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By Maj. Claude Lambert Best Defense guest columnist

Our war in Afghanistan has had not just a complex command and control structure, but also military command continuity challenges aside from its complex command and control architecture.

Changes of command, particularly at the highest levels, which put tremendous stress on the force and continuity of command, are just as important as the principle of unity of command. Therefore, as Washington mulls over whether to change direction in Afghanistan, command continuity should play a prominent role in the discussion.

From 2007 to 2014 there were seven International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders appointed to manage the war in Afghanistan. During this time, the longest tenure for an American ISAF commander was 19 months. Conversely, in World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower served as Commanding General of Allied Expeditionary forces in Europe from 1942-1945. Also, in Vietnam, two out of four U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam commanders served four years apiece providing significant continuity of command for the U.S. national command authority.

Throughout military history, commanders have come and gone in disputes over policy and execution. But it is difficult to deny that frequent changes of command at the highest levels are disruptive events. Even if the overall strategy does not change, newly installed commanders and their staffs routinely conduct 60 to 90 day assessments and strategy reviews that frequently shift or alter the momentum at the operational and tactical levels of war.

Major Claude A. Lambert is an active duty U.S. Army Strategist. The views expressed here are solely his own and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Army, or U.S. Special Operations Command.

Photo credit: the author

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Who's in command in Afghanistan? A scorecard that indicates a lack ... - Foreign Policy (blog)

Yesterday the Pentagon presented its recommendations to the White House for how to defeat ISIS. It is likely that the military campaign that will follow President Trump's final decision will look a good deal like President Obama's, albeit with looser restrictions, and possibly a dimmer view towards Iranian influence in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council are all hard at work formulating a new approach in Afghanistan. They must resist thetemptation to recommend an "accelerated" but largely similar approach to the president.

What the last administration was doing to fight ISIS was moving too slowly, but at least it was moving in the right direction. ISIS is already on the road to defeat. In Afghanistan, however, the best you can say is that we are in a stalemate with various insurgent groups, most prominently the Taliban.

Afghanistan has always been a more challenging problem than Iraq, even if the policy community has failed to appreciate this for years at a time. The problemis not due tostupid clichs to the effect that Afghanistanis the "graveyard of empires"the country has spent much of its history being ruled by external powers. It has more to do with its weak tradition of central government and the fact that its Pakistani neighbors are heavily invested in preventing the rise of a strong Afghanistan with an independent foreign policy. As I wrote recently, Pakistan's interference is driven by fears that Afghanistan could align with India, thereby posing an existential risk to South Asia's Islamic Republic.

Any continuation of an American commitment in Afghanistan must reformulate our strategy with this regional calculus in mind. Of particular interest for this policy debate is a report prepared by Christopher Kolenda of the Center for a New American Security. Aside from highlighting the stunning fact that the U.S. has spent more money in Afghanistan than it did on the Marshall Plan, in real dollars, and that we continue to award Pakistan $742.2 million each yearin effect arming our adversarythe report contains a number of thought-provoking recommendations.

Kolenda rightly argues that it is time to get tougher on Pakistan, with measures that include "suspending major non-NATO ally status, designation as a state impeding counter-terrorism efforts, suspension of security assistance, targeted actions against specific individuals and organizations for supporting militant groups, discouraging future IMF bailouts, and designation as a state sponsor of terrorism." Kolenda also proposes further cultivating a U.S. partnership with India.

Such steps are welcome. But Kolenda proposes a tough line on Pakistan in part to bring Islamabad to the table for a grand bargain on Afghan neutrality. Kabul, backed by the international community, would declare itself neutral on questions of regional alignment, in return for pledges of non-interference from its neighbors.

This is, at best, far-fetched. Any strategy that relies on the Pakistanis (not to mention the Iranians) to pledge anything in good faith is unlikely to succeed.

India and Pakistan, with China watching from the sidelines, are engaged in a dangerous standoff in which the stakes, considering the two countries' nuclear arsenals, are survival. Rather than try to bring about a fragile balance that takes Afghanistan out of this equation, we should accept that Afghanistan will always be a factor in Indian and Pakistani decision making, and use that fact to achieve our own purposes in the region.

