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In a recent meeting, President Trump correctly told his generals that they were losing the war in Afghanistan, rejected their proposed strategy, and sent them back to the drawing board to create a new one.

Like chronic alcoholism, compulsive American meddling in the affairs of other countries can only be recovered from by admitting the problem exists in the first place.

President Trump has partially accomplished this first step by recognizing what has been obvious for years, but an even more enlightened conclusion would be that the war has been lost for quite some time now and the only solution is to withdraw U.S. forces as quickly as possible.

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However, that is not the new strategy that the generals will likely come up with. Instead, as in Vietnam, they will continue to sayand probably even believethat a turnaround is still possible. They have had 16 years to win the war, but have abjectly failed to do so.

In any counterinsurgency war, if the insurgents are not losing, they are winning. Fighting guerrilla style means that insurgents use hit and run tactics against the weak points of a generally stronger enemy (usually government or foreign forces) and then flee before the stronger side can catch them.

Over time, the guerrillas are hoping to make the stronger party exhausted, and if it is a foreign occupier, make the war so costly in lives and money that that participant eventually goes back home.

The Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan are not only winning by not losing and hanging on, they are winning absolutely by capturing and holding more of the Afghan governments territory.

Thus, after 16 years of fighting, approximately 2,400 American military deaths, more than 20,000 wounded, 1,200 U.S. civilian contractor deaths, and a whopping half trillion dollars wasted in this quagmire, instead of cutting its losses, the Trump administration seems to be willing to let the military re-escalate the war by sending 3,000 to 5,000 additional U.S.troops in.

Such forces would continue to advise and assist chronically illiterate, incompetent, corrupt, and AWOL Afghan security forces. And despite their job description, U.S. forces do fight in combat and still continue to take casualties.

If 100,000 U.S. troops could not subdue Afghanistan, the only way U.S.-trained Afghan forces could do so is if they were impeccably honest and competent forces who knew the pulse of the Afghan peopleso they could get good intelligence on who the clandestine insurgents are and neutralize them. Yet, this pipe dream is not even worth fantasizing about.

But if the United States withdraws completely from Afghanistan, wont the country go back into chaos and be a haven for future terrorist attacks against the United States? After all ISIS is now in Afghanistan, and some sources say the group is now cooperating with the Taliban to attack U.S. and Afghan targets.

Also, in western Afghanistan, Iran is now trying to keep Afghanistan unstable by supplying the Taliban with weapons, funds, and fighters to use against U.S. and Afghan forces. (U.S. ally Pakistan has always supported the Taliban in eastern and southern Afghanistan to do the same.)

The major problem with U.S. foreign policy is that, like an addict in perpetual denial, no questions have been asked about why Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda perpetrated the 9/11 attacks from Afghanistan in the first place.

President George W. Bush told us that al Qaeda had attacked us because of our freedoms, which enraged bin Laden, who then rhetorically asked why he hadnt attacked Sweden instead.

No one chose to hear what bin Laden kept repeating: he attacked the United States because of the U.S. military presence in the Islamic holy land of Saudi Arabia and U.S. treatment of Muslim countries U.S. meddling in the Middle East.

To understand bin Ladens motivation for the attacks is not to condone such brutal atrocities but to attempt to find a quieter change in U.S. policy that might take the fire out of the Islamist jihad.

The US government should have introspectively reached the conclusion that U.S. interventionism in the Middle East had helped create the problem, or at least exacerbated it, and had directed it more against the United States.

Donald Rumsfeld, then George W. Bushs secretary of defense, famously asked after 9/11, Are we creating more terrorists than we are killing?

No one has ever answered that question, but the correct answer was and is Yes, especially after the invasion of Muslim soil in Iraq and the air wars against terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Syria that have now spanned three U.S. presidential administrations.

Even before that, the Carter and Reagan administrations helped create al Qaeda by funding the radical Afghan Mujahideen guerrillas in the 1980s and George H.W. Bush motivated bin Laden to begin his war with the United States by unnecessarily leaving U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War.

