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Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP)

Location:Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz, Farah, Bamyan and Nili

Main Partners:Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), Kabul Municipality, Afghanistan Land Authority (ARAZI)

Recognising the importance of land, H.E. President Ashraf Ghani has made urban land regularisation and improving tenure security a priority of his National Unity Government:We commit ourselves to legalizing all properties that have legal flaws Since the properties do not have credible legal basis, a vast capital of our people is perpetually under threat. At the same time, one of the results is that our cities can never take the shape of civic cities and citizens cannot tend to their rights and obligations as citizens.

The vast majority of urban Afghans live in under-serviced, informal housing with little tenure security and very poor access to basic services such as water and sanitation. This is particularly so in Kabul, where 66% of the dwelling stock is comprised of irregular housing (over 280,000 dwelling units), including 10% of the total dwelling stock located on hillsides. The majority of informal housing can easily be upgraded through a community-based regularization process that improves tenure security, infrastructure and services.

Afghan cities concentrate considerable problems of poverty, inequality, youth exclusion and gender inequality, which are a result of weak municipal governance and insufficient pro-poor focus on shaping inclusive urbanisation. Nearly one-third of the urban population lives in poverty (29%, over 2 million Afghans), denied access to affordable and well located land, housing, and services. Gender inequality is a major challenge in cities with urban women and girls facing significant structural barriers to their full social and economic participation in urban life. Cities are home to a disproportionate number of youth (between 15 and 24), who constitute nearly a quarter of the urban population (23.6%), notably higher than in rural areas (17.8%). Yet cities are not providing jobs and opportunities commensurate with demand with youth becoming increasingly disenfranchised.

As of 2014, the challenges of urban poverty, unemployment, and socio-economic marginalization are getting worse due to the international drawdown and economic slowdown. Urban poor households, IDPs, and female-headed households are, and will continue to be most affected from these macro-economic changes. Yet global experience has shown that urbanisation is a source of development, not simply a problem to be solved. The inevitable and positive urban transition presents both opportunities and challenges given the current form and structure of the major cities.

The National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan has recognized the transformative role of urbanisation and is prioritizing urbanisation in its Self-Reliance reform agenda, noting that cities should be drivers of economic development, and municipalities and urban development can contribute to national state building and peace-building objectives.

Afghanistan is heading now in its Transformation Decade (2015-2024) where greater emphasis is being placed on self-sufficiency as international troops withdraw and aid is reduced. For municipalities, this means increasing their local revenues, and spending it more effectively and accountably. This is in line with the stated vision of H.E. President Ashraf Ghani and the NUG:

By expanding cities we can collect hundreds of millions of dollars through municipalities and since municipalities have the legal right to spend, it is our pledge that we will create the widespread participation of citizens so that people take part in creating and boosting conditions for urban living.Experience has shown that the Afghan communities are a key part of the solution. Urban Community Development Councils (CDCs) and Gozar Assemblies (GAs) have demonstrated enormous capacity to organise, find solutions to local social and infrastructure challenges, and engage in peacebuilding efforts. This latent energy needs to be harnessed within a more participatory municipal governance framework and utilised to address local land, planning and governance bottlenecks.

Future of Afghan Cities Programme (FoAC)

Location:National programme, focusing on five city regions and 20 strategic District Municipalities

Main Partners:Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), Kabul Municipality, Afghanistan Land Authority (ARAZI)

Never before in its history has Afghanistan had such an enormous opportunity to lay strong foundations for a sustainable and prosperous urban future. A combination of forces are currently in place that, if urgently harnessed, can set Afghanistan on a path to harnessing its cities, and their rural-urban linkages, for economic development, improved sub-national governance and stabilization.

This convergence of positive forces includes:

The Realizing Self Reliance paper presented at the London Conference on Afghanistan (2014) clearly articulates the reform priority for urban development;

Making cities the economic drivers for development. In order to do so we need to improve living conditions and service delivery in urban centers. Urbanization will need to be managed by reducing disparity between rural and urban areas and thereby controlling rural-to-urban migration. Establishing metropolitan development authorities and funds will allow for coordinated development planning and professionalized management. (Realising Self-Reliance (2014) National Unity Government of Afghanistan, p.12)

Afghanistan Urban Peacebuilding Programme (AUPP)

Location:Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar, Kunduz, Herat, Farah, Bamyian and Nili Cities

Main Partners:Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), Ministry of Urban Development (MUDA), Kabul Municipality, Ministry of Interior (MoI)

Afghanistan is one of the worlds fastest-urbanizing countries. Although the countrys population remains predominantly rural, the break-neck pace of urban growth ensures that the proportion of citizens living in cities will triple in 35 years. Every year, Afghan cities grow by over 320,000 people placing enormous pressure on local governments and security providers to provide services and achieve safe, peaceful, and inclusive cities.

