Archive for the ‘Afghanistan’ Category

Afghanistan Outcome Affirms a Warning: Beware the Blob – The New York Times

First there was the Biden administrations withdrawal from Afghanistan. Then there was the chorus of disapproval. And then, as is so often the case in American foreign policy, there was the Blob.

The Blob turns on Jake, Alex Thompson and Tina Sfondeles wrote in Politico, referring to President Bidens national security adviser, Jake Sullivan. And then: Ive got to say hats off to the Blob on this whole Afghanistan thing, the commentator Matthew Yglesias said sarcastically on Twitter. They couldnt achieve any of their stated war aims, but theyve proven they can absolutely wreck you politically.

What is this Blob of which they speak? What does it have to do with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and whether they can actually govern? And why, like the nebulous malevolent organism in the 1958 horror film with which it shares a name, is it perpetually lurking around, sucking up everything in its path?

The term Blob is generally understood to describe members of the mainstream foreign-policy establishment government officials, academics, Council on Foreign Relations panelists, television talking heads and the like who share a collective belief in the obligation of the United States to pursue an aggressive, interventionist policy in the post-9/11 world. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are seen in this context as Blob-approved.

This foreign-policy philosophy has its origins in the post-World War II view of American exceptionalism, epitomized by officials like Dean G. Acheson, that U.S. military intervention in foreign conflicts was vital to defending American interests and generally did more good than harm. To the extent that the Blob holds this view, the Afghanistan withdrawal was a defeat for its position. For Blob critics, it was more fodder for discussing why the Blob gets things so wrong.

Coming out of Afghanistan was a rebuke to, or the swan song of, the neoconservative approach, which had its heyday during the Iraq war, said Vali R. Nasr, a professor of Middle East studies and international affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. After the first Iraq war, the United States developed a sense that the U.S. could basically engage in war, and help shape outcomes internationally, at little or no cost.

Former President George W. Bush positioned a group of ragtag terrorists as Americas great strategic rival and an existential threat to the United States, Mr. Nasr continued. Even though the effort failed early on, it continued unimpeded and became fundamental to the Blobs thinking post-9/11.

The term was coined in 2016 by Benjamin J. Rhodes, who was a deputy national security adviser for President Barack Obama at the time. It was not a compliment. Rather, it was a criticism directed at foreign-policy experts with an unrealistic set of assumptions about what America could do in the world, Mr. Rhodes, who is now a co-host of the Pod Save The World podcast, said in an interview.

Its not that people are issued a card with their name on it that identities them as part of the Blob, he said. But back in 2016, he singled out Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates and other Iraq-war promoters from both parties, who, he said, had an unpleasant tendency to whine incessantly about the collapse of the American security order.

As a simple branding exercise accusing ones enemies of practicing hegemonic groupthink and being mired in a sclerotic, outdated view of U.S. power it was a diabolical master stroke.

But to the foreign policy establishment, it was a provocation.

A lot of people who are proud members of the foreign policy community would object to the phrase, said Hal Brands, the Henry A. Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He himself objected last year, writing an essay with Peter D. Feaver and William C. Inboden for Foreign Affairs that had a title intended to tease: In Defense of the Blob: Americas Foreign Policy Establishment Is the Solution, Not the Problem.

What I find troubling about the idea of the Blob is that it taps into this old conspiratorial mind-set about what produces American foreign policy, Mr. Brands said. It makes it seem that American foreign policy has been so disastrous and foolish that it must have been foisted on the American people by some elite that doesnt have their best interests at heart.

Even Mr. Rhodes realizes that, like the gelatinous alien mass in The Blob movie, his creature has grown out of control.

Everybody since then has sought to define it for their own purposes, including those who want to make it a badge of honor, and those who want to hang it on their opponents, Mr. Rhodes said.

Maybe, and maybe not.

Ben Rhodes had a very precise definition, and his definition was people who disagree with me, or people who disagree with me and Obama, said Mr. Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University.

And he added onto that a layer of faux populism, as in Woe is me, Im just a poor assistant to the president trying to speak truth to all these well-entrenched fat cats. That is nutty. No one could be more inside the system than the speechwriter for the president.

Mr. Feaver added: Everybody has borrowed this exact same conceit. Youll find Harvard professors complaining about the Blob.

At the American Enterprise Institute, Kori N. Schake, the director of foreign and defense policy studies, said that Blob was a reductive and obfuscatory term, used to misdirect.

