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ISTANBUL (AP) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Saturday that he had ordered 10 foreign ambassadors who called for the release of a jailed philanthropist to be declared persona non grata.

The envoys, including the U.S., French and German representatives in Ankara, issued a statement earlier this week calling for a resolution to the case of Osman Kavala, a businessman and philanthropist held in prison since 2017 despite not having been convicted of a crime.

Describing the statement as an impudence, Erdogan said he had ordered the ambassadors be declared undesirable.

I gave the instruction to our foreign minister and said You will immediately handle the persona non grata declaration of these 10 ambassadors, Erdogan said during a rally in the western city of Eskisehir.

He added: They will recognize, understand and know Turkey. The day they dont know or understand Turkey, they will leave.

The diplomats, who also include the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and New Zealand, were summoned to the foreign ministry on Tuesday.

A declaration of persona non grata against a diplomat usually means that individual is banned from remaining in their host country.

Kavala, 64, was acquitted last year of charges linked to nationwide anti-government protests in 2013, but the ruling was overturned and joined to charges relating to a 2016 coup attempt.

International observers and human rights groups have repeatedly called for the release of Kavala and Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas, who has been jailed since 2016. They say their imprisonment is based on political considerations. Ankara denies the claims and insists on the independence of Turkish courts.

The European Court of Human Rights called for Kavalas release in 2019, saying his incarceration acted to silence him and wasnt supported by evidence of an offense. The Council of Europe says it will start infringement proceedings again Turkey at the end of November if Kavala is not released.

The current U.S. ambassador, David Satterfield, was appointed in 2019. The nomination of his replacement, Jeff Flake, was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday.

After Erdogans order was reported, the State Department said in a statement, We are aware of these reports and are seeking clarity from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Erdogan Orders Removal of 10 Ambassadors, Including U.S ...

11 November 2021 09:38 (UTC+04:00)

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By Vafa Ismayilova

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pledged his countrys furthersupport to Azerbaijan to restore its territories liberated from Armenias occupation in 2020, Azertag reported on November 10.

In a letter of congratulation addressed to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on Victory Day, Erdogan said: I am delighted with the rapid improvement of Karabakh and Eastern Zangazur and the elimination of the consequences of occupation in a short time. We will continue to provide support in the process of reconstruction and restoration of the liberated lands in the future too."

He stressed that "by signing the declaration in the cultural capital of Azerbaijan, Shusha, which was liberated from occupation on 8 November last year, we raised our relations to the level of an alliance, which is a historic step for our countries".

There is no doubt that the Turkish-Azerbaijani unity will continue to develop in all areas under the motto "one nation, two states", Erdogan said.

He remembered with respect the Azerbaijanis who died for the freedom of Motherland and veterans, who paved the way for victory.

Erdogan conveyed his best wishes to Aliyev for the health, happiness, well-being and prosperity of the Azerbaijani people.

Meanwhile, the Turkish parliament approved a bill to extend the term of stay of the Turkish military in Azerbaijan, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Thus, the term of office of the military working in the joint Turkish-Russian monitoring center in Aghdam was extended for another year.

on November 17, 2020, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the Turkish armed forces to send Turkish troops to Azerbaijan for a period of one year.

On January 30, 2021, the joint Turkish-Russian monitoring center was inaugurated in Aghdam. The center aims to contribute to the restoration of lasting peace and security in and around the Karabakh region liberated from Armenia's occupation. Turkey and Russia are represented with an equal number of servicemen in the center.

Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey first emerged in 1992, with an agreement signed between the Azerbaijani and Turkish governments on military education and weapon equipment and deals to help strengthen the bond between the two nations.

On June 15, the two countries signed a memorandum of alliance that cemented the existing military, political and economic cooperation.

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Erdogan vows further support to Azerbaijan to restore liberated lands - AzerNews

Since the 2019 municipal elections, talk of early elections in Turkey has not subsided, as the opposition has repeatedly demanded them, leaning on its relative progress in those elections and promoting an image of confidence for itself in achieving a similar victory in the parliamentary and presidential elections.

On the other hand, the People's Alliance consisting of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) confirm that the elections will not be held early and will take place as scheduled in mid-2023. However, this does not discourage the opposition from its repeated calls, especially since this allows it to claim that its popularity is on the rise and that the popularity of the ruling party is deteriorating continuously and that the party is afraid of the ballot boxes.

