violence as a felony offense that either has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force (the elements clause) or that by its nature, involves a substantial risk [of] physical force (the residual clause). The plea agreement stated that Grzegorczyks Section 1958(a) offense was a crime of violence under Section 924(c). He was sentenced to 211 months of imprisonment.

In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (which is phrased similarly to the residual clause of Section 924(c)) was unconstitutionally vague. Grzegorczyk argued that the residual clause of Section 924(c) was likewise unconstitutionally vague. The district court agreed but held that Grzegorczyk had waived the challenge by agreeing that his Section 1958(a) offense was a crime of violence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed.

Before the Supreme Court, Grzegorczyk renews his claim that his Section 1958(a) offense does not qualify as a crime of violence. The government has filed a confession of error, agreeing the offense does not qualify. Further, the government states that it has determined that, consistent with its practice in similar cases, it will forgo reliance on Grzegorczyks guilty plea as a bar to postconviction relief. Accordingly, it argues that the Supreme Court should grant the cert petition, vacate the court of appeals judgment, and remand for further proceedings in light of the governments new position. In the past, some members of the court have expressed some disagreement with the practice of vacating and remanding absent a showing the judgment below is erroneous (perhaps missing here because Grzegorczyks unconditional plea to the offense arguably waives any claim the charge was insufficient). But that view doesnt command a majority, so the odds are good Grzegorczyk will be getting good news shortly.

Thats all for this week. Until next time, stay safe!

Kelly v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 21-760Issue: WhetherKan. Stat. Ann. 47-1827(b), (c), and (d)violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment by criminalizing trespass by deception at animal facilities with intent to damage the enterprise.(relisted after the April 14 conference)

Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 21-926Issue: Whether the due process clause of the 14th Amendment permits a state to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation, for claims not arising from or related to any contacts between the corporation and the forum state, on the ground that the corporations registration to do business in the state is deemed consent to general jurisdiction there.(rescheduled before the March 25 conference; relisted after the April 14 conference)

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 21-1168Issue: Whether the due process clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state.(relisted after the April 14 conference)

Grzegorczyk v. United States, 21-5967Issue: Whether Zenon Grzegorczyk is entitled to relief on his claim that knowingly using a facility of interstate commerce with intent that a murder be committed, in violation of18 U.S.C. 1958(a), is not a crime of violence under18 U.S.C. 924(c).(relisted after the April 14 conference)

Reed v. Goertz, 21-442Issue: Whether the statute of limitations for a42 U.S.C. 1983claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begins to run at the end of state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including any appeals (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has held), or whether it begins to run at the moment the state trial court denies DNA testing, despite any subsequent appeal (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, joining the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, held below).(relisted after the Feb. 18, Feb. 25, March 4, March 18, March 25, April 1 and April 14 conferences)

Andrus v. Texas, 21-6001Issues: (1) Whether, on remand, the Texas court rejected the Supreme Courts conclusions inAndrus v. Texas, which were amply supported by the habeas and trial records, and whether the Texas court disregarded the Supreme Courts express guidance for conducting a prejudice analysis pursuant toStrickland v. Washington; and (2) whether the Texas courts failure to adhere to the Supreme Courts decision conflicts with our constitutional system of vertical stare decisis and creates widespread confusion regarding the proper legal standard that courts must use in assessing whether the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is violated in death-penalty cases.(rescheduled before the Jan. 14, Jan. 21, Feb. 18, Feb. 25, March 4, and March 18 conferences; relisted after the March 25, April 1 and April 14 conferences)

Cope v. Cogdill, 21-783Issues: (1) Whether jail officials who are subjectively aware of a substantial risk that a pretrial detainee will attempt suicide and respond to the harm unreasonably may be held liable when their violation was obvious as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits have held or whether jail officials who respond unreasonably to the obvious risk should be granted qualified immunity in the absence of a case involving the same facts as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held below; (2) whether the objective standard the Supreme Court announced inKingsley v. Hendricksonapplies to inadequate-care claims brought by pretrial detainees as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 9th Circuits have held or whether the subjective standard that applies to convicted prisoners also applies to pretrial detainees as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have held and as the 5th Circuit held below; and (3) whether the judge-made qualified immunity doctrine requires reform.(relisted after the April 1 and April 14 conferences)

Here is the original post:
Animal rights and the First Amendment, due process and a confession of error - SCOTUSblog

Next Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Kennedy v. Bremerton, a dispute involving high school football coach Joseph Kennedy, who refused to stop holding post-game prayers on the field and later sued the Bremerton, Wash., school district.