Who are the Taliban? The Taliban arose in 1994 amid the turmoil that came after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. They used brutal public punishments, including floggings, amputations and mass executions, to enforce their rules. Heres more on their origin story and their record as rulers.

Who are the Taliban leaders? These arethe top leaders of the Taliban, men who have spent years on the run, in hiding, in jail and dodging American drones. Little is known about them or how they plan to govern, including whether they will be as tolerant as they claim to be. One spokesman told The Timesthat the group wanted to forget its past, but that there would be some restrictions.

The reason they lash out and snarl at the Blob is because their positions are so contrary to the widespread belief about the effective use of American power internationally, she said. Criticism of the so-called foreign policy Blob is a way of saying, I have been ineffective in persuading people that the policies I advocate are the correct ones.

Gideon Rose, a former editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, said that Mr. Biden had to overrule the Blobbish, deep-state-ish, permanent government-ish factions within his own administration in order to carry out his Afghanistan withdrawal.

That is potentially confusing. For one thing, who could be Blobbier than Mr. Sullivan, the national security adviser, or Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, both veteran establishment foreign-policy figures? (The Blob is Back, The American Conservative magazine said in December, referring to the Biden administrations foreign policy team.)

The people claiming that there is some sort of unified theory of Blob-dom are not thinking clearly, said Thomas Wright, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. For one thing, he said, even within Brookings there is a wide range of opinion on Afghanistan. He supported the withdrawal, for instance which would seem to make him a traitor to the Blob, even though he is, by any definition, in the Blob himself.

My impression is that people who talk about the Blob have not read or inquired into what the people in the think tanks have actually said about the topic, he said. They dont know what theyre talking about. But, he said, if they want to say that Biden is doing something that Richard Haass disagrees with, then thats true, he is.

It is also true that any discussion of this topic inevitably leads to Mr. Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, who was christened Pope of the Blob by the writer Andrew Sullivan in 2019. For the record, Mr. Haasss view on Afghanistan is that America should have maintained its presence by leaving behind a small number of troops and not pulled out completely.

In an interview, Mr. Haass said he was happy to be considered part of the foreign policy establishment, but not happy that the foreign policy establishment was called the Blob.

Its a lazy term, he said. Its a pejorative and imprecise way to dismiss those who disagree with you, and it doesnt advance the foreign policy conversation.

Lets have a serious conversation about what should be the lessons of Afghanistan, or about Americas role in the world, Mr. Haass continued. But to simply describe certain people who disagree with you as the Blob is useless. And that is a generous way of putting it.

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Afghanistan Outcome Affirms a Warning: Beware the Blob - The New York Times

GOP Reps demand transparency from Biden on Afghanistan, blast withdrawal as unmitigated disaster – Fox News

EXCLUSIVE: In a letter led by California Republican Rep. Young Kim Friday, 19 GOP House members called on the Biden administration to adhere to congressional demands for increased "substantive briefings" on the situation in Afghanistan.

"Since the August 31stdeadline for U.S. troop withdrawal fromAfghanistan, Members of Congress have received little to no engagement from this Administration on classified briefings and updates on the situation inAfghanistan and ongoing efforts to evacuate our citizens andAfghanpartners," the letter first reviewed by Fox News read.

TALIBAN OFFICIAL CLAIMS AMERICANS ARE SAFE IN AFGHANISTAN, SAYS THERES NO 'INFIGHTING' AMONG LEADERS

"We request that your Administration provide more frequent classified briefings for relevant congressional committees as ourAfghanistan policy continues to evolve," she added.

Kim and her GOP colleagues thanked Secretary of State Antony Blinken for appearing in front of Congress earlier this week to address two days-worth of questions lawmakers had on the number of Americans still stuck in Afghanistan but said his answers "failed" to address congressional concerns.

They accused Blinken of strictly adhering to "administration talking points."

The State Department said this week that roughly 100 Americans remain in Afghanistan, but that many individuals keep reversing their intent to leave the country.

The letter informed Biden that previous briefings were equally unhelpful because they were "dominated" by lengthy presentations by administration officials that did not answer lawmakers questions.

FOX NEWS GOES INSIDE AFGHANISTAN PRISON WHERE THE TALIBAN FREED FIGHTERS

The congressmen applauded the work done by the U.S. military and State officials who helped to get over 124,000 Americans and Afghan allies out of the now Taliban-controlled country, but also blasted the administrations evacuation plan.