What are those purposes? Aside from a general preference for order over state collapse (which, when it happened in Iraq and Syria, led to the rise of ISIS) the United States is in Afghanistan in order to prevent it from becoming a Taliban-controlled space from which another 9/11 could be launched. But after sixteen years of war, this justification grows ever weaker. There are plenty of places from which organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS dream of harming the westSyria, Yemen, and Libya top the listand we do not occupy them with thousands of American troops. Sometimes a lean counter-terror strategy makes sense.

If we choose to continue to fight the re-establishment of a Taliban state in Kabul, we need to get smart, and we need to figure out how such an effort fits into a broader, regionally integrated strategy. We must reduce our focus on building the Afghan state and on helping it control terrainoutside of major population centers. The Afghan state, with sufficient international assistance to forestall its collapse, will have to build itself over time. Rather, we should expand the battlespace to apply pressure on the Taliban in places it does not expect and where it cannot resistspecifically, on its sources of support.

Such a battlespace expansion therefore ought to include diplomatic measures targeting Pakistan. In addition to Kolenda's recommendations, we should explicitly link our support for India to our effort to fight the Taliban. If a pro-India Afghanistan is what Pakistan fears, then let's give it to them. India has long had a low-profile assistance footprint in Afghanistan. Why not encourage and facilitate the enlargement of that footprint?

In addition, perhaps the U.S.pose of neutrality on the dispute over Kashmir needs a review. Pakistan also has a whole host of internal security problems, including a long-standing and low-simmering ethnic insurgency in its Baloch region. Why are we so concerned with helping Pakistan with this problem, however indirectly, through our security assistance funds? Last time I checked, we have the power to make such problems worse. (Meanwhile, our direct military assistance to Afghanistan must have a small enough footprint that it does not require access to Pakistani ports for its sustainment.)

The existence of a Pakistani nuclear arsenal makes some nervous about applying too much pressure on Islamabad. While we must plan for catastrophic scenarios like a Pakistani state collapse, the fear of such an event is a trump card that Pakistan cynically plays to forestall international pressure before it is applied. Moreover, Pakistan has long been building a relationship with China to hedge against a possible break with America. Fine. Let Beijing pay Islamabad's billsand let's see how much both sides prefer that arrangement.

Our attentionshould not be oriented on the terrain controlled by the Taliban, or on the quixotic project of turning Afghanistan into a western state, but on the true sources of support for theinsurgency within the Pakistani state. We must be prepared to inflict pain on those sources in creative and unconventional ways. Afghanistan will only be secure when such men decide the pain isn't worth it anymore, or if they conclude that their support for the insurgency is having the unexpected effect of weakeningtheir regional position. If the culpable elements of thePakistani state then cease to provide succor and refuge for Afghan insurgents, a negotiated solution will become possibleand not before.

A tougher line on Pakistan could fit well into a long-term, integrated U.S. strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. In light of communist China's regional and global ambitions, New Delhi's democratic government is a natural ally for the United States. Further alignment would make sense even if we weren't already dealing with an insurgency in Afghanistan. If Pakistan insists on forcing a closer U.S. alignment with India at its own expenseso be it.

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Our New Afghanistan Strategy Must Get Tough on Pakistan - Washington Free Beacon (blog)

SARNIA A Sarnia family doctor who left his war-torn country says he saw the end of a hard-earned medical career flash before his eyes when he was detained by U.S. border agents and quizzed about his tribe.

Dr. Sardar Ahmad, who left Afghanistan on a prestigious Fulbright scholarship, said he was detained for more than five hours at the Blue Water Bridge, Canadas second-busiest U.S. border crossing, for reasons the Canadian citizen still isnt clear about three days later.

During his detainment Friday, Ahmad said U.S. border agents asked him what tribe he belonged to and the name of his tribe chief, whether he had seen a lot of gunmen growing up in Afghanistan and specific questions about the family he left behind there.

It was frustrating for me because I was worried, I was scared, I didnt know what was going to happen next, the 43-year-old doctor said Monday.

You never know. They could put you in jail. You could lose your career everything all, overnight.

Ahmad, who came to Canada in 2007, had been trying to cross the bridge to Michigan on Friday to visit the Nexus office.

I was scared, I didnt know what was going to happen next.

A few days earlier, Ahmad said hedreceived an email that his Nexus card to expedite border crossings had been revoked. He decided to go over on his lunch break Friday to visit the office in person.