Cities concentrate the risks associated with insecurity and disorder, such as chronic poverty, steep inequality, and reduced solidarity compared to rural villages. Afghanistans cities absorb vast displaced populations and confront urgent demands for basic services and infrastructure. Swollen with rural-urban migrants, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and returnees the cities relegate most of their inhabitants to deprived informal settlements, a situation that aggravates exclusion, illegitimizes the state, and fuels various forms of violence and insecurity. Women and girls, young people, and IDPs and returnees are particularly marginalized and vulnerable, excluded from public space as well as public decision-making, and are disproportionately affected by urban insecurity and exclusion.

Community-Led Urban Infrastructure Programme

Location:Kabul Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad

Main Partners:Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), Ministry of Urban Development (MUDA), Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), Municipalities of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad

In 2014 the number of security and economic related displaced families has reached a record of 755,011 persons (Sept. 2014, UNHCR). In September 2014 alone 33,240 persons have been displaced. The overwhelming majority are migrating into urban areas considered to be safer, with more livelihood opportunities and access to services. The arrival of such migrants into regional cities as well as Kabul city will rapidly exert pressure on local infrastructure and services exacerbating pre-existing vulnerability conditions. This will impact on the way urban development is managed particularly in settlement planning and providing access to basic services, infrastructure and labour markets.

While much has been achieved to address the needs of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returnees, rural-urban migrants and the other urban poor, the continuous large numbers of migrants moving towards Kabul and other cities makes it urgent that the new Government through this project can continue to secure and stabilize urban areas through community empowerment and improvement of living conditions of the people.

Local Integration of Vulnerable Excluded & Uprooted People (LIVE-UP)

Location:Kabul, Jalalabad and Herat

Main Partners:Ministry of Refugees & Repatriation (MoRR), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG); Kabul, Herat & Jalalabad Municipalities

Through the Local Integration of Vulnerable Excluded & Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) project, UN-HABITAT is supporting the Government of Afghanistan to pursue an inclusive, sustainable response to displacement.

Since 2002, over 5.6 million Afghans have returned to Afghanistan after taking refuge in neighbouring countries. In addition there are currently over 850,000 registered Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Afghanistan. Urban areas exert considerable pull factors on the displaced, attracted to the relative security and increased economic opportunities offered by cities. This coupled with rural-urban migration has led to the unprecedented growth of Afghanistans cities over the last decade. Returnees and IDPs however face major obstacles to re-building their lives, accessing rights and services and fully integrating with local communities. The LIVE-UP project, made possible with the support of the European Commission Delegation to Afghanistan aims to make significant improvements in the lives of some of the most vulnerable Afghans and create a precedent for local integration as a response to displacement.

Afghanistans rapid process of urbanisation presents significant challenges as well as opportunities. The development of cities can be harnessed as a tool to improve the access to services, living conditions and economic conditions of the population. The traditional approach to displacement in Afghanistan of creating distinct townships for IDPs, typically located large distances from urban areas has been shown to not be an effective or sustainable response to displacement. LIVE-UP aims to integrate displaced communities into the urban fabric, leveraging the benefits of the urbanisation process and giving communities a platform to rebuild their lives.

Through UN-HABITATs tried and tested Peoples Process of service delivery, the project supports communities through the provision of trunk infrastructure, improved access to services and improved shelter for extremely vulnerable households. Afghanistan Minister for Refugees and Repatriation H.E Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi visited for the first time Maslakh IDP Settlement in Injil District, Herat to officially launch the LIVE-UP project. Speaking at the launch Minister Balkhi thanked UN-HABITAT for its commitment and perseverance in assisting displaced Afghans.

National Solidarity Programme (NSP)

Location:Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Bamyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Balkh, Panjshir, Nangarhar

Main Partners:Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD); Provinces of Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Bamyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Balkh, Panjshir, Nangarhar.After two decades of war, Afghanistans governance system has been weakened. In response, the Government of Afghanistan and UN-HABITAT have contributed to the design of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) which is initially aimed at strengthening the network of some 30,000 self-governing community institutions.