Therefore, despite the People's Alliance's emphasis on keeping the election date as is, Turkey has recently been living in an atmosphere of elections without organising them, in terms of intensity of polarisation, bickering, clashes and discussing candidates for the presidential elections, in particular.

Since Erdogan is the natural and expected candidate for the Justice and Development Party and the People's Alliance, the most pressing question regarding the upcoming elections is the name of the opposition candidate who will compete against him.

READ: Unemployment rate in Turkey drops in September

First, it must be noted that elections derive a good part of their importance from the context in which they occur, which inevitably affects their results to one degree or another. It is not possible to talk about elections and anticipate their results without taking into consideration the circumstances during which they will take place, especially the internal economic situation and the most important developments in foreign policy, as well as electoral alliances, the number of candidates and their names, the preferences of voters, etc.

Secondly, it is important to stress that the chances of winning against Erdogan are not necessarily the only, nor the most important, criterion for selecting the competing candidate(s).

In the last presidential elections in 2014, the opposition did not agree on a common candidate and, if they had, their chances would certainly have been better against Erdogan than when votes are distributed to more than one opposition candidate.

The head of the Good Party, Meral Aksener, insisted on running because it would have boosted her party's chances of running in parliamentary elections for the first time after its founding.

The Republican People's Party's (CHP) choice of candidate was also governed by other factors, other than the chances of winning. Kemal Kilicdaroglu was fed up with the leader of the party, Muharrem Ince, who had long competed with him for the leadership of the party and lost many times against Erdogan, so Kilicdaroglu wanted Ince to run to get rid of him in the party, and then for him to lose to Erdogan. On his part, Ince accepted the candidacy because he intended to use his result in the elections against Kilicdaroglu within the party, which is what happened later and exacerbated the dispute between them, leading to Ince leaving the party and founding the Homeland party recently.

Third, and based on the aforementioned, one of the most important factors that will affect the outcome of the presidential elections is the extent of the opposition's ability to agree on a joint or consensual candidate. If it does so, it increases its chances in the competition, and if it fails, these chances decline. So far, it seems that the two most important opposition parties, the CHP and the Good Party, are in agreement on the need to present a consensual candidate, and it is believed that the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) will support that candidate from afar, without an official and public position.

Thus, the main criterion for this consensual candidate is that he is acceptable to the CHP and the Good Party, in particular, as well as to other segments of the voters, and therefore preferably from a right-wing background (national or conservative) or gives this impression. At the very least, they must be accepted by these groups, which leads to proposing the names of Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, respectively.

In theory, former President Abdullah Gul is still the strongest figure to face Erdogan, as he seems able again in theoryto win votes from different parties and spectra, including the new parties that emerged from the womb of Justice and Development. However, the experience of the 2014 elections clearly tells us that Kilicdaroglu could not convince his party's leadership, let alone his base, to make this choice, something that will likely be repeated in the upcoming elections.

While it seems to many that a figure like Ekrem Imamoglu will be the most likely to compete with Erdogan in 2023 after his victory in the Greater Istanbul Municipality, we remind them that the calculations of the municipalities differ from that of the presidential elections and, therefore, we ruled out his candidacy against Erdogan. Today, party leader Kilicdaroglu basically says that Imamoglu and Yavas should remain as mayors in both Istanbul and Ankara, so as not to lose them again to the Justice and Development Party. This means that he does not prefer to nominate either of them for the presidential elections, and perhaps he will want to nominate himself, but the latter two may not accept this decision, which may open the door to differences within the CHP regarding the elections.

READ: Turkish envoy completes term as UNESCO General Conference president

In summary, the two main factors affecting the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections are the extent to which the opposition is able to present a consensus candidate, and the name of this candidate. This, in itself, is a major challenge to the opposition, as it is not easy to find a candidate who will win the votes of the Good Party (Turkish nationalist) and Peoples Democratic Party (Kurdish nationalist) accused of organic and organisational ties with the PKK.

Matters become more complicated when new parties are added to the equation, and we still do not know exactly what their choice will be in the upcoming elections: the participation of each party individually, joining one of the two existing coalitions, or forming a third coalition of small parties.