As soon as he told the U.S. border agent his situation, Ahmad said he was pulled over, had his car keys taken from him and held for questioning for hours, all as eldeerly patients waited for him back at his clinic.

I was telling (the U.S. border agents), I need to call my clinic to at least cancel the patients, and they said, No, you cant touch the phone, Ahmad said. He noted a border agent eventually allowed him to call his clinic before he was eventually cleared but declined to enter the U.S. hours later.

In an email Monday, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) spokesperson said the agency cannot discuss an individuals processing due to privacy legislation, but the CBP is committed to the fair, impartial and respectful treatment of all members of the trade and traveling public.

Ahmads ordeal comes just weeks after a Moroccan-born Canadian citizen reported being questioned about her Muslim religion and her views on U.S. President Donald Trump at a U.S. border crossing in Quebec. She was denied entry into the U.S.

Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to sign a new refugee and immigration travel order one anticipated to follow in the same vein of his earlier effort to ban Syrian refugees, as well as citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries, from entering the U.S.

Federal judges blocked the travel ban Trump signed late last month, but a White House source has saidTrump plans to introduce a new ban with some minor technical differences but with the same basic policy outcome.

Several members of Sarnia-Lambtons Muslim community have been outspoken about fears of travelling to the U.S. in light of the proposed travel ban.

Monday, Sarnia-Lambton MP Marilyn Gladu described Ahmads experience at the border as unacceptable, but she wasnt surprised to learn of his story.

Its not the first Ive heard of these issues, she said. Weve been hearing in the House of Commons of these issues across Canada where people are being racially profiled when they go across the border.

Weve escalated this issue to the government.

Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale has also been put on notice about the U.S. governments revocation of some Nexus cards, Gladu noted.

On Feb. 8, Goodale announced that all Canadian permanent residents who had their Nexus cards revoked because of the Trump immigration ban have now had their cards reinstated, but Gladu said Monday Ahmads experience suggests this wasnt the case.

Ahmad said he still has questions why his Nexus card was revoked, but now has no interest travelling to the U.S. where he once lived.

Born in Afghanistan, Ahmad moved to the U.S. on a Fulbright scholarship through the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

He eventually moved to Canada where he completed his medical residency in Petrolia a year ago.

He said Fridays experience reminded him that he has everything in Canada. I was telling (the U.S. border agents), I dont have to go here, he said. I live in the most beautiful country in the world.

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Afghanistan-born Ontario doctor says he was questioned more than ... - National Post

Director General (DG) Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Asif Ghafoor in an interview with a private TV channel on Tuesday called for Afghanistan to abandon its 'anti-Pakistan lens' and devise policies with Pakistan through an 'Afghan lens'.

Ghafoor's statements come as Pakistan steps up a crackdown against militancy through Operation Raddul Fasaad after a recent surge in terror attacks across the country, with top officials talking tough on Afghanistan.

Following the attacks, the Foreign Office lodged a protest with Kabul over the use of Afghan soil for launching terror attacks in Pakistan. The government also shut down border crossings with Afghanistan and troops pounded 'terrorist targets' near the border.

As the crackdown intensifies, politicians and rights organisations have raised concerns about the apparent racial profiling of Pakhtuns in Pakistan by authorities, which the government denies is the case.

Speaking to 92HD, DG ISPR Asif Ghafoor stressed the importance of political engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, saying, "Even if one claims such things [terror attacks] are being planned in Afghanistan, it doesn't mean that all of Afghanistan wants to engage in such activities. They themselves are suffering through this issue [terrorism] and have made huge sacrifices themselves."

"One can't delink terrorism from foreign countries," Ghafoor said. "Afghanistan has been a battleground for various powers."

"First and foremost, Afghanistan has to think about what is best for itself, and for them it is best that they view their security situation and ties with Pakistan through an 'Afghan lens', not an 'anti-Pakistan lens'," he said.

"Until Afghanistan sees its relationship with Pakistan through the lens of its own interest, these things will continue happening," the DG ISPR contended.

The army's spokesman said military-level engagement between both countries is ongoing, as suggested by Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa. "That engagement will proceed positively," Ghafoor said. "The Pak-Afghan border mechanism needs improvement and we are hopeful it will improve in the coming days."