The United States also created what eventually became ISIS, which arose as resistance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In Pakistan, the U.S. war in Afghanistan spilled over into that country and thus created the Pakistani Taliban.

US soldiers walk at the site of a Taliban suicide attack in Kandahar on August 2, 2017, after a Taliban suicide bomber rammed a vehicle filled with explosives into a convoy of foreign forces in Afghanistan's restive southern province of Kandahar. JAVED TANVEER/AFP/Getty

In Somalia, U.S. support for an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia created the virulently Islamist al Shabab group.

In Yemen, empirical documentation has shown that U.S. bombing of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has increased the number of fighters being recruited by the group.

Currently, the United States is at war in at least seven Islamic countries. Non-Muslim forces fighting on Muslim land angers even moderate Muslims.

Before the American fracking boom, even when the United States was more dependent on foreign oil, it was cost-ineffective to use massive military forces to safeguard what was best provided by the world oil market, but now that policy is even more absurd.

If anyone doubts that a lower U.S. profile in Muslim countries would reduce blowback terrorism, the case of Lebanon in the 1980s needs to be examined. The Shiite Islamist group Hezbollah was attacking U.S. targets regularly, but after the United States withdrew its forces from that country, the attacks gradually attenuated.

The United States needs to get out of Afghanistan for good and end its other air wars in Muslim countries. None of these countries are strategic to the United States, and wars there merely generate unwanted blowback. These brushfire wars left over from the War on Terror, which actually increased terrorism, distract and take resources from U.S. efforts to counter a much more important potential foreign policy problem: a rising China.

Ivan Eland is a senior fellow at the Independent Institute and author of "The Failure of Counterinsurgency: Why Hearts and Minds Are Seldom Won."

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We Have Lost the War in Afghanistan. We Should Get Out Now - Newsweek

The U.S. Department of Defense funded more than $76 billion dollars of weapons, communication devices, and other security equipment to the Afghan security forces since 2002, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office(GAO).

Yet, according to top U.S. military commanders and other experts, the Afghan military is still unprepared to operate independently.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. has allocated funding for nearly 600,000 weapons to be put in the hands of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), according to Defense Department data. Nearly 81 percent of these weapons were rifles and pistols. The firepower funding also included more than 25,000 grenade launchers and almost 10,000 rocket-propelled weapons used by the Afghan Border Police.

Additional items given to the ANDSF included 162,643 pieces of communications equipment and nearly 76,000 vehicles. These vehicles were primarily light tactical vehicles like Ford Ranger pickups and cargo trucks, but also included more than 22,000 Humvees, according to the DOD data.

When the equipment reached Afghanistan, it was divided between the two main security forces: The Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

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The Pentagon has shipped 110 helicopters and 98 plane since 2007, when the Pentagon authorized sending aircraft. These aircraft could have carried the 314,000 unguided rockets, 8,700 "general-purpose bombs" and 1,815,000 helicopter rounds, which was also funded by the Pentagon, according to their data.

Even with all of this equipment, Gen. John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan,told Congress in Februaryhe needs a"few thousand" more troops to properly train and advise the Afghan military so they can eventually operate independently.

Claude Chafin, communications director for the House Armed Services Committee, told CBS News the GAO reportwas sought as "an objective review of major weapon systems and equipment provided to ANDSF to evaluate the extent to which such equipment supports the ability of ANDSF to provide security for the Afghan people."

Stephen Tankel, an American University professor and adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, said to CBS News that he agrees with top U.S. commanders that the Afghan military is still unprepared after more than a decade of American military guidance.

The "U.S. continues to spend money every year, our forces continue to die, and the mission continues to drift," Tankel said.

Some in Congress are now calling on President Trump to change U.S. policy in Afghanistan.

Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,announced in a press release Thursday a new amendment to the 2018 defense authorization bill that aims to "strengthen the capability and capacity of the Afghan government and security forces."