Finally, and for all the aforementioned reasons and others, it is not possible to talk as of today about the results of the upcoming elections in Turkey, as the elections must occur in their context. However, it is understandable that the various parties, especially the opposition, are spreading the elections atmosphere because this would mobilise supporters and secure their rallying behind their parties and leaderships. This means that this is a partisan interest in the current stage prior to the elections.

As for the question of the winner of the Turkish presidential elections in 2023, it is still a very premature question, and it should be preceded by the question of the candidates and the question of the existing electoral alliances, along with other questions that we have already discussed in this article. However, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the upcoming elections will be more difficult for Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party than the previous ones. Therefore, everyone views them as exceptional elections that will paint Turkey's image for many years to come.

This article first appeared in Arabic in Arabi21 on 8 November 2021

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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Who is going to compete with Erdogan in 2023? - Middle East Monitor

The third lesson is that Turkey faces challenges on the ground that it needs to adapt to, even in Turkey-friendly territories like Sandzak.

Among the Bosniak citizens of Sandzak, Erdogan and Turkey enjoy rockstar status.

During Cavusoglus visit, Turkeys ambassador to Serbia, Hami Aksoy, promised new Turkish investments in Sandzak. It remains to be seen whether Ankara will follow through on this promise, but if it does, now would be the right time.

Despite the enormous popularity that Erdogan and his country enjoy in Sandzak, economic investments in the region are scant and do not correspond with the positive perceptions of the local population.

On top of that, the local political landscape in Sandzak is shifting. The two traditional Bosniak political parties in Sandzak, the Sandzak Democratic Action Party, SDA Sandzak, and the Sandzak Democratic Party, SDP, have been politically overtaken by the younger Justice and Conciliation Party, SPP), of former Grand Mufti Muamer Zukorlic. However, Zukorlic has now passed away unexpectedly.

Zukorlic operated with direct support from the Serbian government. More importantly, unlike traditional Bosniak parties, he was more critical of Turkey and closer to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. A major Turkish investment in the region would help Turkey re-assert itself, given the changes in local politics in Sandzak. The sudden death of Zukorlic creates a vacuum that will be challenging for both Belgrade and Ankara.

However, the ultimate lesson is that Turkish foreign policy, despite lofty rhetoric, has its limitations. Despite the pleas of Bosniak groups and NGOs in Turkey, Turkey was slow to act on the Bosnian crisis at first.

Ankara appears willing to pass this hot potato to the West. Turkeys capacities in the Balkans are limited compared to the West. The Turkish government is preoccupied with its domestic dynamics, including rumours of Erdogans deteriorating health and preparations for the 2023 general elections.

On top of that, Turkey is preoccupied with its more troublesome neighbourhoods in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus. Equally important in terms of international constraints is that Ankara always has to calibrate its Balkan policy based on how it will reflect on its bilateral ties with Belgrade, but more importantly, its relations with the West and Russia.

Russia and the West are engaged in a tit-for-tat battle at the UN Security Council over Bosnia. Simultaneously, Turkey has to coordinate with Russia not just on the Balkans but on hot issues like the Caucasus, as evident from a recent meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Cavusoglu. While the feuding groups in Bosnia show sympathy towards the idea of Erdogan as a mediator, Ankara must always take care when choosing the timing and the tone of its Balkan moves.

The latest Turkish engagement with the Balkans shows that its foreign policy in the region is guided by pragmatism, and that Ankara knows how to adapt to changing regional dynamics. The case of Sandzak has also shown us that Turkish regional policy is not carefree.

Erdogan may celebrate the Ottoman Empire in his speeches, but at the end of the day, he is all business. Based on the current Bosnian crisis, it is clear that Turkey, despite its ambitions and lofty words, faces limits to how far it can go in the Balkans. One thing is also certain, in the Balkans, no one trusts anybody these days.

Vuk Vuksanovic is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He got his PhD in international relations at the LSE. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues.

