Archive for February, 2021

Turkey, Ukraine hail 29 years of diplomatic relations – Anadolu Agency

KIEV, Ukraine

Turkey and Ukraine on Wednesday celebrated the 29th anniversary of their diplomatic relations.

Emine Dzheppar, deputy foreign minister of Ukraine, hailed the relations between the two countries in a tweet. We highly value the strong connection between Ukraine and Turkey. Turkic heritage of Ukraine and its indigenous people - Crimean Tatars - is a cornerstone of our friendship, she said.

She stressed the "great potential of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey.

Turkey's Foreign Ministry marked the day in a tweet saying: We value our cooperation with our strategic partner #Ukraine. Will continue to develop our relations in every field.

Ukraines ambassador to Turkey Andrii Sybiha also tweeted that Ukraine-Turkey cooperation has a centuries-old history, with a promising future ahead.

We wish two countries a strategic partnership, successful and mutually beneficial for many years! he wrote.

Turkey officially recognized Ukraines independence on Dec. 16, 1991, after its separation from the Soviet Union.

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Turkey, Ukraine hail 29 years of diplomatic relations - Anadolu Agency

Is Ukraine still serious about anti-corruption reforms? – The Globe and Mail

Michael Bociurkiw is a global affairs analyst and host of the podcast Global Impact.

Last week, U.S. President Joe Biden picked up the phone to call Russian President Vladimir Putin and, in addition to warning him that there would be consequences for harming U.S. allies something Donald Trump never managed to bring himself to say reaffirmed Americas firm support for Ukraines sovereignty.

Of all the foreign policy challenges facing the Biden administration, Ukraine may top the list. But the file shouldnt just be marked as urgent. It should include an additional warning label: Proceed with caution.

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Thats because in the almost two years since Volodymyr Zelensky won Ukraines presidential election by a landslide, the country has fallen into a dangerous backslide on the very reforms it signed up for in return for multibillion-dollar financing from multilateral donors.

The crisis, sparked by the notoriously corrupt Constitutional Courts October, 2020, decision to curb the powers of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and suspend some anti-corruption legislation, prompted the U.S. embassy in Kyiv to issue a statement saying that Ukraines partners, including Canada, were following the developments with growing concern. The agencys powers were subsequently restored by parliament, but other key measures such as requiring elected and public officials to file asset declarations remain in limbo. As such, lying about assets or failing to file those declarations are not punishable by jail time.

Swept into office on an anti-graft platform, Mr. Zelensky seems to be drowning in the face of the very forces he campaigned against. The political stench is starting to waft into his offices after the Prosecutor Generals Office transferred the jurisdiction of a bribery case against Oleg Tatarov, Mr. Zelenskys deputy chief of staff responsible for law enforcement, sparing him from arrest. And recently the administration said it would abandon pledges to donors to deregulate natural gas prices.

The countrys oligarchs are probably quietly toasting their weak showman president, who hasnt found a way to rein them in. Chief among them is Igor Kolomoisky, a former business partner of Mr. Zelenskys, a part-owner of Ukraine International Airlines (which lost Flight 752 when it was shot down over Tehran last year, killing 176 people including 138 people travelling to Canada) and one of Ukraines wealthiest men. He has been accused by the U.S Department of Justice of money laundering.

Canadas Ukrainian diaspora, which has considerable influence in Ottawa and Kyiv, should resist the temptation to give the Zelensky administration a free pass to ignore agreements designed to push Ukraine toward a future within the rules-based multilateral system and out from under the influence of capricious oligarchs.

For its part, the Zelensky administration should prove to its allies, donors and supporters that it intends to stay the course with the very reforms it promised.

First, the government should demonstrate concrete progress on reintroducing anti-corruption measures that have been suspended. Getting rid of tainted officials in his circle, including Mr. Tatarov, would be a good way to assure international donors that Mr. Zelensky is serious about his work.

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Second, Mr. Kolomoisky should be prosecuted. Ukraine cannot take action its justice system is too broken but there are numerous ongoing investigations involving him in the United States that could strip him of all his U.S.-based assets and see him locked up. This is a necessary move that would send a message.