"Contrary to your repeated statements, the implementation of this withdrawal has been an unmitigated disaster," the GOP representatives wrote. "As you said previously, the buck stops here.'"

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"As long as Americans and ourAfghanpartners remain behind enemy lines and the Taliban continue to provide safe haven for terrorist organizations, Congress has a responsibility to hold your Administration accountable," they added.

Lawmakers have demanded that the White House comply with congressional oversight policies and adhere to any and all hearing and casework requests.

Kim was joinedin sending the letterbyGOP Representatives Steve Chabot, Mike Bost. Brian Fitzpatrick, AugustPfluger, David Valadao, Tim Burchett, Lisa McClain, John Rutherford, Brian Mast, Peter Meijer, Dan Newhouse,Chris Smith, TroyBalderson, Ted Budd,MariannetteMiller-Meeks,Ashley Hinson, Carlos Gimenez and Ben Cline.

Fox News' Kelly Laco contributed to this report.

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GOP Reps demand transparency from Biden on Afghanistan, blast withdrawal as unmitigated disaster - Fox News

Lessons out of Afghanistan: Democracy cannot be exported by forceno matter what the ‘experts’ say. – America Magazine

Any exit was bound to be fraught; and second-guessing mortal, real-time decision making is an arrogant, infuriating exercise. That does not reduce our responsibility to assess the Biden administrations missteps during the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the chaotic effort to rescue civilians that it propelled.

It would be a huge mistake, however, to limit a period of national introspection on Afghanistan, as many political leaders seem keen to do, to that last chapter of this costly misadventure. The United States spent nearly 20 years failing to achieve most of its aims in Afghanistan. The most pressing question now is not how the United States could have better managed the retreat in these last monthsas if a more competently administered defeat could excuse the strategic failures that produced itbut rather how could the United States have admitted earlier that there was ultimately no way to win. Here are a few lessons to carry forward.

Democracy cannot be exported by force. In retrospect, the effort to impose political and social modernity on Afghanistan, a campaign of wishful thinking that disregarded that countrys historical and cultural complexity, can only be described as the worst kind of nationalistic hubris. Americans have shown themselves too ambivalent and too nave about empire to be any good at keeping one together, and a thwarted attempt at mob rule on Jan. 6, plus the ongoing possibility of domestic political violence, suggest that the United States is presently in no credible position to play the global paragon of democracy.

The United States must not lead with military might alone. With no more boots on the ground in Afghanistanand diminishing numbers in other global hotspotsthe Biden administration must develop new soft-power skills and flex old diplomatic muscles. In the short term, that will necessitate rebuilding those capacities at the State Department, which were profoundly diminished during the Trump administration.

For far too long and at too great a cost, the United States has sought to impose its will and protect its interests primarily through its military capacity. But all that power has proved to be a poor match for the remote and asymmetrical security threats and geopolitical challenges of our times.

Stumbling into complex geopolitical realities with guns drawn has led to too many ruinous outcomes over the course of U.S. history. Taking a respite from a historic dependence on military power can only be to the good in this conflict-happy world. Of course, becoming a soft-power influencer in Afghanistan creates new perils for U.S. policy makers. A primary concern is that any program of economic sanctions intended to undermine or redirect the Taliban government will strike instead the Afghan people, who have suffered far too much already.

The last days in Kabul also suggest a new militarist temptation to be wary of: settling for a clinical, over the horizon war to replace the lethal capability lost by the U.S. withdrawal. Drone and fighter strikes are described as a precise, low-cost method of projecting U.S. power, but they are of dubious legal and moral legitimacy, and they have frequently produced collateral damage that provokes new cycles of enmity and violence.

Scrutinize the experts. Americans must reconsider how an active, engaged citizenry can better manage a self-appointed analyst class whose baseless optimism conjured into being this unhappy exercise in nation-building. Revelations from the leak of the Afghanistan Papers in December 2019 suggest the analysts and experts were abetted by those at the highest levels in the intelligence community and military and political leadership, who frequently hid from the public their harshest and most accurate assessments of progress.

Groupthink, supported by corporate profit or think-tank subsidies, was rewarded, and criticism of the project turned aside. The analyst class was incentivized to create a narrative of nation-building that was doomed to unravel as soon as a real end date in Afghanistan emerged.