Kennedy claims his 50-yard line prayers were private prayers protected by the First Amendment.

Of course coaches, like all Americans, have a right to the free exercise of religion. But when they sign up to serve in a public school, coaches agree to uphold the prohibition on government endorsement of religion mandated by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Kennedys prayers occurred while he was still on duty, and students came to midfield to join his prayers.

School officials point out that Kennedy had been organizing prayer with students after games for more than seven years. After stopping for a brief time, Kennedy resumed praying on the field with students and refused the schools offer of alternative places to pray in private.

Joseph Kennedys attempt to push the constitutional envelope by praying with students is a familiar story. Over the past 30 years, I have together with religious liberty attorney Oliver Thomas mediated scores of disputes like this and given First Amendment training to thousands of coaches, teachers and administrators in school districts across the country.

Coaches have been among the most challenging staff members to persuade to uphold the law.

Coaches have been among the most challenging staff members to persuade to uphold the law. Coaches often see it as part of their job to share Christ and pray with their team. If told to stop, some coaches find creative ways to take a knee or otherwise circumvent what is required of them under the First Amendment.

In our discussions with coaches and teachers, we often ask them to put on their First Amendment hat when arriving at school each day and keep it on as long as they are on the job. As authority figures and government employees, they must be neutral, honest brokers protecting the rights of all students. If they wish to pray during the school day, they must do so outside the presence of students.

Encouraging school officials to practice religious neutrality while guarding religious liberty for students has been the national consensus for many years. And it works.

The guidelines we offer over what current law requires developed through years of negotiation appeal to most coaches and teachers, leading to greater understanding of the constitutional role of religion in public schools. Left to right, many religious and educational groups have long agreed that public schools may neither inculcate nor inhibit religion. School officials must be neutral among religions and between religion and non-religion.

At the same time, schools must ensure that the religious liberty rights of all students religious and non-religious are protected. For coaches, this means refraining from praying with students. It also means allowing players who wish to do so to pray without pressuring fellow students to join in.

Consider that today, some 30 years after this consensus was first formed, there is more academic study of religions and more constitutional student religious expression in schools today than at any time in many decades. Contrary to culture war myths, religion does come into public schools, but thanks to legal guidelines, it arrives mostly through a First Amendment door.

Contrary to culture war myths, religion does come into public schools, but thanks to legal guidelines, it arrives mostly through a First Amendment door.

Should Joseph Kennedy prevail, this long settled and widely held consensus about the constitutional role of religion in public schools could be upended. New First Amendment lines could be drawn, eroding the requirement of neutrality toward religion by school officials now required under current law.

If that happens, what would we say to coaches and teachers? It is fine to pray with students if you label it private prayer? What would we say to students who feel coerced into joining the coach in prayer for fear of retribution? How would we instruct administrators on where to draw the line when teachers insist on practicing their religion in the presence of students?

In short, if the Supreme Court uses this case to redraw First Amendment boundaries in schools which is very possible given its current makeup decades of effort to get religious liberty right in public schools could be at risk.

Make no mistake: This case has nothing to do with the right to private prayer. Instead, it is about protecting the conscience of every student by requiring religious neutrality of school officials during the school day. That is or should be the core meaning of no establishment under the First Amendment.

Charles Haynes is senior fellow with the Freedom Forum Religious Freedom Center.

Related articles:

Former high school football coach gets a second shot at the Supreme Court with his claim that he ought to be able to lead public post-game prayers on the 50-yard-line

As fired coachs case heads to Supreme Court, broad coalition says its his students who were the victims, not the coach

Originally posted here:
At the Supreme Court: The First Amendment on the 50-yard line - Baptist News Global