Third, Mr. Zelensky should push back much more strongly against the pro-Russian and oligarch-controlled members of parliament who are stymying reforms. The feeling among this group of bandits seems to be that its time to turn things in their favour, especially with a government distracted by one of the bloodiest wars in Europe on its eastern front with Russia, as well as a worsening pandemic. Tackling this sentiment will mean removing the corrupt judges who contribute to the oligarchs personal enrichment. The old guard wants to drag Ukraine back to the times when they could siphon public money off with impunity and play Russian-style politics. We will not let them succeed, Foreign Affairs Minister Dmytro Kuleba wrote in an Atlantic Council blog.

This will be a challenging year for Ukraine. Having contracted COVID-19 himself, Mr. Zelensky has bungled the response to the pandemic, with Ukraine now in 17th place worldwide for confirmed cases. Its economy contracted an estimated 5 per cent in 2020.

Ukraine is fighting a battle on three fronts: in the east, against Russian-backed rebels; nationwide, in trying to crush the COVID-19 curve; and pushing back against corrupt forces. If it wins the latter, it will be in a much stronger position to claim victory over the first two.

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Is Ukraine still serious about anti-corruption reforms? - The Globe and Mail

Press Statement of Special Representative Grau after the regular Meeting of Trilateral Contact Group on 03 February 2021 – Ukraine – ReliefWeb

KYIV, 3 February 2021 The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Heidi Grau, made the following statement to the press after the regular meetings of the TCG and its Working Groups held through video conferencing:

According to data of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), the average number of ceasefire violations in the conflict zone remains well below the levels recorded prior to the entry into force of the Measures to Strengthen the Ceasefire on 27 July 2020. These Measures agreed by the TG are overall respected.

At today's TCG meeting, however, a trend of increasing tensions was noted, including the increase in the number of ceasefire violations. In particular, on 28 January, the SMM recorded the highest level of violations since the Measures to Strengthen the Ceasefire came into force.

Participants in the Security Working Group meeting discussed the conditions for carrying out repair and reconstruction works at the gas distribution station near the city of Marinka, including the possibility of assistance by the OSCE SMM in coordinating the necessary security guarantees and ensuring enhanced monitoring of the works.

In addition, the general security situation in the conflict zone, the observance of the ceasefire regime and the effectiveness of the co-ordination mechanism for responding to its violations were discussed.

The debates of the Political Working Group focused on issues related to the implementation of the tasking given by the TCG to develop a draft action plan in full compliance with the Minsk agreements.

The Humanitarian Working Group discussed the operational details of the future functioning of the entry-exit crossing points (EECPs) on the contact line near Zolote and Shchastia of the Luhansk region.

Mindful of the interests of civilians in the conflict zone, I urge the participants of the TCG to take early action to resolve all open questions on the way to the simultaneous opening of these EECPs.

During the Working Group's discussions, issues of the mutual release and exchange of conflict-related detainees were also duly considered.

Discussions in the Economic Working Group were mainly devoted to such topics as the provision of water supplies across the contact line in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as well as environmental issues, in particular the question of an international inspection of the storage sites of radioactive materials in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

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Press Statement of Special Representative Grau after the regular Meeting of Trilateral Contact Group on 03 February 2021 - Ukraine - ReliefWeb

The Second Amendment and the Inalienable Right to Self …

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.Amendment II

Modern debates about the meaning of the Second Amendment have focused on whether it protects a private right of individuals to keep and bear arms or a right that can be exercised only through militia organizations like the National Guard. This question, however, was apparently never even raised until long after the Bill of Rights was adopted. Early discussions took the basic meaning of the amendment for granted and focused instead on whether it added anything significant to the original Constitution. The debate later shifted because of changes in the Constitution and in constitutional law and because legislatures began to regulate firearms in ways undreamed of in our early history.

