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New Atlanticist

January 23, 2024

By Atlantic Council experts

Application: still pending. Its been 615 days since Sweden submitted its request to join NATO, and while its not in the Alliance yet, it got closer on Tuesday when Turkeys parliament approved its accession. The ratification now goes to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoan to sign, after which all allies will have approved Swedens membership except Hungary. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbn, who had previously promised that his country would not be the last, on Tuesday invited his Swedish counterpart to Budapest to discuss the matter. Below, Atlantic Council experts explain how Turkey voted, why Hungary is delaying, and what Sweden should expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Defne Arslan: Erdogans political gamble hints at a deal on F-16s

Anna Wieslander: Will Hungary now follow Turkeys lead in approving Swedens accession?

Rich Outzen: A long road for Swedens accession, but its heading in the right direction

The Turkish parliaments vote for Swedens accession to NATO marks a milestone in a prolonged approval process since Erdoan announced in July 2023 that he would send the ratification to parliament. The bill was finally discussed at parliaments foreign affairs commission in late December, resulting in a recommendation just before parliaments winter recess to get the bill approved on the floor. Its worth noting that the accession protocol was supported by the main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP) in addition to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and their alliance partner the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

During the long negotiations, Ankara has demanded that Stockholm step up in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and others. Turkeys point was that NATO members should take member countries security concerns seriously, and Sweden needs to take Turkeys concerns seriously in order to be in NATO. Eventually, a series of measures passed by Sweden, including a new anti-terrorism law that went into effect last year, helped to ease Turkeys concerns.

Meanwhile, as these discussions continued with Sweden, Turkey also saw an opportunity to receive from the United States its long-delayed package of new F-16 fighter jets and upgrades to its existing fleet, noting again that NATO members need to take fellow member-state security measures seriously. Indeed, the renewal of the F-16 program is not only in Turkeys security interest, but also in the United States security interest in the region.

The next step is Erdoan sending the bill to Turkeys official gazette, so the law can take effect. But after the recent PKK attacks in Northern Iraq killing twenty-one Turkish soldiers, Erdoan is taking a big risk in giving a green light to the bill given the sensitivity of the PKK issue among the Turkish people. The most likely explanation is that Turkey has secured F-16s from the United States in return. That would help Erdoan use this deal as a political issue in the upcoming March local elections, which are hugely important for the Turkish president as he is determined to take back Istanbul and several other major cities that the AKP lost to the opposition in previous local elections.

Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, leading the Councils global work and programming on Turkey.

There is one word that sums up the feelings in Stockholm today: FINALLY! The Turkish parliament has, at last, voted yes to Swedens accession protocol to NATO. What was supposed to be a fast-track process hand-in-hand with Finland, after quick ratifications by twenty-eight allies, turned into a frustrating journey for Sweden, as the process first was haltered and then fragmented by Turkey when Finland was allowed to join on April 4, 2023, but not Sweden. Meanwhile, the security situation in Europe has continued to deteriorate.

Step-by-step, rather than fast-track, is the best way to characterize the process. The question now is what the final steps will be. On the Turkish side, the parallel F-16 deal with the United States is still looming. On the Hungarian side, the other ally that has not yet ratified Swedens accession, new obstacles are emerging. Prime Minister Viktor Orbn announced today on X that he had sent a letter to Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and invited him to visit Hungary to negotiate on Swedens NATO accession. Up until now, Sweden has taken comfort in earlier Hungarian promises that the country would not be the last to ratify.

While Hungary has put nothing openly on the table other than a vague discontent with Swedens attitude, fighter jets could be a negotiation card here as well, as Hungary leases Swedish JAS Gripen, a contract which is up for extension and possible expansion.

For NATO and the twenty-nine allies that want to see Sweden as ally number thirty-two as soon as possible, concerns are growing. The urgent executability of the new regional plans in the High North will be more difficult with Sweden on the outside of the Alliance. In addition, the inability to advance on enlargement weakens NATO politically at a critical time for European security, to the benefit of Russia. One problem is that Hungary might have nothing left to lose when it comes to reputational damage to NATO; on the contrary, Orbn might feel strengthened by his recent negotiation success in the European Union as a consequence of blocking support to Ukraine.

Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and chair of the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) in Stockholm, Sweden.