Yet it must be remembered that the U.S. public, perhaps lulled by the myth of invincible American power and righteousness, allowed this catastrophe to unfold as it did. After two decades of war in a fractious, far-off place, only a tiny number of U.S. families, those with loved ones in harms way, were still paying attention, a complacency that is inexcusable and must be rejected. Those who served the people of the United States in Afghanistan deserve that reckoning.

So what now? What does the United States and its political and military establishment owe the people left behindthe collateral damage of this vast policy failure, especially Afghan women, who have been misled for 20 years about U.S. willingness to remain local enforcers of their human rights? At a minimum, perhaps the hope of a safe passage out.

If the United States remains in dialogue with its former adversaries, the Taliban, it can still do some good in Afghanistan. Ongoing negotiations with Taliban leaders should be aimed at securing the evacuation of the hundreds of U.S. citizens or legal residents who were unable to reach Hamid Karzai Airport during the last tumultuous days of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. Those who worked with the U.S. military and government or international agencies, as well as former members of the Afghan government or military and their families, similarly deserve the best U.S. efforts to secure safe passage out.

While the world rightly recoils from the Talibans systematic misogyny, there is some reason to hope that the worst excesses exhibited during the last Taliban rule can be mitigated. Regardless, Afghan women deserve whatever protection from gender-based violence the international community can muster.

The United States and other Western powers still have substantial leverage over the coalescing Taliban government. The International Monetary Fund has blocked access to $440 million in emergency monetary reserves, and most of the Afghan central banks $10 billion in assets are held outside Kabul. More than $7 billion is warehoused (and currently frozen) in the United States.

Sooner or later the new government will want overseas capital to begin reviving the economy and rebuilding Afghanistan after decades of conflict. The release of those reserves and assets can be predicated on the Talibans street-level performance on human rights and its efforts to quash any terrorist threat emerging inside Afghanistans borders.

Ultimately, like the rogues gallery of nations who would be kings in Afghanistan before it, the United States will be tempted to wash its hands of the calamity it has created. That must be resisted. America must find a different, peaceful and productive way to stay in Afghanistan, without drones and without troops, but with a resolve to put right what it still can.

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Lessons out of Afghanistan: Democracy cannot be exported by forceno matter what the 'experts' say. - America Magazine

Could Multinational Peacekeepers Prevent Worst-Case Outcomes in Afghanistan? – War on the Rocks

How should the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, and international organizations engage with the new Taliban government in Afghanistan? How will these decisions impact Afghanistans stability in the next five to 10 years? To date, many analyses have focused on the short-term implications of the Taliban takeover. However, relatively little thought has been given to policy interventions that can bring long-term stability to Afghanistan. The U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Department of Peace Operations should analyze how a multinational peacekeeping operation (PKO) can play a critical role in stabilizing Afghanistan. Empirical research provides compelling evidence on how PKOs support peace settlements and protect local civilians in the fragile time period following conflict termination, leading to durable peace. While several recent works have analyzed an Afghanistan peace operations viability, the idea has received relatively little attention in broader policy discourse. Given PKOs proven track record in stabilizing post-conflict states, the U.N. Security Council should seriously consider whether a PKO can provide a credible monitoring and verification mechanism to help stabilize Afghanistan.

Based on the Talibans consistent demands that all foreign forces depart Afghanistan, a third-party monitoring force may not be feasible. However, with dire economic and humanitarian crises facing Afghanistan, the Talibans need for external support might provide a window for a coordinated effort by the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to convince the Taliban of the benefits of a PKO. A successful PKO would depend upon the right conditions and the right force structure, and must deal with the risks posed by spoilers like the Islamic State in Afghanistan.

An Afghanistan PKO would be a new type of peace operation. PKOs traditionally provide monitoring and verification capabilities to support internal peace settlements between mistrusting former combatants at the conclusion of civil conflicts. However, the Talibans recent military victory obviates the need for a more traditional intra-Afghan peace settlement. Rather than monitoring and facilitating trust between former internal combatants, an Afghanistan PKO would foster trust between the Taliban and other states and international and non-governmental organizations. Given reports of reprisal killings and human rights abuses (despite the Talibans pledges to avoid such practices), international donors are understandably wary of resuming financial aid to a Taliban-led regime. However, if credible third-party monitoring forces were in place to verify that external aid was being responsibly spent and Taliban commitments were being honored, then international donors might be more likely to resume financial assistance. A PKO also provides a reliable mechanism for the donor states and organizations to verify the Talibans pledge that Afghanistan will not be used as a terrorist safe haven, as recent reporting indicates. Such trust-building measures might facilitate diplomatic recognition by some states, who are waiting to see how the Taliban will govern.