However, he said, border closure is not an indefinite measure. "There are some things Afghanistan should be doing before the border reopens that can be decided through shared discussions," he said. "So that when the border reopens, no one from our side should be able to go there and no one from their side should be able to come here for terrorism."

Ghafoor denied that recent attacks represented a 'resurgence' in terror in Pakistan. "Resurgence is a strong word to use," he stated.

Operation Raddul Fasaad seeks to consolidate gains made during previous military operations, he said. "When we cleared these [northern] areas, the remaining terrorists fled to the vacuum near the Pak-Afghan border created by an absence of troops."

"They went there, regrouped and realigned, and they successfully hired facilitators and sympathisers in different pockets along the mainland in Pakistan. But it doesn't mean there is a resurgence of terrorism. They have the capabilities and have done such things. Their leadership claims they did so while physically sitting in Afghanistan. They have the full support of enemy powers, whether [Indian spy agency] Research and Analysis Wing or others it can't happen without their support," he asserted.

The military, through Operation Raddul Fasaad, seeks to fracture this connectivity between terrorists and their facilitators, Ghafoor explained.

When questioned about the veracity of claims that Pakhtuns in Punjab are being targeted in the crackdown, Ghafoor denied that any party, province or sect has been specifically targeted.

On Monday, an HRCP press release had claimed that administrative officials in some Punjab districts had issued formal or informal orders "asking the population to keep an eye on suspicious individuals who look like Pashtuns or are from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and to report any suspicious activity by them."

The statements prompted Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah to issue a statement earlier today, saying that Pakhtuns have the complete right to reside in Punjab, and the allegations being raised in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Sindh of their victimisation were only attempts to "spread hatred".

"We are all Pakistanis," Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor said. "Provinces come later. Terrorism has no religion, country, province or sect... The operation targets are determined after receiving proof of involvement in terrorism and it is not for any specific province. All arrests made have been across the board," the DG ISPR claimed.

When asked if any foreign powers were involved in this 'conspiracy', Ghafoor replied, "For sure, there must be."

"Whoever wants to see Pakistan unstable will observe faultlines and they will exploit them."

Original post:
Afghanistan needs to abandon 'anti-Pakistan lens': DG ISPR - DAWN.com

Andrew J. Bacevich Published 2:42 p.m. ET Feb. 26, 2017 | Updated 19 hours ago

U.S. troops inspect the site of a suicide attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2014.(Photo: Massoud Hossaini, AP)

Will sending a few thousand additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan spell the difference between victory and defeat in what has become the longest war in all of U.S. history?Not likely.

To understand why, recall what the United States has been doing in that beleaguered country since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. At the cost of more than $1 trillion, 3,500 coalition troops killed and thousands more wounded, the United States and its allies have spent more than 15 years trying to create in Kabul a government commanding the allegiance of the Afghan people and security forces capable of maintaining internal security.

That effort has not succeeded. Today, the Taliban not only persists but controls more territory than at any time since 2001. U.S. efforts to foster create a viable Afghan economy have achieved meager results.

Although Afghanistan has received more American aid than the United States expended to rebuild Western Europe after World War II via the Marshall Plan, the country today has achieved distinction in only two categories: corruption, where it ranks among the worlds worst, and heroin production, which has reached an all-time high.

Pretending that a few thousand troops will turn things around in Afghanistan is like expecting a few hundred additional cops to eliminate gang violence in a city like Chicago. Its an argument that ignores root causes. Rather than a serious policy proposal, its a Band-Aid.

In Afghanistan, what's the plan?: Our view

The root causes of Afghan dysfunction are vast and deep. They predate the ongoing war itself. If the security and well-being of the United States do require it to fix the problems afflicting Afghanistan, then doing so is likely to require a few hundred thousand troops. To finish the job, those troops will have to stay a few decades. Along the way, they will burn through trillions of additional taxpayer dollars.

If U.S. policymakers shrink from making any such commitment as well they might perhaps its time to ask a more fundamental question: Is it not possible that Afghans are better able than we are to solve their own problems?

Andrew J. Bacevich is author of Americas War for the Greater Middle East, which is just out in paperback.

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Enough already for Afghanistan: Opposing view - USA TODAY