The Founding generation mistrusted standing armies. Many Americans believed, on the basis of English history and their colonial experience, that governments of large nations are prone to use soldiers to oppress the people. One way to reduce that danger would be to permit the government to raise armies (consisting of full-time paid troops) only when needed to fight foreign adversaries. For other purposes, such as responding to sudden invasions or similar emergencies, the government might be restricted to using a militia that consisted of ordinary civilians who supplied their own weapons and received a bit of part-time, unpaid military training.

Using a militia as an alternative to standing armies had deep roots in English history and possessed considerable appeal, but it also presented some serious problems. Alexander Hamilton, for example, thought the militia system could never provide a satisfactory substitute for a national army. Even those who treasured the militia recognized that it was fragile, and the cause of this fragility was just what made Hamilton disparage it: Citizens were always going to resist undergoing unpaid military training, and governments were always going to want more professionaland therefore more efficient and tractableforces.

This led to a dilemma at the Constitutional Convention. Experience during the Revolutionary War had demonstrated convincingly that militia forces could not be relied on for national defense, and the onset of war is not always followed by a pause during which an army can be raised and trained. The convention therefore decided to give the federal government almost unfettered authority to establish armies, including peacetime standing armies. But that decision created a threat to liberty, especially in light of the fact that the proposed Constitution also forbade the states from keeping troops without the consent of Congress.

One solution might have been to require Congress to establish and maintain a well-disciplined militia. Such a militia would have had to comprise a large percentage of the population in order to prevent it from becoming a federal army under another name, like our modern National Guard. This might have deprived the federal government of the excuse that it needed peacetime standing armies and might have established a meaningful counterweight to any rogue army that the federal government might create. That possibility was never taken seriously, and for good reason. How could a constitution define a well-regulated or well-disciplined militia with the requisite precision and detail and with the necessary regard for unforeseeable changes in the nations circumstances? It would almost certainly have been impossible.

Another approach might have been to forbid Congress from interfering with the states control of their militias. This might have been possible, but it would have been self-defeating. Fragmented control of the militias would inevitably have resulted in an absence of uniformity in training, equipment, and command, and no really effective national fighting force could have been created.

Thus, the convention faced a choice between entrenching a multiplicity of militias controlled by the individual states, which would likely have been too weak and divided to protect the nation, or authorizing a unified militia under federal control, which almost by definition could not have been expected to prevent federal tyranny. The conundrum could not be solved, and the convention did not purport to solve it. Instead, the Constitution presumes that a militia will exist, but it gives Congress almost unfettered authority to regulate that militia, just as it gives the federal government almost unfettered authority to maintain an army.

This massive shift of power from the states to the federal government generated one of the chief objections to the proposed Constitution. Anti-Federalists argued that federal control of the militia would take away from the states their principal means of defense against federal oppression and usurpation and that European history demonstrated how serious the danger was.

James Madison, for one, responded that such fears of federal oppression were overblown, in part because the new federal government was to be structured differently from European governments. But he also pointed out another decisive difference between Europes situation and ours: The American people were armed and would therefore be almost impossible to subdue through military force, even if one assumed that the federal government would try to use an army to do so. In Federalist No. 46, he wrote:

Implicit in the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were two shared assumptions: first, that the proposed new constitution gave the federal government almost total legal authority over the army and the militia and, second, that the federal government should not have any authority at all to disarm the citizenry. The disagreement between Federalists and Anti-Federalists was only over the narrower question of whether an armed populace could adequately assure the preservation of liberty.

The Second Amendment conceded nothing to the Anti-Federalists desire to sharply curtail the military power that the Constitution gave the federal government, but that very fact prevented the Second Amendment from generating any opposition. Attempting to satisfy the Anti-Federalists would have been hugely controversial and would have required substantial changes in the original Constitution. Nobody suggested that the Second Amendment could have any such effect, but neither did anyone suggest that the federal government needed or rightfully possessed the power to disarm American citizens.