A PKO could also play a critical role in fostering intra-Afghan trust between the Taliban and millions of Afghan civilians who are living in fear and skeptical of the new regimes promises. Rather than taking an active part in hostilities and applying coercive military force, traditional peace operations are based on three foundational principles: impartiality, host nation consent, and the non-use of force (beyond self-defense). Neutral peacekeepers would be ideally positioned to facilitate peace between the Taliban regime and remaining resistance groups by supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts, thus strengthening post-conflict peace duration. Increasing trust between former government officials, urban residents, and the Taliban could mitigate Afghanistans refugee crisis, which is predicted to worsen in the coming months. Without external support, international isolation of the Taliban regime in the face of mounting humanitarian disaster will spell calamity for millions of innocent Afghans and threaten the Talibans nascent sovereignty.

Assessing Taliban Consent and International Political Will

The first and most important condition for a successful PKO is the consent of the Taliban. Deploying multinational troops without consent from the de facto government would amount to an invasion, not a PKO. The Talibans insistence on the departure of all foreign forces from Afghanistan seems to make consent unlikely. However, as the Taliban assumes governance responsibilities, their clear need for continued external support may provide donor states, Afghanistans neighbors, and international organizations with critical leverage to recommend a PKO. The fact is that, in addition to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, the Taliban stand to benefit from a PKO that facilitates expanded international assistance. Inducing the Taliban to see that such an operation could be in their interest would require a coordinated international pressure campaign orchestrated by a diverse array of state and non-state actors.

Specifically, top donor states, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, and international governmental organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund could withhold financial aid, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic recognition, conditional on the Taliban consenting to a U.N.-led multinational PKO. While the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan lack histories of robust cooperation with one another, their interests align when it comes to the question of stabilizing Afghanistan. As Afghanistan teeters toward humanitarian catastrophe, the subsequent second- and third-order effects such as millions of Afghan refugees, continued disease transmission, and the creation of terrorist safe havens risk regional destabilization. These risks provide strategic incentives for the U.N. Security Council and Afghanistans neighbors to support stabilizing policy interventions. Coordinated action among this broad, international coalition could persuade reluctant Taliban leaders.

Despite a PKOs obvious benefits, and the clear risks posed by international isolation, Taliban consent to a PKO risks the organizations internal legitimacy. While the Taliban are frequently cast as a unified organization, some analysts have pointed to the groups diverse and disparate assemblage of various armed groups from across Afghanistan. It remains to be seen if Taliban unity, which was boosted by opposition to U.S. and NATO forces, will persist after those forces withdraw. Given the existential threat of organizational splintering, Taliban leaders must balance their need for internal legitimacy amongst Taliban ranks (and between moderate and radical elements) against international legitimacy and external demands for the Taliban to protect human rights, civil liberties, and Afghanistans democracy.

Overall, a PKO with credible monitoring and verification capabilities aligns with the Talibans long-term interests by facilitating trust with skeptical Afghans, donor states, regional neighbors, and international and non-governmental organizations. Enabling international humanitarian relief will be critical to stabilizing Afghanistan by providing urgently needed aid to millions of Afghans facing famine, drought, a pandemic, and displacement. Despite these clear benefits, Taliban leaders will be wary of consenting to a PKO, which risks alienating the groups radical elements and organizational splintering. If the United Nations wishes to deploy a PKO to Afghanistan, it will need to carefully craft the missions force structure and mandate in a manner that facilitates intra-Taliban legitimacy.

Structuring a Peace Operation for Success

Peace operations vary widely in size, composition, and force structure based on their specific mandate. PKO force structure considerations would likely be critical to obtaining Taliban consent. An Afghanistan PKO would require adequate resources to credibly fulfill its mandate while balancing the Talibans internal legitimacy concerns. A large PKO with a robust mandate that includes civilian protection is likely a non-starter. A lightly armed observer mission, concentrated in the main cities is most realistic, given probable Taliban doubts.