The NSP is a national priority programme of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA), executed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and development (MRRD) and funded through multiple sources. As the single largest development programme in the country and reputed to be the second-largest in the world, NSP has an approved budget of US$ 2.7 billion over the period from mid-2003 to September 2016. NSP proposes to cover a total of around 37,000 rural communities in Afghanistan with a first round of block grants and a total of around 12,000 of these with a second round of block grants.

Known in Dari as Hambastagi Milli and in Pashtu as Milli Paiwastoon, NSP is based on the Afghan traditions of Ashar (i.e. community members working together on a volunteer basis to improve community infrastructure) and Jirga councils comprised of respected members of the community. Islamic values of unity, equity and justice are also encouraged.

The State of Afghan Cities Programme (SoAC)

Location:National programme, focusing on 34 Provincial Capitals, including Kabul

Main Partners: Ministry of Urban Development Affairs (MUDA), Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG); and Kabul Municipality, 33 Provincial Municipalities.Rapid urbanization is both an opportunity and a challenge for Afghanistan. As cities grow, it is vital that policy makers and city leaders have access to reliable and verifiable information in terms of urban indicators to support decision-making.

Lacking detailed knowledge of the demographic, economic, cultural, physical and environmental dynamics of Afghan cities, and the capacity to collect and use such information, many planners and decision makers are operating in a climate of uncertainty, allocating resources to immediate and pressing issues rather than investing in progressive change over the long term.The costs of this widespread information and capacity deficit are both immense and immeasurable, and accrue in, for example, the form of expanding informal settlements, land grabbing, decreasing agricultural land, deepening social problems, rising urban inequality, and greater insecurity.

The problem persists because the international community has, for the last decade, focused largely on implementing short-term security-related programmes, mostly in rural areas, through parallel structures rather than building government and civil society institutions and capacities for sustainable, regular monitoring and data collection/use for development. There has been a focus on getting things done rather than on ensuring and developing sustainable monitoring mechanisms. The result is that while urban institutions have been built, they lack the capacities and resources for appropriate monitoring of the urban sector, which is required to formulate evidenced-based policies and plans.

Safety Nets and Pensions Support Project (SNPSP)

Location:Yakawlang District, Bamyan Province

Main Partners:Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD)

Afghanistan is a landlocked, mountainous state situated between central and south Asia with an estimated population of approximately 30 million people and a land area of 653,000 square kilometres. Despite the increased levels of external assistance provided by the donor community in recent years, more than one third of all Afghans still live in poverty, with the nation having one of the worlds lowest average per capita incomes. Afghanistan is ranked 175th among all nations on the UNDP Human Development Index1.

Even if the nature of the crisis in Afghanistan may not have changed drastically in terms of humanitarian needs or levels of violence, the international community is unanimous in describing the current situation as one of transition. This allows for new forms of aid, such as cash transfers, and has stimulated the direct involvement of the government in humanitarian aid coordination and, to some degree, delivery.

There is a common understanding that the use of cash assistance is appropriate in situations of chronic crisis or during transitional phases such as that being experienced by Afghanistan. The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) is initiating a Social Safety Net project (under the Afghanistan Social Protection Program, known as ASPP) in selected districts of Ghor, Paktya, Bamyan and Kunarha provinces. The purpose of the program, which is a cash assistance intervention, would be to assist eligible poor families with young children to maintain adequate levels of nutrition during the winter season, and to promote human capital development.

The program is using a Poverty Scorecard (based on a Proxy Means Testing Approach) to identify eligible households. The Proxy Means Testing (PMT) method will be used in the selected five districts of four provinces. With this project proposal UN-Habitat is applying for the facilitation of the program in Yakawlang District Bamyan Province in 143 communities with a total of 19,866 families2.

Over the last 10 years the Government of Afghanistan implemented the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) with the goal of building peace and solidarity amongst the people and to empower them to be responsible for local level governance and development. This flagship programme of the Government of Afghanistan has covered all the provinces of the country reaching over 21,000 villages. UN-Habitat has to date played a key role in assisting the government in the design of the programme and was responsible for implementation of the programme in 3,283 villages across nine provinces throughout Afghanistan, including Bamyan Province.

As part of the National Solidarity Programme Community Development Councils (CDCs) were formed for each village through a transparent election process. The CDCs were empowered through a process of experiential learning to plan and undertake their own development work so they could be responsible for local level governance. The NSP has been hailed by development practioners and the World Bank as one of the best community empowerment programmes anywhere implemented on a national scale.