The Turkish parliaments vote to approve Swedens accession into NATO brings a long and complicated process of assurance building nearer to completion. Several hurdles have been cleared since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine led Sweden to seek accession. The first was Ankaras insistence that Sweden cannot enter NATO as a haven for activities of the PKK, an anti-Turkish terror-designated movement by US and European Union law. Constitutional reforms and the advent of a Swedish government more sympathetic to Turkish security concerns have not fully satisfied the Turks but have provided enough of a start to indicate a trend in a positive directiona significant accomplishment. By agreeing with Turkey and Finland in a Trilateral Memorandum to heed each others security concerns with appropriate gravity, and by following through with substantive steps, Sweden overcame this obstacle.

The second obstacle has been the defense industrial imbroglio between the United States and Turkey, which became entangled with Swedens accession after politicians first in Washington and later in Ankara tied them together. With Turkey seeking new and upgraded F-16s after the United States expelled it from the F-35 programand with NATO clearly standing to benefit from updated Turkish air capabilitiesthe necessary congressional approvals became difficult even as Swedens accession lagged behind Finlands due to holdouts Turkey and Hungary. It was clear from the start that given congressional dislike for Erdoans government, it would take US President Joe Biden personally, and the executive branch collectively, exerting massive efforts to assure that F-16 approval would quickly follow (or occur simultaneously) with the Turkish parliaments approval for Sweden. It appears that Ankara now believes that the groundwork for F-16 passage has been effectively laid in Washington, and that the assurances are firm.

The final obstacle has been Russias campaign to persuade Turkey (and Hungary) not to allow Sweden in. There is a theme woven into the NATO expansion process of Turkey carefully balancing to keep Russia from defeating Ukraine but also offering some concessionslike not enforcing US sanctions and slowing Swedish accession. Yet with Russian President Vladimir Putin coming to Turkey in the coming weeks (as announced by Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskov today), it is a fair inference that Putin has pushed Erdoan as far as he can in the process and will shrug as it crosses the finish line.

There are still wildcards at play here. Hungarys invitation to Sweden to negotiate on the accession deal may delay things a while more, even after the Turkish parliament says yes. Erdogan may tarry a bit before publishing the parliamentary decision in the official gazette. Congress may say What F-16s? in a manner that damages both Swedish accession hopes and NATOs southern flank. One possible theory Ankara insiders are discussing is that Biden, accounting for congressional prerogatives, may have assured Erdoan that if the F-16s stall, he will lobby Germany aggressively to approve the sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft in lieu of F-16s. There are several alternative scenarios. For now, though, fans of the Alliance should take heart from the decision in Ankarait is moving in the right direction.

Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

Related Experts: Defne Arslan, Anna Wieslander, and Rich Outzen

Image: Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg gather prior to their meeting, on the eve of a NATO summit, in Vilnius, Lithuania July 10, 2023. Henrik Montgomery /TT News Agency/via REUTERS

Read more from the original source:
Experts react: How close is Sweden to joining NATO after the Turkish parliament's approval? - Atlantic Council

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi is set to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara to address the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, alongside discussions on energy cooperation between the two nations.

The meeting, initially scheduled for November, was postponed twice due to scheduling issues and security concerns following attacks in the city of Kerman, southeastern Iran.

The Turkish presidency announced on Tuesday that, in addition to bilateral matters, the leaders will exchange views on current regional and global issues, including the Israeli attacks in Gaza. This comes against the backdrop of Turkey's strong criticism of Israel's actions in Gaza, with Ankara advocating for an immediate ceasefire and endorsing legal steps to bring Israel to trial for alleged genocide.

Turkish Presidency via AP, Pool

While Turkey has maintained trade ties with Israel, its critical stance on the Gaza conflict has drawn attention, especially considering the country's refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist group. Unlike some Western allies and Arab nations, Turkey does not categorize Hamas, the terrorist group responsible for the October 7 attack on Israel, as a terrorist organization.

The discussions between Raisi and Erdogan also extend to energy cooperation, with talks held between Turkish Energy Minister. Alparslan Bayraktar and Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji in Ankara. Bayraktar emphasized the need to evaluate cooperation in the natural gas sector within a broader framework.

Read more:
Iran's Raisi And Turkey's Erdogan To Discuss Gaza Conflict And Energy Cooperation - I24NEWS - i24NEWS

The United States has approved a $23 billion (18 billion) deal to sell state-of-the-art F-16 fighter jets to Turkey after it backed Swedens accession to Nato.

Turkeys parliament voted to ratify the Scandinavian countrys membership of the alliance on Tuesday after delaying the decision for more than a year.