While no funding specifics were outlined in the release, McCain said that "adopting a clear policy and strategy in Afghanistan, backed with the authorities and resources necessary for success, would be a critical step toward restoring that kind of leadership, which has been absent for far too long."

The conflict in Afghanistan is still claiming the lives of American troops. A suicide attack in Kandahar killed two U.S. service members last week.

The Trump administration has said it will soon release its plan on the path forward in Afghanistan, but no details have surfaced yet.

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US spent $76B on weapons and equipment for Afghan security forces - CBS News

Donald Trumps administration is said to be considering radically changing the way it conducts war in Afghanistan, and may move away fromthe US military running the show in favour of laying that responsibility on private contractors.

The unprecedented proposal would put 5,500 private contractors in charge of advising the Afghan military in the 16-year-old war that Mr Trump has inherited from his two predecessors. Most of those contractors would be former Special Operations troops, though their private contractor status would likely mean they are not bound by the same rules of engagement as the US military. There are an estimated 8,400 US soldiers currently in Afghanistan.

Erik Prince, the founder and former CEO of private contracting company Blackwater USA, has put forward the plan. Speaking to USA Today, he said he had met frequently with administration officials to discuss his plan. However, with misgivings by Mr Trumps National Security Adviser, H R McMaster, and Defence Secretary James Mattis, it is unclear whether there would be a way forward for such a plan, despite Mr Trumps frustration at the lack of progress in the country. At least one senior official, chief strategist Steve Bannon, is said to be open to the use of private contractors.

Contractors working for Blackwater were involved in a deadly incident during the Iraq War, when they open-fired in Baghdads Nisour Square while escorting a US convoy in 2007, killing or injuring at least 31 Iraqi civilians. Those events led the State Department to revoke the companys license to operate in the country. One of the contractors recently had a murder charge overturned and a new trial ordered over the incident, while three others who had been handed 30-year prison terms after being convicted of voluntary manslaughter will be re-sentenced after their prison terms were voided. Defence lawyers argued the convoy was under fire from insurgents, a claim prosecutors denied.

But in addition to accountability concerns posed by giving broad agency to non-military, private contractors to conduct war such a revised strategy in Afghanistan could send the wrong message in Afghanistan, Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, told The Independent.

International troops have been involved in Afghanistan for 16 years,following an invasionin October 2001. However, over the past year the Talibanhave made gains and violent attacks have increased in a number of areas leaving few signs of the stability the US craves.

It would be a political signal to Afghanistan including the Taliban, that the United States is really not willing to stick it out, Ms Felbab-Brown said of the plan over privisation. So, I think the will of the Taliban will be strengthened and the will of those who resist the Taliban will be weakened.

Mr Prince whose sister is Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos has argued that the US should cede control of the fight in Afghanistan to private contractors because, as the efforts there lack leadership. The efforts arent working, he says, and the Pentagon is spending a lot of money to do it.

Who has really been in charge of Afghanistan? Nobody. Its been extremely fragmented. Weve had up to 140,000 troops in the country and were now spending, the Pentagon consumes more than the entire defence budget of the UK just in Afghanistan and were losing, Mr Prince, a retired Navy SEAL, said on CNN.

His plan is to establish a viceroy in Afghanistan that would correspond with American troops there, and has said that the basic set up should be modelled after the British East India Company. He says that the plan costs a fraction of American military involvement, and could work around what the Department of Defence. Private contractors could also stay long-term without the political risks associated with having troops on the ground.

Ms Felbab-Brown said that ducking that political risk would still be degrading for efforts there. Already in Afghanistan, citizens are concerned that the US military is simply taking Afghan resources Mr Trump has said that the US should simply seize natural resources in the region and would be wary of a set up modelled after Britains colonial empire, she said.