The U.N.s Department of Peace Operations has the experience and capabilities to manage such a complex mission. A force of 10,000 to 12,000 peacekeepers, spread between Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif would provide a credible PKO with geographic coverage across Afghanistan. These four cities alone contain approximately 12 percent of Afghanistans total population. Given widespread doubts over the Talibans recent pledges, stationing peacekeepers in major cities would be critical for the Taliban to build trust with donor states and international organizations. It would also build trust with vulnerable Afghans who previously supported or worked in the government of Afghanistan. From a humanitarian perspective, the PKOs presence in major cities would increase international and non-governmental organizations access and ability to provide aid to millions of Afghans.

This PKO is also ideal for the missions force protection requirements. As is evident with Kabuls recent U.S. and NATO evacuation, Afghanistans geography creates large risks for external forces mobility and their ability to resupply and evacuate casualties. Militants can isolate and cut off disparate peacekeeping units by controlling key chokepoints, such as airports or Highway 1, posing a large risk to units based away from major cities. Concentrating the PKO in a few major cities with large transportation nodes will similarly ease the missions logistical burden, which is a formidable challenge with Afghanistans geography.

Though beneficial from force protection and logistics perspectives, concentrating peacekeepers in cities reduces the missions monitoring and verification capabilities in rural Afghanistan. Urban PKO units will have limited ability to travel significant distances beyond their local regions, degrading the missions ability to patrol in rural areas and deliver humanitarian aid across the entire country. Despite these shortcomings, PKO force protection concerns may outweigh mandate considerations in a necessary trade-off to keep the missions risk profile suitably low to attract troop-contributing countries.

This limited geographic reach is especially problematic if the PKOs mandate includes verifying that Afghanistan is not being used as a terrorist safe haven. However, new technology provides options to mitigate these risks. Specifically, the PKO could be supplemented with unarmed and unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, extending the missions monitoring capabilities into the countryside and mountain ranges. Though it seems improbable that the Taliban would accept foreign intelligence systems, if these assets were operated under the auspices of the U.N. Department of Peace Operations, it should assuage Taliban concerns. Deploying with these capabilities would be critical to monitoring rural Afghanistan and strengthening the PKOs verification credibility. As suggested by recent research, integrating new technologies would allow an Afghanistan PKO to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities without significantly increasing the number of peacekeepers.

As with all peace operations, selecting donor states and PKO leaders that are acceptable to combatants is critical. In the case of an Afghanistan PKO, Muslim-majority countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Azerbaijan, or Bangladesh would be potential troop contributors. Interestingly, the Taliban previously proposed a majority-Muslim peace operation as a transitional force in 2009. These countries and Afghanistans neighbors should play an active leadership role in overseeing the PKO. Given these states interest in attaining regional stability, political will might be present for sustaining the PKO. For obvious reasons, the United States, NATO members, and partner states who supported Operation Enduring Freedom should not play a role in the PKO. While these states can offer support through PKO financing and applying international pressure to induce Taliban consent, their direct participation would detract from the missions neutrality and impartiality. The Taliban will also be apprehensive about formally incorporating gender considerations into a PKOs mandate. However, compelling research highlights the importance of deliberately utilizing female peacekeepers and these considerations should not be overlooked when resourcing the PKOs composition in a manner that protects Afghan women.

Research indicates that PKOs must be adequately resourced to fulfill their mandates. Under-resourced PKOs have routinely struggled to accomplish their mandates, as was the case with the ineffective United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Initially deployed in 1988, the mission was mandated with three core tasks to monitor: (1) non-interference and non-intervention by the parties [Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union, and the United States] in each others affairs; (2) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and (3) the voluntary return of refugees. Deployed with only 50 total peacekeepers and without an intra-Afghan peace settlement, this severely under-resourced peace operation failed to provide a credible monitoring and verification capability needed for intra-Afghan parties to overcome mutual mistrust. Following the Soviet Unions withdrawal, spiraling violence between various Afghan militias significantly increased risk to peacekeepers, sapping the political will of troop-contributing states. The mission ended in 1990 as Afghanistan devolved into civil war. Under-resourced PKOs were also incapable of fulfilling their mandates in Rwanda and Bosnia, with horrific consequences.