Its air force is now set to receive 40 new F-16s and upgrades for the 79 models it already has as part of the multi-billion dollar agreement.

These new and refurbished aircraft will provide Turkey with a fleet of modernised multi-role combat aircraft to enable it to provide for the defence of its airspace, contribute to Nato missions to preserve regional security and defend Nato allies, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency said.

Hungary is now the only Nato member that has not approved Swedens application to join Nato.

On Tuesday, Viktor Orban, Hungarys prime minister, invited Ulf Kristersson, his Swedish counterpart, to Budapest to negotiate.

Nato hopes Sweden will be formally welcomed into the alliance by April, almost two years after it first applied to join in May 2022 in response to Russias invasion of Ukraine.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkeys president, originally objected to its application and accused Stockholm of supporting Kurdish separatist organisations that Ankara says are terrorist groups.

Sweden responded by tightening anti-terror laws and making other security concessions demanded by Turkey.

Mr Erdoğan then demanded the US fulfil a pledge to deliver F-16 fighters that had been bogged down in Congress over allegations that Turkey was becoming more authoritarian.

Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, refused to hand over the F-16s unless Turkey approved Sweden joining Nato.

Fellow Nato member Greece will also receive 40 of the more advanced F-35 fighter jets worth $8.6 billion (6.7 billion) as part of the deal.

It had initially opposed the sale of F-16s to Turkey because of unresolved territorial disputes with Ankara in the energy-rich eastern Mediterranean region.

The US Congress has 15 days to review the deal but it is not expected to oppose it.

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Read this article:
US will sell F-16s to Turkey after Erdogan backs Sweden's Nato bid - Yahoo News

US ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake said on Thursday that he expects Congress to work rapidly to endorse a $20bn sale of F-16 fighter planes to Ankara once Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gives the official sign-off on Sweden's Nato membership.

The deal would include modernisation kits for older planes and new aircraft deliveries.

Flake said in an interview with Reuters that once the formal ratification document for Sweden's Nato bid is received in Washington, the State Department will immediately send Congress notification of the F-16s sale.

"I see no reason why, with the parliament having acted here, that Turkey would wait," he said. "So I would expect as soon as that is conveyed to Washington, then congressional notification [of the F-16 sales] will happen."

The ambassador said that he has been speaking with the chairs of the US House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

"There are members of Congress who felt strongly that before proceeding with the F-16 sale that Sweden needed to be a member of Nato," he said.

"But they all see the value of Turkey's participation in Nato and they all see the value of interoperability that comes with this F-16 modernisation."

President Joe Biden sent a letter to leaders of key congressional committees on Wednesday, informing them of the administration's intention to begin the formal notification process for the F-16 sale once Ankara completes Sweden's Nato accession process.

That final sign-off from Erdogan, Flake said, is likely to happen "within days". The Turkish president needs to sign the legislation, which would be published in the country's "official gazette".

Turkey ratifies Sweden's Nato membership after months of blocking accession

Turkey's parliament ratified Sweden's bid to join the western military alliance on Tuesday, clearing a major hurdle after 20 months of delay.

The majority of Turkish MPs voted for Sweden's bid, including members of the main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP).

Finland and Sweden requested to join Nato in 2022, a move that was sparked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine that year. The bids were blocked for months by Turkey, which accused the two Nordic nations of failing to crack down on groups considered terrorist organisations, particularly the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Ankara later approved Finlands bid but continued to block Swedens accession, citing Quran-burning protests by far-right activists in the country, as well as rallies against Turkey and President Erdogan.

With the ratification on Tuesday, now only Hungarys parliament needs to ratify the Swedish bid to finalise the Nato accession.

See original here:
US envoy sees rapid F-16 sale to Turkey after Erdogan approves Sweden-Nato bid - Middle East Eye

This week, Turkeys parliament finally approved Swedens bid for NATO membership, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan swiftly ratified the measure.

Swedens NATO accession has dragged on for more than a year. While every other NATO member aside from Hungary supported Stockholms accession, Turkish leaders accused the Scandinavian country of harboring Kurdish terrorists. They demanded that Sweden tighten its anti-terrorism laws, extradite people accused of terrorist activities in Turkey, and resume arms sales to Turkey. The United States seems to have linked approval of Swedens NATO membership to future U.S. sales of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey.