Still, she concedes that there doesnt appear to be a surefire path forward for the US in Afghanistan. Completely withdrawing would forfeit huge American investments in the country while giving up control to the Taliban. Staying could simply be an exercise in hoping that the Taliban slowly falls apart through repeated mistakes.

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson acknowledged this week that the White House is looking for a new strategy to bring Americas longest war to an end.

To just say were going to keep doing what weve been doing, the president is not willing to accept that, and so he is asking some tough questions, Mr Tillerson said earlier this week in Manila during an Asia trip.

The top US commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, has recommended that several thousand more troops be deployed to Afghanistan, primarily to bolster the advisory mission and stop the Taliban gaining more territory.

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Trump administration considers privatising war in Afghanistan - The Independent

A Taliban commander who was targeted by the US military in an airstrike nearly a decade ago and who has links to Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp Qods Force remains a key player in the insurgency in central Afghanistan. The Taliban commander, known as Mullah Mustafa, was instrumental in the Talibans takeover of Taiwara district in Ghor province several weeks ago. Afghan forces have retaken the district, but maintain a tenuous hold on it.

Taiwara district fell to the Taliban on July 23 after hundreds of fighters assaulted the district center and overran Afghan forces and the local militia and police forces. More than 700 Taliban fighters using humvees and trucks stolen from Afghan forces in Helmand province launched the assault, according to The New York Times. Out of a force of 50 Afghan commandos guarding the district, 12 were killed, more than 20 were wounded, and several more are missing. Afghan officials claimed that more than 200 Taliban fighters were killed during the fighting.

Mustafa, who The New York Times described as a local facilitator of the Taliban, had played a major role in the recent offensive to take Taiwara. He has contacts in Iran and is protected by senior figures in Kabul, the capital, including those in Afghanistans peace council assigned to negotiate with the Taliban.

FDDs Long War Journal has tracked Mullah Mustafa since the US military targeted him in an airstrike in Ghor province on June 9, 2009. The US military initially believed they killed Mustafa and prematurely announced his death. Two days after the US military announced his death, Mustafa spoke to the media. Mustafa claimed he never [has] been in the opposition to the [Afghan] government but did not deny attacking US forces.

The US military said Mustafa commands more than 100 fighters in Ghor and is thought to receive support from Irans Qods Force, the external operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

The commander of approximately 100 fighters in western Afghanistan, Mustafa had recently met with senior Taliban leaders, and reportedly had connections to Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, the US military stated when it wrongly announced his death.

When it retracted its initial report of his death, the US military said it will continue to target Mustafa.

Mustafa is an enemy of Afghanistan, and were working with Afghan officials to pursue him until he is captured or confirmed killed, Navy Lieutenant Commander Christine Sidenstricker said.

Eight years after the US military tried to kill Mustafa, he remains a key player in the Talibans growing insurgency in western and central Afghanistan.

Mustafa likely played a role in the Talibans takeover of Char Sada district in Ghor in July 2014. Before the district was overrun, the Taliban exerted significant influence there. In 2013, Mustafa was spotted along with Mullah Abdul Rahamn, the Talibans shadow district governor for Char Sada. The two Taliban leaders imposed the Talibans strict brand of sharia law when they ordered the public beating of a couple for having an affair.

Irans links to the Taliban, particularly in western and central Afghanistan, have been well established by the US military and government. In an Aug. 2010 designation of General Hossein Musavi and Colonel Hasan Mortezavi, both senior officers in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force, the US Treasury Department noted that the two provide financial and material support to the Taliban.

Musavi was the commander of the Ansar Corps, the IRGC command that is assigned to direct operations in Afghanistan. The Ansar Corps is based in Mashhad in northeastern Iran. [See Iranian Qods Force commanders linked to Taliban: US Treasury.]

The US military has targeted multiple Qods Force-linked Taliban leaders and operatives inside Afghanistan, while Taliban commanders have admitted to receiving support from Iran.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

Tags: Afghanistan, Ansar Corps, Iran, IRGC, Qods Force, Taliban

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Qods Force-linked Taliban commander leads insurgency in central Afghanistan - Long War Journal

WASHINGTON You will be forgiven for confessing that you are confused about where we are going in Afghanistan. You might also add that you still are not sure why we are there.