The communities that have benefitted from the NSP, as well as the government, now consider that it is crucial to consolidate the hard-won gains to further the cause of peace-building through addressing some of the particular needs identified by the communities that could not be met by NSP. This includes facilitating access to services and support for the extremely poor and most marginalized members of the communities through the established CDCs.

Please see the State of Afghan Cities discussion papers below

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Afghanistan UN-Habitat

Taliban fighters ambushed and killed around 100 Afghan police and soldiers Tuesday as they attempted to retreat following heavy losses in the southern province of Helmand, Reuters reported.Government forces were on the run after months of intense fighting in Chah-e-Anjir, several miles outside the city of Lashkar Gah, where they had been surrounded by militants for days.

The group of soldiers and police were viciously attacked, leaving few survivors. An entire battalion was essentially wiped out, according to surviving army soldier Faiz Mohammad."We were one batallion," he told Reuters. "Except me and two others, no one came out alive."

Hundreds of commandos were sent to Lashkar Gah that same day in response to prevent Taliban militants from advancing into the city. Omar Zwak, spokesperson for the provincial government, assured international press that the area would soon be cleared of Taliban presence. Instead, troops and police were overrun and ambushed before reinforcements could be sent, according to Mohammad Rasool Zazai, spokesperson for the army's 215th corps. The besieged forces left when they believed they had negotiated a route of safe passage with the Taliban, however the militants had staged a trap.

Afghan security officials inspect the scene of a suicide bomb attack in Helmand province, Afghanistan, on Oct. 10, 2016. At least 14 Afghan were killed after the attack. Photo: Getty Images

The Taliban launched a massive nationwide assault in Afghanistan last year, securing a number of strategic victories including the northern city of Kunduz. Afghan security forces managed to wrestle control back from the militants, but security remains a serious issue as casualties mount. Between August and March, around 4,500 soldiers and police were killed with an additional 8,000 wounded in battle. Afghan officials say that they are now dealing with a serious drought of morale with the rate of casualties mounting toward four times that of recruitment.

The Taliban are an Islamic fundamentalist group in Afghanistan. They took over the nation in 1996 and established a government until a U.S. invasion in 2001 ousted them from power. As U.S. forces largely withdrew from the country between 2011 and 2014, however, the Taliban have experienced a powerful resurgence and concerns are growing as to the Afghan government's ability to contain their presence. NATO has sent hundreds of advisors to the restive Helmand province and the U.S. has offered aircraft and personnel. Since the beginning of October, the U.S. has conducted at least 15 airstrikes against the Taliban in order to relieve Afghanistan's beleaguered army.

The Islamic State group also presents a threat to Afghanistan. The militants also known as ISISclaimed responsibilitythis week for a deadly attack Tuesdaythat killed at least 18 people at a Shiite shrine in the capital city of Kabul during the holy day of Ashura.

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War in Afghanistan: Taliban Massacres 100 Afghan Soldiers and ...

The Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework is our plan to achieve self-reliance and increase the welfare of our people. We will build a productive and broad-based economy that creates jobs. We will establish the rule of law and put an end to corruption, criminality, and violence. Justice and the rule of law require that we step up the fight against corruption, reform our courts, and [Read More...]

Click here to see and download the document: Realizing Self-Reliance Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership [Read More...]

Lecture by Ashraf Ghani President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Chair: Michael Keating Senior Consulting Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House 4 December 2014 [tab:TEXT] Robin Niblett Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. Delighted you could all join us this evening. I hope that you will join me and my colleagues at Chatham House in giving a very warm welcome to Dr Ashraf [Read More...]

KABUL (Pajhwok): Kabul and Washington on Tuesday signed a long-delayed security pact allowing the presence of a residual American force, number around 9,500, in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Also on Tuesday, the new government of national unity inked a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with NATO, whose combat mission in the country is scheduled to end this year. National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar [Read More...]

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Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in NY

Why Does Afghanistan Matter to Maneuver Leaders?

In its complexity and diversity, the Afghan experience is rich with lessons for the American military and its civilian interagency counterparts. In the years ahead, U.S. forces may again be called upon to assist or intervene in weak states experiencing protracted instability or rebuilding after years of violence. Like the conflict in Afghanistan, these interventions may involve a combination of counterinsurgency, stabilization, or counterterrorism operations, along with security force assistance, counter-narcotics, and counter-organized crime missions. Drawing upon the many lessons of the Afghan conflict, maneuver commanders must be prepared to:

Enable and conduct mutually supporting operations involving a wide range of U.S., coalition, and host-nation military, civilian, and law enforcement stakeholders pursuing complementary security and governance objectives.