As Swedens membership process stalled, analysts warned of the alliances decline and offered a range of proposed carrots and sticks to rein in Ankara. Some went so far as to suggest that Turkey be expelled from NATO, despite such an action being nearly impossible under its charter.

These concerns and threats come at a time when it has become common for U.S. experts to describe Turkish foreign policy as transactionalmeaning that Turkish national interests override NATOs common values. Once a reliable, Western-oriented U.S. ally, they argue, Turkey is now pursuing its own interests, which often run counter to those of the United States and European countries.

It is worth looking to history to understand Turkeys posture. The country waited nearly four years before it was finally allowed join NATO in 1952. The experience convinced Turkish policymakers that relations with the United States, NATO, and Western countries always involve a degree of bargaining. Turkish-NATO relations in the seven decades that followed have often reinforced this view, sometimes in Turkeys favor and sometimes to its detriment.

American NATO official Charles M. Spofford signs the protocol to admit Greece and Turkey into NATO in London in 1952.Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

Turkeys efforts to join NATO and other U.S.-dominated postwar institutions occurred under conditions of extreme insecurity for the country. Turkish leaders kept their country neutral during World War II, accepting aid from Britain and France without committing themselves as belligerents and selling war materials to Germany. At the conflicts end, Turkey found itself with few friends among the Allied victors. And it was surrounded on several sides by communist-controlled regimes: Bulgaria in the west, and the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani Soviet republics in the northeast.

In neighboring Iran, the Soviet Union and Britain occupied the north and south of the country, respectively. The Soviets supported the autonomy of the regions Azeri and Kurdish ethnic groups; Turkish leaders have long opposed the latter separatist movement. Soviet officials also pressured Turkish leaders to renegotiate treaties regulating transit through the Bosporus and Dardanellesstraits and cede control of several northeastern border provinces. To Ankara, the Soviet threat seemed existential.

Rather than comply with Soviet demands, Turkey turned to Britain and the United States. With London unable to maintain its expansive role in the eastern Mediterranean, Washington increased its commitments to Turkey and Greece, directing aid to both countries via the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.

But U.S. and Western European leaders stopped short of including Turkey in NATO. Ankara first inquired about membership in 1948, when the alliance was taking shape, but it was rebuffed. Turkey tried again in 1950 but was offered only associate status. Western leaders objections to full Turkish membership were not based on the ideals of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law enshrined in the NATO charter; the military alliance included Portugals dictatorship. Rather, their reasoning was strategicnot wanting to extend NATOs political and military commitments so far east.

Turkey did not gain firm U.S. support for its NATO membership until after 1950 and 1951, when Ankara sent thousands of Turkish soldiers to fight alongside the United States in some of the most brutal months of the Korean War. Washington proposed Turkeys accession in May 1951, and support from and the whole NATO Council followed. Turkey was admitted in 1952, along with Greece.

From the beginning, Turkeys relationship with NATO was transactional. By demonstrating their willingness to place Turkish citizens in harms way to contain communist expansion in Korea, Turkish leaders convinced their Western peers that Ankara had strategic value. Turkeys geographic position between Europe and Asiaand on major waterwaysseemed beneficial to the Western alliance in the event of war with the Soviet Union. So did Ankaras large army.

Greek Cypriots participate in a communist-backed demonstration in Nicosia against the plan to enlarge the NATO peace force in Cyprus in 1964. Central Press/Getty Images

Though Turkey was often able to extract benefits from NATO, the country was not always on equal footing with its Western counterparts. Turkish leaders felt their national interests were subordinated to those of the United States and other allies. Washingtons willingness to bargain with the Soviet Union over U.S. nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis was one example of this dynamic. But the main source of frustration was Cyprus.

Cyprus won independence from Britain in 1960 with a power-sharing agreement between its Greek majority and Turkish minority. When the deal broke down in 1963, Turkey began preparations to invade the island to protect its Turkish population.

But then-U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson informed the Turkish government that it could not count on NATO support should an invasion lead to Soviet intervention in Cyprus. Johnsons letter to Ankara stoked anti-U.S. sentiment in Turkey, putting Turkish leaders who supported the allianceand its various financial and security benefitsin a tough spot.

A decade later, when Turkey did intervene in Cyprus, NATO membership worked to its advantage. In 1974, Greeces military regimewhich had come to power in 1967supported a coup in Cyprus. Turkey responded by taking control of a third of the island, which remains divided to this day.

