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As the military campaign to recapture the city of Raqqa intensifies with the arrival of U.S. forces in Syria, and the battle for the Iraqi city of Mosul reaches its last stages, the decimation of the Islamic State groups self-styled caliphate appears imminent. In preparation for ISISs final act, much has been written on what Iraq and Syria will look like in the wake of its reign. However, beyond discussion about the terrorist diaspora that will descend upon the United States and Europe as thousands of foreign fighters return home, little attention has been paid to the future territorial ambitions of the ISIS core. In September 2014, at the height of ISISs power, local Iraqis and Syrians comprised 90 percent and 70 percent respectively of ISISs military cadre in its so-called Islamic State. When the caliphate falls, what will this core tenet of fighters -- discarded by their home communities and fluent in the jihadi organizations military and ideological tradecraft -- pick as their next theater?

It may be tempting to address this question from a military perspective alone -- especially in light of President Trumpsmultibillion-dollar fortification of the defense budget -- but an understanding of ISISs ideological infrastructure provides a more accurate guidebook. The Islamic State groups ideological beliefs and military activity are often analyzed separately, by different U.S. agencies, with de-radicalization efforts aimed at ideology, and military activity informing Americas battlefield response. However, a close read of this influential ISIS manifesto suggests that this siloed approach may be misdirecting the United States broader counterterrorism campaign. Pairing the main tenets of ISIS ideology with the groups past military activities helps to better understand the organizations operational goals, its ideological selection of targets, and the tactics it uses to ensure longevity. Using these three factors to forecast what country ISIS will seize as its next territorial conquest, Afghanistan emerges as an attractive and tenable target.

The Management of Savagery

While relatively unknown to the Western world, a booklet called The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass has been claimed by several ISIS commanders as part of the organizations curriculum. Published to the Internet in 2004 under the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji, Management of Savagery was originally written for al-Qaeda but was rejected by leader Ayman al-Zawahiri for being too radical. Its strategy did, however, resonate with top ISIS commanders Baathist roots, and it subsequently spilled over to guide that organizations two-tiered crusade to consolidate the Muslim world territorially and ideologically.

Management of Savagery is striking because it resembles a comprehensive military plan more than the outline of a specified Islamist ideology; it outlines a series of military campaigns with the ultimate goal of restoring the caliphate and establishing an Islamic state. First, in the stage of the power of vexation and exhaustion, Naji instructs militants to exhaust the chosen state and overthrow the governing authorities, creating savagery and chaos in order to force the targeted society to suffer from the absence of security. Second, the stage of the administration of savagery prescribes the militants management of the regions of savagery, which, if successful, will enable them to consolidate control throughout the conquered territory.

ISISs Campaign Strategy Applied to Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a viable target because ISISs stage-one goal of vexing and exhausting the state has already been accomplished by domestic actors. The Taliban are resurgent in Afghanistan, and the foreign military presence is perpetual yet fluctuating. Against that backdrop, political violence, corruption, and a stagnating economy have broken down Afghanistans political space. In the eyes of the Islamic State group, this makes Afghanistan an easy operational target because the countrys lack of democracy and security helps ISIS exacerbate existing societal divides. ISISs affiliate in Afghanistan, known as the Khorasan Province, has successfully exercised this tactic to gain territory in at least seven Afghan provinces. It is important to note that similar to ISISs tactic of seizing upon historically significant territory that negates the sovereignty of Iraq and Syrias state borders, the Khorasan Province claims jurisdiction over a historical region incorporating parts of modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan. Defining territory based upon its historical importance to Islam, as opposed to nation-state borders, furthers ISISs goal of delegitimizing Afghanistans institutions and planting fertile roots for a prospective takeover by ISIS core.

Second, Management of Savagery, in addition to ISISs record of attacks around the globe, reflects that the group seeks to eliminate what it considers apostate Muslims in addition to foreign infidels. Foreign troops in Afghanistan deployed by NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia have been frequent targets of ISISs vendetta against what it considers infidels. Additionally, similar to the Taliban, ISIS views much of Afghanistan as occupied by apostate Muslims given the countrys reenergized focus on education -- especially for women -- in the early 2000s. This apostate narrative is furthered by the fact that ethnic and tribal affiliations shape the average Afghans identity more profoundly than an adherence to Islam. Thus, Afghanistans role as host to so-called apostates and infidels makes it an attractive theater for ISIS to target both enemy groups on one territorial battleground.

Finally, looking to the regions where ISIS has most effectively acquired affiliates and sympathetic proxies -- Egypt, Libya, Pakistan -- it has done so by absorbing existing Islamist militants into its fold. In Afghanistan, the Khorasan Province is already capitalizing on the countrys historical struggle with Islamist and tribal factions. While it competes with the Taliban -- which benefits from their Deobandi and Pashtun roots in the local population -- ISIS has exploited personal and factional grievances within established militant networks, along with bribery, to co-opt defection. Former Taliban commander and Guantanamo Bay detainee Abdul Rauf Aliza defected from the Taliban and became the Khorasan Provinces deputy commander. Additionally, multiple commanders and officials of the Pakistani Taliban publicly defected to pledge allegiance to the Khorasan Province. By absorbing Taliban members and other Islamist militants into its ranks, ISIS has increased its human capital while gaining operatives with knowledge of Afghanistan and Pakistans unique histories, geographies, and socio-political environments. Notably, this method also masquerades as ISISs ability to administer and manage savagery.

While we cannot know whether ISIS will try to manufacture another caliphate after Iraq and Syria fall from its grasp, the organizations promotion of territory as a central component of its brand makes it likely that ISIS will at least attempt to recreate its claim to divinely sanctioned land. Given that the international community was blindsided by the conception of ISISs first caliphate, the United States should rely on ISISs ideology for more than a rhetorical battle about terrorisms terminology. By extending the tactics outlined in Management of Savagery to the battlefield, the United States and its allies may be able to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the next Islamic State.

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Will ISIS Rebuild in Afghanistan? - RealClearWorld