Facilitate and contribute to the integration of military and law enforcement operations against convergent networks of threats that frequently emerge in fragile, post-conflict states (including insurgents, weapons/IED-facilitators, and traffickers of narcotics and other illicit goods).

Sustain operational partnerships with host nation forces that are in the early stages of development, while establishing mechanisms to encourage transparency and cooperation on the part of host nation leaders at the local and national levels (many of whom may be inclined to advance their parochial interests at the expense of the success of the joint mission).

Finally, although U.S. force levels in Afghanistan are declining, it is likely that American units will remain deployed in the country long after 2014. Afghanistan will remain a vital front in the war to defeat al-Qaeda and allied insurgent and terrorist groups, which retain safe-havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and which are intent on returning to and restoring safe-haven in Afghanistan. Maneuver leaders will continue to engage the problem of Afghanistan, and must understand the conflict not only as a case study, but as one in which they may well be personally engaged.

The U.S. experience in Afghanistan over the past decade offers myriad lessons for the U.S. Army as it continues military operations in support of the Afghan government and prepares for future conflicts of similar complexity.

The American campaign in Afghanistan was launched in response to al-Qaeda's use of Afghan territory, granted by the Taliban government, to plan and launch the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. At the outset, the objectives of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan therefore included the defeat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated groups in Afghanistan, as well as the development of a stable and legitimate Afghan government that would serve as a U.S. partner in denying the use of Afghan territory to terrorist networks. A principal strategic rationale underlying the efforts of the United States and its NATO partners in Afghanistan was the notion that fragile states with weak institutions, particularly those dangerous and volatile regions, have the potential to serve as safe havens for transnational terrorist groups.

Even as American objectives and the rationale for U.S. engagement in Afghanistan have remained broadly consistent over the last decade, the character of the Afghan conflict and the strategies the U.S. has pursued to achieve its aims have evolved repeatedly between 2001 and the present. In 2001, U.S. forces, in tandem with the Northern Alliance, overthrew the Taliban regime in two months with only several hundred deployed troops. This early and decisive victory was followed by a period of optimism from 2002 to 2004, marked by what initially appeared to be a successful exercise in post-war reconstruction and state-building. In 2005, however, having reconsolidated in safe havens across the border in neighboring Pakistan, the Taliban mounted a significant resurgence, enabled in part by the population's resentment the Afghan government's apparent corruption and ineffectiveness. The size of the American force deployed in the country at the time was judged insufficient to contend with the Taliban's reemergence across the country.

A surge of American troops into Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 marked a new evolution in the conflict and enabled the pursuit of better resourced counterinsurgency operations. The current stage of the conflict, as the U.S. and NATO transition security responsibilities to Afghan forces in 2013 and 2014, presents different and equally complex challenges for the U.S. military. In the coming years, U.S. forces will be expected to enable their Afghan counterparts to contend with an ongoing insurgency, while preparing for and supporting an orderly Afghan presidential election in 2014, and at the same time guarding against the continued threat of transnational terrorism emanating from the tribal regions of Pakistan.

The Afghan conflict has been one of the most complex and challenging in the history of the U.S. military. Not only is Afghanistan's physical terrain intensely inhospitable; the country is also characterized by deep cultural and social divides between regions, and across ethnic and tribal groups. The tumultuousness of the last thirty years in Afghanistan and the volatility of the surrounding region have likewise presented deep challenges for U.S. forces. The anti-Soviet jihad, the subsequent Afghan civil war, and the following years of Taliban rule resulted in the erosion of Afghan governing institutions and the rule of law, while leaving deep divisions within Afghanistan's society and political space. In addition, even as the causes of conflict in Afghanistan since 2001 have at times appeared intensely localmanifested through tribal infighting and family vendettasviolence in the country has in fact been consistently fueled and manipulated by Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Iran and Pakistan, whose interests in the outcome of the Afghan conflict are shaped by broader geopolitical considerations (namely their competitions with the United States and India, respectively).