As a political gesture to the Anti-Federalistsa gesture highlighted by the Second Amendments prefatory reference to the value of a well-regulated militiaexpress recognition of the peoples right to arms was something of a sop. The provision was easily accepted, however, because everyone agreed that the federal government should not have the power to infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms any more than it should have the power to abridge the freedom of speech or prohibit the free exercise of religion.

A great deal has changed since the Second Amendment was adopted. The traditional militia fell fairly quickly into desuetude, and the state-based militia organizations were eventually incorporated into the federal military structure. For its part, the federal military establishment has become enormously more powerful than 18th-century armies, and Americans have largely lost their fear that the federal government will use that power to oppress them politically. Furthermore, 18th-century civilians routinely kept at home the very same weapons they would need if called to serve in the militia, while modern soldiers are equipped with weapons that differ significantly from those that are commonly thought to be appropriate for civilian uses. These changes have raised new questions about the value of an armed citizenry, and many people today reject the assumptions that almost everyone accepted when the Second Amendment was adopted.

The law has also changed. At the time of the Framing, gun control laws were virtually nonexistent, and there was no reason for anyone to discuss what kinds of regulations would be permitted by the Second Amendment. The animating concern behind the amendment was fear that the new federal government might try to disarm the citizenry in order to prevent armed resistance to political usurpations. That has never occurred, but a great many new legal restrictions on the right to arms have since been adopted. Nearly all of these laws are aimed at preventing the misuse of firearms by irresponsible civilians, but many of them also interfere with the ability of law-abiding citizens to defend themselves against violent criminals.

Another important legal development was the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Second Amendment originally applied only to the federal government, leaving the states to regulate weapons as they saw fit. During the 20th century, the Supreme Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause to apply most provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states and their political subdivisions. The vast majority of gun control laws have been adopted at the state and local levels, and the potential applicability of the Second Amendment at these levels raised serious issues that the Founding generation had no occasion to consider. It is one thing to decide that authority over the regulation of weapons will be reserved largely to the states. It is quite another to decide that all regulations will be subjected to judicial review under a vaguely worded constitutional provision like the Second Amendment.

Until recently, the judiciary treated the Second Amendment almost as a dead letter. Many courts concluded that citizens have no constitutionally protected right to arms at all, and the federal courts never invalidated a single gun control law. In the late 20th century, however, the judicial consensus was challenged by a large body of new scholarship. Through analysis of the text and history of the Second Amendment, commentators sought to establish that the Constitution does protect an individual right to have weapons for self-defense, including defense against criminal violence that the government cannot or will not prevent.

In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), the Supreme Court finally did strike down a gun control regulation, in this case a federal law that forbade nearly all civilians from possessing a handgun in the District of Columbia. A narrow 54 majority adopted the main conclusions and many of the arguments advanced by the revisionist commentators, ruling that the original meaning of the Second Amendment protects a private right of individuals to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.

The dissenters interpreted the original meaning differently. In an opinion that all four of them joined, Justice John Paul Stevens concluded that the Second Amendments nominally individual right actually protects only the right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia. In a separate opinion, also joined by all four dissenters, Justice Stephen Breyer argued that even if the Second Amendment did protect an individual right to have arms for self-defense, it should be interpreted to allow the government to ban handguns in high-crime urban areas.

Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court struck down a similar law at the state level, again by a 54 vote. The four-Justice McDonald plurality relied largely on substantive due process precedents that had applied other provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment but rejected the Courts long-standing doctrine of substantive due process, which he concluded is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. Instead, he set forth a detailed analysis of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendments Privileges or Immunities Clause and concluded that it protects the same individual right that is protected from federal infringement by the Second Amendment.

Notwithstanding the lengthy opinions in Heller and McDonald, their holdings are narrowly confined to invalidating bans on the possession of handguns by civilians in their own homes. Neither case provides clear guidance on the constitutionality of less restrictive forms of gun control, although Heller does set forth a non-exclusive list of presumptively lawful regulations that include bans on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, bans on carrying firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, laws restricting the commercial sale of arms, bans on the concealed carry of firearms, and bans on weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.