On top of that, you could admit to not knowing who from the White House to the Pentagon to the denizens of that mysterious country so far away to believe.

The Afghan War will be 16 years old in the fall. That is a special age when teenagers begin to approach their majority and even (God save us!) start acting a little like adults. Yet we see precious little evidence that our most recent disastrous war is approaching adulthood at all.

Rather, we see such a mixed bag of conflicting "answers" to the problem and confusing messages to the American people that I wonder if it is not time to ask: Is Afghanistan becoming our newest Vietnam?

Before he became president, Donald J. Trump was almost unrelievedly critical of American interventions. But since then, the administration's "strategies" for military action in both Iraq and Afghanistan have changed by the hour.

One day, a plan worked out by the commanding general in Kabul and the Afghan president called for doubling the size of the U.S./Afghan commitment. The next day, an impatient President Trump wanted to fire the American commander.

A new Afghan policy was to have been hammered out by May, then July, then ... when? Talks to supposedly compel the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with the U.S. went nowhere; instead, articles now reveal in disturbing detail not only Pakistan's support for the medieval-minded Taliban, but also Russia's and Iran's support, which is in large part revenge against the U.S. for previous supposed or real slights.

Perhaps the most amazing element to suddenly insert itself into the Afghan mix is Erik Prince, the famous, controversial and often reviled military contractor, who has now formally put forth a two-year plan to hire about 5,000 "global guns-for-hire." He has officially proposed putting the Afghan war through a restructuring "similar to a bankruptcy reorganization" and appointing a "trustee" to oversee it.

Yes, you are right. Our "Hessians"!

The kindest analysis of the Afghan situation I have been able to find comes from a high-level Brookings Institution panel that concluded, "The U.S.-Afghan partnership should be recognized as generational in duration."

The most unkind analysis in my search came from a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey, who is quoted in The Wall Street Journal as saying we have to deal with Afghanistan "like a chronic illness."

Meanwhile, in excess of 8,000 American soldiers remain in Afghanistan, almost as hostages to our lack of strategy for the region. Additionally, 2,300 Americans have died in the conflict, and 17,000 have been wounded in this land of warlords and opium fields that no foreign invader in history has mastered.

Is there anything left to say? Yes, this: It is far past time to go back to First Principles and define what is crucially important to America and what is mere destructive gamesmanship in war and peace. Let us look again at American thinking and action in both Vietnam and Afghanistan.

First, there is a dangerous comparable overreaching of power. Neither in Vietnam nor in Afghanistan was America endangered. They were/are wars of choice, what I call "hypothetical wars" (If this happens, then this will happen).

They were/are both wars pushed in Washington by (mostly) men with outsized ambitions to be great political figures on the world stage.

Second, in both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the interests of the local people are infinite, while ours are finite; theirs are eternal, while ours are seasonal. A prolonged war in their country will strengthen them against foreign invaders, and disarm and destroy us unless we destroy them completely, which we will not do.

Third, the U.S., for all its brilliance in so many areas, has shown a repeated incapacity for governing in Third World countries. Any concerned American who wants to know the why of this should read a brilliant recent book, "War and the Art of Governance," by Nadia Schadlow, now with the National Security Advisor's office.

In effect, Schadlow argues that several deeply ingrained principles in American thinking concerns about appearing to be colonialist, the idea that civilians must govern and traditional views about the military profession have caused American military governance to fail time after time.

There may be no immediate answers to the Afghan quandary, but there is nothing to stop us from analyzing where we are and why and what can be done about it on a deeper level.

Chronic illness has never been something I went out of my way to seek, and neither should we as a country.

Excerpt from:
Echoes of Vietnam reverberate in Afghanistan - Meridian Star