The Risk of Spoilers

Even if the U.N. Security Council and Afghanistans neighbors can induce Taliban consent for a peace operation, the mission will still be vulnerable to spoilers parties threatened by peace settlements that employ violence to undermine internal peace processes. As seen with the tragic bombings at Kabul Airport on Aug. 26, spoilers will continue to play an active role in Afghanistan and these groups would almost certainly target peacekeepers. Though the Islamic State in Afghanistan is the most prominent threat, radical Taliban factions may also serve as spoilers in the same way that splinter factions have done in other post-conflict settings. Beyond targeting the PKO, spoilers may target remaining international and non-governmental organizations to discredit the Taliban-backed regime. In addition to extremist groups, criminal organizations are taking advantage of Afghanistans instability to settle scores and disrupt competitors, making attribution of attacks difficult. While these spoilers pose a certain risk for a PKO, their presence simultaneously highlights the need to have impartial third-party observers on hand who can investigate attacks and credibly attribute spoiling attacks. The risk posed by spoilers increases PKO force protection requirements, further strengthening the case for a mission that is concentrated in large cities that can leverage existing military bases.

Conclusion

Complex trade-offs dominate many aspects of this proposal. An Afghanistan PKOs size would be directly linked to the missions monitoring and verification capabilities. However, the mandates scope and the missions size must be constrained in a manner that enables Taliban internal legitimacy and consent, while still providing a credible peace operation that will assuage international concerns and incentivize Taliban compliance with their stated promises. Further, the PKOs risk profile must be low enough to gain and sustain troop-contributing countries support. While Taliban consent to such a mission would significantly reduce risk, the persistent threat of spoilers like Islamic State in Afghanistan will increase force protection considerations importance while simultaneously limiting the missions geographic reach. I argue these trade-offs can be carefully balanced in a manner that produces a credible PKO and a limited mandate.

Beyond trade-offs, a critical question is: Why should the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, and international organizations cooperate with the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan? While a PKO paired with conditional foreign aid would be a vital step in stabilizing Afghanistan, it would simultaneously enable a Taliban-led regime to consolidate power in a manner that is not aligned with democracy, civil liberties, or womens rights.

The answer is that continued civil conflict and humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan carries significant concerns. Beyond the normative considerations regarding the safety and security of 39 million Afghans, there are clear strategic imperatives for a stable Afghanistan. The widespread abandonment of Afghanistan following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal offers an instructive lesson for world leaders today. Isolating a Taliban-led Afghanistan risks continued civil war, state failure, and humanitarian disaster. Further, this isolation will likely strengthen radical sects within the Taliban. Extremist organizations may take advantage of the security vacuum, risking further regional destabilization in South Asia.

While Taliban rhetoric diminishes a PKOs feasibility, coordinated effort across groups such as the U.N. Security Council, Afghanistans neighbors, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank might increase the likelihood of the Taliban government consenting to a U.N.-led PKO. Following four decades of persistent conflict, creative and proactive steps ought to be considered to bring stability to Afghanistan. Decades of research suggests peace operations monitoring and verification capabilities can overcome post-conflict mistrust and assist in providing Afghanistan lasting stability.

Ryan C. Van Wie is a U.S. Army Infantry officer who has deployed to Afghanistan. He has a masters degree in public policy from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and his research focuses on civil conflict dynamics and military force structure. This paper only reflects the authors views and does not represent the views of the U.S. Army or the U.S. government.

Image: U.S. Army National Guard (Photo by Sgt. Heidi Kroll)

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Could Multinational Peacekeepers Prevent Worst-Case Outcomes in Afghanistan? - War on the Rocks

Afghanistan: The Rise of the Taliban : Throughline – NPR

How did a small group of Islamic students go from local vigilantes to one of the most infamous and enigmatic forces in the world? The Taliban is a name that has haunted the American imagination since 2001. The scenes of the group's brutality repeatedly played in the Western media, while true, perhaps obscure our ability to see the complex origins of the Taliban and how they impact the lives of Afghans. It's a shadow that reaches across the vast ancient Afghan homeland, the reputation of the modern state, and throughout global politics. At the end of the US war in Afghanistan we go back to the end of the Soviet Occupation and the start of the Afghan civil war to look at the rise of the Taliban. Their story concludes Throughline's two-episode investigation on the past, present, and future of the country that was once called "the center of the world.

If you would like to read more about the Taliban's rise to power:

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Afghanistan: The Rise of the Taliban : Throughline - NPR