In the short period of time since Heller was decided, the lower courts have struggled to divine how it applies to regulations that the Court did not address, such as bans on carrying weapons in public and bans on the possession of firearms by violent misdemeanants. At the moment, the dominant approach in the federal courts of appeals can be summarized roughly as follows:

The application of this framework has varied somewhat among the courts, and Heller left room for other approaches to develop. One important outstanding issue is the scope of the right to carry firearms in public. Heller laid great stress on the text of the Second Amendment, which protects the right to keep and bear arms, while also giving provisional approval to bans on the concealed carry of firearms.

A ban (or severe restrictions) on both concealed and open carry would seem to conflict with the constitutional text. It would also seem hard to reconcile with the Courts emphasis on the importance of the right to self-defense against violent criminals, who are at least as likely to be encountered outside the home as within it. Heller, however, did not unambiguously recognize any right to carry weapons in public. Some lower courts have concluded that no such right exists, while others have disagreed. The Supreme Court may eventually have to address the issue.

A more general question concerns the scope of the governments power to inhibit the possession and use of firearms through regulations that impose onerous conditions and qualifications on gun owners. In the analogous area of free speech, courts have struggled endlessly to draw lines that allow governments to serve what they see as the public interest without allowing undue suppression of individual liberties. If the Supreme Court is serious about treating the right to arms as an important part of the constitutional fabric, we should expect the Justices to encounter similar challenges in its emerging gun control jurisprudence.

Nelson Lund is University Professor at George Mason University School of Law.

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The Second Amendment and the Inalienable Right to Self ...

Twenty-second Amendment | United States Constitution …

Twenty-second Amendment, amendment (1951) to the Constitution of the United States effectively limiting to two the number of terms a president of the United States may serve. It was one of 273 recommendations to the U.S. Congress by the Hoover Commission, created by Pres. Harry S. Truman, to reorganize and reform the federal government. It was formally proposed by the U.S. Congress on March 24, 1947, and was ratified on Feb. 27, 1951.

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The Constitution did not stipulate any limit on presidential termsindeed, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 69: That magistrate is to be elected for four years; and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. (Hamilton also argued, in Federalist 71, in favour of a life term for the president of the United States.) George Washington, the countrys first president, opted to retire after two terms, setting a de facto informal law that was respected by the countrys first 31 presidents that there should be rotation in office after two terms for the office of the presidency.

There is no clear indication that the decision to pursue the amendment was triggered by any single event or abuse of power. Indeed, throughout U.S. history, few presidents ever expressed the desire to serve more than the traditional two terms. Ulysses S. Grant sought a third term in 1880, but he was denied his partys nomination. Theodore Roosevelt sought a third term in 1912 but lost (it would have been his second elected term).

In the 1930s, however, the national and global context brought forth an interruption to this two-term precedent.

In the midst of the Great Depression, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt had won election in 1932 and reelection in 1936. In 1940, as Europe was engulfed in a war that threatened to draw in the United States and without a clear Democratic successor who could consolidate the New Deal, Roosevelt, who had earlier indicated misgivings about a third term, agreed to break Washingtons precedent. A general disinclination to change leadership amid crisis probably weighed heavily on the minds of votersmuch more so than the perceived deep-seated opposition to a third term for a presidentand Roosevelt romped to victory in 1940 and again in 1944.

Following on the heels of the establishment of the Hoover Commission and with Republicans winning a majority in Congress after the 1946 elections, they introduced an amendment to limit the president to two terms. The amendment caps the service of a president at 10 years. If a person succeeds to the office of president without election and serves less than two years, he may run for two full terms; otherwise, a person succeeding to office of president can serve no more than a single elected term. Although there have been some calls for repeal of the amendment, because it disallows voters to democratically elect the president of their choice, it has proved uncontroversial over the years. Nevertheless, presidents who win a second term in office are often referred to as lame ducks, and the race to succeed them often begins even before their inauguration to a second term.

The full text of the Amendment is:

Section 1No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

Section 2This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

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Twenty-second Amendment | United States Constitution ...