Maneuver leaders should first understand the strategic context of the war in Afghanistan, asking how and why U.S. strategy in Afghanistan evolved from 2001 to the present. As they study Afghanistan, leaders should consider the connection between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the conflict. They should ask how the actions of American units on the ground fit into U.S. strategy, and whether tactical and operational successes genuinely furthered strategic objectives and contributed to the long-term viability of the Afghanistan state. They should be attentive to cases in which short-term expedients were pursued by military and civilian actors at the cost of long-term stability.

Leaders must also understand how Afghanistan's (and Pakistan's) history and culture determined the conditions under which U.S. forces have operated. Failed and fragmented states are products of their history, and cannot be stabilized without attention to the patterns of political stability and the fault lines determined by a society's past, and the success of U.S. units restoring stability and countering the insurgency in Afghanistan frequently depended on knowledge of local culture and history.

Given its complexities, Afghanistan offers valuable case studies for how commanders and staffs adapted or failed to adapt to unexpected and unprecedented challenges, both kinetic and political (i.e. Afghan partners whose corruption or abuse of power antagonized the population.) Leaders should also consider how U.S. and NATO staffs calibrated the scope and ambition of their operations to limited resources and shifting strategic guidance. Leaders should consider the role of Pakistan in the resilience of the insurgency in Afghanistan, as well as the complexities of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. In thinking about Pakistan, they should ask how military leaders should respond to the intervention of outside powers in a theater of operations.

Leaders should also understand Afghanistan's lessons on the integration of civilian and military efforts to establish security, enable host-nation military and law enforcement organizations, and promote the rule of law. They should ask how military and civilian leaders at all levels could have avoided the interagency conflicts that have at times undermined the execution of U.S. strategy, while also identifying instances of successful civil-military integration.

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Afghanistan - Army - Fort Benning

Two separate attacks targeting members of Afghanistan's Shi'ite minority during Ashura commemorations have left several dozen people dead and scores wounded.

In the latest attack, at least 14 people were killed on October 12 in a bomb attack outside a mosque in the northern province of Balkh.

The attack came less than 24 hours after the Islamic State (IS) extremist group claimed responsibility for an attack on a shrine in the capital, Kabul, that killed 19 people and left dozens wounded.

The attacks came during Ashura, a religious day of mourning and one of the holiest on the Shi'ite calendar, raising fears of sectarian violence after a string of attacks on the country's Shi'ite minority.

Afghan officials said the bomb blast in Balkh, which wounded at least 30 people, targeted Shi'ite mourners who were leaving a mosque.

The bomb was planted outside the mosque in the Khoja Gholak area of Balkh Province and detonated remotely, a provincial spokesman told RFE/RL.

Local health officials said most of the wounded were children. Some of the injured were in critical condition, doctors said.

No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack on October 12.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan condemned both attacks.

"These attacks on worshippers are truly abhorrent" said Tadamichi Yamamoto, the secretary-general's special representative for Afghanistan. "The extremists behind this emerging pattern of sectarian violence will not succeed in reversing Afghan traditions of religious and ethnic tolerance."

Wounded arrive at a hospital in Balkh.

Kabul Attack

A day earlier, a gunman opened fire on a crowd of Shi'ite mourners who had gathered at the Karte Sakhi Shrine, one of the largest in Kabul.

Interior Ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi said 62 people, including 12 police, were wounded in the attack on the shrine.

The IS group, via its Aamaq media outlet, said an IS "commando" had opened fire on mourners in Kabul before blowing himself up using an explosive jacket.

Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah said the Kabul attack on civilians amounted to "a war crime and human rights violation."

"People were gathered inside the shrine for worshipping when the attackers arrived," an eyewitness, who did not reveal his or her name, told Reuters. "First they shot the policemen at the gate of the shrine and then they entered the compound."

Another eyewitness described what he said was a "horrific situation."

"Everyone was trying to escape," the eyewitness said. "Many people were shot in their legs and many others in their hands and bodies."

The mourning for Ashura reached its peak on October 12.

Afghan police had warned Shi'a -- mostly ethnic Hazara -- against large gatherings as attacks were expected.

Ashura commemorates the death of Imam Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was killed in 680 and whose death laid the foundation for the Shi'ite faith.

For Shi'ite Muslims around the world, Ashura is a symbol of the struggle against oppression.

In July, an attack claimed by IS extremists killed 84 people, many of them Shi'a from the ethnic Hazara minority.

In 2011, 54 people were killed when a suicide bomber attacked another Kabul shrine where hundreds of people had gathered. A Shi'ite mosque in the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif was also hit the same day, leaving four dead.

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Deadly Attacks Target Shi'a In Afghanistan