Then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw Turkey as more important than Greece and worried that pushing Ankara could result in a left-wing regime taking power. Unconvinced, Democrats in the U.S. Congress voted to halt weapons sales to Turkey. The Ford administration responded to the embargo, which would not fully end until 1978, by convincing West Germany and other NATO allies to increase weapons exports to Ankara.

The government in Ankara responded to the embargo by allowing several additional Soviet aircraft carriers to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean and ending unilateral U.S. access to bases in Turkey. On the eve of NATOs annual summit in May 1978, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit refused to sign on to a joint declaration and told reporters that he saw no threat to Turkey from the USSR. He added that a continued U.S. embargo was likely to reduce Turkeys contribution to NATO.

Two months later, the U.S. Senate voted to lift Turkeys arms embargo. By bargaining with NATO, Turkeys leaders satisfied short-term public anger with the United States without wholly undermining their countrys long-term strategic relationships. Transactional diplomacy had paid off.

Then-Turkish National Security Council chair Kenan Evren walks with other officials a few months after a military coup in Ankara, Turkey, on Nov. 10, 1980. Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

After Turkeys 1980 coup, NATO membership again became useful for the country. Military leaders emphasized their determination to honor NATO commitments. They also made conciliatory moves, offering potential territorial concessions in Cyprus (although they never followed through) and supporting the reintegration of rival Greece into NATOs command structure following its withdrawal during the 1974 crisis.

These gestures came as the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War again placed Turkey at the center stage of U.S. strategyand gave Turkeys military rulers more room to maneuver. The United States increased its aid to Ankara even amid reports of torture, investigated by Amnesty International, which prompted countries such as Denmark and Norway to freeze their financial support. By 1991, only Israel and Egypt received more U.S. military aid than Turkey.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR between 1989 and 1991 threatened to make NATO irrelevantand diminish Turkeys importance to its Western allies. In part to reassert Turkeys centrality to Western interests, then-Turkish President Turgut Ozal gave his support to the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. He also liberalized Turkeys economy to encourage foreign investment. In return, Ozal hoped to secure concessions from the United States and other allies in Europe, such as increased access for Turkish textiles in the U.S. market.

NATO began to expand its ambitions in ways that suited Turkish interests. The alliance provided Turkey with additional aircraft during the Gulf War to deter Iraqi attacks. It chose to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo, where Turkey was concerned about Serbian attacks against Muslims. There was even talk of an enhanced partnership between Ankara and Washington. The United States and other NATO allies played crucial roles in the 1999 capture of a key Kurdish separatist leader. That same year, the European Union formally acknowledged Turkeys candidacy for membership.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is surrounded by security on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 10, 2023. Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Despite these developments, Turkey in the 1990s was rocked by economic crises, violence, and political instability. The chaos of these years helped discredit established parties and bring Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2003.

Initially, the AKP intensified Turkeys efforts to engage with Western allies. But there were multiple setbacks. Turkeys European Union membership talks stalled following Cypruss admission to the bloc and the elections of European leaders such as Germanys Angela Merkel and Frances Nicolas Sarkozy, both of whom opposed Ankaras EU membership.

As the AKP lost the support of Western-oriented groups in its coalitionincluding liberals and the Gulen religious movementErdogan became reliant on political factions that advocated for a Eurasianist foreign policy that was less Western and more engaged with Russia and Central Asia.

Of all the conflicts between Turkey and its NATO allies in the post-Cold War era, the most central has been over relations with Kurdish nationalist groups. Washington has repeatedly looked to Kurdish groups to act as local partners in military operationsfirst against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and later against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Meanwhile, anti-Kurdish measures taken by governments in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran have helped create a sizable, politically active Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Sweden is one of the most notable examples. There, a closely divided parliament in 2021 allowed a legislator who had fought with Iranian-Kurdish guerrillas in her youth to cast the deciding vote securing additional support for Kurdish groups in Syria.

But the actions of a single legislator were not at the root of Turkeys unwillingness to grant Sweden a quick NATO accession. In fact, Sweden itself is not the issue. Sweden was the first country after Turkey to designate the PKKthe Kurdistan Workers Partyas a terrorist organization in 1984, and other NATO member countries, such as Germany, also have influential Kurdish diasporas.

Rather, Turkeys leaders decided to pick a fight within NATO because the alliance remains one of the few venues where they can exert pressure on Western peers. Through NATO, Ankara can draw attention to its security concernsand gain importantconcessions along the way.

See the original post:
Why Turkey Waited to Approve Sweden's NATO Membership - Foreign Policy