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Turkey's Pragmatic Policy in the Balkans has its Limits - Balkan Insight

On Oct. 26, Turkish Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu gave a speech addressing Turkey's female mukhtars. Mukhtars are elected neighborhood administrators, and there are over 50,000 of them throughout the country. This group generates a significant support network for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). At this gathering, Soylu mentioned their battle against drug dealers and said he gets complaints from authorities who cannot destroy abandoned buildings without court orders, which they say are being used by drug dealers. Advising the mukhtars to destroy the buildings in the middle of the night so who would know who had done it? Soylu said, You demolish those buildings and acourt order will follow. Female mukhtars happily cheered.

In the media, Soylus comments about flouting the law raised some red flags among independent journalists, and a small left-wing opposition party brought an official complaint against the minister for inciting the public to commit criminal acts. But Soylu does not need to be afraid: Advocating to ignore the law or to custom design laws according to the AKPs needs has become the norm in Turkey.

This is not Soylus first on-the-record advocacy to ignore the law. In January 2018, Soylu urged police officers to break the legs of drug dealers, referring to it as their duty.

Al-Monitor spoke with 10 female mukhtars who attended Soylus speech and asked why they cheered his comments. Most said they did not think Soylu was suggesting anything illicit.

One was upset at the question and said, He is the interior minister. Do you think you would know better? Another mukhtar from Ankara explained, It is good to know the minister is on our side. There are so many rules and regulations; it creates gridlock. To get things done we need support from the central government.

When pressed about private property rights and asked how they'd feel if their homes were declared abandoned and burned to the ground one night, the Ankara mukhtar protested, That is not what the minister said. We all respect private property laws. This is for the order of the neighborhood.

None of the mukhtars could explain how the decision to destroy would be made and which buildings would be considered abandoned without a court order. Yet they all agreed that the speech made them feel good.

That might just be an explanation for the prevailing political rhetoric in Turkey nowadays. But when senior government officials urge other public employees to disregard the law repeatedly, it generates a formidable and discriminatory political environment where laws only apply to dissidents but for the AKPs friends and AKP-approved acts, laws can be bent, adopted, and even ignored diligently.

Aykan Erdemir, senior director of the Turkey program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former member of the Turkish parliament, told Al-Monitor, By openly advising officials to disregard laws in their actions and promising to legalize such extralegal actions by retrospective court rulings, Soylu has confessed that there is neither rule of law in Turkey nor an independent judiciary. This is yet more evidence that Turkey has descended into arbitrary rule under the executive presidential system, which increasingly resembles sultanistic regimes of the region.

Another worrisome point in all of this abandoned house talk is the AKPs control over the lawmaking process since the transition to the presidential system in 2018. It is fair to say most, if not all, laws originate from Erdogans speeches and decrees.

Erdogans and his closest associates opinions not only rule politics, but they also go into effect as laws once they are spoken. So whatever laws AKP elites do not like, they can change them, and they have done so.

A political scientist working at a public university in Ankara, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Al-Monitor, What they advocate cannot be turned into law, because then the law would not have any value for others. For example, if mukhtars are given exclusionary discretion to declare an abandoned building to be demolished, then how could private property ever be protected? Or if cops are given the legal discretion to break the legs of drug dealers, how could proper prosecution work? What if those people are not drug dealers after all?

And there is another caveat: There are an overwhelming number of new laws, bylaws, revised laws and regulations on almost all areas of public policy since the transition to the presidential system, and it is becoming unmanageable.

A senior bureaucrat involved in planning at the Ministry of Interior told Al-Monitor, Erdogan was loved because he was a go-getter; he would find smooth and swift solutions to everyday problems. Sometimes if he cut a few corners, people did not mind. Today, it seems the AKP generated a system that makes life rather stressful. Administrators, bureaucrats, any government office really does not want to do the simplest procedures without authorization from the top. These types of endorsements from the AKPs top echelons are signals to the rest of us that we are safe and will not be prosecuted because there is increasing concern that top guys will run abroad and the middlemen will end up in jail.

As talk about the post-Erdogan era intensifies, the opposition has been warning bureaucrats not to disrespect the laws under pressure from the AKP, as they could be prosecuted later on. This rattled already nervous bureaucracy and intensified the gridlock in Ankara. Simultaneously, there is also talk from opposition members that they will not engage in revenge-seeking policies once they assume power.

Read more from the original source:
Legal ambiguity becomes the norm in Erdogans Turkey - Al-Monitor