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With little fanfare, and even less Western media coverage, another April to October fighting season is now grinding to a bloody close in Afghanistan. This years campaign offers an unusually revealing glimpse of the Government of Afghanistans exposed position as the tides of foreign military assistance and aid recede. Marked by electoralparalysis, the continued retrograde of foreign forces, and a virtual moratorium on new aid programs, the 2014 fighting season posed the stiffest test yet for Kabul and its allies.

Five lessons/trends stand out.

First, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) recorded their highest loss rates of the war during summer 2014. According to official estimates, the Afghan National Army (ANA) lost over 800 soldiers between April and September. The Afghan National Police (ANP), which has borne the brunt of fighting against the Taliban, lost over 1,523 soldiers during this same period. Taken together, these totals surpass Americas combined fatalities in Afghanistan since 2001. These losses are compounded by equipment and pay shortages, endemic corruption, and a lack of close air support, all of which conspire to reduce ANSF military effectiveness, not to mention morale.

While the ANSF appears capable of beating back most, though not all, Taliban offensives, there are cracks in the facade that bear watching. Desertion remains a running sore, with approximately 2 percent of its force going AWOL (and not returning) each month. Whispers that ANA units are striking live and let live deals with the Taliban to avoid casualties also exacerbates ANA-ANP tensions while further contributing to the erosion of Kabuls remit outside major cities.

Second, unlike previous campaigns, this years fighting season witnessed the appearance of large Taliban units on the battlefield. No longer fearing dwindling U.S. airpower, Taliban forces have been operating far more brazenly, and in much larger numbers, than previously seen in the war. The map below outlines the location of Taliban offensives that involved at least 100 insurgents attacking ANSF positions or district capitals. (Click here for the interactive version).

In total, 41 different districtsabout 10 percent of the total districts in Afghanistanwitnessed at least one major Taliban offensive. These data were collected by Yales Political Violence FieldLab from Afghan media sources such as Pajhwok and Tolonews. In some cases, estimates of up to 1,000 insurgents were recorded, numbers not seen since the Talibans original push to capture Kabul during 1992-96 civil war.

Yes, estimates of insurgent strength often warrant skepticism. Gen. John Campbell, the new Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), has publicly accused Afghan politicians of inflating their assessments of Taliban strength in a last ditch effort to gin up more military assistance and aid dollars.

Even acknowledging these issues, however, the map reveals a third trend: far from contained, the Taliban has the ability to launch offensives across the country, including far from its home fields of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan. Perhaps most worrisome is the fact that nearly every major cityincluding Kabul but also extending to Jalalabad, Kandahar City, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Sanginhad offensives occur right on itsdoorstep. Kunduz City, in Afghanistans far north, remains nearly completely encircled by Taliban forces. Worse, these data only capture districts where the Taliban sought to challenge state authorities openly; it does not include areas (notably, in Wardak, Ghanzi, and Logar) where Taliban dominance has already been established.

Fourth, Pakistan may be repositioning itself to shape future events in Afghanistan by increasing its support of the Taliban to include, if Afghan officials are to be believed, regular Pakistani soldiers fighting alongside the Taliban. This summer, Afghan officials stepped up their (mostly) rhetorical war against increased Pakistan involvement; in a series of high-profile speeches, senior officials openly castigated Islamabads interference, suggesting that the Talibans gathering strength was due to an influx of Pakistan funds, soldiers, and technical expertise. More indirectly, Pakistans Operation Zarb-e-Azb (June-August 2014) in North Waziristan forced militants, including those from the Haqqani network, to seek refuge in Afghanistan, deepening the Talibans recruit pool.

Finally, the unexpected intensity of the fighting season forced ISAF to rethink its reluctance to use airpower to support the ANSF. While strike sorties were initially down considerably from 2013 totals, airpower was employed to beat back serious Taliban advances in Helmand and Nangarhar provinces. Drone strikes targeting senior Taliban leadership also continued unabated. By October 2014, airstrikeshad reached a two-year high.

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